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X 



JAMES K. POLK 

A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 

EUGENE IRVING McCORMAC, Ph.D. 

Professor of American History in the University of California 




UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS 

BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 

1922 



^ 



.M/2 



LIBRARY OF CONH^vuss 

JAN10l92:i 



\ 

/^9 



9 7 



TO 

THE MEMORY OP 

MY MOTHER 



I) 



PREFACE 

In the two standard sets of American biographies— namely, 
the America7i Statesmen Series and the American Crisis Bio- 
graphies—the name of James K. Polk does not appear in the list 
of titles. Evidently the editor of the first set did not consider 
Mr. Polk to have been a statesman worthy of serious consideration, 
and the editor of the second set seems to have been unaware that 
Polk had played a conspicuous part in any of the crises of 
American history. 

Although it is not my purpose to criticize the selection made 
by these editors, I believe that the character and success of Polk's 
political career entitled him to a place in either series. I believe 
that the following pages will show Mr. Polk to have been a con- 
structive statesman— a statesman possessed of vision, sound judg- 
ment, and unusual executive ability. Surely he was a "crisis" 
President. He extended our national boundaries to the Pacific 
Ocean and determined the political destinies of the future popu- 
lation of the vast area lying west of the Louisiana Purchase. His 
request for an appropriation with which to conduct negotiations 
with Mexico called forth the Wilmot Proviso; and this proviso 
precipitated the "irrepressible conflict," which was one of the 
greatest crises in American history. 

When nominated for the Presidency in 1844, Polk was neither 
unknown nor inexperienced in national affairs. He had been 
selected to conduct Jackson's bank war in the House of Repre- 
sentatives, and he had performed this task to the entire satisfac- 
tion of the President and the Democratic party. As Speaker of 
the House of Representatives,he had displayed alertness of mind, 

[V] 



• 



sound judgment, and ability as a party leader. And when, in 
1844, Van Buren announced his opposition to the annexation of 
Texas, General Jackson urged that Polk be nominated, for, as 
he said, Governor Polk was the ablest exponent of Democratic 
doctrines and the one who would be most capable of carrying 
them into successful operation. The General did not overrate 
the political ability of his protege. As President, Polk formulated 
his policies with precision and confidence ; and despite many 
obstacles, he succeeded in carrying them into eifect. 

It has not been my purpose to write a personal biography. 
Therefore this volume deals almost entirely with Polk's political 
career. In the discussion of the events of his administration I 
have attempted to show the part played by the President in 
formulating the policy of the nation. In the field of foreign 
relations I have been concerned mainly with the President's for- 
eign policy and with the motives, viewpoints, and exigencies 
which led to the adoption of that policy. For this reason the 
history, policies, and motives of other countries concerned have 
been treated incidentally only. Polk's policies were influenced 
by what he believed to be the facts concerning those countries, 
and not by the facts which have subsequently been found to be 
.true. For example, I did not feel that a biography of President 
Polk called for an exhaustive discussion of conditions in Mexico, 
either before or during our war with that nation. For similar 
reasons, the discussion of the Oregon question is confined to the 
official acts of Great Britain and to the interpretation of those 
acts by the government of the United States. 

The material used in the preparation of this volume has been 
gathered mainly in the University of California Library, the 
Tennessee State Library, and the Library of Congress. I am 
indebted to Dr. John W. Jordon, Librarian of the Historical 
Society of Pennsylvania, for placing at my disposal the Buchanan 
Papers, and to Professor St. George L. Sioussat for assistance 

[vi] 



of various kinds. I am under especial obligation to Dr. Gaillard 
Hunt and Mr. John C. Fitzpatrick, of the Manuscripts Division 
of the Library of Congress. Their never-failing courtesy and 
valuable suggestions facilitated my research work in many ways. 
Dr. Justin H. Smith's valuable work entitled "The War with 
Mexico" was published soon after the manuscript of my volume 
had been completed. Although it appeared too late to be used 
in the preparation of my manuscript, I am gratified to note that 
on most points covered by the two works we have arrived at 
substantially the same conclusions. 



Berkeley, Califorxia, 
December, 1919. 



[vii] 



CONTENTS 

i-iii 
Prkface 

CHAPTEE I 

1—9 
Ancestry and Early Life of James K. Polk 

CHAPTER II 

10-25 
Opposition Member of Congress - 

CHAPTER III 

2ti— 46 
Polk and the Bank of the United States 

CHAPTER IV 
Polk-Bell Contest for the Speakership 

CHAPTER V 

62-91 
JiTDGE White and the Presidency 

CHAPTER VI 

92-112 
Speaker of the House under Jackson 

CHAPTER VII ^^_^_^^g 
Speaker of the House under Van Buren 

CHAPTER VIII 

... 139-154 
Polk versus Cannon, 1839 

CHAPTER IX ^^^_^^^ 

Governor of Tennessee 

™^^™^ ^ 180-191 

Defeated by Jones in 1841 

CHAPTEKXI ^^^_^^^ 

Polk in Retirement 

CHAPTER XII 

212-247 
Selection of Candidates, 1844 

[ix] 



CHAPTER XIII PAGE 

Campaign of 1844 248-283 

CHAPTER XIV 
President-elect 284-318 

CHAPTER XV 
Administration and Patronage 319-351 

CHAPTER XVI 
Completion of Annexation 352-372 

CHAPTER XVII 
Prelude to the Mexican War 373-414 

CHAPTER XVIII 
War in Northern Mexico 415-452 

• CHAPTER XIX 
Campaign against the City of Mexico 453-486 

CHAPTER XX 
Treaty of Gu^U)alupe Hidalgo ,— 487-554 

CHAPTER XXI 
Oregon 555-611 

CHAPTER XXII 
Slavery and Territorial Governments 612-655 

CHAPTER XXIII 
Tariff, Internal Improvements, and the Independent Treas- 
ury ; 656-689 

CHAPTER XXIV 
The "Polk Doctrine" and Minor Diplomatic Questions 690-712 

CHAPTER XXV 

Close of Career 713-725 

Bibliography 726-732 

Index 733-746 



[^] 



) 



CHAPTEE I 
ANCESTRY AND EARLY LIFE OF JAMES K. POLK 

The pedigree of the Polk family has been traced back to 
1075_to Fulbert, who was born in the reign of Malcolm III, of 
Scotland. In 1153 Fnlbert was succeeded by his son Petrms, 
who took the surname Pollok from the estate which he inlierited. 
In 1440 Sir Robert de Pollok, a "younger son" of the family, 
inherited an Irish estate and removed to Ireland. By common 
usage the name of this branch was soon contractd into Polk. 
Sometime between 168.0 and 1687^ Robert Bmce Polk, or Pollok, 
second son of Sir Robert II, left Ireland with his wife, six sons, 
and two daughters, and settled in Somerset County, Maryland. 
Their oldest son, John Polk, married Joanna Knox and estab- 
lished that branch of .the family whence came our subject, James 

K. Polk. 

William Polk, the only son of John and Joanna, after living 
for a, time in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, removed with his family 
to Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. Colonel Ezekiel Polk, . 
the seventh child of William, married Mary Wilson, and the 
fourth child of this imion was Samuel Polk, the father^ of the^S- 
future President. The President's mother was Jane Knox, a,.,^ 
great-grandniece of John Knox, of Scotland. Her father, James 
Knox, of Iredell County, North Carolina, was a captain in the 
Revolution. 3^Irs. Polk was a rigid Presb^-terian, and a woman 
of keen intellect and high character. From her James inherited 
manv of his well-known traits. She lived to witness the whole of 
his successful career, and to assist, during his last moments, m 
preparing him f or " a future estate. ' '^ 

1 Authorities differ as to the date. 

2 Garrett Fcdigree of the Folic favvilij. Richardson, Messages, I\, 371. 
Nelson iemo.L/o/ sJraU dhildress Poll; 150 and passim. Chase, History 
of the Polk Administration, 475. 



2 JAMES K. POLK 

James Knox Polk, oldest of the ten children of Samuel and 
"f^ Jane Knox Polk, was born on November 2, 1795, in Mecklenburg 

County, North Carolina.=^ The Polk family had settled in this 
frontier region some time before the Revolution, and tradition 
has credited Polk's ancestors with a leading part in promulgat- 
ing the much-mooted Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence. 
His grandfather, Colonel Ezekiel Polk, whom the Whigs in 1844 
accused of Toryism, was an officer in the Revolutionary army. 

James's father, Samuel Polk, was a plain but enterprising 
SI farmer. At an early age he had been thrown upon his own 

' resources and had met with the hardships incident to frontier 

conditions. With the hope of improving his fortunes, he fol- 
lowed the trend of emigration westward, and in the autumn of 
1806 settled in the valley of the Duck River, Tennessee. He was 
one of the first pioneers in a region then a wilderness ; but the 
valley proved to be fertile and Mr. Polk in time was rated as a 
prosperous farmer. He was an ardent supporter of Jefferson, 
and his faith in the soundness of Republican doctrines was in- 
herited by his son James. The correspondence in the Polk Papers 
indicates that the entire family, including the President's mother, 
took a keen interest in politics and that all of them were firm 
believers in the maxims of Jefferson. 

James was but eleven years old when his father located in 
Tennessee. Had he possessed a strong physique, doubtless he 
would have shared the fate of the average eldest son and have 
been trained to cultivate the family estate. But he M^as not 
strong* and his first years in Tennessee were spent in making 

3 On November 2, 1846, Polk noted in his diary : ' ' This is my birthday. 
According to the entry in my father's family Bible I was born on the 
2nd day of Nov., 1795, and niy mother has told me that the event occurred, 
as near as she could tell about" 12 o'clock, Meridian, on that day." (Diary, 
II, 216.) 

4 " I closed my education at a later period of life than is usual, in 
consequence of having been very much afflicted and enjoyed very bad health 
in my youth. I did not commence the Latin Grammar until the 13th of 
July, 1813." (Polk, Dmry, IV, IGO.) 



?^ 



ANCESTEY AND EARLY LIFE 3 

good use of such limited educational advantages as were afforded 
in a i^ioneer community. 

Young Polk was studious and ambitious, but Fate seemed 
determined to deprive him of the opportunity for satisfying his 
desire for an education. His health did not improve, and his 
father, believing that a more active life than that of a student 
would be conducive to health, determined to make a business 
man of his son. Accordingly, much to the son 's disgust and over "^ 
his protest, he was placed with a merchant to learn the business. 
After remaining but a few weeks with the merchant, however, 
the earnest appeals of the son overcame the resistance of the 
father, and in July, 1813, James was permitted to continue his 
education under the guidance of Reverend Robert Henderson \l 
at a small academy near Columbia, Tennessee. For about a 
year Polk "read the usual course of latin authors, part of the 
greek testament and a few of the dialogues of Lucian, " and, 
according to the testimony of his preceptor, he "was diligent in 
his studies, and his moral conduct was unexceptionable & ex- 
emplary."^ After spending nine months at Murfreesborough 
Academy, where his "literary merit and moral worth" won the 
approval of the rector, Samuel P. Black,*' James entered the Uni- 
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in the autumn of 1815. , 
He was naturally drawn to the university of his native state, 
and the fact that his cousin, Colonel William Polk, had for many 
years been one of its trustees, may have been an additional reason 
for selecting this institution. 

At college Polk manifested those peculiar traits which later 
characterized his career as a statesman. Eschewing the less profit- ^ 
able, but usually more attractive, side of college life, his time 
was occupied with hard and well directed study. "His ambi- 



5 A recommendation dated December 31, 1814. MS in Tenn. Hist. Soe. 
Library. 

<5 Eecommendation dated October 5, 1815. MS in Tenn. Hist. See. 
Library. 



^ 



4 JAMES K. POLK 

tion to excel, ' ' wrote one of his political friends,' ' ' was equalled 
by his perseverance alone, in proof of which it is said he never 
missed a recitation nor omitted the punctilious performance of 
any duty." Numerous remarks in the diary written while he 
was President show that, in Polk's own opinion, thne spent in 
mere pleasure was so much time wasted. He seems to have been 
equally serious-minded during his college days. Neither at col- 
lege nor at a later time did Polk deceive himself or attempt to 
deceive others by assuming great native brilliancy. He never 
posed as one whose genius made it easy for him to decide great 
questions offhand. He never attempted to conceal the fact that 
his conclusions were reached as the result of unremitting labor. 
And if his conclusions were sometimes attacked as unsound, he 
was, on the other hand, spared the embarrassment of ridicule, 
which often fell to the lot of his more brilliant competitors during 
his long political career. 

Polk was graduated from the university in 1818 and enjoyed 

^, the distinction of being awarded first honors in both mathematics 
1 and the classics. He was very fond of both subjects, as each 
appealed to his taste for industry and precision. Of his classical 
training he retained the substantial and discarded the ornate. 
"So carefully," wrote the friend above cited, "has Mr. Polk 
avoided the pedantry of classical display, which is the false taste 
of our day and country, as almost to hide the acquisitions which 
distinguished his early career. His preference for the useful and 
substantial, indicated by his youthful passion for mathematics, 
has made him select a style of elocution, which would perhaps be 
deemed too plain by shallow admirers of flashy declamation. ' ' 

After his graduation Polk returned to Tennessee with health 
impaired by close application, and early in 1819 began the study 

~H- of law in the office of Judge Felix Grundy. A warm i:»ersonal and 
political friendship resulted, which was severed only by the death 



' Democratic Eeview, May, 1888. Polk says that this sketch was written 
by J. L. Martin, later charge d'affaires to the Papal States (Dian/, IV, 
132). 



ANCESTEY AND EABLY LIFE 5 

of Grundy in 1840. The pupil studied hard, and late in 1820 he 
was admitted to the bar. He immediately began the practice of 
law at Columbia, in his home county of Maury, among friends 
and neighbors whose confidence in his ability assured him, from 
the beginning, a profitable practice. "His thorough academic 
preparation, his accurate knowledge of the law, his readiness and 
resources in debate, his unswerving application to business, 
secured him, at once, full employment, and in less than a year 
he was already a leading practitioner. "« His account books 
show that he continued to enjoy a lucrative practice although 
much of his time was spent in public service. « 

For three years the young attorney's time was occupied exclu- 
sively in the practice of his profession. His only active participa- 
tion'in politics was to serve for one term as clerk of the state ^ 
senate. In 1823, however, he was chosen to represent his county 
in the state legislature, and, having thus entered the political 
arena he continued in a very active, and for the most part suc- 
cessful, political career to the close of his term as President. 
He spent two years in the legislature, where he soon established 
a reputation for business capacity and for superiority in debate. 
He took an active interest in all measures for developing his 
state and gave special attention to the providing of better educa- 
tional advantages. He enjoyed the personal and political friend- 
ship of General Jackson, and it afforded him much pleasure to 
assist by his vote in sending that military hero to Washington to ^^ 
represent the state in the Senate of the United States. Few acts 
of his life gave him, in later years, greater pride than his partici- 
pation in launching Jackson in his political career; and, as the 
General was ever mindful of the welfare of his political sup- 
porters this incident was no impediment to Polk's own political 
advancement. His friendship for Jackson was natural, although 
the two men differed widely in personal characteristics and m 

8 Dem. Eev., sup. cit. 

9 His account books are in the Library of Congress. 



t 



6 JAMES E. POLK 

their attitude toward authority. From early youth Polk had 
been an ardent advocate of republicanism. He was a firm believer 
in the teachings of Jefferson and shared with his patron an 
unbounded faith in individual freedom. Pioneer conditions also 
are conducive to a strong belief in practical democracy, and 
Jackson seemed to be a leader who understood the people's desires 
and sympathized with them. 

On January 1, 1824, Polk married Sarah Childress, whose 
father was a prosperous farmer near Murfreesborough, Tenn- 
essee. ^° Mrs. Polk was a lady of refinement and ability. Her 
sound sense and personal charm aided materially the political 
fortunes of her husband and later caused her to be regarded as 
one of the most popular ladies of the White House. Many who 
rated her husband as inferior, even contemptible, joined in the 
unanimous verdict that Mrs. Polk was a lady of culture and 
attractive persqnality. This fact is attested by numerous private 
letters.. Judge Story was "thunderstruck" to hear of Polk's 
nomination in 1844, but he admired Mrs. Polk. When her hus- 
band was leaving Washington in 1839 to enter the campaign for 
the governorship of Tennessee, Story expressed his admiration for 
Mrs. Polk in a poem written in her honor. ^^ 

One of the young men who attended Polk on his wedding day 
was his law partner, Aaron V. Brown, later United States senator 
and governor of Tennessee. Their friendship continued to the 
end, and to no one else, except Cave Johnson, did Polk more 
frequently confide his usually well concealed political plans. 

Two years in the state legislature increased the young 
attorney's natural taste for politics, and his success in that field 
made him determine to seek a wider opportunity for satisfying 
his political ambitions. In 1825 he offered himself as a candidate, 
and in August of that year was chosen to represent, his district 
in Congress. When elected, he was not quite thirty years of age. 



10 Nelson, Memorials of Sarah Childress Polk, 17. 

11 Ibid., 54. 



ANCESTRY AND EARLY LIFE 7 

and on entering Congress, he was, with one or two exceptions, the 
youngest member of that body. 

Mrs. Polk did not accompany her husband on his first trip 
to Washington. The journey was made on horseback, in com- 
pany with several other members of Congress. At Baltimore they ''" 
took the stagecoach, leaving their horses until their return in 
March.'- On his second journey to Washington, Mrs. Polk accom- 
panied him in the family carriage. The money paid to members 
as mileage in those early days was small compensation for the 
hardships encountered on a journey from remote western states. 
Still, the pioneer statesmen endured such hardships without com- 
plaint ; they even extracted pleasure from these tedious overland 
journej^s. 

There was little ostentation in Washington in this early period. 
The life of the average congressman's family was extremely 
simple. It was customary for two or more families to rent a 
single house for the season and "mess" together.'^ Among the 
''messmates" of the Polks were Hugh L. White, of Tennessee, 
and John C. Calhoun, of South Carolina, both of whom later 
became Polk's bitter political enemies. 

Although in politics a disciple of Jefferson and an ardent 
supporter of Jackson, Polk was wholly unlike either man in per- 
sonal peculiarities. Jefferson was a born leader of men, and his 
exuberant optimism and personal charm attracted hosts of dis- 
ciples. He advertised his democracy by extreme informality and 
slovenly garb; and he delighted in shocking the ''well born" by 
disregarding the rules of social etiquette. Jackson, also, was 
a born leader of men. He commanded the multitude because he 
insisted upon doing so,'^ but the "plain people" approved him 

12 /bid., 27-28. is/bifZ., 30-31. 

1* Judge Catron has given such an excellent description of Jacltson 's 
will to command that it seems desirable to rescue his letter from oblivion 
in spite of its length. It was written on the day after the General s 

'''''''one thing may be safely said of Gen' Jackson— that he has written 
his name higher on the Temple of fame, than any man since Washington, 



8 JAMES K. POLK 

mainly for the reason that they regarded him as one of them- 
selves. Polk, on the contrary, had few intimate friends. His 
associates recognized his ability, but he lacked that magnetism 
which alone can attract a wide personal following. He was 
naturally formal and punctilious, and he seldom sacrified his 
dignity in the pursuit of popular applause. While he was 



of those belonging to History in this country. And what is more remark- 
able in him than any other American is, that he maintained his power 
from seventy to eighty, when he had nothing to give. This he did by the 
force of will and courage, backing his thorough out «fe out honesty of 
purpose. His intuitive faculties were cjuick and strong — his instincts 
capitally good. The way a thing should be done struck him plainly — & 
he adopted the plan. If it was not the best, it would still ansAver the pur- 
pose, if well executed. Then to the execution he brought a hardy industry, 
and a sleepless energy, few could equal — but this was not the best quality 
he brought to the task. He cared not a rush for anything behind — he 
looked ahead. His awful u-ill, stood alone, & was made the will of all he 
commanded; & command it he would and did. If he had fallen from the 
clouds into a city on fire, he would have been at the head of the extin- 
guishing host in an hour, & would have blown up a palace to stop the fire 
with as little mis-giving as another would have torn down a board shed. 
In a moment he would have willed it proper — & in ten minutes the thing 
would have been done. Those who never worked before, who had hardly 
courage to cry, would have rushed to the execution, and applied the matcli. 
Hence it is that timid men, and feeble women, have rushed to onslaught 
when he gave the command — fierce, fearless, and unwavering, for the first 
time. Hence it is that for fifty years he has been followed, first by all 
the timid who knew him — and afterwards by the broad land, as a match- 
less man — as one they were ready to follow wherever he led — who with 
them never was weary — and who could sweep over all opposers abroad or 
at home, terrible and clean as a prairie fire, leaving hardly a smoke of the 
ruin behind. Not even death could break the charm. The funeral yester- 
day was a great mass meeting — of women, children, men, black, white 
colored — of every grade, mixed up by the acre outside — the House crammed 
within. There was not a loud word nor a smile so far as I heard or saw. 
See him they would and did — nay they would see the cof[f]in cased in 
lead. It was just possible to have room for the soldiers, (a rather tedious 
process) they claimed it as a right to see the thing done. The [illegible] 
crowd followed him to the Tomb; a stone grave by the side of Mrs. 
Jackson's — laid there in 1828 — covered with a copper roofed canopy some 
ten feet high resting on stone pillars. He was tediously put in, and the 
tomb-stone left off, so all could look once more. It was a scene for a 
painter to see the dense crowd at the particular spot — the slave women 
in an agony of grief laying their heads on the shoulders and backs of the 
lady friends of their old master; leaving laces wet with tears — nor did 
the circumstance elicit a single remark so far as I heard. Death did not 
make all equal, more completely than did this funeral" (Catron to 
Buchanan, Nashville, June 11, 1845, Buchanan Papers). 



ANCESTRY AND EARLY LIFE 9 

Speaker of the House, a press correspondent gave the following 
sketch of his personal appearance : 

I have never seen a man preside over a po^jular legislative body with 
more dignity and effect than Mr. Polk. In person he is rather below the 
middle size, and has a firm and upright carriage which gives great self- 
possession and command to his manner. His head is finely formed, with 
a broad and ample forehead, and features indicative of a character at once 
urbane and decided. He is scrupulous in his dress and always appears in 
the chair as if he were at a dinner party.is 



15 United States Magazine, quoted by Nashville Union, July 17, 1839. 



^ 



CHAPTER II 

OPPOSITION MEMBER OF CONGRESS 

On questions of governmental policy which divided the people 
of his day Polk entered the political field, as he left it, a con- 
sistent Jeffersonian Republican. Like his illustrious patron, 
however, he found, when entrusted later with the highest execu- 
tive responsibilities, that theories, however good, nuist sometimes 
yield to the practical solution of the problem in hand. On such 
occasions, as in his expansion policy, he did as Jefferson had done ; 
he assumed far-reaching power for the executive branch of the 
central goveriiment, leaving himself thereby open to the same 
criticisms which he and Jeiferson had hurled at the Federalists. 

Polk began his career in Congress as an opponent of the 
existing administration, and republicanism is always most vigor- 
ous when relieved of responsibility. During his first years in 
Congress his republicanism could have free play. He took a 
definite stand at once on the side of the states and the people, 
and vigorously assailed the autocratic powers alleged to have 
been assumed by President Adams, as well as the centralizing 
tendencies of that administration. 

At a later day Polk's political opponents ridiculed him as 
being Jackson's alter ego and asserted that he had ascended the 
political ladder on the coat-tails of the "old hero." However 
effective such allegations may have been as campaign arguments, 
the fact remains that as early as 1825 Polk's political views were 
already freely promulgated in Congress, while those of Jackson 
on most questions were yet unformulated, or at least unan- 
nounced. As to the tariff, the only important question on which 
the General seems at that time to have formed a definite idea, 



OPPOSITION MEMBER OF CONGRESS H 

the two men differed widely. That Polk, like others, humored 
the whims of General Jackson for political reasons need not be 
denied, that he profited by his friendship is beyond question ; but 
priority in advocating measures later championed by both men 
would seem to absolve Polk from the charge that his opinions 
were derived ready-made from his more conspicuous chief. It 
does not appear that he gripped more firmly to the General's 
coat-tails than did others of his party. 

Since the Tennessee land question was the theme of Polk's 
first formal speech in Congress, and since this subject was des- 
tined to acquire great political significance, it seems desirable to 
give a summary of its history in order to show its political 
importance.^ 

North Carolina, the former owner of Tennessee, when ceding 
this territory to the United States, had reserved the right to 
dispose of certain lands included in the ceded area. Other tracts 
were reserved for the Indians. These reservations necessarily 
limited the amount of land left at the disposal of Tennessee. 
Under the so-called compromise agreement of 1806, much of the 
Indian land was procured for the state, and one-sixth of it was 
to be reserved for educational purposes. In 1821, however, the 
provision relating to school lands was found to be invalid. As a 
result, the Tennesseans decided to ask Congress for certain gov- 
ernment lands (in Tennessee) which might be disposed of for 
educational purposes. As the lands in question were those which 
settlers had declined to purchase at the price asked by the fed- 
eral government, they were commonly called "waste" lands, 
although they were far from being worthless. 

Although the legislature considered the subject as early as 
1821, no definite action was taken until 1823, when it was referred 
to a select committee of which Polk was made chairman. From 

iFor a more detailed account, see Professor Sioussat's interestiug 
article, "Some Phases of Tennessee Politics in the Jackson Period, 
Am. Hist. Rev., Oct., 1908. 



y 



12 JAMES E. POLK 

this committee the chairman reported resohitions which, in addi- 
tion to asking Congress to grant the lands in question, requested 
the senators and representatives from Tennessee to work for 
this end.- 

In 1825, Polk was transferred from the state legislature to 
the federal Plouse of Representatives. Realizing that the school 
land question was of prime importance to the people of his state"' 
he embraced the earliest opportunity (January 23, 1826) to call 
up the Tennessee memorial — which he had prepared in 1823 — and 
moved that it be referred to a select committee rather than to the 
Committee on Public Lands ; and despite considerable debate this 
course was followed. Polk was made chairman of the new com- 
mittee.* The bill which he reported soon afterward failed to 
pass the House. As will appear later, however, this Tennessee 
land question was revived from time to time by both Polk and 
''Davy" Crockett, and it was one of the rocks on which the 
Jackson party in Tennessee split into fragments. 

Questions less local in character soon presented themselves. 
All of Jackson's supporters asserted, and doubtless many of them 
believed, that their hero had been virtually, even if not legally, 
cheated out of the Presidency in 1824 by "bargain and corrup- 
tion" on the part of Adams and Clay. The well-known fact that 
the House of Representatives, whenever it might be called upon 
to select the chief magistrate, was intended by the Constitution to 



2 Printed copy of the resolutions in Colonel Wm. Polk Papers. 

3 ' ' You cannot be too industrious, ' ' wrote one of his constituents a year 
later, ' ' in endeavoring to effect the object contemplated in your Eeport 
of the last session on the subject of those govr n ment lands. To get this 
matter through 'is a consumation devoutly to be wished' for it will in a 
great measure disarm the opposition. ' ' The writer told Polk that the 
press did not tell the people very much about his work in Congress, and 
he advised Polk to send personal communications to many friends to coun- 
teract any assertions by enemies that he is inefficient. He also urged 
Polk to make a ' * thundering speach ' ' against Haynes ' bankrupt bill. 
"I do not know what your sentiments are on this subject but I think I 
know what your interest is" (Jim E. White to Polk, Dec. 30, 1826, Poll- 
Papers). 

^Begister of Debates, 19 Cong., 1 sess., 1075-1077. 



OPPOSITION MEMBER OF CONGRESS 13 

have a free choice, irrespective of the popular vote, did not in 
the least appease their wrath. They resolved at once on two lines 
of policy — to alter the Constitution of the United States in order 
to deprive the House of the privilege of choosing a President in 
any case, and in the meantime to make it as uncomfortable as 
possible for the one who had been so chosen. It is not easy to 
determine the degree of their sincerity in the first part of their 
program, but in the second part they were in deadly earnest. 

The first move toward altering the Constitution was made 
by McDuffie, of South Carolina. On December 9, 1825, he offered 
resolutions which were referred to the Committee of the Whole 
House. His resolutions declared that the Constitution ought to 
be so amended that in electing the President and Vice-President 
of the United States "a uniform system of voting by Districts 
shall be established in all the States," and in no case should the 
choice of these officers devolve upon the respective houses of 
Congress. The resolutions provided also that the subject should 
be referred to a select committee "with instructions to prepare 
and report a joint resolution embracing the aforesaid objects."^ 
On December 29, Cook, of Illinois, offered resolutions much like 
those of McDuffie, but providing in addition that the voters in 
the districts should vote directly for both officers. If by employ- 
ing this method no election resulted, the choice should ' ' be made 
by States" from the two highest on the list.*' The last part was 
not clear, for it did not specify the manner in which the states 
should make the choice. 

The resolutions of McDuffie and Cook caused considerable 
debate, and afforded an opportunity for others to air their views 
on constitutional questions. Some thought that the people were 
already intrusted with more power than they could use with intel- 
ligence, while others vigorously expounded the doctrine of vox 
populi vox dei. McDuffie was not, he said, ' ' one of those visionary 



5 Register of Delates, 19 Cong., 1 sess., 797. 
e Ibid., 866. 



14 JAMES E. POLK 

advocates of the abstract rights of man, that would extend the 
power of the people further than is conducive to the happiness 
of the political society. ' ' Patriotic intentions, he admitted, w^ould 
furnish no adequate security for the wise selection of a chief 
magistrate, in the absence of sufficient intelligence. "It would 
be a vain and delusive mockery, to invest them with an elective 
power, which they could exercise to the destruction of that which 
is the end of all government — the national good."' Although 
McDuffie himself believed that the people were sufficiently intel- 
ligent to make a proper choice, the conservatives could not be 
convinced that he w'as not playing with fire. 

Polk spoke to the resolutions on March 13, 1826.^ He apolo- 
gized for departing from his usual custom of giving a "silent 
vote," and for extending a debate already prolonged. But as 
the subject was national in scope and vital in character, he could 
no longer remain silent. He attempted no flights of oratory, but 
he displayed at once more than ordinary ability as a debater. 
His remarks were clear and incisive, both in declaring his own 
views and in refuting the arguments of others. Jefferson him- 
self never gave more unqualified endorsement to the doctrine of 
majority rule. The resolutions involved, said Polk, the question 
N^ of the people's sovereignty. "That this is a Government Ixised 
• upon the will of the People; that all power emanates from them; 

and that a majority should rule; are, as I conceive, vital prin- 
ciples in this Government, never to be sacrificed or abandoned, 
under any circumstances." In theory, all "sound politicians" 
admit that "the majority should rule and the minority submit," 
but the majority, in his opinion, did not always prevail under 
the existing system of elections. 

In his zeal for the popular cause Polk attempted to refute an 
assertion made by Storrs, of New York, that it was not intended 
by the framers of the Constitution to intrust the choice of 



7 Feb. 16, 1826. Abridg. of Debates, VIII, 992. 
sAbridg. of Vebates, IX, 8-16. 



OPPOSITION MEMBEE OF CONGEESS 15 

/?U4xdent and Vice-President to direct popular vote. He made the 
rather astonishing statement that, if Storrs were right, "I am 
free to admit that I have been wholly mistaken, and totally 
wrong, in my conceptions upon this subject. ' ' With a shade of 
sophistry he held that it was not reasonable to suppose that the 
people, having "recently broken the chains oi their slavery, and 
shaken off a foreign yoke, ' ' should in drafting their Constitution 
have voluntarily disfranchised themselves. In spite of well- 
known facts to the contrary, he tried to prove his contention by 
quoting parts of the preamble," and rather unsuccessfully from 
the Fcdcralkt, Randolph, and Monroe, to show that election by 
the people had been intended by those who framed the Constitu- 
tion. He was on surer ground when he asserted that it mattered 
little whether Storrs were right or wrong, inasmuch as the ques- 
tion before them did not concern elections under the present 
provisions of the Constitution but an amendment for changing 
the present method of selecting a President. 

In Polk's opinion, there were several good reasons why the 
President should never be chosen by the House of Representa- 
tives. He is not an officer of the House. He is the chief magis- 
trate of the whole people and should therefore be responsible to 
them alone, and dependent upon them for reelection. Election 
either by the House or the Electoral College always makes choice 
by a minority possible, and there is danger that such elections 
will become more frequent. Representatives are chosen a long 
time before, and not for the purpose of selecting a President. 
A Representative may be ignorant of the wishes of his con- 
stituents, or he may willfully ignore their preference. The long 
period between the election of Representatives and their choice 
of a President affords ample time to influence their votes by 
bribery or by executive patronage. 

Election by districts, as proposed in the resolutions, was, Polk 
believed, better than a continuation of the present system under 



--K 



9 "We, the People etc. do ordain and establish this Constitution." 



16 JAMES K. POLK 

which some electors were chosen by state legislatures, others by 
districts, thereby making it possible for one-fourth of the people 
to elect a President. But he concurred with Livingston, of 
Louisiana,^" who preferred to dispense with electors altogether. 
"Let the people vote directly for the President without their 
intervention ..." then "... there can be no division between 
contending candidates for elector, in favor of the same candidate, 
and the majority of the people of each district can control and 
give the vote of that district . . . the sentiment of each mass of 
the community throughout the Union, composing a district, is 
fairly elicited, and made to have its due and proportional weight 
in the general collected sentiment of all the districts in the 
Union." 

Although he offered no resolution embodying his ideas he 
suggested one" for the committee's consideration. His sugges- 
tions were more explicit and covered the ground more completely 
than the resolutions already before the House. Some of his 
arguments on this subject were partisan and sophistical; but 
in no case did he indulge in such absurdities as did one of his 
opponents, Edward Everett, who tried to convince his fellow- 
members that any attempt to amend the Constitution was itself 
unconstitutional. Each member, said the sage from Massachu- 
setts, had taken an oath to support the Constitution as it is, 
and could not propose to alter it without violating that oath.^- 
Neither George III nor John Tyler could plead a more tender 
conscience nor display a greater respect for oaths of office than 
Everett did on this occasion. No wonder Polk asked if "the 
gentleman [were] serious in this puerile conception?" 

10 McDuffie favored this also. 

11 Each state was to be divided into as many districts as it had members 
in both houses of Congress. The people in each district were to vote 
directly for President and Vice-President, watliout the intervention ot 
electors, and a plurality in each district was to count as one vote. If no 
election should result, the matter was to be referred back to the people, 
who were then to select from the two highest on the list (Abridg. of Debates, 
IX, 16). 

12 Ibid., 18. 



OPPOSITION MEMBER OF CONGBESS 17 

In attempting to show that members of the House were not 
the proper persons to elect a President, Polk supported the ex- 
treme democratic view which would divest a member of Congress, 
even as a legislator, of his representative character and make 
him a mere delegate. "It has been openly avowed upon this 
floor," said he, "that there is no connection between the Repre- 
sentative here, and his constituent at home ; that the Representa- 
tive here is not bound to regard or obey the instructions of those 
who send him here. For myself, I have never entertained such 
opinions, but believe, upon all questions of expediency, that the 
Representative is bound to regard and obey the known will of 
his constituent." Any other view would intrust the rights of 
the people to "the accidental interest, or capricious will of their 
public servants." He no doubt had Jefferson's inaugural in 
mind w^hen he added : ' ' Shall we assume to ourselves the high 
prerogative of being uncontaminated and incorruptible, when 
the same attributes are denied to all the rest of mankind? Is 
immaculate purity to be found within these walls and no other 
corner of the earth?" Whether representatives endowed with 
"immaculate purity" or "angels in the form of kings "^^ can 
be intrusted with the government of their fellows may be open 
to question, but both Jefferson and Polk must have known that 
the framers of the Constitution had consciously placed more 
reliance on the discretion of the public officials than on the efficacy 
of a count of heads. 

A remark made by Everett gave Polk an opportunity to pay 
tribute to General Jackson as the champion of the people. . If the 
government were ever destroyed, said Everett, "it would not be 
by a President elected by a minority of the people, but by a 
President elected by an overwhelming majority of the people ; by 
some 'military chieftain' that should arise in the land." "Yes, 
sir," answered Polk, "by some 'military chieftain,' whose only 
crime it was to have served his country faithfully at a period 



i«See Jeffersou 's inaugural address. 



18 JAMES E. POLK 

when that country needed and realized the value of his services." 
If the government were ever destroyed, it would be, in his opinion, 
,' by "the encroachments and abuse of poM-er and by the alluring 
and corrupting influence of Executive patronage." This was 
intended, of course, as a thrust at President Adams ; but in lend- 
ing his support to the elevation of the ' ' old hero, ' ' Polk was help- 
ing to hasten the demoralizing influence of patronage which he 
so much feared. 

Some of the northern members objected to the proposed 
amendment on the ground that under it slaves would be repre- 
sented. During his whole political career, slavery was a subject 
which Polk avoided whenever possible. It is interesting to note, 
however, that his opinions now expressed for the first time in 
Congress were never substantially modified. He regretted ex- 
ceedingly "that scarcely any subject of general concern can be 
agitated here, without having this important subject of slavery, 
either collaterally, or incidentally, brought into view, and made 
to mingle in our deliberations." His views now expressed were 
reiterated in substance when he had to deal with the Wilmot 
Proviso. Both now and later he was unable to see why this 
irrelevant topic should be dragged into discussions of public 
policy. 

In answering his opponents Polk declared his firm belief in 
■^ state rights. Storrs and others had alleged that the proposed 
amendment would tend to consolidate the people of the Union. 
Polk denied this and said that he would oppose the amendment 
if he had any idea that it would jDroduce any such result. ' ' No 
man," said he, "deprecates more than I do, any violation of 
rights secured to the States by the Federal Constitution," and 
no one more fears "the yawning gulf of consolidation."" 

Polk always referred to himself as a Republican, but it is 
plain that he was not a believer in true representative govern- 



14 << When I speak of State rights, I mean, as I understaud the consti- 
tution to mean, not the rights of the Executives of the States, but I mean 
the rights of the people of the States." 



OPPOSITION MEMBEE OF CONGEESS 19 

ment, and was in fact a democrat. ^^ His remarks show clearly 
the influence of Jefferson 's teaching. He was an admirer of Gen- 
eral Jackson, and used his influence both publicly and privately^ "^ 
to promote the General's interests, but there is no evidence that 
he relied on Jackson for political opinions. On the contrary, 
Jackson read with approval Polk's speech on the constitutional 
amendment and assured him that it was well received by his 
constituents and would give him a strong claim to their future 
confidence. "I agree with you," wrote the General,^^ "that the 
District System is the true meaning of the Constitution, but as 
this cannot be obtained any uniform System ought to be adopted 
instead of leaving the election of President to Congress." 

As a critic of the Adams administration Polk did not rise 
above the political claptrap of the day. All that can be said in 
his favor in this respect is that he spoke less frequently than 
did some of his colleagues. Even his private letters ar6 tinctured 
with a bias and a bitterness that do him no credit. A letter- 
written to Colonel William Polk concerning the subserviency of 
the Speaker and of congressional committees is of special interest, 
for in it Polk makes the same charges which were later made 
against himself when he became the leader of the administration 
forces. "The 'factious opposition' as they are termed," said 
the letter,^^ 

who really consist of the friends of the Constitution, & who do not support 
upon the fashionable doctrine of faith every measure emanating from the 
administration, merely because it is an administration measure, are to the 
extent of the power of the administration, and its friends literally 
proscribed. ' ' 

Senate committees have been "arranged for effect," although 
there is but a small administrative majority in that body. 



15 There was, of course, no Democrat party at this time. 

10 For example, in a letter to Colonel William Polk, Dec. 14, 1826, he 
urged the latter to induce the legislature of North Carolina to give some 
public expression in favor of Jackson on January 8 (Colonel Wm. Folk 
Papers). 

17 Jackson to Polk, May 3, 1826, Polk Papers. 

18 Polk to Col. Wm. Polk, Dec. 14, 1826, Colonel Wm. Polk Papers. 



1 



20 JAMES K. POLK 

"Studied majorities iu favor of the administration have been plaeed on 
each, regardless, it would seem in some instances, of qualifications, talents, 
or experience. The selections were no doubt made, in conformity to a 
previous secret understanding, among the favorites at Court. ' ' 

In the House, also, ' ' some remarkable changes have been made in 
committees by the Speaker. They too have all been arranged for 
effect." The power of patronage, he continued, is corruptly used 
to "sustain an administration, who never came into power by 
the voice of the people. ' ' How could a man who felt thus, within 
three short years, give his unqualified support to the administra- 
tion of General Jackson? The answer is simple. Polk was, 
despite his ability and genei-ally sound judgment, above all a 
party man. 

At the close of his first term in Congress, Polk, in his appeal 
to his constituents for reelection, laid special stress on his oppo- 
sition to the Panama mission. Soon after taking his seat, he 
said it became his duty to act upon a proposition emanating from 
the executive, "as novel in its character as it was believed to be 
in consequences."^-' Not believing in entangling alliances, "I 
was opposed to the Mission in every possible shape in which it 
could be presented, believing, as I did, that the United States had 
nothing to gain, but much to lose, by becoming members of such 
an extraordinary Assembly. ' ' The administration, lacking popu- 
larity, was trying to extend the powers of the federal government 
"to an inordinate and alarming extent . . . and substitute 
patronage for public will." He was reelected without difficulty 
and was, at the beginning of the next session of Congress, made 
a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. =" 

Throughout the Adams administration Polk corresponded with 
General Jackson. He not only supplied the hero of the Her- 
mitage with information on passing events, but offered welcome 
suggestions and advice. "I feel greatly obliged to you," wrote 

19 Polk's circular letter to his constituents, dated March 4, 1827. 
Printed copy in Colonel Wm. Polk Papers. 
^0 Jour, of E. E., 20 Cong., 1 sess., 25. 



OPPOSITION MEMBEE OF CONGFiESS 21 

Jackson ou one occasion,-^ "for the information contained in 
your letter [on internal improvements] . . . and I truly appre- 
ciate those feelings of friendship which dictated the communi- 
cation. ' ' 

When, in the spring of 1828, the subject of Jackson's execu- 
tion of the six militia men was under investigation in Congress, 
Polk and Judge White procured and published a statement from 
General Gaines and a copy of Governor Blount 's orders to Jack- 
son." It was Polk who first notified Jackson of his vindication 
by a committee, and it was to Polk that the General forwarded 
additional documents to be used in case it should become neces- 
sary. =^ Jackson approved Polk's advice that the attack of the 
opposition relating to this subject should be met by an active cam- 
paign of refutation, but that there should be no defense on the 
Burr episode until there had been some definite charge.-"' To 
another letter from Polk offering advice on political matters, 
Jackson answered : "I have read your letter with great interest 
& attention — the reasons therein contained leaves no reason to 
doubt of the correctness of your conclusions, it is such as I had 
long since concluded to pursue. ' '-■' It is evident that the General 
already recognized the soundness of Polk's judgment and his 
shrewedness as a practical politician. 

During the session of 1828-29 the Tennessee land bill again 
became the subject of animated discussion in the House. When 
he first introduced it, in 1825, Polk had the unanimous support 
of the people of Tennessee, and of the entire delegation in Con- 
D-ress from that state. But it now met with opposition from an 



21 Jackson to Polk, Dec. 4, 1826, Polk Papers. 

22 Polk to Jackson, April 13 and 15, 1828, Jackson Papers. 

23 Jackson to Polk, March 23, 1828, Polk Papers. 

24 The six militia men are made a hobby by the opposition, said Jack- 
son, by which thev "can impose upon the credulity of the ignorant. . . . 
The plan there that you have suggested is th.e.only one that can fairly 
meet, and effectively put down their hobby." "I think your reflections 
on the Burr business is correct, no defence, without a charge" (Jackson 
to Polk, May 3, 1828, ibid.). 

. 20 Jackson to Polk, Sept. 16, 1828, ibid. 



22 JAMES E. POLE 

unexpected quarter — an opposition which resulted in a bitter 
political feud. The eccentric David Crockett, for reasons best 
known to himself, had come to the conclusion that the "waste" 
lands, instead of being sold at a liigher price for tlie support of 
schools, should be given or sold at a nominal price to poor settlers. 
He therefore offered an amendment to effect this purpose, and 
thus assumed the role of champion of the poor, as opposed to 
the rich who, as he said, could alone afford to take advantage of 
schools. Whatever his motives may have been, his opposition 
to a bill which he had ardently supported at the last session was 
at once attributed to the influence of Jackson's political enemies. 
The Tennessee delegation, wrote Polk,'*' were mortified to think 
that Crockett ' ' should have cooperated with some of our bitterest 
and most vindictive political enemies, men, some of them of 
'coffin hand bill' and 'six militia men' memory, and joined them 
in denouncing the Legislature of his state on the floor of Con- 
gress." Gales and other "Adamsites," Polk continued, are urg- 
ing him on and reporting speeches that he never made, while he, 
it is said, will vote for Gales and Seaton for public printers and 
against Duff Green. They are making a tool of Crockett in order 
to deal a blow at Tennessee. Other members of the Tennessee 
delegation, said Polk, will furnish evidence against Crockett, but 
prefer not to do so, because the people might regard such action 
as persecution. 

Crockett differed from his colleagues not merely on the land 
question ; he opposed, also the attempt made by the Jackson party 
to introduce viva voce voting in the House so that they might 
brand the unfaithful. Several members, including Polk, Judge 
White, R. Desha, and J. C. Mitchell prepared statements con- 
cerning the boasts and the conduct of Crockett, and addressed 
them to Pryor Lea, one of their colleagues. The statements were 
based largely on assertions made by Crockett at White's lodgings 
in the presence of the men who had prepared them. Crockett 

26 Polk to McMillan, Jan. 16, 1829, ibid. 



OPPOSITION MEMBER OF CONGBESS 23 

there produced his amendment and boasted that it would be 
adopted. When asked if he were willing to imperil the entire 
land bill by insisting upon his amendment, he replied in the 
affirmative. His constituents, he said, wished the land bill to 
be killed, for so long as the land continued to be property of 
the United States the people might use it free of charge. He 
went so far as to avow that, regardless of his instructions from 
the legislature, he would support the measures of any man who 
would vote for his amendment. All agreed that he had been 
fraternizing with Adams men in an effort to procure their yotes. 
To Mitchell, Crockett openly admitted that Gales had printed— 
under Crockett's name — a speech which had never been delivered, 
so that the latter might distribute it among his constituents. 

As a result, it was thought, of Crockett's opposition, the 
House laid the entire land bill on the table. Not satisfied with 
his victory, however, the incorrigible "Davy," after returning 
to his district in western Tennessee, continued his attacks upon 
his colleagues. In public addresses he told the people that the 
land bill, had it passed, would have sacrificed the interests of the 
poor settlers. He was especially enraged by what he termed 
Polk's "officious interference" in the affairs of West Tennessee.-^ 
Apparently, Polk retaliated by publishing articles hostile to 
Crockett in a local paper of the latter 's congressional district.-^ 

Although Crockett did not succeed in his efforts to obtain 
cheap land for his constituents, he nevertheless had the pleasure 
of blocking the attempt made by his colleagues to procure school 

27 Adam R. Alexander to Polk, April 25; Polk to Alexander, May 1, 
1829; ibid. 

28 In volume 80 of the PoR- Papers is a series of five undated articles 
in Polk's handwriting headed "Col. Crockett & his course in Congress." 
They are signed ' ' Several voters, ' ' and as Crockett is spoken of as ' ' our 
imniediate representative," it is evident that they were to be understood 
as coming from his constituents. They were probably written for piibli- 
cation in some West Tennessee newspaper. They point out that Crotdcett 
had been elected as a friend of General Jackson, but that he has been 
supporting the old Adams-Clay party, "under the orders of Daniel Web- 
ster" and other Hartford Convention Federalists. He has been absent 
from duty in the House and has done "literally nothing" for the poor 
settlers of his district. 



24 JAMES K. POLE 

lands for their state.-'' Until his defeat by Adam Huntsman in 
1835 he remained in Congress and continued to oppose all meas- 
ures championed by the followers of Jackson. The importance of 
his defection lies in the fact that it was the first breach in the 
solidarity of the Jackson party in Tennessee. One of the chief 
critics of Crockett's apostasy in 1829 was Judge White, a man 
destined ere long to become the center of a political storm that 
w^ould overthrow Jackson's supremacy in his state and seriously 
weaken it in the nation. For the time being Crockett stood prac- 
tically alone. Tennesseans generally were proud to uphold the 
standard of their warrior hero. 

As General Jackson entered the White House the specter of 
executive usurpation vanished through the window and Polk, 
like other critics of President Adams, now became a loyal sup- 
porter of executive policies. In a letter to his constituents, dated 
February 28, 1829,^** Polk congratulated them on the recent 
political victory, and dwelt at length on the significance of that 
victory. The contest had been "between the virtue and rights 
of the people, on the one hand and the power and patronage of 
their rules [rulers] on the other." The people, said he, have 
spoken with a voice of warning to future aspirants who may seek 
to elevate themselves by bargain and intrigue. The country is 
still destined to be divided into political parties, and already 
there is evidence that the partisans of Adams and Clay are pre- 
paring under the leadership of the latter to oppose tlie incoming 
administration. But Jackson has nothing to fear from his 
enemies. " He is expected to produce reform, correct abuses, and 
administer the Constitution in its purity, and upon Republican 
principles contemplated by its wise framers." He has been chosen 
by the people, and his administration will be both prosperous and 
popular. 

20 By the acts of 1841 and 1846 Congress finally granted these lands to 
Tennessee (Sioussat, "Some Phases of Tennessee Politics in the Jackson 
Period," Am. Hist. Eev., 1908, 58). 

30 Pamphlet in Tenn. State Library. 



OPPOSITION MEMBER OF CONGRESS 25 

Having prononnced this encomium on the new regime, Polk 
reminded his constituents that he had contributed his "feeble 
aid" to the Jacksonian cause because he believed the General's 
principles to be orthodox and his purpose to be to serve the whole 
Union. According to others, however, the aid which he had 
contributed was not so feehle as his modesty had led him to 
assume. The Adams men in Tennessee gave him ' ' grate credit 
for compassing their mortifying defeat, and resolved, on that 
account, to defeat him if possible at the next election.^^ 

Despite efforts of his enemies Polk was re-elected by a large 
majority. On his return to Washington he soon became leader 
of the administration forces in the House and, as will appear 
in the following chapter, acted as Jackson's aide-de-camp in 
the war on the Bank of the United States. With his customary 
discretion he declined to join with those who felt impelled to 
give unsolicited advice to the President regarding his social and 
his executive duties. Toward the end of Jackson's first year in 
office, and after political Washington had been arrayed in hostile 
camps by the crusade against Mrs. Eaton,'^- certain members of 
Congress met, by invitation of C. A. Wickliffe, of Kentucky, for 
the purpose of discussing the situation. Some of those who 
attended proposed that the President should be urged to remove 
Eaton from the cabinet, and that he should be advised to hold 
regular cabinet meetings. When consulted, Polk, White, Grundy, 
and other members from Tennessee declined to participate. They 
even refused to enter into a correspondence with Wickliffe con- 
cerning the subjects which had been discussed at the meeting.^^ 
By thus declining to assume the role of guardian over the Presi- 
dent, Polk and his associates retained his confidence and good 
will. While each did his part in supporting Jackson's legislative 
program, Polk, more than any other, aided in his war against 
the Bank of the United States. 



31 Yell to Polk, Sept. 9, 1829, Polk Papers. 

32 See Parton, Life of Andrew Jackson, III, eliap. xvii. 

33 Letters from Wickliffe to White, Grundy, Polk et ah, Dec. 24, 1831. 
Also other letters on this subject in the Polk Papers. 



CHAPTER III 

POLK AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 

In the bank controversy of Jackson's administration, which 
Sumner has called "one of the greatest struggles between dem- 
ocracy and the money power, ' '^ Polk bore a prominent and diffi- 
^ cult part. It was a part which required a thorough knowledge 

of the subject, alertness of mind, industry, and sound judgment. 
It required, also, an intimate knowledge of the plans and pur- 
poses of the President, and a certainty on Jackson's part that 
his confidence would not be misplaced. As this is a biography 
of Polk, not of Jackson, no attempt will be made to treat the 
bank war in all of its phases. Yet it seems necessary to consider 
certain aspects of this controversy in order to make clearer the 
part played by Polk as a member of the Committee of Ways and 
Means.'- 

It is generally held by historians that Jackson, when he 
became President in 1829, harbored no special hostility to the 
Bank of the United States, but that he was later won over by his 
friends, who had grievances of their own against the bank. But 
if Jackson's memory may be relied upon, this belief is contrary 
to the facts in the case. In 1833, in reply to a letter of inquiry 
from Polk, Jackson stated that the original draft of his inaugural 
address, written at the Hermitage, contained a paragraph giving 
his views on the bank, and another, his views on surplus revenue. 
After he had reached Washington, he said, he was persuaded by 
friends to omit both of these paragraphs, as it was thought that 
the subjects were better suited to an annual message to Congress. 

1 Sumner, Andrew Jackson, 227. 

2 The summary of the beginnings of the bank war, unless otherwise 
noted, is drawn largely from Sumner. 



FOLK AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 27 

' ' Every one knows, ' ' he added, ' ' that I have been always opposed 
to the U. States Bank, nay all Banks. ' '^ 

In his first annual message Jackson questioned both the con- 
stitutionality and the expediency of the existing bank, and 
vaguely suggested the desirability of a bank "founded on the 
credit of the government and its revenues." This part of the 
message was referred by each house to a regular committee. In 
the Senate, Smith, of Maryland, reported from the Committee 
on Finance in favor of the bank. In the House, April 13, 1830, 
McDuffie, of South Carolina, reported from the Committee of 
Ways and Means, also in favor of the bank. McDuffie declared 
that the constitutionality of the bank had already been settled 
by decisions of the Supreme Court, that its expediency was 
beyond question, and that a bank modeled on the President's 
suggestions would be both inexpedient and dangerous. On May 
10, the House, by a vote of eighty-nine to sixty-six, tabled reso- 
lutions which declared that the House would not consent to 
renew the charter of the bank, and on May 29 it likewise tabled 
resolutions calling for a report of the proceedings of the bank. 
It was evident that Congress would not support the President 
in his opposition to the bank. The defection of McDuffie, who 
had taken a leading part in the attack of the Jackson forces on 
the Adams administration, made it necessary for the President, 
when the time came for forcing the bank question to an issue, to 
look elsewhere for a leader on whom he could rely. 

In his message for 1830, Jackson again proposed a bank as 
a "branch of the Treasury Department." This seemed to indi- 
cate a desire for something like the sub-treasury which was later 
recommended by President Van Buren. But Jackson's sugges- 
tions were vague and Congress gave them little serious consid- 
eration. An attempt of the Secretary of War, in July, 1831, to 
remove the pension funds from the New York branch of the bank. 



3 Polk to Jackson, Dec. 23, 1833. Jackson 's reply is undated and 
written on the back of Polk's letter (Folk Fapers). 



28 JAMES E. POLE 

met with opposition and failure. By the end of 1831 the Presi- 
dent's message was more pacific in tone, and the report of his 
Secretary, McLane, even spoke in favor of the bank. 

The tone of the message only encouraged his political oppon- 
ents, who were already making plans for the next Presidential 
election. The bank took the initiative by addressing a memorial 
to Congress, asking that the bank be rechartered. On January 9, 
1832, this memorial was presented in the Senate by Dallas and 
in the House by McDuffie, both 'Mjank Democrats."* The com- 
mittees of the two houses to which the subject was referred both 
reported in favor of a new charter, but with certain modifications. 
The Jackson supporters now determined to fight a recharter with 
every possible weapon and demanded a searching investigation of 
the bank's conduct. On February 23, Clayton, of Georgia, pre- 
sented a motion in the House asking for the appointment of a 
select committee to conduct the investigation. Technical objec- 
tions were raised by friends of the bank, but Polk met their 
objections point by point and defeated them with their own 
weapons.^ In a speech delivered on this occasion, Polk con- 
demned the bank for having the audacity to ask for a charter 
and then trying to prevent an investigation. The inference to 
be drawn from such shrinking from scrutiny, said he, was that 
there was something "rotten in the state of Denmark." In justi- 
fication of his motion for a select committee, Clayton presented 
two lists of charges, which had been prepared for the purpose 
by Benton.*' The first specified seven instances of charter viola- 
tion, involving forfeiture; the second gave fifteen instances of 
abuse, which required correction, though not involving forfeiture. 
The investigating committee which the Speaker selected sub- 
mitted three reports (that, of the majority unfavorable to the 
bank), but our present purpose does not warrant a discussion of 
either the reports or the charges. 



* Eegister of Debates, 22 Cong., 1 sess., 54. 

5 Benton, Thirty Years View, I, 236. 

6 Ibid., 237. The charges are given on the next page. 



FOLK AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 29 

In the Presidential campaign of 1832, Clay, seeing the avail- 
(ibility of the bank question, made it a leading issue. In so doing 
he acted contrary to the better judgment of many friends of the 
bank, including its president, Nicholas Biddle. A bill passed 
Congress, providing for a recharter of the bank, and Jackson 
must now either admit defeat or kill the bill by his veto. He 
accepted the challenge, vetoed the bill, and appealed to the people 
to sustain him. He was reelected by a large majority. Jackson's 
triumph at the polls was not in reality an endorsement of his 
veto, but he so regarded it and resolved to exterminate the 
' ' monster. ' ' 

When the bank question first became prominent, the opinions 
of the administration party were not yet clearly defined. This 
party ' ' was still only that group of factions which had united in 
opposition to Adams. "^ A large number of Jackson's most 
enthusiastic supporters were friends of the bank. Some of the 
political leaders, including Van Buren, had even signed petitions 
for the establishment of branch banks. Many politicians, as Niles 
said, had to "turn a short corner," when Jackson came out 
against the bank. More independent spirits, like McDuffie, 
refused to see the light and braved the executive wrath. Opposi- 
tion in Congress made Jackson only the more determined to wage 
a relentless Avar upon the "corrupt institution," but his success 
would depend, to a considerable degree, on the orthodoxy and 
ability of the leaders of the administration forces in that body. 
Obviously the administration program could not be intrusted to 
the recently converted, whose past record would surely be held 
up to embarrass them. The fight must be led by those whose 
record was unassailable. Such was James K. Polk, of Tennessee, 
the friend and neighbor of the President. He gave to the admin- 
istration his unqualified support, and, to quote his eulogist,^ "in 



" Sumner, Andrew Jackson, 248. 

8 Eulogy delivered at the time of Polk 's death, by L. M. Smith, New- 
man, Ga. {Fapers of Mrs. Folk, I). 



T 



30 JAMES K. POLK 

the hour of darkness and danger, was unquestionably its chief 
reliance. ' ' 

When Congress convened in December, 1832, Polk was trans- 
ferred from the Connnittee on Foreign Aifairs to the Committee 
of Ways and Means. A confidential letter written by Jackson 
to Polk on December 16 discloses the temper of the President 
as well as the intimate relations of the two men : 

The president with his respects to Col. J. K. Polk, of Congress, encloses 
him a note from Mr. Page of Philadelphia, a man of high character & 
in whom confidence may be placed. This is done to add to the information 
heretofore given the Col. to show him that the hydra of corruption is only 
scotclu'd, )iot dead, and that the intent is thro' Wolf's recommendation, 
to destroy the vote of the people lately given at the ballot boxes & to 
rally around the recharter the present Session of Congress two thirds. . . . 
Call upon the Sec. of the Treasury who must agree mth me that an investi- 
gation by Congress is absolutely necessary. 

A postscript instructed Polk to have Sullivan, a government 
\i director, brought before the committee, and ended with a per- 
emptory order "Attend to this."*^ Polk did "attend" to it, and 
the Secretary of the Treasury seems to have been persuaded that 
an investigation was necessary. 

Though Jackson in his annual message, December 4, 1832, 
informed Congress that the report of the Secretary of the 
Treasury "will exhibit the national finances in a highly pros- 
perous state," nevertheless he advised the sale of all corporation 
(bank) stocks, held by the government. He also urged that the 
safety of public deposits in the Bank of the United States was 
worthy of "serious investigation" by Congress. In response to 
these suggestions, the Committee of Ways and INIeans, of which 
Polk was a member, undertook an investigation of the charges 
which had been brought against the bank. The directors were 
summoned to Washington and examined ni^on oath,^° and other 
testimony was taken to supplement the information which had 



» Polk Papers. 

10 Dem. Eev., May, 1838. 



FOLK AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 31 

been gathered by the President. Reuben M. Whitney, the polit- 
ical scavenger of the administration, wrote to Polk from Balti- 
more, February 9, 1833, urging him to hasten the investigation, 
and warning him that Adams and Sergeant had been consulting 
with members of the committee. On February 11 Whitney 
wrote from Philadelphia advising Polk that the bank relied much 
on the ability of Verplanek^^ to outgeneral his opponents on 
the committee. While the investigation was in progress, Polk, on 
February 13, reported a bill to sell the bank stock owned by the 
government, but it failed in the House by a vote of one hundred 
and two to ninety-one. On March 1, Verplanck, for the majority 
of the Committee of Ways and Means, reported the bank to be 
sound and the public deposits safe, although it was admitted that 
in interfering with the plan of the government to pay off the 
three per cent securities the bank had exceeded its lawful powers. 
This report was adopted by the House. The Glohe charged the 
majority with forcing the adoption of its report without having 
considered or presented the evidence which had been collected 
by its minority members. Many members, it said, who were not 
in favor of the bank had voted for adoption because, on the show- 
ing of the majority report, they could not conscientiously say 
that the bank was not safe}- Anticipating the character of the 
majority report, Polk prepared and submitted a minority report 
for himself and two other members of the committee. After 
criticizing the majority of the House for wishing to force the 
adoption without adequate consideration of evidence, and inti- 
mating with some justice that the committee had passed lightly 
over certain damaging testimony, Polk went with considerable 
detail into the question of the "three per cents." These were 
securities bearing three per cent interest issued by the government 



11 Chairman of Ways and Means Committee and a friend of the bank. 
Whitney urged Polk to see that Gilmore, another member of the committee, 
shouhi not be tampered with. Verplanck, he said, was not to be trusted 
and should not be permitted to have access to the testimony already 
taken, unless accompanied by "one of our friends" (Folk Fapcrs). 

12 Washington Glohe, March 6, 1833. 



32 JAMES K. POLE 

in 1792 for accrued interest on the Revolutionary debt. The 
government had decided to pay off about $6,500,000 of these, and 
on March 24, 1832, the Secretary of the Treasury notified the 
bank of his intention to pay this amount on the first of July. 
Biddle requested the government to postpone payment until 
October 1 and agreed to reimburse the treasury for the extra 
three months' interest. To this the government agreed. "When 
asking for postponement, Biddle based his request largely on two 
special reasons, neither of which implied that the bank wished any 
accommodation for itself. The assigned reasons were: (1) that 
$9,000,000 of duty bonds would be payable on July 1, and mer- 
chants would be inconvenienced should the three per cent debt 
also fall due on that date; (2) should the much feared cholera 
appear, business would be deranged, and if, in addition, the bank 
should have to call in its money loaned to merchants, in order 
to pay off the three per cents, great distress would result. 

The government having agreed to delay payment, the bank 
made secret but unsuccessful attempts to arrange with Thomas 
W. Ludlow, New York agent of foreign holders, to postpone pay- 
ment of part of this debt. It then sent General Cadwallader, a 
director of the bank, to Europe. He made an agreement with 
Baring Brothers & Co., of London, by which the Barings were 
to arrange with certificate holders to postpone payment for one 
year. The Barings were to pay all holders who were unwilling 
to wait and themselves to assume the debt to that amount. As 
a result of Cadwallader 's agreement adjustments were made to 
the extent of nearly five million dollars. Every effort was made 
to keep the transaction a secret, but it leaked out, and an account 
of it was published in a New York paper. Biddle then dis- 
avowed the arrangement. 

In his minority report Polk showed conclusively that the real 
reasons for the bank's desire for postponement could not have 
been those assigned by its president. He gave a very clear 
analysis of the evidence which had been collected by the committee 



FOLK AND THE BANE OF THE UNITED STATES 33 

and made it plain that the bank had no intention of applying any 
of its money to the purpose for which it had said it desired these 
funds. He reached the inevitable conclusion that the bank had 
desired postponement because of its own weakness. 

In his entire report, but especially in his arraignment of 
Biddle, Polk displayed those qualities which ever distinguished 
him in debate, and which fully justified the confidence reposed 
in him by General Jackson. His preparation was exhaustive and 
his arguments clear cut and logical. His language was well 
chosen and dignified, but at the same time scathing and merci- 
less. "When the President of the Bank," said Polk, "not only 
induces the board to act for reasons unknown to themselves, but 
conceals even from the committees acts done in their names, some- 
thing stronger than doubt almost seizes on the mind. When, to 
the consideration that the committees know little of the proceed- 
ings had in their names, is added the fact that every Government 
director is excluded from even that little, by being excluded from 
every committee, the Government at least has grounds to doubt 
whether its interests are safe in such keeping. When a show of 
the strength of the Bank is made, consisting of sums in specie 
and amounts in exchange, while the debts are secretly contracted, 
which have enabled the Bank to accumulate these funds, are 
concealed even from those who make the exhibition, there is just 
ground to doubt whether there be soundness in the institution, 
or proper precaution and responsibility in its management. ' '^■''' 

When, in the spring of- 1832, Benton prepared his catalogue 
of charges against the bank for Clayton to present in the House, 
he strained his imagination in order to make his list as long and 
as formidable as possible. Such a course may have been effective 
for campaign purposes, but many of Benton's charges were easily 
shown to be exaggerated or unfounded. For this reason his ar- 
raignment lost force and failed to convince the doubtful. Polk, 
on the contrary, confined his denunciation to points on which the 



IS Feports of Committees, 22 Cong., 2 sess.. No. 121. 



34 JAMES K. POLK 

bank could offer no legitimate defense of its conduct. His argu- 
ments were then, and are today, unassailable." Polk well knew 
that neither his report nor his arguments on the floor would have 
much weight in the House, as a majority of the members were 
resolved to stand by the bank in spite of its faults. He was 
speaking to a wider audience and may have been already seeking 
popular support for the impending executive assault on the bank. 
However this may have been, he significantly pointed out that 
the institution might be reached by the executive without any 
assistance from Congress. "Whether the existing facts," said 
Polk in his report, 

are sufficient to justify the Executive in taking any steps against the 
Bank, authorized by its charter, is a matter for the decision of the proper 
officers, acting upon their own views and responsibility: any opinions by 
Congress can make it neither more nor less their duty to act. Whatever, 
therefore, the opinions of the members of this committee might be as to 
the justice or policy of any Executive action, they deem it unauthorized 
and improper to express them officially. 

In other words, it was for the executive alone to determine 
whether the bank had violated its charter or had been guilty of 
mismanagement, and, if so, to apply the remedy. 

"Whether, at the time Polk made his report, Jackson had re- 
solved upon a removal of the deposits from the bank as a proper 
remedy, we are unable to say.^^ If he had, Polk, who was cer- 
tainly in his confidence, was doubtless aware of the fact. Polk's 
remarks on executive responsibility and his indifference to the 
opinions of Congress seem to indicate that such was the case. 
He may even have suggested removal of the deposits to the Presi- 
dent, but of this there seems to be no direct evidence. It is 



i-^'Its facts and reasonings," said the Globe (March 6, 1833), "are 
perfectly irresistible. It exposes the subterfuges and self-contradicted 
testimony under which that corrupt and corrupting institution has shel- 
tered itself, in a manner so clear and convincing, that it must satisfy 
every honest man who reads it, of the utter profligacy of its management. 

15 To quote Sumner on this point: "Lewis says that he does not know 
who first proposed the removal of the deposits, but that it began to be 
talked of in the inner administration circles soon after Jackson 's second 
election" (Sumner, Joc/t-so)i, 297). 



FOLK AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 35 

worthy of note, however, that the well-known paper of September 
18, 1833, in which Jackson announced to his cabinet his intention 
to remove the deposits, makes use of many of the same facts and 
employs much the same reasoning that Polk had already used 
in his minority report. 

The minority report arrayed against its author all the power 
and the venom of the bank party, and measures were taken to 
prevent his reelection to Congress. Friends of the bank held a 
meeting at Nashville and denounced his report. He was accused 
of destroying credit in the West by proclaiming that the people 
were unworthy of mercantile confidence. Handbills signed 
"Muhlenging" were circulated, alleging that Polk as a member 
of Congress had been opposed to pensioning Revolutionary sol- 
diers.^ "^ Polk met the issue squarely as a foe of the bank, and 
during the campaign stress was laid on the bank affiliations of 
Bradford, his opponent. Under the circumstances, Polk's suc- 
cess or defeat was regarded as of more than local importance. 
"Your friends here," wrote Donelson from "Washington, "take 
a deep interest in your election and are all well apprised of the 
instruments which are employed to defeat you."^^ Donelson 
showed his own interest by inclosing in his letter evidence to be 
used against Bradford. In 1827 Bradford had applied to Adams 
for an appointment as marshall. His friends had sent letters of 
recommendation representing him to be a friend of Adams and 
an opponent of Jackson. From the files in the State Department, 
without the knowledge of the Secretary, Donelson had copied 
extracts, and now sent them to Polk, to be used at his discretion 
so long as Donelson 's name was not mentioned. A speech made 
by Bradford in the Tennessee Senate in 1831, in favor of rechar- 
tering the bank, w^as also reprinted and circulated among his con- 
stituents. It was a spirited contest, but Polk was reelected by a 
majority of over three thousand votes. 



16 Dem. Rev., May, 1838. Polk's "Circular Letter" to his constituents. 

17 A. J. Donelson to Polk, May 30, 1833, Polk Papers. The letter was 
marked "Private and for your eye alone." There is nothing to imlicate 
whether Jackson was cognizant of Donelson 's act. 



36 JAMES K. POLE 

As soon as he was safely elected, Polk, with the assistance of 
Cave Johnson, began a quiet campaign for the Speakership/^ 
He received encouragement from his political friends, but the 
expected vacancy^'-* did not occur and he continued his labors 
as a floor member. 

The adoption by Congress of Verplanck's report did not in 
the least alter Jackson's opinion of the character of the bank. 
On August 31, 1833, he-'^ sent Polk a confidential letter in which 
he inclosed a report of the bank directors. Polk was authorized 
to use the facts contained in the report, but not to divulge that 
they had come from the President. Jackson regarded these facts 
as proof positive that Biddle had been using the people 's money 
for purposes of corruption. 

By September Jackson was ready to carry into effect his plan 
to deprive the bank of the use of government money. Duane 
had in May succeeded McLane in the Treasury Department and 
was expected to do the bidding of the President. On September 
18, Jackson read to his cabinet the well-known paper in which 
he asserted that the deposits ought to be removed. Among the 
reasons assigned for the proposed action were the political activ- 
ities of the bank, its attempt to postpone payment of the three 
per cents, and the fact that it had come into existence by an un- 
constitutional law. He would not, he said, dictate to the Secre- 
tary, but the President himself, assuming all responsibility, had 



IS This subject will be considered at length in another place. 

19 Stevenson was expected to accept a foreign mission and not be a 
candidate for reelection. He resigned later for this purpose. 

20 The signature is cut off, but the letter is in Jackson 's unmistakable 
hand. He says: "You will find from the inclosed that I have at last 
thro the Government Directors got a Small peep into their expense account, 
and the corruption on the morals of the people. 

"In two years $80 odd thousand expended to corrupt the people & buy 
a recharter of that mamoth of corruption. I think when these scenes of 
corruption are made known to the people and that by an order of the 
board of directors, the whole funds of the Bank are placed at the disposal 
of Mr. Biddle to appropriate as he pleases [cut out with signature] most 
bold specious of corruption ever practiced by any body of people in the 
most corrupt governments" {Folk Papers). 



POLK AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 37 

decided that, after October 1, government money should no longer 
be deposited in the bank, and that all money there on that date 
should be drawn out as needed. Duane declined to give the neces- 
sary order to effect Jackson's purpose and later refused to resign. 
He was dismissed and Attorney General -Taney commissioned to 
take his place, September 23, 1833.-^ Taney gave the order, and 
the "hydra of corruption" was at last more than "scotched." 

Jackson's high-handed act produced much excitement through- 
out the country. The bank issued a paper-- in reply to the Presi- 
dent's charges, and a bitter conflict was inevitable as soon as 
Congress should assemble. "At such a crisis it became important 
to have at the head of the Committee of Ways and Means a man 
of courage to meet, and firmness to sustain, the formidable shock. » 
Such a man was found in Mr. Polk, and he proved himself equal 
to the occasion."-^ 

Congress met on December 2, 1833, and, as a result of the 
recent election, the administration forces were in unequivocal 
control of the House. Jackson's message, dealing among other 
topics with his removal of the deposits, and accompanied by a 
report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the same subject, was 
sent to Congress on the third of December. A contest at once 
arose over the reference of both message and report. Friends 
of the bank wished them referred to the Committee of the Whole 
House, where the enormity of the President's conduct might be 
discussed without limit. The Jackson supporters, on the other 
hand, wanted them referred to the Committee of Ways and 
Means, of which Polk had recently been made chairman. On 
the tenth, McDuflie succeeded in carrying a resolution to refer 
Taney's report to the Committee of the Whole. On the eleventh, 
Clay, of Alabama, presented a resolution to refer that part of 
the President's message relating to finance to the Committee of 
Ways and Means, but to this McDufde and others offered vigorous 

21 Mosher, Executive Eegister, 113. 

22 Niles' Beg., XLV, 248. -^ Hem. Rev., May, 1838. 



38 JAMES K. POLE 

objections. On the same day, Polk moved a reconsideration of 
the vote which had referred Taney's report to the Committee of 
the Whole, and he was at once accused by the opposition of aim- 
ing to have it referred to his own committee so that he could 
smother the question. -Chilton, of Kentucky, who was especially 
opposed to a reconsideration, did not wish to see "the whole 
weight of this massive Grovernment imposed on the shoulders of 
his friend from Tennessee,"-* and urged that the question ought 
to be left with the larger committee so that all might discuss it. 

Discussion was the last thing which Polk desired, and prece- 
dent supported his contention that the reference made under 
McDuffie 's resolution had been entirely irregular. Never before, 
he said, had a great subject of national policy been referred, in 
the first instance, to the Committee of the Whole on the state of 
the Union. The course which he advocated was simply the usual 
one. In the argument Polk was the equal of any of his opponents. 
When they told him that the Secretary 's reasons had been stated 
in his report, thereby making investigation by a committee un- 
necessary, Polk replied that the report contained various state- 
ments of fact which might involve the bank's charter, and that 
these facts should be carefully investigated. He also reminded 
them of their assertions that the state banks in which the Presi- 
dent had deposited public money were unsafe, and that the public 
faith had been violated. "Is it not proper, then, for a committee 
of the House to inquire by which party the contract was vio- 
lated?"-" After much discussion the House, on December 17, 
decided, by a yea and nay vote of one hundred and twenty-four 
to one hundred and two, to reconsider its vote on McDuffie 's 
resolution. 

Having won on the question of reconsideration, Polk now 
fulfilled Chilton's prophecy by moving that Taney's report be 



2^ Cong. Globe, 23 Cong., 1 sess., 24. All arguments made in the House, 
unless otherwise noted, are taken from the Globe, and may be found under 
dates mentioned in the text. 

25 Ibid., p. 25, Dec. 12, 1833. 



POLK AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 39 

referred to the Committee of Ways and Means. McDuffie im- 
mediately moved that Polk 's committee be instructed to ' ' report 
a joint resolution providing that the public revenue hereafter 
collected be deposited in the Bank of the United States, in con- 
formity with the public faith pledged in the charter of the said 
bank." It is not at all likely that McDuffie expected his motion 
to carry, but he gained what was doubtless his main object — an 
opportunity for a discussion of all phases of the question. This 
move on the part of the opposition brought from the President 
a letter instructing Polk to make a short reply and then to call 
for the previous question ;-'' but two long months of debate had 
yet to elapse before Polk's committee would be able to consider 
the Secretary 's report, unhampered by annoying instructions. 

Binney, of Pennsylvania, interrupted the discussion on De- 
cember 18 by presenting a memorial from the bank. The sub- 
stance of this document was a declaration that the bank was 
entitled to the deposits unless Congress should decide otherwise. 
On Polk's motion, the memorial was referred to his committee. 
On the same day, Chilton moved to instruct the Committee of 
Ways and Means to report a joint resolution directing the Secre- 
tary of the Treasury to restore the deposits to the bank, but, on 
the request of McDuffie, this motion was withdrawn. 

On the main question of referring the Secretary 's report with 
instructions to Polk's committee, McDuffie made the opening 
speech (December 19). The gist of his remarks was that re- 
moval of the deposits was illegal because the President had 
usurped authority in performing it. Even the President, he 
said, had admitted that the authority rested with the Secretary, 
and, if so, Jackson could not lawfully assume it. On December 
30, Polk replied in defense of the administration. As usual he 
had thoroughly prepared himself for his task. He was ready 
with authorities and precedents to support his own contentions 
as well as to refute those of his opponents. So thorough and 

20 Jackson to Polk, Dec. 18, 1833, Polk Papers. 



40 JAMES E. POLE 

inclusive was his array of facts and arguments that, although 
the debate lasted nearly two months longer, there was little for 
any other administration member to add. Every opposition mem- 
ber who spoke to the question devoted most of his time to an- 
swering the arguments of Polk. He was regarded by all as the 
chief supporter, in the House, of the President and his policies. 
Jackson himself, on his next visit to Tennessee, told the people 
of Nashville that "Polk for the hard service done in the cause 
deserves a Medal from the American people."-^ 

So far as a reference of Taney's report to the Committee of 
Ways and Means, as well as the attempt to instruct that com- 
mittee, w^ere concerned, Polk showed without difficulty that the 
opposition members were clearly in the wrong. The memorial of 
the bank setting forth its grievances, and likewise the charges of 
the government directors against the bank, had, after full delib- 
eration, been referred by the House to the Committee of Ways 
and Means ; there was consequently no good reason why the Sec- 
retary 's report should not be sent to the same committee. Polk 
intimated that the real reason for this attempt to interrupt the 
normal procedure was the desire of his opponents to "flood the 
country with infiannnatory speeches," telling the people that 
panic must result from the removal of the deposits. Should the 
committee be compelled, said Polk, to act under the instructions 
proposed by McDuffie, it would be prejudging the question; 
investigation would be superfluous, and a report made under 
such instructions would be absurd. The task of justifying the 
arbitrary conduct of the President was more difficult. By many, 
Polk's argument on this subject may not be regarded as convinc- 
ing.-^ But whether Jackson had acted within his rights or had 



27 Eobert M. Burton to Polk, Aug. 27, 1834, Folk Papers. Polk 's speech 
may be found in Cong. Deb., X, 2. 

28 When Polk was a candidate for the Presidency, the Natinnal Intel- 
ligencer (Sept. 21, 1844) said: "Throughout the whole of Mr. Polk's 
course in Congress in relation to the Bank of the United States, there was 
exhibited a zeal not only without knowledge, but often, we must think, 
against conviction. ' ' 



FOLK AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 41 

been guilty of gross usurpation, no one could have defended his 
course more ably than did the chairman of the Committee of 
Ways and Means. A slightly new turn was given to the dis- 
cussion by the motion of Jones, January 14, 1834, to substitute 
instructions for those submitted by McDuffie. McDuffie's in- 
structions, as Polk had pointed out, prejudged the whole ques- 
tion, and were mandatory as to the findings of the committee. 
Those now offered by Jones simply instructed the committee to 
"inquire into the expediency of depositing the revenues here- 
after collected," not in the Bank of the United States, but in 
state banks.-" It was now a question of compulsory restoration 
of the deposits, on the one hand ; on the other, discretion for the 
committee as to its findings, after the expediency of deposit in 
state banks had been investigated. 

While the question of reference with instructions was being 
debated, memorials from groups of individuals, some for and 
some opposed to the bank, were sent to the House. One came 
from the Maine legislature, upholding Jackson and pronouncing 
the bank unconstitutional. Efforts were made to refer some of 
the memorials to select committees, but, usually, on Polk's motion, 
they were all sent to the Committee of Ways and Means. Polk 
and his committee were therefore the objects of much criticism 
and even abuse. The sole purpose of both Taney and Polk, 
according to Binney, was to sustain the administration, without 
thought of the country's welfare. Polk's object in wishing to 
get possession of Taney's report, in the opinion of Moore, of 
Virginia, was to stifle debate, to put the stamp of approval on 
the report, and then to send it forth to deceive the people and 
prejudice them against the bank. A motion made by Hubbard 
to refer to Polk's committee the President's message on the re- 



ason February 19, Mardis, of Alabama, offered a resolution, "That the 
Committee of Ways and Means be instructed to inquire into the expedi- 
ency of reporting a bill requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to deposit 
the public moneys of the United States in State banks. ' ' There was much 
debate on this resolution, but, as it was later withdrawn by the mover, it 
will not be considered in the present discussion. 



42 JAMES E. POLK 

fusal of the bank to surrender its books and papers as pension 
agent, caused Watmoiigh, of Pennsylvania, to think that "the 
Committee of Ways and Means have got a voracious appetite, 
and seem desirous to devour all that comes before the House." 
It was a question of law, he said, and should be referred to the 
Judiciary Committee. He was supported by Barringer, of North 
Carolina, who asserted that Polk's committee was trying to grasp 
all important legislation so that it might be shaped in the ad- 
ministration mold. But oppositon was futile ; the message went 
with the memorials to appease the "voracious appetite" of Polk 
and his colleagues. There, too, went Taney's report, the main 
subject of discussion. On February 18, 1834, the two months' 
debate was closed by invoking the previous question, and Polk's 
original motion (of December 17, 1833) to refer to his own com- 
mittee Taney's report on the removal of the deposits was at last 
carried by a yea and nay vote of one hundred and thirty to 
ninety-eight. All motions to instruct the committee had already 
been voted down, and the House now refused to hear new reso- 
lutions for this purpose. The victory of the committee was com- 
plete, and it could proceed, unhampered, to perform its part in 
the executive program. Polk's successful defense of the admin- 
istration brought him letters of commendation from all parts of 
the country, and especially from his own state. Governor Carroll 
wrote from Nashville to compliment Polk on his "temperate, able 
and successful vindication of the President," and added that 
"this is almost the universal sentiment here."^" Polk's services 



30 Governor Carroll to Polk, Jan. 23. 1834, Polk Papers. John H. Dew, 
member of the Tennessee legislature, wrote to Polk, Jan. 21: "Your 
argument in defence of the Executive for the exercise of an ordinary 
power, expressly conferred on him by the Constitution of the U. S. and 
fully sanctioned by precedent & custom evinces a most intimate acquain- 
tance with the multifarious movements that have been made upon the 
great American political Chess hoard from the organization of the Govern- 
ment to the present Crisi'i. You have shown most incontestibly, from 
laborious research into public records and documents that the President 
and his Cabinet have in all things acted strictly within the sphere of their 
Constitutional duty and rule of action." There are many similar letters 
among the PoJk Papers. 



POLK AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 43 

as guide in the proposed constitutional convention of his state 
were eagerly sought, and he was much talked about as a desirable 
candidate for Governor of Tennessee, and for Speaker of the 
national House of Representatives. Even your enemies say, said 
a letter from his home town, that "you could be elected for any- 
thing in Maury. ' '^^ 

Before the vote on the reference of Taney's report had been 
taken, the Committee of Ways and Means had already made it 
quite clear that nothing favorable to the bank might be expected 
from them. On February 11, Polk reported for the committee 
on Jackson's message against the bank — the message in which 
the bank was denounced for not surrendering the books and 
money held by it in its capacity as pension agent. Polk fully 
sustained the President and refuted every contention of the bank. 
"The committee," so read the report, "cannot condemn, in terms 
too strong, the conduct of the bank in this transaction." He 
reported a bill to the effect that, in future, pensions should be 
paid by officers of the government, and not left in "the hands of 
an irresponsible corporation." 

By March 7, the committee was ready to submit its opinions 
on the removal of the deposits. These opinions were placed be- 
fore the House on that date, and it was generally understood 
that they had been drawn up by the chairman. They held that 
both the removal of the deposits and the placing of this money 
in state banks were unquestionably legal. The committee be- 
lieved the bank to be unconstitutional, but, even if it were not, 
its conduct had been such that it ought not to be rechartered, 
and therefore, the deposits ought not to be restored. They ex- 
pressed full confidence in the competence of state banks to per- 
form all necessary services for the government, and revived 
Jefferson's well-known arguments to prove that such an institu- 
tion as the Bank of the United States had never been contem- 



31 T. H. Cahal to Polk, Jan. 2, 1834, Poll: Papers. Maury was Polk 's 
county. 



44 JAMES K. POLE 

plated by the framers of the Constitution. For his own repu- 
tation, Polk might well have stopped here ; but he repeated the 
arguments of the day that "none can doubt the power of the 
bank to create embarrassment," and he proceeded to show that 
this had been done by loaning money at a given place during one 
month, and then calling it in during the next. Such action may, 
indeed, have been within the power of the bank, but banking 
institutions seldom resort to that form of amusement. This may 
have been one of the occasions noted by the National Intelli- 
gencer^- on which Polk's zeal was not supported by either 
"knowledge" or "conviction." However this may be, Polk had 
not been found wanting in his defense of the President. His 
services as a party leader of the House w^ere none the less effi- 
cient because history may pronounce some of his arguments 
untenable. 

The House, on March 12, suspended the rules so that Polk 
might have his report made a special order and thereby hasten 
its adoption. This action was denounced by Adams, who said 
that Polk, acting under royal prerogative, would soon close all 
debate by the previous question and deprive the minority of its 
constitutional right of discussion. But Adams could not very 
well complain, as Polk pointed out, because Adams himself had 
voted for the previous question when the bill to recharter the 
bank had been forced through the House. 

Polk did not, however, immediately call for the previous ques- 
tion, and his critics made the most of the opportunity afforded 
them. Instead of reporting on Taney's reasons for removing the 
deposits, said Wilde, of Georgia (March 19), the committee had 
reported an argument — that the bank ought not to be rechar- 
tered. They had "gone beyond the President and the Secretary, 
in claiming power for the Executive." Harden, of Kentucky, 
admired the "master-stroke of policy" of the committee in pro- 
nouncing against recharter when that question was not before it, 



National Intelligencer, Sept. 21, 1844. See above, note 28. 



FOLK AND THE BANE OF THE UNITED STATES 45 

but it had given no information except a reecho of Taney's report. 
McDuffie criticized Polk for shutting off debate, but he gave him 
full credit for acting "with a tact and skill and zeal worthy of 
a better cause. ' '^^ McDuffie concluded his argument on April 4, 
Mason called for the previous question, and the debate on Polk's 
report was closed. Resolutions prepared by the committee, pro- 
viding among other things for a select committee to investigate 
the bank, were quickly adopted. The new committee, appointed 
by the Speaker on the seventh, repaired at once to Philadelphia 
whence Mason, one of its members, kept Polk informed of its 
proceedings by confidential letters.^* But the bank refused to 
submit its books for examination, and the special committee soon 
(May 22) reported that it had been unable to perform the duty 
assigned to it by the House. While investigation thus ended in 
failure, nothing was left undone which in any way depended 
upon the vigilance or activity of Polk. On June 13, he succeeded 
in sending to the table two joint resolutions from the Senate: 
one, disapproving of the removal of the deposits; the other, 
directing that the deposits be restored to the Bank of the United 
States. 

By adopting Polk's report the House had put its stamp of 
approval on the President's act in removing the deposits, but 
the question of depositing this money in state banks had still to 
be considered. Jackson's opponents had always contended that, 
without the authority of Congress, the President had no right 
to intrust public money to such banks. On April 22, 1834, Polk 
reported from his committee a bill for regulating these state 
deposit banks. It was based on the report of the Secretary of 

33 McDuffie said he had criticized Jackson in the hope of bringing out 
Jackson's supporters. "The honorable member from Tennessee did come 
out boldly and manfully, took his position, and, whatever views I may 
entertain of his generalship, I am ready to bear testimony that the position 
which he has assumed is the only one he could assume, without leaving 
unprotected and undefended the very part which it was his duty to de- 
fend" (April 3, 1834). I have converted this into direct discourse. It is 
reported indirectly in the Cong. Globe. 

3* Mason to Polk, May 5 and May 10, 1834, PoJJc Papers. 



46 JAMES E. POLK 

the Treasury. Adams (June 7) attempted to filibuster by mov- 
ing- a resolution to call on the Secretary of the Treasury to lay 
before the House the names of officers and stockholders of such 
banks, as well as numerous unimportant details. Polk promptly 
met this by moving an amendment which required a similar 
statement from the Bank of the United States. A request made 
by Adams (June 13) that Polk should withdraw his amendment 
gave the latter an opportunity, not only to defend the adminis- 
tration, but to employ that sarcasm and scorn which ever made 
him feared as a debater. It was far more necessary, Polk be- 
lieved, to require information from the old bank than from the 
new banks, because the government was a stockholder as well 
as a depositor in the Bank of the United States. It was also 
more necessary, he said, because that bank 

had set itself up in antagonistic position to the Government, had de- 
nounced the Executive as a tyrant, usurper, and despot, and more recently, 
had denounced and insulted the representatives of the people, because they 
had sustained him in his measures. But, according to the gentleman, this 
immaculate and inoffensive Bank of the United States must not be looked 
into, though the affairs of the State banks must be thoroughly probed.--"' 

Polk's bill for regulating the deposits in state banks passed the 
House, June 24, 1834, by a vote of one hundred and twelve to 
ninety, but it was now near the end of the session and the Senate 
at its last meeting, June 30, laid the bill on the table. In the 
House, at least, the friends of the bank had been defeated on 
every point, and the acts of the President had been fully vindi- 
cated. The completeness of this vindication was due, in no small 
measure, to the industry and vigilance of the chairman of the 
Committee of Ways and Means. 

3"' Polk here read from the National Gazette an article in which the 
bank directors had denounced Jackson and the House. 



CHAPTER IV 

POLK-BELL CONTEST FOR THE SPEAKERSHIP 

During his canvass for reelection to Congress in 1833, Polk , 

seems to have decided to become a candidate for the Speakership ■*'| 
in the event of his success at the polls. Public attention had 
recently been called to this office by a rumor that the Speaker 
of last session, Andrew Stevenson, was to be given a diplomatic 
appointment and would therefore not be a candidate for re- 
election. 

"Whether Polk's idea of becoming a candidate originated with 
himself or was suggested to him by friends is uncertain. There 
are among his papers letters which show that, soon after his 
election early in August, he began to sound his friends on the 
subject. Other letters make it equally clear that he was being 
considered for the office by men who knew nothing of his own 
initiative in the matter. Cave Johnson, his most intimate friend, 
aided him by soliciting the support of their political associates. 

His first campagn for the • Speakership was soon abandoned, 
for Stevenson did not go abroad as soon as had been expected. 
However, his aspirations met with some encouragement. In 
answer to a letter from Polk on the subject, C. C. Clay, of Ala- 
bama, wrote : ' ' Should tlie vacancy, of which you speak, occur, 
I know of no other member, whose election to fill it would be 
more agreeable to my own feelings than yours. ' ' On the same 
day Clay said in a letter to Cave Johnson: "I am pleased with 
your suggestion of Polk as the successor of Stevenson, and hope 
we may be able so to manage, as to effect the object."^ A week 
later Leavitt, a member from Ohio, informed Polk of Stevenson 's 



1 Clay to Polk, Aug. 19, 1833; same to Johnson, same date, Poll- Papers. 



48 JAMES K. POLK 

rumored appointment to a foreign mission. He did not know, 
he said, whether Polk had been approached, but he hoped that 
he would be chosen to fill the vacancy.- Other letters of similar 
import were received ; one from Cave Johnson^ said that he had 
been writing letters to members of the House in an effort to 
bring about concerted action in Polk's behalf. 

At this early date Jackson seems to have taken no special 
interest in Polk's political promotion, although he was ready to 
give it his approval. Having corresponded with the President 
on the subject, Grundy informed Polk^ that he had "received 
an answer from the highest quarter of the most satisfactory & 
encouraging character." He advised Polk to induce his friends 
to write to members of the House, but to avoid writing such 
letters himself. James Walker, a brother-in-law of Polk, went 
to Washington in October in quest of a mail contract. After 
an interview with the President in relation to Polk's aspirations. 
Walker reported that ''he gives in to them I think decidedly and 
frankly."'^ Jackson told Walker that some persons believed it 
would not "look very modest" to solicit the Speakership for 
Tennessee, as well as the Presidency. The President himself 
ridiculed this objection and assured Walker that Polk's election 
would in no respect embarrass the administration. Walker got 
the impression, however, that William B. Lewis was in favor of 
Bell. Here may have been the beginning of Polk's intense dis- 
like for Lewis. Another interview with Jackson convinced 
Walker that the President was not only willing but eager to 
have Polk chosen Speaker of the House. He was charmed with 
the Vice-President and advised Polk to make it known to Van 
Buren that he would support him for the Presidency." 



2 H. H. Leavitt to Polk, Aug. 26, 183.3, ibid. 

3 Johnson to Polk, Aug. 26, 1833, ihid. 
i Grundy to Polk, Sept. 13, 1833, ihid. 
s Walker to Polk, Oct. 22, 1833, ihid. 

6 Walker to Polk, Nov. 7, 1833, ihid. From Yell, also, came a letter 
(Dec. 1) stating that in his opinion Van Buren could throw the Speaker- 
ship to whom he pleased. 



FOLK-BELL CONTEST FOR THE SFEAKEFSHIF 49 

The twenty-third Congress convened on December 2, 1833, 
and Stevenson was reelected Speaker on the first ballot — vir- 
tually without opposition. As Polk's candidacy had been con- 
tingent upon Stevenson's refusal to stand for reelection he ac- 
cepted the party program without evidence of disappointment. 
The committees were announced on the ninth, with Polk at the 
head of the Committee of Ways and Means— the appointment 
having been made, it was said, upon the suggestion of General 
Jackson. The chairmanship of this committee is an important 
position under normal conditions. At this time, when the Presi- 
dent was preparing for his last and greatest contest with the 
bank, it was undoubtedly the most responsible position in the 
House. But Polk was not the man to shirk responsibility, and 
his success in outgeneraling the bank party soon demonstrated 
that the administrtaion had been fortunate in its choice of a 
leader. 

Polk had scarcely accepted his new appointment when letters 
came from friends at home urging him to become a member of 
the proposed Tennessee constitutional convention. "A great 
number of people," wrote James Walker," "will be satisfied in 
no other way than for you to be in the Convention. 

While there seems to have been a general desire for Polk's 
services in the convention and a feeling that he of all men in 
the state was best fitted to draft a new constitution, yet some, 
even among his friends, appear to have doubted his ability to 
cope with his new duties in Congress. His brother-in-law, A. C. 
Hayes, wrote from Columbia, Tennessee, that Polk's friends were 
pleased, and his enemies mortified, by his elevation to the chair- 
manship of the Committee of Ways and Means. But he added : 
"I have, however, heard it suggested by some of your good 
friends, that you may not leave the present congress with the 
same reputation with which you entered — 'they fear, that there is 
too great weight of talent against you on the Bank Question. ' ' '^ 

7 Walker to Polk, Dee. 18, 1833, Folk Fapers. 

8 Hayes to Polk, Jan. 10, 1834, ibid. 



1 



50 JAMES K. POLK 

Polk himself had no such fears, for self-confidence was one of 
his chief characteristics ; difficulties never appalled him when 
party services were to be performed. He was already occupied 
with his committee and therefore declined to serve in the con- 
vention. 

On June 2, 1834, Speaker Stevenson presented to the House 
his long expected resignation. On the same day John Bell, of 
Tennessee, was chosen to succeed him. On the first ballot Polk 
received forty-two votes to Bell's thirty. Both men gained as 
the balloting proceeded, but Bell 's gains — due to accessions from 
the anti-Jackson camp — were larger than those of his rival. 
When the tenth ballot was counted tlie tellers reported that Bell 
had received one hundred and fourteen votes — more than enough 
to elect — while his nearest competitor, Polk, had received but 
seventy-eight. 

The brief official record of this day's proceedings which one 
finds in the Congressional Globe gives not the slightest hint of 
the heartburnings and bitterness which were associated with this 
choice of a Speaker. From this election, however, resulted a 
political feud which split the Jackson party in Tennessee, and 
materially weakened it in other states. From this day forth Polk 
and Bell were uncompromising enemies — each determined to 
overthrow the political power of the other. As the opponents 
of the President had helped to elect Bell, the new Speaker was 
forced to ally himself more and more with this element. His 
endorsement of Judge White's candidacy aroused the ire of the 
President. Regarding both men as apostates and traitors, Jack- 
son resolved to employ every means at his disposal for the purpose 
of crushing them. Polk profited much by this new turn of af- 
fairs. He was already fighting the battles of the President in 
the war on the bank. He liad always enjoyed the confidence and 
good opinion of Jackson ; but Bell's defection still more identified 
the Speaker's rival, Polk, with the party of the President. In 
a greater degree than ever was Polk now regarded as the adminis- 
tration leader of the House. 



POLK-BELL CONTEST FOB TEE SPEAKERSHIP 51 

The antecedents of the Speakership election and the attitude 
of Polk and Bell toward adhering to a party program are told 
in a statement prepared, at Polk's request, by Cave Johnson. 
Johnson was, of course, one of Polk's closest friends, but his 
statement seems credible and is corroborated by the testimony of 
other members of the House. It reads as follows : 

It was supposed many months before the vacancy actually happened, 
that it would take place & several individual friends of the administration 
were spoken of as suitable to fill the vacancy, among the number you & 
Col. Bell were esteemed the most prominent. None seemed to doubt that 
if so many friends of the administration were run, that the election would 
be finally settled by the votes of the opponents of the administration, who 
would of course cast their votes upon the man least acceptable to the 
President & his friends. This was a result the friends of the administra- 
tion wished to evade — and therefore it was proposed, that the friends of 
the administration should have a meeting that the strength of the several 
candidates should be ascertained, that the strongest should be run as the 
candidate of the administration party & the others should yield their pre- 
tensions & support him. You unhesitatingly determined, that you was,. 
willing to have the election submitted to the friends of the administration 
& let them decide who should be the candidate & that you would support 
the man thus selected. You was considered I believe finally by all parties 
as the administration candidate & so far as I knew, heard or believe every 
vote which you received except one was given by the friends of the admin- 
istration. ... I understood, from members who conversed with Col. Bell 
upon the subject whose names I can give if necessary, that he refused to 
submit his claims to the Speakers chair to the friends of the President, & 
in consequence of his refusal no such meeting was holden. He received 
the votes of the opponents of the administration & was elected by them 
in conjunction with a few votes received by him among the friends of the 
administration. 9 

In a similar statement,^'' John McKintry, of Alabama, charged 
Bell with having refused to submit his claims to Jackson 's friends 
and with having stated "that he did not expect to be elected by 
the administration party in the House, that he did not expect to 
get of that party more than 25 or 30 votes, [and] that he was 
supported by the opposition & elected by them. ' ' McKintry was 



9 Johnson to Polk, Sept. 12, 1834, ihid. 

10 McKintry to Polk, Aug. 13, 1834, ihid. C. C. Clay, of Alabama, in 
a letter to Polk (Sept. 13) says that Bell was generally considered to be 
an opposition candidate. 



52 JAMES K. POLK 

equally positive that Polk had readily consented to submit his 
claims to his party friends and to abide by their decision. 

Up to the time that Bell became a candidate for Speaker, he 
was considered to be a loyal supporter of General Jackson. He 
was so regarded in his own state as well as in the House of Rep- 
resentatives. "When the rumor that Stevenson would not be a 
candidate for reelection was first circulated, it will be remem- 
bered that Jackson was consulted as to his attitude toward Polk's 
candidacy. Although the President was willing to give his ap- 
proval, he did not appear to have any special interest in Polk's 
elevation. There is no evidence that the General, at that time, 
harbored any ill feeling toward Bell. Indeed, James Walker 
gathered from various conversations that Major Lewis preferred 
Bell for S]>eaker. But Bell's conduct during his recent cam- 
paign for the office changed all this. He was first distrusted, 
then openly denounced, by the President and his friends. 

Congress adjourned shortly after the elect-ion of a Speaker, 
and in the final rush of legislation little attention was given to 
the contest between the two candidates. It was not apparent at 
the time that the controversy would have any vital significance 
in national politics. The first important result of the victory 
of Bell over Polk was its effect upon the influence of the two men 
in their home state. 

For some time past Polk had been considered a desirable 
candidate for governor, and after his defeat by Bell his friends 
in Tennessee renewed their offer to support him for this office. 
His ever loyal brother-in-law, James Walker, began on his own 
initiative to agitate Polk's claims to the office and to assure liim 
of the certainty of success. He informed Polk^' that he had not 
lost prestige on account of his recent defeat, and that he could 
beat any man in Tennessee if he would consent to run. Letters 
offering support and encouragement came from Cave Johnson 
and other party leaders of the state. James Standifer assured 



11 Walker to Polk, June 30, 1834, Folk Papers. 



POLK-BELL CONTEST FOB THE SPEAEEESHIP 53 

Polk that he had not "seen the first man but what says they 
would rather have James K. Polk's standing than John Bell's 
Speaker's place and all, the people are for the man that stands 
up boldly for the President and his measures, they are for no 
other sort of man these times. "^- The sentiment expressed in 
this letter was becoming general in Tennessee, namely, that Polk 
and Grundy were the administration leaders in the state, and 
that Bell had deserted to the enemy. This view was impressed 
upon the President, who was then spending his vacation at the 
Hermitage, and it was about this time that he declared Polk to 
be deserving of a medal for ' ' the hard service done in the cause. 

Much resentment was aroused in Middle Tennessee by a 
speech delivered by Bell at Murfreesborough on October 6, 1834. 
The circuit court was then in session and Bell took advantage 
of the occasion to address the people there assembled. There 
are conflicting reports as to the substance of this speech, but in 
general the account of it given to Polk in a letter from his brother- 
in-law, John W. Childress, seems to be corroborated by the testi- 
mony of many who heard the speech delivered. According to 
this letter^^ Bell was very severe in his criticism of all who had 
questioned the propriety of his course in Congress, particularly 
during his contest for the Speakership. He asserted that all his 
competitors except one had treated him in a gentlemanly manner, 
leaving it to be inferred that Polk had not. "He vaunted 
greatly," said Childress, 

his adherence to principle, his unwavering support of the president, and 
said distinctly, and in these words, that had he not been true and firm to 
the administration, he could have changed the small majority in the house 
upon the Bank question by going over and taking his friends with him 
and thereby have defeated all the measures of the President. 

His enemies, he said, had managed to delay Speaker Stevenson's 
appointment to a foreign mission in the hope of weakening his 



12 Standifer (member of Congress from Tennessee) to Polk, Aug. 25, 
1834, ibid. 

13 Childress to Polk, Oct. 7, 1834, ibid. 



54 JAMES K. FOLK 

(Bell's) prospects and strengthening their own (i.e., Polk's), but 
of this the President was of course not aware. He alleged that 
although other tricks had been employed in an effort to defeat 
him, he still had the confidence of the entire party except six or 
seven individuals. He said 

that he was willing to give Jackson's experiment [state banks] a fair 
trial and if it did not answer the wants of the people, that then he might 
be in favor of a National Bank. That he had no idea that a metalic 
currency would answer the purpose of a circulating medium and almost 
said it was Demagoguic in any one that would say so. 

W. R. Rucker, another brother-in-law, said in a letter^* that the 
speech was "most intemperate and ill advised" and that many of 
Bell 's friends did not approve such ' ' abuse ' ' of Polk and General 
Jackson. 

Under the circumstances, Bell's speech was certainly ill ad- 
vised, even if every assertion made in it had been true. More- 
over, even though reports of the speech may have exaggerated 
its abusive character, yet certain remarks attributed to the speaker 
were of such a nature that, if skillfully used, they would arouse 
the ire of General Jackson against the man who had uttered them. 
Protestations of loyalty to the administration had an unwelcome 
ring in the General's ears when accompanied by boasts of Bell's 
great influence over party members and of the ease with which 
he might have defeated administration measures in the House. 
The truth of such an assertion would make it all the more galling 
to a man of Jackson 's temperament. One can imagine his exclaim- 
ing: "By the Eternal, I'll show John Bell!" Then, too, Bell's 
remark concerning the President's experiment, and his ciuasi en- 
dorsement of a national bank, were most unfortunate for any 
man who wished to retain the friendship of "the old hero." 

Polk's answer to Rucker indicated clearly the use that was 
to be made of Bell's speech. If the address has been accurately 
reported, said Polk, "it places him clearly and unequivocally at 



14 Kucker to Polk, Oct. 12, 1834, ibid. 



POLE-BELL CONTEST FOR THE SPEAKERSHIP 55 

issue with the policy of the administration."'" He wished the 
speech to be reported accurately and published to the world; 
then he would be fully prepared to meet its author on the issues 
which it had raised. 

Before Bell's Murfreesborough speech had been delivered, 
Polk, as we have seen, had already been collecting statements 
from his friends concerning Bell's conduct in Congress. Both 
men had also been exerting themselves to get control of the press 
in Middle Tennessee. Local newspapers at that time wielded 
great influence, and the success of a politician depended in a 
great measure on his control over the reading matter of his con- 
stituents. 

Polk's home was in Columbia ; therefore the Observer, a local 
paper of that place, supported its townsman and criticized Bell's 
maneuvering in the late Speakership election. The two leading 
papers of Nashville at that time were the RepuUicari and the 
Banner. The Rcpuhlican defended Bell, and many of Polk's 
friends promptly administered the customary punishment of can- 
celing their subscriptions to that paper. One of these was Colonel 
Archibald Yell, an ardent admirer of Polk and an orthodox party 
man. In answer to his protest, Allan A. Hall, editor of the 
RepuUican, defiantly predicted that Polk would soon lose the 
friendship of Jackson, Grundy, and Governor Carroll, and would 
be driven from power if he should dare to persist in his opposition 
to Bell.'° 

Bell succeeded in getting control of the Banner, also. Until 
the middle of September, 1834, this paper had been edited by 

15 Polk to Eueker, Oct. 16, 1834, ibid. 

iGYell to Polk, Sept. 25, 1834, ibid. One part of Hall's letter, as 
quoted by Yell, read: "and now mark me Yell for a prophet in less than 
six months there will be a split between Carroll & Polk nay there will 
be a split between Polk & the President!! Coming events cast their 
shadows before. Col. Polk by no earthly possibility can continue to 
maintain his present iJosition, in the event of Certain future Contmoencies 
which are obliped to take place." Yell took this to mean that Polk was 
to be driven from the chairmanship of the Committee of Ways and Means. 
Carroll denied that he was hqstile to Polk (Carroll to Polk, Dee. 19, 1834). 



56 JAMES K. POLK 

Samuel H. Laughlin, a friend of Polk, but who, unfortunately 
for both men, had been made extremely unreliable by a passion 
for strong drink. ^" His contract as editor expired at this time 
and the proprietor, Hunt, formed a partnership with Bell. A 
new editor was installed and the paper henceforth championed 
the cause of the Speaker.^^ For the time being Polk had to rely 
mainly on the support of the Columbia Ohserver and the Mur- 
freesborough Monitor. 

Bell seems to have become somewhat alarmed at the result of 
his Murfreesborough speech, for both of his Nashville papers 
maintained that he had been misquoted, and that he was still a 
loyal follower of General Jackson. Thereupon, William Brady, 
of Murfreesborough, set about collecting statements from various 
persons who had heard Bell deliver the address. These Brady 
published in an extra number of the Monitor. Copies of this 
number were sent to the President, to members of Congress, to 
leading political journals, and to prominent individuals, for the 
purpose of removing the "veil which now covers the political 
hypocrite [Bell]."^'^ 

Polk and his associates saw the necessity of establishing in 

Nashville a paper which would promulgate their own views. "I 

think it more desirable," wrote A. C. Hays, of Columbia,-" 

that a Newspaper should be established in Nashville, that will fearlessly 
speak the sentiments of the people of the State, at this time than it has 
ever been, because I believe that the Press is at this time more under the 
influence of the Bank & Bell & Foster faction than it has ever been. 

Laughlin had offered to serve as editor of an administration 
journal, but Brady'^ was not alone in thinking that "poor Sam" 
had already proved himself to be a total failure. "The trouble 

IT One becomes accustomed to reading in private letters: "Laughlin 
has been drunk for a week. ' ' 

18 John W. Childress to Polk, Sept. 18; Wm. Brady to Polk, Dec. 26, 
1834, Polk Papers. 

19 Brady to Polk, as cited above. 

20 Hays to Polk, Dec. 24, 1834, Polk Papers. 

21 Bradv to Polk, as cited above. 



POLK-BELL CONTEST FOB THE SPEAKERSHIP 57 

is, ' ' said he, ' ' Sam lacks moral courage ; and when the sound of 
the Bugle is heard — and the enemy shall appear in force — Sam's 
in the straw." In Brady's opinion, some editor ought to be 
found who would be "wholly de Nashvilleized/' who would stand 
by the President and support Van Buren as his successor.-- For 
his own purposes, said Brady, Bell is putting Judge White for- 
ward to succeed Jackson, with the hope of succeeding "White in 
the Presidential chair. 

Bell's success in getting control of the Nashville papers was 
disconcerting enough to Polk's Tennessee friends, but they were 
still more chagrined because the Washington Glohe seemed also 
to be lending its support to the Speaker. "How is it with the 
Globe?" wrote Brady in the letter above cited, 

if that print is with the President and his friends, to me it has an awk- 
ward way of shewing of it. It is true that Blair sanctions the President 
personally, and in the main the measures of his administration; but how 
is it, that every apologetic article, which has appeared in the Nashville 
papers or elsewhere, in relation to Bell's election to the Speaker's chair, 
or his Murfreesboro Speech have found their way into the columns of the 
Globe? 

Brady thought that Blair ought to give both sides or neither ; 
Polk should compel him to show his colors by presenting for 
publication in the Glohe the account of Bell's speech which had 
appeared in the extra Monitor. "Why is the Globe either silent — 
or giving support to Bell ? ' ' asked Childress.-'^ People in Tenn- 
essee, he added, are beginnig to believe that the President 
prefers Bell to Polk; this is what Bell's adherents claim, and the 
attitude of the Glohe lends color to their assertions. By all 
means, urged Childress, Polk must have his side of the argument 
published. 

By courting the enemies of the administration and by sub- 
sequent indiscretions. Bell had engendered feelings of distrust 



22 On December 28 General Samuel Smith, in a letter to Polk, dwelt 
on the necessity of starting a new paper. Many in Tennessee, said he, 
whom Jackson believes to be his friends are in reality against him. 

23 Childress to Polk, Dec. 20, 1834, Polk Papers. Polk received other 
letters of similar character. 



t 



58 JAMES K. POLK 

and hostility that were destined to involve others in serions polit- 
ical difficnlties. Polk was a man who did not easily forget, and 
by lending aid to Bell in 1834 Blair was paving the way for his 
own downfall, when Bell's rival became President ten years later. 
Polk's friends believed that they saw the sinister as well as 
successful influence of the Speaker in every quarter. Polk him- 
self alleged that Bell's exertions in behalf of Judge White were 
not due to any love for the judge, but for the sole purpose of 
promoting his own political advancement.-* 

The project of founding an administration newspaper in 
Nashville now absorbed the attention of party leaders. As no 
really suitable man could be found to edit such a paper, Laughlin 
was considered, although not without misgivings.-^ Many poli- 
ticians who had hitherto shouted for Jackson had deserted to 
White, and nearly all of the papers of Middle Tennessee, in- 
cluding even the Columbia Ohserver,-'^ had come out for the 
judge. This fact made it all the more necessary to have an 
orthodox journal which would enlighten the people, and Laughlin, 
despite his weaknesses, was a loyal party man. After many 
tribulations capital was collected, an outfit purchased, and in 
March, 1835, Laughlin was installed as editor of the Nashville 
Union. Polk and Grundy were the guiding spirits of the new 
paper, and to them and Cave Johnson "poor Sam" appealed for 
aid in increasing his subscription list. He reported to Polk that 
the editor of the Banner was ' ' wallowing in the mire, ' ' entirely 
under the influence of Bell and Foster; and that efforts were 
being made to retard the progress of the Union."-' 

During the excitement which was created by Bell's Cassedy 
letter, Laughlin — being "himself again"-' — with his "sharj) pen" 



24 Polk to James Walker, Dec. 24, 1834, Folk Papers. 

25 Sam'l G. Smith to Polk, Jan. 6, 1835, ibid. 
20 James Walker to Polk, Jan. 17, 1835, ibid. 
27 Laughlin to Polk, April 17, 21, 1835, ibid. 

2s Grundy to Polk, June 25, 1835, ibid. For the Cassedy letter, see 
84. 



POLK-BELL CONTEST FOB TEE SPEAEEBSHIP 59 

did effective service for Polk by heaping odium upon Bell. ' ' That 
Cassedy letter, ' ' wrote Grundy to Polk, ' ' will make you Speaker, 
I think. ' '-*' It did, indeed, contribute to this result, but in Tenn- 
essee the combined influence of Bell and White could not be 
overcome. In spite of heroic efforts * on the editor's part, the 
Union could not pay expenses, and the list of political "apostates" 
was steadily growing. Although Laughlin labored without salary, 
he was not without hope,'° and his pungent editorials undoubt- 
edly aided Polk in his campaign for reelection. 

President Jackson viewed with alarm the disintegration of 
the administration party in his home state. He was especially 
interested in the election of members of Congress. From his 
retreat at the "Rip Raps" he asked Polk^^ for reliable infor- 
mation concerning the political situation, and directed him to 
cooperate with Grundy and Cave Johnson in combating the 
schemes of Judge White and John Bell. He was able to get 
some news from the Union, although it came irregularly; "the 
other Nashville papers, like base coin, circulate freely, but they 
have become the mere echo of Duff Green & other opposition 
prints. ' ' 

White's candidacy had irrevocably split the Jackson party 
in Tennessee. The President now considered White, Bell, and 
all their supporters to be his political and personal enemies. 
Polk, Grundy, and Johnson were to a greater degree than ever 
looked upon as the administration leaders in the state. It was 
certain that Polk would have the President's backing in his next 
contest with Bell for the Speaker's chair. From Washington, 
Donelson^^ wrote to congratulate Polk on his triumphant 



2Qlbid. 

30 ' ' 1 am now fairly in a State of belligerancy with my worthy neigh- 
bors. I have them, I think, in a good way if I can keep them so. A 
gradual but sure work of reformation in public sentiment is in progress 
here, and I hope the same work is going on throughout the State ' ' 
(Laughlin to Poik, July 5, 1835, ibid.). 

31 Jackson to Polk, Aug. 3, 1835, ibid. 

32 Donelson to Polk, Aug. 28, 1835, ibid. 



> 



60 JAMES E. POLK 

reelection in spite of the "intrigues" of Bell, and he reported 
the President to be in good spirits, notwithstanding the defeat of 
Governor Carroll. Donelson had, he said, conversed with many 
politicians, all of whom wished Polk to be chosen Speaker, 

In Nashville, Laughlin, through the columns of the Union and 
by letters to individuals, was doing his utmost to discredit Bell 
and to present Polk's claims to reward for his loyalty to General 
Jackson. Polk had been the intended victim of Bell's "treach- 
ery," wrote Laughlin, and therefore "ought to be made the 
instrument of his defeat. "^^ 

While the rivalry between White and Van Buren was of 
greater interest in national polities, yet administration leaders 
in all parts of the Union had come to feel that Bell — the alleged 
instigator of the party schism — was, after all, more guilty than 
White, and consequently deserving of punishment. Polk, on the 
other hand, was clearly entitled to the support of the adminis- 
tration forces in Congress. As chairman of the Committee of 
Ways and Means he had borne, in the House, the brunt of the 
President 's war on the bank. In his home state he had done more 
than any other, with the possible exception of Grundy, to oppose 
the Bell-White coalition and to uphold the standard of General 
Jackson. 

When Congress convened in December, Polk's election to the 
Speaker's chair was practically assured, and he was chosen on 
the first ballot by a majority of thirty-nine votes. His triumph 
over Bell was regarded by all as a distinct party victory. A 



33 Laufihlin to Polk, Aug. 30, 183.5, ibid. He quoted several reasons 
which he had assigned when urging Polk's election, among them: 

"That your election will prostrate Bell and the White influence in this 
State, by showing to the people the true position of Bell, and how his 
position is received by the Eepublican party every where else, and that 
they are only sustained now by the false opinion which prevails that they 
are friends of Gen. Jackson. 

"That your election will unmask the White party and exhibit them 
as the opponents of the Administration. 

"That much is due to you. That you have stuck when others failed. 
. . . That your confidential relation to the President ought to be consid- 
ered both as a merit and as a necessary qualification in a Speaker &c &c. ' ' 



POLK-BELL CONTEST FOE THE SPEAKERSHIP 61 

"White" member of the Tennessee legislature, when writing to 
congratulate Polk on his election,^* said that, although BelFs 
own friends hardly expected him to win, they did not think that 
he would be beaten so badly; they "attribute Mr. Bell's defeat 
to the influence of the President." Although a White supporter, 
the writer said that Polk had gained by his firm stand and that 
he was now stronger in his district than either White or Van 
Buren. "The election of Speaker," wrote Judge Catron,'^ "had 
an uncommonly great effect on the country people. They had 
been lead to believe great strength existed elsewhere — this is now 
admitted to be a mistake, and what must follow [defeat of White] 
is certain, as I believe." Bell himself had not been sanguine. 
He predicted his defeat by Polk before Congress had convened.'" 
Before proceeding with Polk 's career as Speaker of the House 
of Kepresentatives it seems desirable to retrace our steps in order 
to consider, in the following chapter. Judge White 's unsuccessful 
campaign for the Presidency. The rivalry between White and 
Van Buren was the dominant factor at the time in both state and 
national politics. It played an important part in making Polk 
the presiding officer of the House, and it helped to shape many 
of the issues with which Polk, as Speaker, had to deal. 



34 H. M. Watterson to Polk, Dec. 21, 1835, Polk Papers. 

35 Catron to Polk, Jan. 8, 1836, iUd. "The effect of the news [Polk's 
election] upon the White cause," wrote Nicholson, December 20, "has 
been blighting. ' ' Many White men, said he, now think that their candi- 
date should be withdrawn. 

36 W. H. Polk to J. K. Polk, Dec. 21, 1835, PoR- Papers. He had seen 
a letter written by Bell to Judge Kennedy before the opening of Congress. 



CHAPTER V 

JUDGE WHITE AND THE PRESIDENCY 

No biography of a statesman of the thirties — particularly of 
a prominent Tennessean — would be complete that did not in- 
clude a chapter on the far-reaching effect of Judge White's de- 
cision to become a candidate for the Presidency. The importance 
of this decision lay in the fact that General Jackson had made 
other plans. In the parlance of the day, "King Andrew" had 
decreed that the "little magician" must be his successor, regard- 
less of the will of the subjects — the "consent of the governed." 
When, therefore, the friends of White brought him forward as 
a rival to Van Buren, harmony in the Jackson camp was at first 
threatened, and finally destroyed. "Davy" Crockett had driven 
the first wedge into the solidarity of the Jackson domination of 
Tennessee ; the White movement split it asunder. The result 
was the birth of the Whig party and a national political re- 
alignment. 

When White was first mentioned in connection with the Presi- 
dency, Jackson's feelings were those of regret that his old friend 
should have been deluded by designing politicians ; but when the 
judge was found to be a willing victim — independent even to 
the point of defying the President's wishes — the old-time friend- 
ship changed to bitter hatred. It was soon made apparent to 
politicians that they could not support Judge White without for- 
feiting all claim of loyalty to General Jackson. Assurances on 
their part that the two things were not incompatible availed 
nothing ; all were forced to choose between the two men. 

It is not easy to determine just when and by whom Judge 
White was first brought forward as a candidate for President, 



JUDGE WHITE AND THE PRESIDENCY 63 

but his nomination for that office was considered by the Ten- 
nessee legislature as early as December, 1833. Up to this time, 
so far as Tennessee politics were concerned, Judge McLean, of 
Ohio, seems to have been regarded as Van Buren's most formid- 
able rival. Some of the local papers had hoisted the McLean 
banner, with either Governor Carroll or Judge White for Vice- 
President.^ But before adjourning in early December, 1833, the 
legislature seriously considered the feasibility of presenting a 
Presidential candidate from their own state. A resolution to 
nominate White was actually drawn up ; but it was made known 
by a member that White opposed such a proceeding, and the 
matter was dropped. None of the members manifested any 
interest in nominating either Van Buren or McLean.- 

Several causes cooperated in fixing the attention of politicians 
on White as a possible candidate. It was well known that Jack- 
son had decreed that the Vice-President should succeed him; 
in spite of this, however, Van Buren had never been popular in 
Tennessee. Many of the President's most loyal supporters did 
not, and could not, share his admiration for the "heir apparent." 
State pride caused many to feel that, if possible, another Tenn- 
essean should be chosen to fill the office, and, next to Jackson, 
White was generally conceded to be the most able and popular 
son of the state. It is probable that Jackson's preference for 
Van Buren would have been sufficient to cause a split in tlie 
party as soon as the White movement assumed serious propor- 
tions, but the rivalry between Polk and Bell, and the support of 
White by the latter, lent an added bitterness and political sig- 
nificance to White's candidacy. The plan to nominate White 
was alleged to have been conceived by Bell for the purpose of 
advancing his own political fortunes in both state and national 
politics. Whether this allegation was true or false is a matter 
difficult to determine ; but whatever Bell 's motives may have been, 



1 Yell to Polk, Dec. 1, 1833, Polk Papers. 

2 A. O. P. Nicholson to Polk, Dee. 5, 1833, Polk Papers. Orville Bradley 
to White, Aug. 23, 1836 (Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson White, 302). 



64 JAMES K. POLK 

it seems clear that White's conduct was at all times aboveboard 
and commendable. He was too honest to seek political prefer- 
ment by underhand methods, but he was, also, too brave and 
independent to step aside simply because General Jackson willed 
that he should do so. 

Up to the time when White and Van Buren had been for- 
mally nominated and party lines definitely drawn, there was 
quite a diversity of opinion in Tennessee, even among Jackson's 
friends. On December 22, 1833, A. V. Brown wrote to ask Polk 
"the signs as to the ' successorship to the throne,' " and spoke 
of McLean's popularity. "Personally," said Brown, "I like 
McLean myself but politically I fear he is too far off from us in 
the South — and how will Van Buren help that matter in the 
least?" Between Clay and Van Buren, he continued, "might 
not one find refuge in the personal worth «& virtue of IMcLean, 
although he would prefer some other than either, if chance or 
destiny had not thrown him too far in the rear of probable suc- 
cess ? ' '^ Other passages in the letter indicate that it was Calhoun 
to whom he referred. Generally, however, those of Polk's cor- 
respondents who were "not satisfied" with A^an Buren were of 
opinion that White was the only man who would bring success to 
the party.^ 

On June 2, 1834, Bell defeated Polk in the contest for the 
Speakership. He was supported by many who were openly op- 
posed to the administration. In the House Polk had, during the 
entire session, been leading the battle against the bank, and when 
Congress adjourned on June 30 he had won a signal victory for 
the administration. In his defeat by Bell, Polk could easily be 
made to assume the role of a martyr who had suffered for his 
loyalty to the President and the party. He seems sincerely to 
have regarded himself as a victim of the treachery of Bell, who 
had solicited opposition votes. 

3 Polk Palmers. 

* E.g., John W. M. Breazeale to Polk, March 21, 1S34, Poll: Papers. 



JUDGE WHITE AND THE PEESIDENCY 65 

As soon as Congress had adjourned, both men returned to 
Tennessee to air their grievances on the platform and in the 
public press. Polk, as we have seen, applied to his congressional 
friends for statements which would prove the perfidy of Bell, 
while Bell proceeded to get control of the Nashville papers, the 
Republican and the Banner, in order to defend himself and to 
overthrow the influence of Polk. Many of Polk's friends were 
desirous of nominating him for Governor, but he preferred to 
continue in national politics. 

General Jackson, also, spent his summer vacation in Tennessee. 
The bank question was uppermost in his mind, and in a speech 
delivered in Nashville he made it clear that any new federal 
bank would be quite as objectionable as the one now in existence. 
As yet he seems to have taken no active interest in the quarrel 
between Bell and Polk, but he naturally felt grateful to the latter 
for his loyal support of the administration during the last sesssion. 
It was at this time that he declared Polk to be deserving of a 
medal from the American people for his services in Congress. 
Bell had not yet broken with the party and gave the President 
new assurances that he would continue to support the adminis- 
tration.' Indeed after Jackson 's return to Washington there was, 
as we have seen, complaint in Tennessee that the Globe seemed to 
show a preference for Bell.« But during the fall of 1834 the 
political situation in Tennessee became such that the interests of 
Polk and the President were closely identified, while Bell cast his 
lot with the opponents of the administration. The main cause 
of the party cleavage was the renewed effort to nominate Judge 
White for the Presidency. 

While Jackson was still in Nashville a caucus was held in that 
eity — by friends of the bank, it was said — for the purpose of con- 
sidering the nomination of White.' White was informed that 



5 Gen. Sam '1 Smith to Polk, Sept.' 20^ 1834, PoJJc Papers. 

« See above, p. 57. 

- Burton to Polk, Aug. 27, 1834, Polk Papers. 



66 JAMES K. POLK 

the President threatened to denounce him should he express a 
willingness to become a candidate.* Jackson doubtless noted 
many evidences of the popularity of White and of the unpopu- 
larity of Van Buren, but at this time it is probable that he had 
hopes of preventing disaffection. 

While the President was passing through East Tennessee on 
his way to Washington, Orville Bradley, a member of the legis- 
lature, told him of the attempt made by the assembly in 1833 to 
nominate White — an attempt which Bradley, acting under 
White's directions, had been able to defeat. He told the Presi- 
dent, also, that two-thirds of the legislature had been unfavorable 
to Van Buren. Jackson vigorously defended Van Buren. He 
said "that White could hardly get a vote out of Tennessee, and 
that Tennessee must not separate from the rest of his friends." 
He was willing to compromise by supporting White for Vice- 
President, and it would be time enough for White to run for 
President after Van Buren had retired.^ 

Jackson did not at this time harbor bitter feelings toward 
White, personally. These did not come until later, and even 
then, as will appear, he regarded the judge more as a dupe of 
political intriguers than as his personal enemy. His feeling in 
1834 was one of annoyance that White should be made the instru- 
ment in an attempt to thwart the plans he had made for Van 
Buren. 

White and Jackson had long been close personal friends. 
The judge had loyally supported the "old hero" in his cam- 
paigns for the Presidency and during the first part of his admin- 
istration was regarded as one of his most able advisers.^" But 
White was no sycophant, and he was too indei^endent to follow 
any man's program, even though the man might chance to be 



8 White to Polk, Aug. 26, 18.34 (Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson White, 
254). 

oBrarlley to White, Aug. 23, 1836 (Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lairson 
White, 302). 

10 See letters of Jackson, Overton, Coffee, Polk et aJ.. in Scott, Memoir 
of Hugh Lawfson White, 267-269. 



JUDGE WHITE AND THE PRESIDENCY 67 

General Jackson. As early as 1831, when Jackson was recon- 
structing his cabinet so that Van Buren might, under the Presi- 
dent's own rule,^' be made eligible to succeed him, he had invited 
White to become Secretary of War, while Eaton, the outgoing 
Secretary, was to have White 's place as Senator from Tennessee. ^- 
The judge declined the offer, and although no breach between 
the two men resulted. White was henceforth made to feel that 
he was no longer in good standing in administration circles. ^^ 

Jackson was irritated by various manifestations of White's 
independence, and especially so by his disregard of the Presi- 
dent's wishes when Clay's compromise tariff bill was before the 
Senate in 1833. The Senate had voted to refer Clay's bill to 
a select committee. Before White, their presiding officer, had 
appointed the committee, he was invited to a conference with 
the President. Preferring Clay 's bill to one which had been sent 
to the House by the Secretary of the Treasury, and anticipating 
that Jackson had sent for him for the purpose of dictating the 
membership of the committee, White, before going to see the 
President, selected a committee which he thought would support 
Clay's measure. A majority, which included Clayton, of Dela- 
ware, were rated as anti-administration men." The President 
was much ' ' mortified ' ' and told Grundy in a letter that ' ' it is an 
insult to me, & the Sec. of the Treasury that such a man as 



11 This rule was that none of his cabinet should succeed him if he 
could prevent it. 

12 White's testimony before the House Committee (Scott, Memoir of 
Hugh Laicson White, 299; Washington Globe, May 25, 1831). 

13 "The true reason why nothing I have said is noticed in the Globe, 
I have no doubt is, because I have never assured any man that as soon as 
Gen. Jackson 's terms of service are at an end, I will use all my endeavors 
to elect the favorite of those who direct the operations of the paper. I am 
for Gen. Jackson; but am not either a Calhoun Jackson man, or a Van 
Buren Jackson man, and therefore it is pleasing to the Globe and Tele- 
graph not to notice favorably anything I can say or do; and as I am 
opposed to Mr. Clay, his papers will of course speak disrespectfully of 
me."' ' White to F. S. Heiskell, editor of the Knoxville Begister, May 18, 
1832 (Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson White, 269). 

1* Testimony of Judge White before the House Committee (Scott, 
Memoir of Hugh Laicson White, 299). 



68 JAMES K. POLK 

Clayton should be iii:>oii it [the committee] ."^^ Nevertheless, 
Jackson held White in high esteem, and, despite this "insult" 
and other similar vexations, the two men continued amicable 
relations. White was still rated as a Jackson man, and, in the 
judge's opinion, it was not until the President visited Tennessee 
in 1834 that he became convinced that White would not support 
his political program/'^ Jackson was willing to compromise by 
letting White have the Vice-Presidency, but the judge must not 
stand in the way of Van Buren. 

Up to the time that Polk returned to Washington for the 
opening of Congress, there is nothing in his correspondence, 
except his letter to White, to indicate that he took an active inter- 
est in the movement to nominate Judge White. His thoughts 
were centered on Bell, and the suggestion made by C. C. Clay^" 
to "take good care to put your adversary in the ivrong" was 
entirely superfluous. His task was made comparatively easy by 
the indiscretions of the adversary himself. Bell's Murfrees- 
borough speech^** proved a boomerang to its author, for in it he 
had criticized the President and given quasi support to the 
national bank. Then, too. Hall, of the Nashville Republican, had 
boasted that there would be "a split between Polk and the Presi- 
dent," and that Polk would be driven from power^" by the 
political influence of Bell. Such arrogance, when duly reported 
to the President, was sufficient to arouse his resentment, and, 
Avhen it soon developed that Bell was one of the most ardent sup- 
porters of White, he was denounced as a political apostate. 

The determination of White's Tennessee friends to nominate 
him, and Jackson's strenuous opposition to such a nomination, 
placed Polk in an awkward position. White's friends have always 



15 Jackson to Grundy, Feb. 13, 1833, Am. Hist. Mag., V, 137. 

10 "He no doubt believed that whenever he and those he eouhl control 
changed their creed, I would change my creed likewise, and he was never 
convinced to the contrary, until after his attempt upon me through Mr. 
Bradley, which was in the autumn of 1834. ' ' "White to the ' ' Freemen of 
Tennessee" (Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson White, 320). 

17 Clay to Polk, Sept. 23, 1834, Polk Papers. 

IS See above, p. 53. lo Yell to Polk, Sept. 25, 1834, PoJk Papers. 



JUDGE WRITE AND THE PSESIDENCY 69 

assumed that Polk treacherously turned against White simply 
to please General Jackson, and White himself appears to have 
held this view. Even now, after Polk's entire correspondence 
has become available, it is difficult to determine to what extent 
this charge is true. His friendship for Judge White he never 
attempted to conceal, and that he desired the support of Jackson 
is beyond question; but after his defeat by Bell the political 
situation, both in Tennessee and in Congress, was such that for 
reasons of his own, and irrespective of Jackson's wishes, he could 
not support a candidate whose chief sponsor was his rival, John 
Bell. He liked White and, like many of his Tennessee friends, 
he probably did not share the President's admiration for A^an 
Buren ; but he was a firm believer in party loyalty ; and besides, 
the men who were taking the lead in promoting White's interests 
were at the same time endeavoring to undermine Polk himself. 
Polk's habitual reticence adds to the difficulty of determining 
his thoughts and motives. If possible, he always avoided contro- 
versies which did not immediately concern himself, and to his 
best friends he was guarded in expressing his opinions. When, 
in 1831, there was discord in Jackson's cabinet, Polk discreetly 
declined to participate in the effort to force Eaton from the 
cabinet, or even to discuss the matter in writing.-" When the 
break between Jackson and Calhoun occurred, he forwarded 
Calhoun's "defense" to his friends, but without disclosing his 
own views. One of his closest friends complained that ' ' I write 
you my opinions freely as I am not disposed with you to conceal 
my views, but I must acknowledge that you have been more 
prudent with yours for I am not able to even conjecture how your 
feelings are after all your long letters. ' '-^ 



20 Several letters to C. A. Wiekliffe declining to discuss the subject 
{Folic Papers). 

21 A. Yell to Polk, March 13, 1831, Poll-: Papers. Yell expressed his own 
opinions freely enough. He believed Calhoun 's defense to be honest and 
sincere, and that Crawford was a scoundrel. He had a "bad impression" 
of Van Buren and hoped that he would not be nominated as Jackson 's 
successor. The attempt to force Van Buren on the people would oulv aid 
"Prince Hal." 



y 



70 JAMES E. POLK 

Polk and White had long been personal and political friends. 
There is nothing to indicate that their friendship had been in 
any degree affected by the coolness between White and the Presi- 
dent. To this White's comments on Polk's defeat by Bell in 1834 
bear witness. ' ' Both are to me like children ; " he wrote-- ' ' there- 
fore I took no part in the contest." Polk's expression of "sur- 
prise and astonishment"-' in September, 1834. when informed 
of Jackson's threat to denounce White, should he consent to 
become a candidate, was no doubt unfeigned. He was frequently 
evasive or noncommittal, but he was not given to flattery.-* 

Polk returned to Washington to assume his duties in the 
House in December, 1834. Up to this time there appears to have 
been no connection between his quarrel with Bell and Jackson's 
opposition to White. But he had not been in Washington long 
before these two controversies became merged by an effort on 
the part of Polk's opponents to bring White out as a candidate. 
Polk 's own version of his attitude toward the judge 's nomination 
is stated in a "confidential" letter to his brother-in-law, James 
Walker. As his motives in opposing White have often been 
questioned, it seemes desirable to insert this letter in spite of its 
length. 

I have been so busily engaged in preparing tlie appropriation bills — 
and those connected with the Banks that I have not heretofore taken leisure 
to write to you. I have had nothing to do with the management — and 
undercurrents which I understand have been going on here in regard to the 
next Presidency. I have considered that it was my first duty to attend 
to the important measures committed to the committee of Avhieh I am a 



22 To editor of Knoxville Eegister (Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson 
White, 253). 

•23 Polk to White, Sept. 2, 1834, ibid., 2.54. 

2-1 "White's biographer in commenting on this letter (of September, 
1834) makes the rather astonishing statement that as soon as Polk ascer- 
tained "the sentiments of Gen. Jackson in regard to his successor" he 
shaped his "course according to the President's wishes, although motives 
of personal policy . . . decided him not to define his position until after 
his reelection the ensuing August. ' ' She then goes on to show that Polk 
and Cave Johnson ' ' had determined to pick a quarrel ' ' with White in 
February, 1835! 



JUDGE WRITE AND THE PEESIDENCY 71 

member. This I have done and shall continue to do, and I am sure my 
constituents will appreciate my serA^ices more than if I were engaged in 
the intrigues of politicians Avith a view to my own personal advancement. 
I have no doubt that my constituents feel and think as I do, upon the sub- 
ject of the succession, — but still they have not commissioned me here — 
either to engage their votes, to commit them upon the subject or to express 
their opinions. As a citizen I shall have a right to my own opinion, — and 
whenever there shall be occasion shall certainly exercise it. In regard to our 
countryman Judge White I have said this, — that there was no man to 
whom personally — I have ever had kindlier feelings, and that if he was 
brought forward, or taken up and run by our political party, it would give 
me pleasure to support him, — but at tlie same time I think that the party 
now dominant in the country, who have recently achieved so signal a victory, 
have fought the battle to little purpose, if in the moment of this triumph, 
they permit themselves to be divided & distracted about men, and thereby 
perhaps enable our political adversaries to take advantage of our divisions, — 
throw the election into the House, Avhen there is danger that the money of 
the Bank and the patronage of the Government, — Avould cornipt & purchase 
votes enough to carry the election against us. It must certainly be the desire 
of our party, who are emphatically — from the policy Ave advocate, the party 
of the country, — if possible to continue united and not diAdde about men. 
I think the party should unite if it be possible and run but one man, and 
it would assuredly give me pleasure should Judge White be that man. Sup- 
pose we diAdde and select more than one candidate, — and suffer the friends 
of our respectiA'e candidates to become irritated & exei[ted] against each 
other; may not the opposition, and Avill they not take advantage of such a 
state of things, and at a moment Avhen it shall be too late for us to retrace 
our steps, and re-unite our friends in favor of any one, suddenly push out a 
candidate of their OAvn, defeat an election before the people, throw the elec- 
tion into the House and thus stand a fair chance to come into poAver 
against the popular Avill. To meet such a state of things I repeat we 
should continue united and if possible run but one man. Should Judge 
White be the man upon AA^hom the party unite, none would support him 
Avith more pleasure than myself. Upon this subject, the present moment 
may be an important crisis. As soon as Congress assembled, — many of the 
opposition members expressed Avishes that Judge White should be brought 
out and announced their intention to support him, — if he was &e. Their 
motive for this, the game they Avill play hereafter or the subject they hope 
to effect, I knoAv not except — that they would doubtless do any thing in 
their poAver to divide & scatter us. That portion of our delegation in W* 
Tennessee, who manifested such unprovoked hostility to me during the past 
summer— I mean the Speaker, Dickinson &c. probably think they can make 
something out of this state of things to my prejudice, and for their oAvn 
purposes, — have been zealous, or pretended to be so, to bring Judge Wliite 



72 JAMES E. POLK 

out at once, and at all events, -without waiting to consult any portion of 
the democratic party — residing in other states with whom we have so 
long acted, — and Avho have so long acted with us in supporting the admin- 
istration of the present Chief Magistrate. Ought they not to be at least 
consulted before such a step is taken? But that portion of our delegation 
probably think that by taking this course they Avill gain an advantage of 
me in Tennessee and that by uniting with the opposition Mr. B[ell] may be 
enabled to retain his place here at the next Congress, in the same way he 
originally obtained it. The East Tennessee part of our delegation very 
honestly and sincerely desire to see Judge White elected. On the day before 
yesterday I was informed by Col. Standifer that there Avas to be a meeting 
of the delegation, — on the night following (last night) upon the subject 
and was requested to attend. On yesterday Mr. Lea spoke to me on the 
subject & told me the meeting was to be at Peyton's room and urged us to 
attend. I told him that my attending or not attending was a matter of no 
consequence; — that neither my own opinions or that of my constituents of 
Judge White would be changed, — whether I attended or not; that I had no 
commission from my constituents to speak for them.; that, that was a matter 
they would attend to for themselves, when the time came for them to act; 
that I was very laboriously engaged in the discharge of my public duty as a 
meml>er of the House; and that I did not regard the proposed meeting as 
any part of that duty. I told him furthermore that I could not but suspect 
that, that portion of our delegation who are, without cause given by me so 
exceedingly hostile to me, were prompted in this movement more in the hope 
of injuring me, than for any love they had for Judge White. And further- 
more I told him, that what was conducive against my attendance was this — 
that I could not without losing all self-respect go into a consultation upon 
any subject, — (unless public duty required it,) with that portion of our 
delegation, — Avho had during the past summer through their organs and 
tools so unjustly and Avantonly assailed me, and especially when I was 
informed that the meeting was to take place at the room of a colleague"-5 
who was certainly unfriendly in his feelings towards me, and had never 
invited me to come_ to it. For these reasons I declined and did not attend. 
The meeting was held, Grundy, Blair & myself absent. Johnson attended — 
but will probably communicate to the delegation his views in writing ; they 
entirely accord Avitli mine. I understand that Dunlap (though I have not 
talked to him) agrees in his vieAvs AAdth Johnson and myself. I Avrite you 
very confidentially — that you may be apprised of Avhat is going on here. 
From the unfairness Avith Avhich I have been treated in other things I haA'e 
reason to suspect that letters may be Avritten home misrepresenting me upon 



23 Peyton, who A\-as White's nephcAV, had opposed Polk in the Speaker- 
ship election and had giA'en as his reason, according to CaA'e Johnson, that 
Polk had Avorked Avith the Nullifiers! (Johnson to Polk, July 15, 1884, 
PoR- Papers). 



JUDGE WRITE AND THE FBESIDENCY 73 

this; — probably representing from my absence from the meeting, that I am 
unfriendly to Judge White &e. — and I look for nothing else than to see 
some misinformation in regard to it, through the Nashville papers. I write 
you to put you in possession of the faets,^ — that you may in the proper way, 
and without using my letter publicly be enabled to put the matter right. 
I wish you to take so much of your time from your business — which I know 
to be pressing upon your time, as to write me your opinion fully & freely 
upon the subject; — and whether you think I have acted prudently or not. 
I have acted upon my convictions of what was proper, — and Avith feelings of 
most perfect friendship for Judge White. Can I be affected by it? 

James Walker, Esq., 

Columbia, Tenu. 

V ery sincerely, 

Yr friend, 

James K. Polk2fi 

This letter seems to give ample reasons why a man of Polk's 
well-known belief in party loyalty should not support the appar- 
ently hopeless cause of Judge White. It is not fair to assume, 
as the friends of White have done, that those who did not come 
out for the judge were necessarily the abject creatures of General 
Jackson. There was only one man whose support could, by any 
possibility, have elevated White to the Presidential chair. That 
man was Jackson himself ; and neither Polk nor those who acted 
with him could hope, even if they had so desired, to alter the Presi- 
dent 's determination to aid Van Buren. To support White, as 
Polk pointed out, would result in splitting the party and endang- 
ering its success, without benefiting the judge in any particular. 
It was too much to ask of Polk to cooperate with men whom he 
both distrusted and despised as he did Bell and Peyton in sup- 
porting a candidate who would inevitably be defeated. There 
is no reason for questioning the sincerity of Polk's belief that 
Bell was flirting with the opposition, as he had done when he 
was a candidate for Speaker. The assertions made by Polk, 
Grundy, and Johnson that they would gladly support White if 
he could procure the party nomination were said by their oppon- 
ents to be pure cant and of course there was no possibility of his 



20 The letter is dated Dec. 24, 1834, Foil- Papers. 



74 JAMES K. POLK 

procuring such a nomination unless Jackson should change his 
mind — but there is nothing in their private cort-espondence to 
indicate that they did not really prefer White to Van Buren. 

On the day after the above letter was written Polk wrote-^ 
another " confidentiaV ' letter to Walker. Alluding to the former 
letter he said: 

Since then the fact that a meeting took place and the objects of it has been 

communicated to 2s and my course is highly approved. 

The meeting has attracted attention and things as they really are in Ten- 
nessee, are beginning to be well understood here. He says that if Judge 
White should be united upon and be a candidate of the party — that then he 
should be supported by the party — but any portion of those professing to 
be the friends of the administration who would bring him or any one else 
out — without consulting the wishes of the friends of the administration in 
other States, mil eventually not only destroy him but themselves. The 
storm I apprehended is to burst upon us, and we in Tennessee must be 
prepared to meet it. Wliatever our personal preferences for men may be, as 
patriots we should go for the good of the country, — and to that end should 
avoid divisions — and preserve if possible the integrity of the party. 

The portion of the letter just quoted clearly indicates that Polk 
declined to attend the meeting without having a consultation with 
the President. Continuing, he told Walker that the person to 
whom he has alluded (Jackson ?) 

says he has already heard that it has been dropped out by some one of the 
opposition, that the plan of tlieir operation, is upon the Bell system, alluding 
to the Speaker's election. I will not be hasty or imprudent in this matter, — 
but may venture to communicate what is passing to yoiL-^ 

He wished to know whether Tennessee would probably send dele- 
gates to the national convention of the party. He instructed 



27 Polk to Walker, Dec. 25, 1884, Polk Papers. 

28 Blanks in the copy in the Polk collection, but evidently mean Jackson. 

29 Cave Johnson, Polk told Walker, had written to the Tennessee dele- 
gation stating that he would not support White ' ' if he is to be run by 
the opposition Nationals and NuUifiers, — aided by a small portion of the 
Jackson party." Polk, Dunlap, and Blair felt the same way, and "Grundy 
is more excited than I have almost ever seen him, — and seems almost 
ready to come out and denounce the whole movement, — as calculated to 
divide and destroy the party." 



JUDGE WHITE AND THE PRESIDENCY 75 

Walker to prevail upon the Columbia Observer to support the 
regular nominee in case its favorite should fail to procure the 
nomination. To this Walker replied^° that he preferred White 
if he could be nominated by the party, but he feared that a split 
would make success doubtful. He promised to induce the 
Observer, if possible, to support the national ticket whoever 
might be nominated. 

In a formal statement prepared by Polk^^ several items con- 
cerning the meeting of the Tennessee delegation in Washington 
are related which are not mentioned in his letters to Walker. 
According to this account, on the Sunday night before Congress 
convened, while Polk was calling on Grundy, Duff Green came 
in and urged that the Tennessee members should come out for 
White. Green expressed his own readiness to support the judge. 
Polk remained silent, but Grundy replied that he was not pre- 
pared to act on this subject. Although Polk had declined to meet 
with the other delegates, Lea, of Tennessee, came to the House 
a few days after the meeting had been held and handed Polk a 
letter which the delegation had prepared to send to Judge White. 
There were no signatures attached and Lea explained that the 
delegation had desired to have Polk sign it first. Polk replied 



30 Jan. 12, 1835 (Polk Papers). Walker had already written on Jan- 
uary 7 that it had been reported in Tennessee that Bell and others in- 
tended to run White whether he is chosen by the national convention or 
not. ' ' I believe Judge White is the most popular man in Tennessee ex- 
cept Gen. Jackson, but I do not think it is certain that even he can get 
the vote of Tennessee in opposition to the regular nomination of the 
Republican party — it looks like suicide — and how can we mix with such 
men as Poindexter and others of the same stamp?" He hopes that White 
will not lend his name to the scheme. 

31 It is addressed to J. B. & Co. (John Bell & Co.), but is changed into 
a letter to Cave Johnson. It is dated January 20, but relates to events 
that occurred as late as March 26. It probably is the first draft of his 
statement addressed to Johnson under date of March 26. In another letter 
to Johnson, dated March 28, Polk gives his reason for addressing him 
instead of Bell. Bell 's criticisms of Polk had been contained in a letter 
written to Johnson, and, as Polk had received no communication directly 
from Bell, he could not write to him; or, if he should do so, Bell would 
not publish the letter. So it was sent to Johnson for publication at the 
proper time. 



76 JAMES K. POLE 

that he had noticing against White, but wouhl not act with a 
portion of the party. A few days later Hubbard,'Of New Hamp- 
shire, informed Polk that Green was trying to interest members 
of Congress in the establishment of a White paper in Washing- 
ton. Bell had tried to convince Hubbard that it would benefit 
New Hampshire to join with the South and West in forming a 
new party, but Hubbard declined to cooperate with him. ^lay, 
of niinois, told Polk that he had "stumbled on a caucus" com- 
posed of Bell, Peyton, and other Tennessee members. To May's 
protests against dividing the party. Bell replied that he saw no 
sacrifice of principle in winning opposition votes. In all of 
this Polk saw — or, at least, pretended to see — a plot of Bell, 
Green, and Crockett"'- to use Judge White for the purpose of 
overthrowing the Republican party. 

The other side of the story is told in letters written to Cave 
Johnson by other members of the Tennessee delegation. These, 
White's biographer has published for the purpose of showing 
the "duplicity of Johnson and Polk."^^ The essential difference 
between these letters and those of Polk above quoted is that they 
state that Polk and Johnson had expressed a preference for White 
over any other man and had agreed to support him "under 
any circumstances that he. Judge White, would permit his name 
to be used," while Polk maintained that he had promised sup- 
port only in ease White should be nominated by the party. Which 
of the two statements is correct we are unable to determine with 
absolute certainty, but Polk's version accords with his invariable 
practice of conforming to the party program. ''^ 

While Polk was declining to meet with Bell, his friend Brady 
was sending to Jackson and to members of Congress copies of the 



32 Crockett had signed the letter to White. 

33 Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lciicson White, 259-262. 

34 Standifer asserted that the meeting of the delegation held for the 
purpose of considering White's nomination "was a project of my own 
without being prompted by any one." Both Polk and Grundy, he said, 
after ascertaining that Bell would be there, declined to attend the meeting 
{ibid., 260-262). 



JUDGE WHITE AND TEE PEESIDENCY 77 

Murfreesborough Monitor containing Bell's Murfreesborough 
speech. He also urged upon Polk the necessity of establishing 
an administration paper in Nashville. ^^ The plan of the bolters, 
he said, was White for eight years, and then "the Speaker will 
graciously condescend to take upon himself the burthens of 
State." 

There is abundant evidence that Polk's Tennessee friends 
really believed that Bell and his adherents were plotting to divide 
the party. Daniel Graham of Murfreesborough wrote'" that, 
while he preferred White to any other man, he distrusted his 
supporters. "No one here doubts," wrote Polk's brother-in-law, 
W. R. Rucker, "that he [Bell] is a thorough Bank man and at 
heart (though a dissembling hypocrite) one of Gen^ Jackson's 
bitterest enemies. "^^ In the opinion of James Walker, another 
brother-in-law. Van Buren was the only man who could lead the 
party to victory. "We justly esteem and appreciate Judge 
White, but cannot consent to become the tools of the opposition, 
or to be associated in political feeling with such as Poindexter & 
others."^- A. V. Brown, one of Polk's closest friends, preferred 
White as a successor to Jackson but asked the question. 

Do the Whigs really mean to do something finally for him — or is it a part 
of their policy to make a pTesent shew in his favor to effect division in the 
Jackson ranks & so weaken Mr. Van Buren & then finally press some 
favorite of their own & so throw the Election in the House ?39 

Childress informed Polk" that it was rumored in Nashville that 
Bell and his friends were confident of throwing the election into 
the House, where White would have a majority, and that they 



3- Brady to Polk, Dec. 26, 1834, PolJc Papers. 

36 Graham to Polk, Jan. 2, 1835, Polk Papers. 

3" Eucker to Polk, Jan. 5, 1835, Poll' Papers. "Don't misunderstand 
me, ' ' he added, ' ' I like White as well as any of these people, but I don 't 
like these intriguing friends of his." He urged Polk to inform Jackson 
of the intrigues. 

38 Walker to Polk, Jan. 15, 1835, Polk Papers. 

39 Brown to Polk, Jan. 15, 1835, Polk Papers. 

40 Childress to Polk, Jan. 23, 1835, Polk Papers. Childress was Mrs. 
Polk's brother. 



78 JAMES K. FOLK 

were equally confident of defeating Polk and Cave Johnson at 
the coming election. 

The anomalous situation in Tennessee was aptly put by 
another of Polk's correspondents. 

Tlie more I reflect ou the posture of affairs, the more am I provoked at the 
success of iniquitj\ Almost evei-y man in the community who takes part 
in or cares for public doings, finds himself occupying a false position which 
he is compe"lled to defend. I shall find myself opposed to Judge White, 
which is not true, so of Doct Eucker & thousands of others — whilst thousands 
will find themselves opposed to Genl Jackson wiio are sincerely wath him. 
Furthermore Genl Jackson & Judge White will find themselves in hostile 
attitude before the scene closes, whatever may be tlieir hopes and expectations 
now. 41 

All agreed that John Bell was the man who had created this 
embarrassing predicament. 

No doubt the intriguing of White's supporters was greatly 
exaggerated, but it seemed real enough to those who were striving 
to preserve party solidarity. Jackson's determination to force 
upon the people an unpopular candidate was after all the main 
cause of the diificulty, for many could not pass White by and 
support Van Buren without sacrificing their principles. Party 
loyalty alone kept others from espousing White's cause, and for 
some time many of Jackson's friends had hopes that he might 
yet drop Van Buren and acquiesce in White's nomination.*- 

The President, however, had no thought of abandoning his 
favorite. He vehemently condemned the activities of the Teini- 
essee delegation, and he was beginning to regard Bell as an 
enemy.^^ Back of the encouragement given to White by political 
opponents was seen the hand of Henry Clay, who was believed 
to be ready to seize any advantage that might result from throw- 
ing the election into the House. ^* 



41 Daniel Graham to Polk, Jan. 29, 1835, Folic Papers. 

42 Gen. Sam '1 G. Smith to Polk, Feb. 3, 1835, Poll- Papers. 

43 Polk to Walker, Jan. 18, 1835, Pollc Papers. 

44 Copy of a letter from Polk to somebody in Tennessee, dated Feb- 
ruary 7, 1835, Po]lx' Papers. The letter was probably written to James 
Walker; see Walker to Polk, Feb. 24, ihid. 



JUDGE WHITE AND THE PRESIDENCY 79 

After the meeting of the Tennessee delegation, White of 
course realized that the members had divided on the question 
of supporting him. He regretted the discord that had arisen but 
nevertheless declined to forbid the use of his name.*^ On Decem- 
ber 29, 1834, the delegation had addressed him a letter asking 
if he would accept a nomination, and he replied in the affirma- 
tive.'**' He said afterwards that he would never have consented 
to become a candidate but for Jackson's threat to make him 
' ' odious to society " if he did.*' 

Outwardly, at. least, the judge remained on friendly terms 
with the Tennessee members of Congress who had opposed his 
nomination until a controversy arose over a question of patron- 
age. Polk and Johnson had recommended, and Jackson had 
appointed, a district attorney for West Tennessee without con- 
sulting Senator White. In a letter to the two men** White inti- 
mated that there had been "secret contrivance" to bring about 
the appointment. If, as White's biographer asserts, these two 
Tennesseans "had determined to pick a quarrel with Judge 
White," they now had their opportunity — and they certainly 
made the most of it. They replied in a very caustic letter in 
which they repelled what they regarded as insinuations against 
themselves and the President. White's rejoinder was equally 
caustic, and the break was complete.*^ 

It is quite possible that Polk may have welcomed such an 
excuse for openly breaking with the judge. The time had arrived 
when he must take a definite stand for one side or the other, 
inasmuch as it was now certain that the opposition intended to 



45 White to Alexander, Jan. 12, 1835 (Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson 
White, 255). 

■4G Correspondence in Scott, Memoir of Hiigh Lawson White, 329-331. 
■17 Speech at Kuoxville, Aug. 1, 1838 (Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson 
White, 359). 

48 Dated Feb. 24, 1835 {Folic Papers). 

49 The correspondence may be found in the Polk Papers under dates of 
February 24-26. Part of it is printed in Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson 
White, 256-259. 



80 JAMES E. POLE 

use White for the purpose of defeating the nomination of an 
administration candidate — that is a regular Republican nomi- 
nation/'^' Such being the case, both self-interest and party loyalty 
beckoned in the same direction, for he could expect no favors 
from the men who were promoting the campaign for White's 
nomination. Bell was liis personal enemy and political rival ; 
many letters warned him that the White adherents were schem- 
ing, as one put it, "to get White & the people upon one side & 
Van Buren & my friend Col. Polk on the other. "^^ Having made 
the inevitable choice, Polk endeavored, through James Walker 
and other local leaders, to hold his constituents in line for the 
administration, but White's popularity was already playing 
havoc with party solidarity.^'- At a political meeting held in 
Columbia on February 12, Walker, by resolution, tried to pledge 
the meeting to the "party candidate." The resolution was de- 
feated by the aid of many who had hitherto been averse to 
White's nomination.^^ Not long after this Walker felt certain 
that White would carry Tennessee and he cautioned Polk that 
"non interference may be your true position.""'^ 

Nearly all the newspapers in Tennessee favored White's nom- 
ination. Bell controlled both Nashville papers, and late in Feb- 
ruary F. K. Zollicoffer, of the Columbia Observer, hoisted the 
White banner. Polk and his friends in Middle Tennessee were 
without an organ of influence until they established, a month 
later, the Nashville Union, which White, in a speech in the Senate, 



-oPolk to (probably Walker), Feb. 7, 1835, Folk Papers. 

51 James H. Thomas to Polk, Feb. 12, 1835, Polk Papers. J. W. Child- 
ress wrote (Jan. 23) that Polk and Johnson had been marked for defeat. 
Similar information came from Gen. Smith (Feb. 13), W. G. Childress and 
James Walker (both Feb. 14), ibid. 

'>- Some in Tennessee, said W. G. Childress in his letter of February 14, 
"seem to think or to say that Jackson, the Jackson party and Jackson 
administration will soon be no more, that the whole will be swallowe<l in 
the White party." 

•''- "The small i)oliticians are all on the scent and expect to rise on the 
White excitement" (Walker to Polk, Feb. 24, 1835, Polk Papers). 

-1 Walker to Polk, Feb. 28, 1835, ibid. 



JUDGE WHITE AND THE PRESIDENCY 81 

called a "vehicle of slanders and falsehoods, gotten up in this 
city [Washington] " for the purpose of distorting the truth. ''^ 
This paper was edited by Samuel H. Laughlin ; its policy was 
directed by Polk, Grund}", and Judge Catron, who M^ere mainly 
responsible for its financial support. 

Polk returned home after Congress had adjourned, only to 
find White's prospects daily growing brighter. In a speech de- 
livered at Columbia, April 20, he justified his refusal to join 
other members of the delegation in asking White to run on the 
ground that he had not been sent to Washington for the purpose 
of making presidents. His personal preference had been for 
White, he said, if he could have been nominated by the Repub- 
lican party.''*^ Grundy approved this speech, but as to any further 
discussion of the subject his advice to Polk was that "the 
judicious course is a plain one — say nothing."^' 

In Washington, General Jackson was eagerly awaiting news 
from Tennessee. He was now fully convinced of Bell's "per- 
fidy," but apparently he did not yet realize the strength of the 
White movement. In a long letter"^ he expressed a fear that 
Polk's promised communication had been delayed by illness, 
" for I am sure the little noise, and various meetings, got up 
by the instrumentality of Mr. Bell and Co. cannot have alarmed 
you." After delivering a homily on the iniquity of abandoning 
principles, and citing Clay, Calhoun, and Burr as horrible ex- 
amples, he said that "Mr. Bell, Davy Crockett & Co. has placed 
Judge White in the odious attitude of abandoning principle & 
party for office, ' ' and with the association of the nullifiers 

The eyes of the people soon were opened to this wicked plan, to divide and 
conquer the Democracy of the union, prostrate the present administration 
by making it odious by crying out corruption and misrule, and being sup- 
ported by office holders, and corruption, thereby to bring into power the 



55 Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lnwson White, 292. 

56 Speech printed in the Washington Globe, May 29, 1835. 
"' Grundy to Polk, May 11, 1835, Folic Papers. 

58 Jackson to Polk, May 3, 1835, ihid. The letter was marked "private 
for your own eye — it is wrote in haste. ' ' 



82 JAMES K. POLK 

opposition, reeharter the United States Bank, destroying tlie republican 
government & substitute in its stead, a consolidated government under the 
conti-ole of a corrupt monied monopoly. 

After scanning this doleful picture of a future possibility, Polk 
must have felt relieved when he read further on that "Mr. Bell 
& Co. have not succeeded — Virginia is erect again." "Surely," 
continued the President, "Tennessee will never put herself in 
the false position of joining the piedbald opposition of Whiggs, 
nullifiers, blue light federalists, and Hartford convention men. 
It cannot be — heaven and every principle of virtue and repub- 
licanism forbid it." Had White remained with his party, said 
Jackson, he might have procured the Vice-Presidency, but 

he has been placed by Mr. BeU & Co. as the candidate of the opposition 
under the odious imputation of abandoning his old republican principles & 
party, for office, and Avliether he has or not the world has taken up that 
opinion, and he never can regain the confidence of that party again. The 
opposition never intended that he should be elected, they meant to divi.le, 
that they might conquer for Mr. Clay Avho, you may rely, is to he tlieir 
candidate at last. 

He had hopes that ' ' judge White 's eyes may be opened and he 
will now see that he is in a false position and abandon Bell, Davy 
Crockett & Co., and withdraw himself from the odious attitude 
intriguing apostates have placed him [in]." 

It was doubtless pleasing news that Jackson thus fixed the 
blame for disrupting the party upon Polk's own enemies. Bell 
and Crockett. Equally pleasing must it have been to read that 

You and Grundy, (by the true Republicans in Congress) are looked to, to 
take a firm and open stand in favour of the republican principles, a natwnal 
convention by the people, and in toto, against nullification & disunion — and 
against UttU caucuses, of a few apostate members of congress, & preserve 
Tennessee from the disgrace of uniting with the piebald opposition to put 
down my administration, and mil fame with it, and give the reigns of 
Government into the hands of those who liave recently conspired to reeharter 
the Bank. 

In this fight for principles, said the President, all must take a 
definite stand; "do your duty (as you have done here) at home, 



JUDGE WHITE AND THE PRESIDENCY 83 

and you will stand high with the republicans everywhere. ' ' Sav- 
ing Tennessee proved to be a more difficult task than Jackson 
had anticipated, but, by attempting to do so, Polk and Grundy 
earned his undying gratitude. 

In the President 's opinion, two mutually antagonistic factions 
had joined forces for the purpose of destroying the Republican 
party. While Bell and Clay were aiming at consolidated govern- 
ment, Calhoun and his friends were using White's name "to build 
up a Southern confederacy and divide the union. ' ' The President 
still spoke of White with regret more than anger. He did not 
charge him with being either a consolidationist or a nullifier, 
and he still had hopes that the judge would free himself from 
the influence of evil associates. 

Jackson was much encouraged by the success won by his party 
in Virginia, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. As to Tennessee 
he had fears, but he also had hopes. "Can it be," he said in 
closing his letter, 

that Tennessee will abandon republican principles and be ranked with 
apostates, nullifiers & hluelight Federalist — Tristam Burges says she will — 
forbit it virtue, forhit it lieaven — Tennessee has sustained me thus far, 
and I trust she never will abandon her principles for any person. 

In another long letter written to Polk on May 12, Jackson vented 
his wrath upon those who held political control of the state for 
their refusal to participate in the national nominating conven- 
tion.^^ "How it is," he asked, "that there is no man in the 
Republican ranks to take the stump, and relieve Tennessee from 
her degraded attitude ? ' ' This question may have been intended 
as a hint for a more aggressive stand on Polk's part. "If I was 
a mere citizen of Tennessee again," he continued, "and wanted 



59 For example, the Nashville Banner, denouncing the national conven- 
tion, said: "So long as we live and breathe American air, we will resist 
the insidious proposition (whensoever and wheresoever it may originate), 
to lay at the feet of village politicians and placemen, who most usually fill 
conventions, the inestimable privilege of thinking and acting for ourselves 
in the choice of our rulers." Quoted in Niles' Begister (March 28, 1835), 
XL VIII, 58. 



84 JAMES K. POLE 

everlasting fame, I ^vould ask no other theatre to obtain it than 
before the people of Tennessee.'"''" In this letter- Jackson spoke 
of the seceders as "White Whiggs, " and althongh both White 
and Bell still claimed membership in the Republican party, the 
press of both jiarties was beginning to class them as Whigs.''^ 
It was becoming the custom to apply this name to the National 
Republicans, of whom Clay was a recognized leader ; they, with 
the White supporters, constituted the new Whig party."- 

The desire of the Jacksonites to identify White and Bell with 
the Clay faction of the Whigs was aided materially by the dis- 
covery of Bell's "Cassedy" or "Bedford" letter of May 11, 
1835/'^ There is nothing particularly damaging to either man 
in the letter itself, but as construed and placed before the people 
by their opponents, it was said to be a pledge that White, if 
elected, would not veto any law for rechartering the bank. The 
latter part of it was construed as a suggestion that Polk's 



'io In Poll- Papers. Jackson's signature has been cut from this letter. 

61 "Elected, if elected at all, by the votes of the Whigs, he [White] 
will naturally and necessarily select his councillors from their ranks, and 
modify his nieasures according to their views." Richmond Whig, quoted 
by Richmond Enquirer, and reprinted in Washington Globe, May 4, 1835. 

C2 In his letter of May 3 to Polk, above quoted, Jackson spoke of 
"modern Whiggs. " He often omitted the h, and invariably used the 
double g. 

63 It was written to Cliarles Cassedj' of Bedford County, Tennessee, 
and read as follows: 

"Dear Sir: You will receive enclosed, the manifesto of the White 
cause and party. I think it contains our principles and the argument upon 
which they may be sustanied briefly set forth. 

"You will see by my letter all I know of Judge White's vie^\'s about 
the Bank. He douijtless never will swerve from them, but it would be 
most unprecedented, and <lo him, and very justly too, a great injury, to 
be declaring before hand, that he would put his veto upon any measure 
whatever. It would be said to be an electioneering declaration, and be- 
sides Mr. Van Buren has given no such pledges. 

"To defeat me for the Speaker's chair, is the main interest which 
Mr. Polk and Johnson have in this whole contest, as I believe. 

"It would not do to ask Polk to vote for me against himself, but he 
might be made to pledge himself to go for me against any other candidate. 
My course in appointing him chairman of the Committee of Ways and 
Means could be used to show that I have not been influenced by personal 
considerations against him, when the country is concerned. 

' ' Yours truly, < . jq^^^ ^ell. ' ' 

Printed in Nashville Union, April 5, 1839. 



JUDGE WHITE AND THE PBESIDENCY 85 

constituents should pledge him to cast his vote for Bell in the 
election of a Speaker. Between the lines there was seen a threat 
to defeat Polk in his campaign for reelection to Congress unless 
he should give such a pledge. The rumored contents — before 
its publication — were far worse than the letter itself, and its 
appearance in print failed to counteract the effect which the 
rumors had produced.^* 

Knowing that the people still believed in Jackson despite their 
loyalty to Judge White, Bell, who was himself a candidate for 
reelection, published a long letter in the Nashville Republican 
denying that he had "brought White out" in the sense and for 
the reasons claimed by the Democrats. "I am not against Jack- 
son or his administration," he wrote, "but I am opposed to Mr. 
Van Buren."*'^ As a blow at Polk, however, he published in a 
McMinnville paper extracts from the correspondence which had 
passed between Cave Johnson and the Tennessee delegation at 
the time that White had been invited to become a candidate. 
Bell's adversaries now published the entire correspondence in 
the Nashville Vnion-, and that journal highly commended the 
course which had been pursued by Polk, Grundy, and Johnson. 
From T. J. Pew, of Kentucky, Laughlin, the editor, learned that 
during the previous autumn Bell had urged Col. R. M. Johnson 
to become a candidate on the bank ticket'^'' and this paper now 
claimed to have conclusive proof of Bell's affiliations with the 
bank. His "Cassedy" letter was published in the Und&n on 
June 26, and Grundy confidently assured Polk that "that letter 
will make you Speaker, I think. ' '*^' 

During this same month (May 20) Van Bur en was nominated 
for the Presidency by the Baltimore convention, and a bitter 



6* A similar letter was written by Bell to a man in Giles County 
(Kincannon to Polk, June 1, 1835, Polk Papers). Kincannon said that he 
had seen the letter. 

65 Copied by the Washington Globe, May 28, 1835. 

G6 Laughlin to Polk, May 30, 1835, Polk Papers. Pew said that he had 
seen Bell's letter to Johnson. 

OT Grundy to Polk, June 25, 1835, ibid. 



86 JAMES E. POLE 

national campaign was waged in Tennessee simultaneously with 
the contest for supremacy between Polk and Bell. Although 
Jackson had, in his "Gwin letter, "*^^ asserted that it was to be a 
convention ' ' fresh from the people ' ' to whose will all in the party 
ought to submit, it was well known that this body had been called 
together for the sole purpose of ratifying the "appointment" 
already made by the President. His letter to Gwin had failed to 
produce the desired effect, for Tennessee did not even send dele- 
gates to the convention at Baltimore. Still unwilling to believe 
that the people of his state could fail to do his bidding, Jackson 
caused a statement to be circulated to the effect that the contest 
was really between himself and White, and not between the 
judge and Van Buren.*'^ 

There was much vituperation on either side during the months 
which preceded the congressional elections in Tennessee. Both 
parties seemed to realize that, if elected, Polk would be chosen 
Speaker of the House. Polk was popular in his district and many 
of the "White Whigs" remained loyal to him. Toward the close 
of the campaign, the Bell forces became more moderate in their 
criticisms, for it had become apparent that by indulging too 
freely in denunciations they had strengthened both Polk and 
Van Buren.^° 

Confident of victory, Jackson, from his retreat at "Rip 
Raps," was already planning work for Polk to do as soon as he 
had been reelected.^^ Polk, Grundy, and Johnson were to get up 
meetings which would instruct Representatives in Congress to vote 
against the chartering of any bank. They were also to induce the 
state legislature to instruct the Senators from Tennessee to vote 



esNUes' Ecgister, XLVIII, 80-81. 

«9 Scott, Memoir of Hugh Laicson White, 335. 

70 Polk to Jackson, Aug. 14, 1835, reporting his victory at the polls, 
Poll' Paper!?. 

"1 Clay, said the President, is the real t-andidate of the opposition, and 
Bell will'sacrifice White and try to get votes for himself in the Speaker- 
ship election. "The Judge will be left politically prostrate as ever Aron 
Burr was, and as few to sympathize with him on his downfall.'' 



JUDGE WHITE AND THE PEESIDENCT 87 

for Benton's expunging resolution and against a bank charter. 
In order to preclude the charge of persecution, he advised that 
the local meetings should draft their instructions before the legis- 
lature had convened and before either Bell or White had been 
nominated for reelection as members of Congress. In any event, 
Bell 's ' ' Cassedy letter ' ' would be a sufficient answer to any such 
charge.'- And yet the man who wrote this letter vehemently 
denied that he ever interfered with the free choice of the people ! 
Some of the party politicians'^ were inclined to doubt the wis- 
dom of having the members of Congress instructed by local meet- 
ings. They were not given much choice, however, in the matter 
of instructing Senators, for the President himself prepared an 
outline of instructions, which he sent to Governor Carroll. Major 
Guild was selected to present the instructions in the legislature. 
Jackson sent to Carroll, also, two volumes of the Extra Globe 
which contained Benton's speeches and other materials that might 
be useful for reference. He instructed Polk to repair to Nash- 
ville before the meeting of the legislature for the purpose of 
arranging everything for prompt action.'* He also urged Polk 
to be in Washington a few days before the opening of Congress, 
and "there must be a meeting of the friends of the administration 
& select the candidate for Speaker and elect him the first ballott. ' ' 
He did not state explicitly that Polk would be that candidate, but 
his assurance that "the New England states will sustain you" 
indicates that Polk was the President's own choice for the office."^^ 



72 Jackson to Polk, Aug. 3, 1835, Folic Papers. 

"For example, A. V. Brown (Brown to Polk, Aug. 27, 1835, Folic 
Fapers). 

74 ' ' You must be in Nashville some days before the Assembly meets, 
every arrangement ought to be made, and as soon as the House is formed 
the resolutions ought to be offered, or the opposition will forestall you by 
a set prepared for their own pallate be prompt and do not permit your- 
selves to be outgeneraled, the first blow is half the battle, and as they 
are preparing to elect a Senator, these resolutions will strike terror & 
confusion in their ranks — produce a panic, and blow up all their digested 
arrangements, and will add all the doubting members to your ranks. ' ' 

"5 Jackson to Polk, Sept. 15, 1835, Poll: Papers. ' ' When you read & 
note burn this" was his final instruction. 



88 JAMES K. POLK 

Even if there had not already existed a strong personal friend- 
ship between Polk and the President, their common desire to 
overthrow the Bell-White faction was sufficient to identify their 
political interests. 

For the next two months Polk kept Jackson well informed on 
passing events in Tennessee. With Donelson, also, he kept up 
a separate correspondence, concerning which they did not always 
take the President into their confidence.^" Donelson did not 
share Jackson 's belief that the legislature would adopt the Guild 
resolutions to instruct the Senators from Tennessee.'^ 

In October, while the legislature was in session, Judge White 
visited Nashville and other nearby towns, where public dinners 
were given in his honor. Without assigning any reasons, Polk 
curtly declined to attend any of these, but he reported to the 
President that White had taken advantage of the occasions to 
electioneer for himself and to censure Polk, Grundy, and other 
supporters of the administration. Jackson was much incensed 
by this information, but he still believed that the effect of the 
judge's speeches would be counteracted by the debate in the 
legislature on the expunging resolutions. ''Mark these words," 
he wrote to Polk, "have the yeas & nays taken upon them, and 
all who votes against them will be taught by the people of Tenn- 
essee that they have misrepresented them."'- White, in Jack- 
son's opinion, could not be too severely condemned for attacking 
Polk and other members of Congress ; ' ' rouse Grundy & Johnson 
into action, and I will vouch for the virtue of the people. ""'* 

The President's wish for prompt action on the expunging 
resolutions was doomed to disappointment ; a wearisome discussion 



vsBoth suspected that Bell had a spy in the President's household by 
whom he was supplied with administration secrets, but they give no clew 
as to whom they suspect (Donelson to Polk, Sept. 24, 1885, Poll- Papers). 

77 Donelson to Polk, Oct. 20, 1835, ibid. 

78 < 'I cannot yet believe," he continued, "that the democratic repub- 
licans of Tennessee can be so unjust to me, as to unite with Clay & the 
opposition in condemning me for preserving the constitution." 

70 Jackson to Polk. Oct. 20, 183.5, Polk Papers. 



JUDGE WHITE AND THE PRESIDENCY 89 

followed the introduction of the subject. On the other hand, 
the legislature very promptly nominated White for the Presi- 
dency, even before Jackson's above-quoted letter had reached 
Tennessee. In his letter of acceptance, White declared emphati- 
cally that his political principles had undergone no change ; that 
the administration forces, and not he, had deserted the traditional 
party standards and become "a mere faction. "^^ After the 
formal nomination had been made the people regarded the cam- 
paign as a contest between Jackson and White, and the Presi- 
dency was the principal topic of discussion at every local gath- 
ering. The country people generally stood loyally by the Presi- 
dent, while those living in towns were more apt to favor White. *^ 
After the congressional delegation had set out for Washing- 
ton — Polk to be elected Speaker over his arch enemy, Bell, and 
Johnson to frighten his friends by his near approach to a duel 
with the much hated Bailie Peyton*- — the legislature continued 
the acrimonious debates on Jackson's expunging resolutions. To 
add variety, the White supporters in the legislature were accused 
by their opponents of fraud in connection with the public print- 
ing. While the debate was in progress, Jackson sent appeals for 
support to members of the legislature, and it was said that Polk 
had prepared the list to be thus solicited. White, also, corre- 
sponded with some of the members. He made no attempt to in- 
fluence their votes, but his exposure of the methods employed by 
the President to defeat him undoubtedly brought him support. 
Strong language was used by both sides, and members did not 
hesitate to call General Jackson a "dictator" or to accuse him 
of trying to appoint his successor.*^ 



80 The documents relating to White 's nomination are printed in Seott, 
Memoir of Hugh Lmvson White, 331-,334. 

81 J. W. Chihiress to Polk, Nov. 22, 1835, FoJl: Papers. 

82Laughlin to Polk, Dec. 1; J. W. Johnson to Polk, Dec. 9, 1835, PoU: 
Papers. 

83 A. O. p. Nicholson to Polk, Feb. 4, 1836, ibid. "It is declared every 
day & by the leaders, that to Mr. Van B's personal character they do not 
object — but their great objection is, to Pres' Jackson nominating his 
successor" (Catron to Polk, Jan. 8, 1836, ibid.). 



90 JAMES K. POLK 

Both Jackson and Bell were said to have flooded the state 
with "franked" political literature for the purpose of influencing 
both the legislature and the people. But the command of the 
"old hero" was no longer as of yore. The legislature which 
had so recently nominated Judge White now declined to instruct 
him to vote for Benton 's expunging resolution^* 

Polk was elected Speaker of the House by a large majority, 
and both in Washington and in Tennessee the defeat of Bell for 
that office was expected to injure White's prospects in his own 
state. ' ' It was urged by the faithful, ' ' wrote White, 

that by the election of Polk, the vote of Tennessee would be changed. 
The course of Alabama,85 it was said, will be followed by the legislature 
of Tennessee, and in a very short time my name will be dropped every- 
where. . . . Everything which can be done to my injury, within their 
power, is done by Grundy and Johnson, from my own State, and probably 
by Polk, also.ss 

Party leaders in Tennessee undoubtedly believed that White 
would now withdraw^ from the race, or that in any case Van 
Buren would carry the state. Polk received many letters ex- 
pressing this opinion." Their hopes of defeating the judge were 
somewhat disturbed by the refusal of the legislature to instruct 
him on the expunging resolutions, but they were revived by the 
expected effect of White's votes against some of Jackson's ap- 
pointments and by his arguments and vote in favor of Clay's 
land distribution bill.^- 



84 E. H. Foster to White, Feb. 26, 1836 (Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson 
White, 337). 

S5 The legislature of Alabama nominated White, but on the condition 
that he should be ' ' the choice of the republican party throughout the Union. ' ' 

86 White to Geo. W. Churchwell, Jan. 3, 1836 (Scott, Memoir of Hugh 
Laicson White). 

87 Among the rest Nicholson wrote (January 22) that since Polk's 
election the White men had practically given up the struggle; "all ex- 
citement here has subsided, and the election of V. B. is given up by all but 
Gen. Barrow. ' ' 

88 Walker to Polk, April 11, 1836. White 's vote on the land bill ' ' must 
seal his fate," wrote Laughlin to Cave Johnson on May 9. One of White's 
admirers said at a political meeting that he "had followed White to his 
grave when he [White] voted for the land bill— and that he could not 
stand to be buried with him" (Herndon to Polk, May 25, 1836). All in 
Polk Papers. 



JUDGE WHITE AND THE PEESIDENCY 91 

One of the most serious handicaps of the administration party 
in Tennessee was the weakness of their press. The Bell- White 
faction had procured control of the leading newspapers in Nash- 
ville and elsewhere. The Nashville Union was the main Demo- 
cratic organ and Polk was in constant receipt of letters from 
Laughlin, its editor, which stated that the paper was approaching 
bankruptcy. Laughlin himself was enthusiastic but unreliable. 
Many a letter from Nashville politicians reported to Polk that 
"Laughlin has been drunk for a week." Near the close of the 
campaign he became so untrustworthy that Judge Catron was 
obliged to edit the Union.^^ 

For our present purpose it is unnecessary to follow in detail 
the remainder of White's campaign for the Presidency. By 
splitting the Democratic party and by bringing to Polk the 
powerful support of General Jackson, it was one of the prin- 
cipal factors in elevating Polk to the Speaker's chair. In his 
attitude toward White, Polk may have in some degree played the 
"unscrupulous partisan" which Parton says he was,°° but the 
political situation which resulted from White's candidacy left 
him very little choice. ^^ He' could not cooperate with Bell, and 
it would have been political suicide to break with the President. 

With the remainder of this campaign Polk's political wel- 
fare was not so intimately connected. It will therefore be treated 
incidentally only, in connection with his career as Speaker of the 
House. 



89 Catron to Polk, Sept. 6, 1836, Polk Papers. 

90 Parton, Life of Andreic Jackson, III, 617. 

91 That partisan Democrats really believed Judge White to have been 
made the tool of designing politicians and his own ambition is well indi- 
cated by Laughlin 's entry in his diary on hearing of the death of White. 
' ' So, here is the end of ambition — of the ambition of an old politician who 
had been betrayed and deceived by his pretended friends, John Bell and 
others, into a course of intrigue and tergiversation, which had cast him 
from the Senate, had lost him the esteem of all good men in his state, and 
had embittered his latter days, and probably shortened his life. What a 
warning his example ought to afford to all thinking and candid men ! ' ' 
(Diary, April 14, 1840). As White carried the state by an overwhelming 
majority, there must inded have been a dearth of "good men" and a 
surplus of rascals! 



i 



CHAPTER VI 
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER JACKSON 

Following Jackson's advice Polk went to Washington late in 
November, 1835, in order to prepare the way for his election as 
Speaker.^ The twenty-fourth Congress assembled on December 
7, and, as the President had planned, Polk was elected on the 
first ballot. The coveted office was his reward for party loyalty, 
but he soon discovered that he must also pay the penalty of his 
success by being the object of more heckling and abuse than had 
fallen to the lot of any of his predecessors. The Democrats had 
a substantial majority in the House and were able to carry their 
measures; but the knowledge of this power only made their op- 
ponents more determined to goad the majority by obstructive 
tactics and by personal vituperation. 

The entire period of Polk's speakership was one of political 
unrest, sectional discord, and personal animosity. Those who 
had so recently been friends and relentless in pursuing the com- 
mon enemies, Adams and Tobias Watkins, hated one another all 
the more cordially now that the party was disintegrating, for 
each faction believed the other treacherously to have abandoned 
traditional party principles. On his own account, Polk had to 
suffer the slings and arrows of his brilliant but censorious rival, 
and of Peyton, Crockett, and other personal enemies. In addi- 
tion, all who harbored grudges against the ' ' military chieftain ' ' — 
whether Nullifiers or Whigs — took keen delight in vitriolic at- 
tacks upon the administration, and in making it personally un- 
comfortable for the Speaker, whom they charged with being the 
President's creature and obedient slave. To this potpourri of 



1 Jackson to Polk, Sept. 15, 1835, Polk Papers. 



SPEAEEE OF THE HOUSE UN DEE JACKSON 93 

discord was added the battle between Adams and the southern 
fire-eaters over the abolition petitions. Each side accused the 
Speaker of unfairness and harrassed him with hairsplitting ques- 
tions of parliamentary procedure. Fortunately for himself his 
knowledge of detail, his methodical mind, and his habitual cool- 
ness under the most trying ordeals, enabled him to preside over 
the exciting debates with dignity and success when many a more 
brilliant man would have met with failure. 

The disposition to humiliate Polk was manifested even before 
he had been elected. As soon as the House had been called to 
order, the clerk announced the first business to be the election 
of a Speaker by ballot. To this customary procedure Patton and 
others objected, and insisted upon a viva voce election. Except 
for showing a disposition on the part of the opposition to resort 
to annoying tactics whenever possible, this attempt to alter the 
mode of election was of little importance, for the House pro- 
ceeded to ballot as usual, and Polk received one hundred and 
thirtj'-two votes to eighty-four for Bell — a vote which Benton 
says "was considered a test of the administration strength, Mr. 
Polk being supported by that party. "- 

The President's message was sent to Congress on the second 
day of the session. Evidently descrying the gathering war clouds, 
Jackson called attention to the dangers that would result from 
internal dissensions. He again recommended the adoption of an 
amendment to the Constitution which would prevent the election 
of a President from devolving upon the House. It is unlikely, 
however, that he had much hope that his suggestion would be 
followed. 

The standing committees were announced by the Speaker on 
the fourteenth of December. In forming them, Polk followed 
the usual custom of placing safe party majorities on those which 
would have the shaping of important legislation. In so doing 
he simply followed precedent ; but he had, when a minority 



• 



Benton, Thirty Years' View, I, 569. 



94 JAMES E. POLK 

member, condemned the practice, and by adhering to precedent 
now he became the object of criticism and abuse. 

The first difficult problem which confronted the new Speaker 
was the disposition of abolition petitions. On December 18, 
1835, Jackson, of Massachusetts, presented a memorial in which 
citizens of his state asked Congress to abolish slavery in the 
District of Columbia. Hammond, of South Carolina, moved that 
the petition ' ' be not received, ' ' but Polk ruled that such a motion 
had never before been presented to the House and that under 
the rules it was not in order. When Hammond offered another 
motion to "reject" the petition, Polk ruled that any petition 
might be rejected after it had been received. Although his 
rulings were logical and fair, they were assailed by the contest- 
ants on either side. The Speaker's motives were impugned and 
appeals were taken to the House, but even John Bell admitted 
that Polk had made the best disposition of a new and debatable 
question. This particular petition was sent to the table on Decem- 
cember 21; but others like it soon appeared, and the "right of 
petition" became one of the most heated topics of debate. The 
Glohe upheld the cause of the petitioners. Should the House, 
it said, yield to the demands made by Hammond and Wise and 
refuse to receive such petitions, it would be violating one of the 
most sacred constitutional guaranties.^ 

Nearly all of the northern members held that all petitions 
from American citizens must be received and that, after recep- 
tion. Congress might dispose of them as it pleased. Southern 
members did not deny the right of petition, in the abstract ; they 
were willing, they said, to receive "bona fide" petitions. But 
radicals from that section argued that, inasnuich as the peti- 
tioners in question were asking something which did not fall 
within the power of Congress to perform, there could be no obli- 
gation to receive requests to do the impossible. 



3 Washingtou Glohe, Jan. 1, 1836. 



SPEAEEB OF THE HOUSE UNDEE JACKSON 95 

On February 8, Pinckney, of South Carolina, presented a 
resolution which prescribed a method for dealing with anti- 
slavery petitions. After its passage by Congress it was popu- 
larly known as the ' ' gag rule. ' ' It directed that all memorials, 
already presented or to be presented, praying for the abolition 
of slavery in the District of Columbia should be referred to a 
select committee. By the same resolution the committee was in- 
structed to report that Congress possessed no power to interfere 
with slavery in states and ought not to interfere with it in the 
District. Regarded as a compromise, the resolution was passed 
by a large majority, but its provisions did not win the approval 
of extremists on either side. Slavery restrictionists condemned 
a measure which to them seemed a combination of cowardice and 
tyranny, while southern hotspurs like Hammond and "Wise were 
dissatisfied because Congress would not reject all petitions re- 
lating to this subject. The recalcitrant members raised endless 
technical objections and appealed repeatedly from the decisions 
of the chair, but onl}^ in one instance did the House fail to sustain 
the rulings of the Speaker. Of all the objectors. Wise was the 
most abusive and unfair. Among other things he accused Polk of 
trying to force members to "vote like mules" withovit affording 
them an opportunitj' to consider the questions to be decided. 

Pinckney's resolution did not succeed in precluding further 
debate on the subject of slavery. Briggs, of Massachusetts, pre- 
sented another petition on February 15, and, in response to a 
question put by Wise, Polk decided that the Pinckney resolution 
applied only to petitions which had already been received. There- 
upon Wise moved that the Briggs petition "be not received," 
and the Speaker ruled the motion to be in order. The ruling 
was clearly an error on Polk's part, and his decision was over- 
ruled by a vote of the House. His apparent concession to Wise 
was severely criticized by both northern and southern men. 
Among the latter. Manning, of South Carolina, said that the 
effect of the Speaker's decision would be to renew the angry 



7 



98 JAMES K. POLK 

sectional debates which the supporters of the Pinckney resolution 
had hoped to obviate ; in addition, it was an arbitrary setting 
aside of the will of the House. "If the Speaker," continued 
Manning, ' ' can by his decision reverse this resolution . . . then 
he has power to suspend, alter, or change, any deliberate act of 
this House, intended as a rule for its governance."^ The vote 
of the House settled the question for the session at least. The 
effect of the reversal of Polk's decision was to aj^ply the "gag 
rule" to all petitions that might appear, and to refer them auto- 
matically to the select committee. It was, of course, well under- 
stood that they would not be considered or reported back by the 
committee. 

The Nashville Repuhlican criticized Polk for being unable to 
keep order in the House. It contrasted him unfavorably with 
Bell, and proved his incompetence by citing numerous appeals 
that had been taken from his decisions. The Glohe replied that 
the disorder and appeals were machinations of Bell's henchmen, 
who had been jiurposely trying to discredit the Speaker. It 
pointed with pride to the fact that only one of his decisions — a 
new rule which Polk had construed in favor of the Bell men — 
had been reversed by the House.^ 

The twenty-fourth Congress had not been long in session be- 
fore the candidacy of Judge White entered into the debates of 
the House. On January 2, 1836, the Glohe charged that Nulli- 
fiers, like Wise, and Abolitionists were supporting White for no 
other reason than to draw votes from Van Buren. For the same 
reason, it said, Webster was urged to run on a ticket of his own. 
In turn. Wise embraced every opportunity to attack the Presi- 
dent and administration members, including the Speaker, and 
to accuse them of engaging in j)olitical intrigues. 



•» Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., 1 sess., App., 145. 

■'■> ' ' The truth is, Mr. Polk has deserved the confidence of the House by 
a firm, faithful, industrious, and able discharge of his duties." This paper 
denied that Polk desired or had been offered a place in the cabinet, for 
the administration wished him to remain in the Speaker's chair (Wash- 
ington Globe, March 16, 1836). 



SPEAKEB OF THE HOUSE UNDER JACKSON 97 

Such an opportunity was presented when Adams moved that 
a certain passage of the President's message be referred to a 
select committee. During the last days of the twenty-third Con- 
gress the House had passed, as part of the general appropriation 
bill, an item of $3,000,000 to be expended for national defense 
by order of the President. As the two houses had been unable 
to agree on certain details, the measure was defeated in the 
Senate. The President in his message deplored the failure of 
Congress to pass this necessary measure, and again recommended 
the appropriation. Adams moved that the subject be referred 
to a select committee for the purpose of ascertaining by whose 
fault the appropriation had been lost.** While debating the 
question, Wise sarcastically remarked that it was a most import- 
ant subject, for "the fate of the presidential canvass is in part 
made to depend upon it. ' ' The President, he said, had intended 
to use the money as a secret service fund; had Cambreleng not 
refused to accept the reasonable amendments proposed by the 
Senate, the measure would have carried. He charged Polk with 
having solicited votes for the appropriation on the plea that the 
President desired it, and with having requested the members 
solicited to refrain from mentioning this fact.' Scarcely a mea- 
sure came before the House that was not made by Wise the motif 
for an assault upon the administration. His criticisms of the 
Speaker were many and bitter, and frequent though futile were 
his appeals from the decisions of the chair. Polk's friends 
thought that Wise and Peyton were trying to provoke the Speaker 
into fighting a duel ; even his own family feared that blood might 
be shed.® 



6 The National Intelligencer had asserted that the House, not the Senate, 
had been at fault — a charge which Adams resented. 

7 Jan. 21, 22, 29. Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., 1 sess. 

8 James Walker advised Polk to treat their abuse with contempt. No 
one, he said, would doubt the Speaker's physical courage. The whole 
matter was, in his opinion, a scheme of Bell to disgrace Polk by drawing 
him into a duel with either Wise or Peyton (Walker to Polk, March 14, 
1836, Polk Papers). 



98 JAMES K. POLK 

Although Bell was less abusive than either Wise or Peyton, 
he frequently questioned the justice of the Speaker's rulings and 
accused him of partisan bias." On February 3, 1836, during a 
debate on the reference of a Senate bill for limiting the terms of 
certain officers. Bell said that never before had so many things 
of importance been excluded from the discussions of the House 
' ' by forms and decisions upon the rules. ' ' His principal speech 
of the session was delivered while the naval appropriation was 
being discussed in the House. He had little to say on the sub- 
ject under consideration, but, having avowed his intention "to 
indulge the privilege of debate to the utmost limit of parliamen- 
tary license," he launched into an extended discussion of "the 
general policy of the present Administration, as lately devel- 
oped."^" He employed the present occasion, he said, because 
those who were in control of the House took good care to exclude 
any resolution to which such remarks as he desired to make would 
be really germane. After twitting the Speaker with having 
changed his opinions on the subject of patronage," he arraigned 
the administration party for having abandoned the principles 
on which General Jackson had been chosen President. It was 
not surprising, he said, that strange doctrines should appear, 
inasmuch as the single principle which is common to the present 
majority is unlimited devotion, not to any particular creed, but 
to i])r pariij. He pointed out with remarkable precision the evils 
of abject pai'tyism, and the inevitable abuses wdiich result from 



9 Perhaps, as was later suggested by the Boston Age (Aug. 17, 1836), 
prudence led Bell to refrain from leading the assault and to delegate this 
function to his two associates. Still, Wise needed little urging, and the 
fact that Bailie Peyton was a nephew of Judge White was sufficient to 
account for his animosity. 

10 March 16, 22, 25, 1836. Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., 1 sess., App., 722 flf. 

11 "It was, I believe, a i^rivate scheme [earlier] of my colleague, who 
is now the presiding officer of this House [Mr. Polk] to take from the 
Secretary of State the power of designating the jniblishers of the laws, 
and to vest it in the House of Representatives; so important at that day 
was the purity of the public press regarded by the Jackson jiarty. ' ' 



SPEAKEB OF THE HOUSE UNDER JACKSON 99 

personal government by a popular hero.^- His own speech was 
no doubt intended for campaign purposes, but the picture which 
he drew of existing evils was none the less accurate on that ac- 
count. If it lacked in any particular, it was in being too char- 
itable to the President himself, for after all Jackson was the 
individual most responsible for perpetuating those evils in the 
interest of party discipline. There were other critics of the 



12 "How has it happened that these abuses have not only been suffered 
to exist, but even to increase, under an Administration so decidedly pop- 
ular and powerful? When this problem shall be solved to the satisfaction 
of the public, the remedy will be supplied. The true answer to the ques- 
tion, how these abuses came to exist under such an Administration, is, 
because the Administration is such as it is, because it is popular. Every 
man of sound mind and lawful age knows that the President, nor any 
other beino; of created existence, can exercise a personal inspection and 
superintendence over all, or even a tenth part of the most important de- 
tails of the public service. Yet every important transaction connected 
with the public service is so managed by the subordinate officers, as to 
throw the responsibility upon the President. If the delinquent officers 
do not do this themselves, their defenders in Congress and out of Congress 
do not fail, in effect, to fix the responsibility there. Whether in Congress, 
or in the country, complaint is made of abuse in any branch of the public 
service, the answer is, eternally, that the charge is meant as an attack 
upon General Jackson! His great name and po]>ularity are the shield and 
buckler of every official delinquent, whether from incompetency or infi- 
delity, from a clerk to the head of a Department — from the register or 
receiver of a land office, or an Indian agent, to a Minister Plenipotentiary! 
The name and services of General Jackson, I repeat, are invoked to shield 
and cover, as with a mantle, every official transgression or omission, from 
the highest to the lowest, whenever it suits the interest of party to avail 
themselves of them. 

"And the people are called upon to rally round — to stand by and 
defend — not the individual arraigned — not the delinquent department, but 
the President himself, who it is asserted through a thousand channels, is 
intended to be struck at and stabbed through the sides of the accused 
officer or Department. The peoj^le cannot at once detect the artifices of 
party. They are jealous of everything which savors of an attack upon 
General Jackson, and they in general act upon that suspicion. Those, 
therefore, who dare, here or elsewhere, to find fault with the course of 
affairs, upon any ground, instead of finding countenance from those in 
power, or from the dominant party — instead of being cheered on in the 
ungracious task of reform, are met on the threshold, with the charge of 
secret and sinister motives — with anti-Jacksonism ! They are told, that 
their object is to assail the character of the hero of New Orleans, and the 
conqueror of the United States Bank; as if either one or the other of 
those victories could be of any worth now or hereafter, except to protect 
the Constitution, the country, and its liberties — as if those victories could 
be of any value, if as the price of them we are to surrender that very 
Constitution, those very liberties — those rich and glorious prizes for which 



.^^ 



100 JAMES E. POLE 

administration," but none covered the whole ground so thor- 
oughly and so accurately as did Bell. 

The attacks made by Wise on the Speaker and the adminis- 
tration were capricious and, to his associates, extremely enter- 
taining. His assertions, however, were more irritating than con- 
vincing. His own resolution, which called for an investigation 
of the method by which state banks of deposit had been selected, 
gave him an opportunity to vent his wrath upon Reuben M. 
Whitney, and upon those who had employed Whitney. His time 
was ill spent ; assailing Whitney 's reputation was like slaying 
the dead. 

Throughout the session the Presidential campaign was a topic 
of absorbing interest. Few questions came before the House that 
did not elicit a discussion of the approaching election. This was 
natural, perhaps, for Van Buren had been nominated for the 
avowed purpose of continuing the policies of the present admin- 
istration, and it w^as from these very policies that the White 
element of the party had revolted. On this subject personal 
animosity increased as the end of the session approached. As 



those battles were fought and won. If those who venture to make charges 
against any department of the public service are not met precisely in this 
way, they are, at all events, told that General Jackson is the head of the 
Government — that he is responsible for all the executive branches of the 
public service, and no attack can be made upon any branch of the public 
service, therefore, without attacking him, and everybody knows that he 
does his duty. A most shameful, egregious, and pernicious flattery. But 
the absurdity of the argument does not prevent it from being constantly 
interposed. The argument is, that because General Jackson is able, faith- 
ful, and patriotic, in the discharge of all his duties, therefore all the sub- 
ordinate officers of the Government are so likewise. But more: if anyone 
shall reply to all this, and that he means no attack upon General Jackson, 
that he is willing to exonerate him from any agency in the abuses which 
are alleged to exist, he is forthwith denounced as a hypocrite — as a das- 
tardly assailant, who wants the courage and independence to make a direct 
attack. He is dared to come forward like a man, and assail General 
Jackson as the author of all these abuses — his pride is appealed to — his 
feelings are chafed to draw him on to utter the fatal denunciation; and 
the moment he does so, the myrmidons of the party stand ready to hack 
him to pieces! These, sir, are the true causes of the continued abuses in 
the public service." 

13 Robertson, of Virginia, when speaking (April 5) on the same bill, 
asserted that the administration desired a large approj)riation for the 
navy so that there might be no surplus to distribute among the states. 



SPEAKER OF TEE HOUSE UNDER JACKSON 101 

if to make amends for the moderation displayed in his speech on 
the naval appropriation bill, Bell, when discussing the river and 
harbor bill on June 23, severely castigated both the Speaker and 
the administration. He charged the administration with delib- 
erate extravagance, and said that the Committee of Ways and 
Means had been purposely organized by Polk "upon a principle 
of extravagance."^^ His purpose was to show, as Robertson, of 
Virginia, had tried to show when discussing the naval appro- 
priation bill on April 5 that the administration hoped to nullify 
the effect of Clay's "distribution bill" by leaving no surplus 
for distribution among the states. However, it is difficult to see 
how Polk could have anticipated the passage of this bill when 
he appointed the Committee of Ways and Means. 

Bell had little reason to complain of Polk's committees, for, 
as Gillet, of New York, pointed out (June 24), they were sub- 
stantially the same as those appointed by himself.^^ In selecting 
his committees Polk had given no greater advantage to the ma- 
jority than was customary, yet it is interesting to recall in this 
connection that he, too, during the Adams administration, had 
complained because "studied majorities" had been placed on 
committees, "in conformity to a previous secret understanding. 



i+"I have said that I regard this bill as the result of a deliberate 
system of extravagance — of a plan for increasing the wants of the Gov- 
ernment, and exhausting the Treasury. ... I affirm that your Committee 
of Ways and Means of this House was organized upon a principle of ex- 
travagance. Look at the composition of that committee, sir, and then 
tell me it was not constituted with a deep design, and expressly with a 
view to the largest expenditure for which a pretext could be found, in every 
branch of the public service. Was there ever such a Committee of Ways 
and Means appointed in this House? Was there ever a more palpable 
desertion of the principle of representation — a more shameful abandon- 
ment of the interests of the entire interior of the country?" (Cong. Globe, 
24 Cong., 1 sess., App., 745). 

15 Gillet scathingly denounced Bell's attitude toward Polk. He twitted 
Bell with not having defended his constituent (the President) when 
during the last Congress he had been called a toothless tyrant by a member 
of the opposition party. Eepelling such attacks upon the President and 
declining to attend a caucus of the Tennessee delegation were the only 
crimes, said Gillet, of which Polk could be convicted, and as Speaker, 
' ' even his political opponents bear testimony to his capacity, honesty, and 
impartiality. ' ' 



102 JAMES E. POLK 

among" the favorites at Court. "^^ Both men advocated majority 
rule, yet neither accepted it with good grace when he chanced to 
be numbered with the minority. 

In this same speech Bell reverted to the caucus of the Tenn- 
essee delegation, which had been called to consider the nomi- 
nation of Judge White. He said that the main object of the 
meeting had been to test the sincerity of certain members and 
that two of these gentlemen, Polk and Grundy, "are at this 
moment in the enjoyment of the rewards of their hypocrisy and 
their treachery to their colleagues. ' ' He still spoke with respect 
of General Jackson and denied that he had ever called the Presi- 
dent a tyrant or a crouching sycophant. "He may be the master 
of shn'es and meniaU," said Bell, "but nature has disqualified 
him from becoming one himself. ' ' 

The first session of the twenty-fourth Congress terminated 
on July 4, 1836. Among its legislative acts were the admission 
to statehood of Arkansas and Michigan, and the reorganization 
of the general post-office along lines advocated by Amos Kendall. 
Another law approved the President's order for removing public 
deposits from the Bank of the United States, and regulated for 
the future the method of depositing public money in state banks. 
As a result of the payment in full of the national debt, Clay 
introduced in the Senate his well-known measure for distributing 
among the states the surplus revenue of the federal government. 
As it was made to assume the guise of a deposit rather than a 
gift, the bill passed both houses of Congress and was signed — 
but with reluctance — by the President. On June 7, while the 
bill was before the House, an attem^Dt was made to refer it to the 
Committee of the Whole, for the purpose, said the Glohe, of pro- 
longing the debate and thereby defeating the admission of Ar- 
kansas and Michigan. Polk blocked such a reference by casting 
his ballot in the negative and making it a tie vote.^' 



ic Polk to Colouel Wni. Polk, Dee. 14, 1826, Col. Wm. Polk Papers. 
1" Washington Globe, June 10, 1836. 



SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER JACKSON 103 

Although the Speakership is the most important and respon- 
sible position in the House, and although the Speaker's influence 
upon legislation is surpassed by few other officers of the federal 
government/^ yet, from the very nature of his position, that 
influence is difficult to trace. By the personnel of his committees, 
by his decisions, by his control over debate by recognizing or 
refusing to recognize members who may desire to speak, one may 
trace in a general way the part played by the Speaker ; but neces- 
sarily he takes little part in the discussions of the House. Polk 
did not even avail himself of the privilege of participating in 
debate when the House had resolved itself into a Committee of 
the Whole. For this reason his views on the various measures are 
not readily ascertained, and during this particular period his 
private correspondence affords little assistance. That he satisfied 
the party which elected him, there is abundant evidence in the 
records of the House, and in the public press. That he possessed 
the necessary knowledge and coolness of temperament to avoid 
the pitfalls prepared by his adversaries, is equally clear. 
"Never," said the editor of the Boston Age, 

was man more rigidly and constantly assailed by a pack of untiring pursuers, 
than was Mr. Speaker Polk by his uncompromising assailants. They left 
no stone unturned that could be moved to his disadvantage. . . . But 
notwithstanding all the efforts that were made to destroy Mr. Polk, he 
passed the ordeal unscathed, and ultimately triumphed. 

The editor said that he did not like Polk personally, and that he 
had preferred Bell for Speaker, still "it is but an act of justice 
to say of him, that he discharged his duties with great ability, 
promptness, and throughout the session was popular with an im- 
mense majority of the members," and self-respect compelled 



18 Mrs. Polk probably voiced her husband's sentiments when she said, 
years afterward: "The Speaker, if the proper person, and with a correct 
idea of his position, has even more power and influence over legislation, 
and in directing the j^olicy of parties, than the President or any other 
public offlcer. " Conversation with Samuel J. Eandall. Quoted in Nelson, 
Memorials of Sarah Childress Polk, 206. 



104 JAMES K. FOLK 

northern "Whigs to support the Speaker in putting down Wise 
and his friends.^'' 

After the adjournment of Congress on July 4, the great proh- 
lem to be solved by the administration forces was not so much 
how to elect Van Buren, for that seemed certain, but how to save 
Tennessee. The prospect of losing the vote of the President's 
own state was most humiliating to himself and to the entire party. 
At first Jackson could not believe such a calamity possible ; but, 
as the campaign proceeded, even he began to realize that, if the 
state could be saved at all, it could be done only by heroic efforts. 

As usual, Jackson spent his vacation at the Hermitage, and 
during the summer he was honored with public dinners at various 
places. The people of Nashville entertained him with a barbecue 
to which "all creation" was invited.-" The press and the plat- 
form of the respective parties vied with each other in regaling 
the people with political gasconade and personal abuse of the 
opposing politicians. On the President's side w'ere Polk, Grundy, 
Cave Johnson, and Judge Catron, assisted by many lesser lights 
who followed their directions. Opposed to them were White, 
Bell, Peyton, and Foster, aided by a much longer and much abler 
list of second-rate assistants than could be rallied to the Jackson 
standard. 

The most serious handicap with w^hich the administration 
leaders had to cope was the want of an influential press. The 
Nashville Vnion, which had been founded after Bell had obtained 
control of the other Nashville papers, had never prospered, and 
was now in the final stages of bankruptcy. Long, the proprietor, 
had given up in desj^air and gone to Athens in East Tennessee 
to edit an obscure Van Buren sheet of precarious existence.-^ 
Due to drink, Laughlin, the editor of the Vnion, had become so 
unreliable that Catron, in the heat of the campaign, was forced 



10 Boston Age, Aug. 17, 181^6; copy among Folk Fapers. 

20 Laughlin to Polk, Aug. 8, 1836, Folk Papers. 

21 Long to Polk, Aug. 21, 1836, ibid. 



SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER JACKSON lOo 

to come to the rescue and edit the paper himself." The Wash- 
ington Glohe devoted considerable space to political affairs in 
Tennessee. It tried to convince the people of the state that White 
could not by any possibility be elected, and that his nomination 
had been the work of instruments of Clay and Calhoun, who 
were conspiring against Jackson and Van Buren and attempting 
to deceive the people of Tennessee.==^ Bell, of course, was charged 
with being the chief conspirator. "It is painful," said the Glohe 
on October 7, 

to a fair mind to deal with petty tricks— the offspring of low cunning— 
of a man educated as a pettifogger, and improved into a political Machiavel 
by a persevering study of the arts of deception in a seven years' appren- 
ticeship in Congress. John Bell has arrived at a point which entitles him 
to a diploma as a political iniposter 

who is trying to deceive the people of Tennessee. As examples 
of Bell's hypocrisy, it cited his original opposition to White and 
his attempt to induce R. M. Johnson to run for President on a 
bank platform. 

Much emphasis was placed on White 's alleged affiliation with 
friends of the United States Bank. Bell's " Cassedy letter" was 
said to have pledged White, in the event of his election, to sign a 
bill for rechartering the bank. In several letters. Van Buren 
had already stated his unalterable opposition to such an institu- 
tion, and by so doing furnished an excuse for the catechizing of 
his rival. In a letter addressed to him by one of the local Demo- 
crats, White was asked the definite question whether he, if elected, 
would sign a bill to establish a bank of discount and deposit, or 
one of deposit only. It was hoped that the letter would place the 
judge in an embarrasing position, but this hope was not realized. 
He met the issue squarely by stating that, while he considered 
the bank question to be obsolete, he would nevertheless give his 

22 After the campaign Avas over Catron, in a letter to Polk (Nov. 
24) said that, while he hated to desert a man for "that infirmity," they 
must have a reliable editor. 

23 Washington Globe, Aug. 27 and Se^it. 5, 1836. 



106 JAMES E. POLK 

views on the subject. He had always believed, he said, that Con- 
gress did not possess the power to authorize any bank to transact 
business within the states ; moreover, even if the power existed, it 
should not be exercised. This was still his opinion.-* 

In a speech delivered at Knoxville in August. White had 
already given a very complete statement of the principles for 
which he stood. He enumerated the doctrines which had been 
advocated by himself and the President at the time of the latter 's 
first election. For advocating these same doctrines, said he, the 
President is now ' ' openly denouncing me as a ' red hot Federalist, ' 
having abandoned his Administration and being as far from him 
as the poles are asunder." The judge claimed to uphold the 
Republican creed of Jefferson, while the President is on "that 
side which leads directly to monarchy, although I hope he does 
not so intend it. ' ^'^ 

Not even Jackson could shake the faith of Tennesseans in the 
ability and the integrity of Judge White. Even though the 
motives of his leading supporters may have been somewhat ques- 
tionable, nothing that was ignoble or equivocal could be traced 
to White himself. He carried the state in si>ite of the misrepre- 
sentations of his traducers, and never again during the life of the 
"hero of New Orleans" was Tennessee to be found in the Demo- 
cratic column at a Presidential election — although one of her own 
sons was the candidate in 1844. 

The President was greatly mortified by the loss of his state. 
He declared that White had always been a hypocrite, and that the 
"morals of society" demanded his exposure.-" But the mote in 



^* Andrew A. Kincaiinon to White, Sept. 14; AVhite to Kiueanuon, 
Sept. 19, 1836, PoJk Papers. 

25 Speech printed in Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson White, 346 ff. 
Excerpts in Washington Globe, Sept. 23, 1836. 

26 "Nothing but falsehood appears to be the weapons of our modern 
new born White Whigs of Tennessee in their late political crusade. White, 
Bell, Peyton, Murray & Co. appear to have abandoned truth, and now when 
the election is over, does not wish to be held accountable for their false- 
hoods . . . should I live to get home, a duty I owe to truth & the morals 
of society will induce me to expose Judge White, Mr. Bell, Mr. Peyton, 



SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER JACKSON 107 

his brother's eye obscured the huge beam in his own own; his 
unfair treatment of White had been the determining factor in 
making the Judge a candidate and in winning for him the 
electoral vote of the state. 

Congress reassembled on December 5 and, on the following 
day,' received the last annual message of General Jackson. This 
document criticized the operation of the deposit act passed at the 
last session and advised the adjustment of revenue to the actual 
needs of the government. It informed Congress of the promulga- 
tion of the "specie circular" and asked that the policy therein 
adopted be made permanent by legislative enactment. It urged 
that the finances of the government should be put on a hard 
money basis. The tone of the message was optimistic, and indica- 
tive of the satisfaction felt by the President with the results of 
his administration. It contained no hint that he even suspected 
the country to be already on the verge of one of its most disastrous 
industrial and financial crises. 

To carry the administration program through the House was 
a task of little difficulty for the Speaker. Polk arranged his com- 
mittees on a political basis, and there was a safe majority in that 
body to insure the passage of desired measures. It required both 
skill and patience, however, to preserve order and to render harm- 
less the assaults of an opposition whose animosity had not been 
lessened by their recent defeat at the polls. 

Early in the session there appeared a new avalanche of memo- 
rials in which Congress was asked to abolish slavery in the District 
of Columbia. Generally, but not always, they were presented by 
John Quincy Adams. Polk decided that the "gag rule" had 



Mr. Murray, and their falsehoods, so that the moral part & truth loving 
portion of the citizens of Tennessee may judge what credit can be reposed 
in those men, when they make assertions as to the acts & doings of others. 
I now believe that Judge White has been acting the hypocrite in politics, 
all his life, and individually to me — that he is unprincipled & vindictive 
I have full proof — that he will willfully lie, his Knoxville speech amply 
shows. I can forgive, & will, but I never can forget hypocrisy, or the 
individual capable of it" (Jackson to Eev. H. M. Cryer, Nov. 13, 1836, 
Am. Hist. Mag., IN, 242-24:3). 



108 JAMES K. POLK 

expired with the last session, and so the whole question was once 
more open for discussion. After several heated debates, the rule 
was reenacted in an aggravated form which sent all such peti- 
tions to the table as soon as presented, without even the courtesy 
of a reference to a committee. Southern members looked upon 
these petitions as the work of fanatics-' whose sole purpose was 
malicious mischief. They failed to realize that abolition was 
simply one among the many manifestations of the birth of a pub- 
lic conscience and of a desire to reform the world. The old idea 
that governments should not abridge personal privileges, even by 
eradicating admitted evils, was, during this period, rapidly giving 
way to a new belief that society as well as individuals possesses 
rights, and that governments are in duty bound to protect them. 
It was a period among which "isms" of various sorts flourished, 
and among the number, aholitionism. The most important and per- 
manent product which resulted from this social unrest and striv- 
ing for the ideal was the emergence of a public conscience and a 
determination to adjust individual conduct to the standards of 
public opinion. A feeling of responsibility for existing evil led 
the troubled conscience to seek power to eradicate it, and in seek- 
ing the necessary power the reformers naturally turned to the 
federal government. Calhoun understood the changed viewpoint 
far better than did his contemporaries. He realized that, on the 
subject of slavery, a national conscience had developed, although 
he may have exaggerated the part played in this development by 
the Nullification proclamation of General Jackson.-* 

27 "Abolition," said Byuuin, of North Carolina, Jan. 9, 1837, "is 
priestcraft [i.e. New England clergy], concocted and brought into exist- 
ence by their unholy alliance with the superstitious and ignorant of both 
sexes." • 

28 Speaking in the Senate on the Oregon bill, Aug. 12, 184:9, Calhoun 
said: "The abolition of African slavery in its old form in the British 
West India Islands, and the long and violent agitation which preceded it, 
did much to arouse this feeling at the North, and confirm the impression 
that it was sinful. But something more was necessary to excite it into 
action,— and that was, a belief, on the part of those who thought it sinful, 
that they were responsible for its continuance. 

"It was a considerable time before such a belief was created, except 
to a very limited extent. In the early stages of this Government, while 



SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER JACKSON 109 

The enactment of gag rules resulted in more harm than good 
to the cause which they were intended to benefit. Many who had 
little sympathy with abolitionists disapproved of this drastic 
method of stifling public opinion. They regarded the gag laws 
as a fatal blow to the right of petition, although it is difficult to 
see why the southern members were not right in their contention 
that this right extended only to those who would petition about 
their own grievances, and not those of other persons. The right 
of the people to petition for a redress of their own grievances was 
never questioned by the most belligerent of the southern fire- 
eaters. 

Polk was a slaveholder, but he did not let this fact influence 
his decisions. When objections were raised because Adams in- 
sisted upon presenting petitions from states other than Massa- 
chusetts the Speaker decided, on February 6, 1837, that "every 
member had a right to present a petition, come from what quarter 
it might. ' ' Adams thereupon informed the Speaker that he had 
a petition purporting to have come from slaves and asked if it 
would fall within the regular rule. The character of the peti- 
tioners presented a new point in procedure, which Polk did not 
attempt to decide ; instead, he asked for a ruling by the House. 
Without seeking to ascertain the nature of the petition — which 



it was yet called, and regarded to be, a federal Government, slavery was 
believed to be a local institution, and under the excdusive control of the 
Governments of the States. So long as this impression remained, little 
or no responsibility was felt on the part of any portion of the North, for 
its continuance. But with the growth of the power and influence of the 
Government, and its tendency to consolidation, — when it became usual to 
call the people of these States a nation, and this Government national, 
the States came to be regarded by a large portion of the North, as bearing 
the same relation to it, as the counties do to the States; and as much 
under the control of this Government, as the counties are under that of 
their respective State Governments. The increase of this belief was ac- 
companied by a corresponding increase of the feeling of responsibility 
for the continuance of slavery, on the part of those in the North who 
considered it so. At this stage it was strengthened into conviction by 
the proclamation of General Jackson and the act of Congress authorizing 
him to employ the entire force of the Union against the Government and 
people of South Carolina." Having discovered the extent of national 
power, said Calhoun, the abolitionists have, since 1835, been striving to 
bring it into operation (Calhoun, JVorls, IV, 517-521). 



110 JAMES E. POLE 

turned out to be a hoax, and asked for the expulsion of Adams — 
southern members wasted much time in an intemperate tirade 
against the venerable ex-President. They at first demanded his 
expulsion, and, failing in this, asked that he should be censured 
"for giving color to an idea" that slaves might address a com- 
munication to Congress. After Adams had riddled their argu- 
ments with sarcasm and ridicule, the House finally ended the 
matter by deciding simply that slaves had no right to petition. 
The charge made by Adams that Polk had exercised arbitrary 
authority in his decisions on the subject of petitions seems to have 
been wholly unwarranted, for the Speaker accorded him every 
privilege which the rules of the House permitted.^^ 

The Speaker's enemies tried on many occasions to confuse 
him by propounding unusual and complicated questions, but in 
this they were invariably disappointed. His thorough knowledge 
of parliamentary procedure, and his ability to anticipate their 
designs and to prepare for them, enabled him to render his deci- 
sions promptly and correctly. Never frustrated, he was quick 
to see the bearing of an unusual proposition.^'^ Although he 
safeguarded the interests of the administration whenever possible, 
yet his rulings were sustained — almost without exception, by a 
considerable number of his political opponents. 

The most severe charge which was brought against Polk during 
the session arose out of the investigation of Reuben M. Whitney 's 
connection with the Treasury Department. It was alleged that 
Whitney had given out advance information to speculators 



29 Polk's opinion of Adams' conduct and his complaints is recorded in 
an undated manuscript in the Poll- Papers. It is an answer to letters 
written by Adams to the Quiney Patriot. ' ' The Speaker carries out and. 
enforces the decisions of the majority & therefore he represents in his 
letter that the 'Speaker and the majority of the House' have undertaken 
to exercise 'arbitrary authority.' If Mr. Adams is unwilling to submit 
to the decisions of the majority of the House, he is unfit to be a member 
of that bodv. . . . His complaints that his petitions were not read, — 
shows either" a total ignorance of the rules of the House, or is an attempt 
to impose on the public" {Poll- Papers, undated, vol. SO). 

30 For example, Bell's motion of January 10 for leave to bring in a 
bill to secure freedom of elections. 



SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UN DEB JACKSON 111 

regarding the purport of Jackson's specie circular, and that he 
had been a partner in the resulting speculations. It was said, also, 
that he had levied blackmail upon the state banks which had been 
selected as depositories for government funds. A majority of the 
committee which Polk appointed to investigate these charges 
exonerated Whitney, but, in a minority report, Peyton, of Tenn- 
essee, accused the Speaker and the majority of the committee 
with having deliberately covered the fraud out of subserviency 
to the President. Nothing better, he said, could be expected from 
a Speaker who had crawled up to his office and had exchanged 
principle for power. "^ Even if these charges had been true, Pey- 
ton was not the man to throw stones. Hamer, of Ohio, forced 
him to admit that he had himself solicited for Bell the support 
of the President on the plea that Bell was a good party man and 
that Polk had been seeking votes from the Nullifiers. 

The short but stormy session was adjourned by the Speaker on 
March 3, 1837. Although Polk had been severely criticized by 
some of his enemies, no one — as was done two years later — refused 
to join in extending to him the customary vote of thanks. The 
administration and its defenders had been denounced in violent 
language for alleged interference in elections, abuse of the power 
of patronage, and derangement of the finances of the country. 
Investigations had been demanded, and in some cases undertaken, 
but the charges had not been sustained. Indeed, so long as Polk 
had the selection of committees, there was small danger that any 
malfeasance would be officially unearthed. 

For good or for evil. General Jackson had triumphed over all 
opposition. Van Buren had been chosen to succeed him, Taney 



31 i i ijijig 2}ric€, in these days, which must be paid for poiver, is the sale 
and prostration of every principle of honor, patriotism, independence ; and I 
fear, sir, the day is distant when we shall see the Speaker of an American 
Congress dare to appoint investigation committees, a majority of which 
will be in favor of inquiry, how important soever it may be to the preser- 
vation of the institutions and liberties of this country. . . . Any man who 
crawls up to that point [Speakership] in these days, will never hazard the 
consequences of a patriotic, a generous, or a noble action; it would be fatal 
to him." March 1, 1837 {Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., 2 sess., App., 349-359). 



112 JAMES K. POLK 

had been confirmed as Marshall's successor, the mortifying cen- 
sure of the Senate had been expunged, and the Bank of the United 
States no longer existed as a federal institution. On the last day 
of the session Congress passed an act which not only carried out 
another of the President's wishes, but which affected materially 
the future career of the Speaker of the House. Incorporated in 
the civil appropriation bill was a clause providing for the outfit of 
a minister to Texas, which meant, in effect, a recognition of Texan 
independence. The already approaching financial crisis made 
Congress unwilling to continue by law the policy of the specie 
circular, as Jackson had recommended in his message; instead, 
that body sent him, on the last day of the session, a bill which 
would virtually annul the celebrated circular. But even in this, 
''Old Hickory" had his way. He declined to sign the bill on the 
ground that its provisions were obscure and contradictory.^- 



32 Richardson, Messages, III, 282. 



CHAPTER VII 

SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER VAN BUREN 

Judge White's victory in Tennessee humiliated, and for the 
time being discouraged, the Democrats of that state. Before the 
winter had passed, however, their hopes revived and they began 
to lay plans for the future. They were encouraged by the belief 
that White would never again be a candidate and that the main 
cause of defection would therefore be removed. In a letter to 
Polk, Nicholson said that the opposition leaders were determined 
to hold the state, and would do all in their power to injure Van 
Buren. But the people, said he, had gone over to White for 
purely personal reasons and would return to the Democratic 
fold.^ Childress, also, had hopes that the people would renew 
their allegiance. He believed, on the other hand, that the leaders 
of the White party would vote for "Theodore Dwight himself" 
if he were run on the opposition ticket.- Still another informant 
discovered that the White faction was plotting to get control of 
the legislature for the purpose of ousting Grundy from the federal 
Senate. They were planning, he thought, to run Bailie Peyton 
for Governor ; and should this be done, no one except Polk or 
Jackson could defeat him.^ At the Hermitage Jackson was busily 
engaged in repelling slanders invented and circulated by the 
Whigs. One of these slanders was that, as a result of endorsing 
notes for relatives, the General had become financially ruined 
and now wanted a national bank. Protesting that he never had 
and never would favor a bank, Jackson announced his intention 



1 Nicholson to Polk, Jan. 22, 1837, Poll- Papers. 

2 Cliildress to Polk, Feb. 17, 1837, ibid. 

3 J. H. Talbot to Polk, April 21, 1837, ibid. 



114 JAMES E. POLK 

to prepare an article on the snbject which he desired Polk to see 
before its publication.* 

Democrats were united in their desire to regain control of 
the state, but opinions differed as to the better method of pro- 
cedure. Grundy advocated a conciliatory attitude toward the 
White supporters; this policy was adopted, and was voiced by 
John 0. Bradford, the new editor of the Nashville Union}' But 
the seceders did not respond to kind treatment. Dunlap was 
badly beaten in his campaign for reelection to Congress, and his 
district sent only bank supporters to the state legislature.'^ Cave 
Johnson was likewise unexpectedly defeated by an opponent who 
was as "bitter and malignant" as John Bell." The result of the 
election caused a tempest at the Hermitage. Still blind to the real 
cause of the dissensions within his party, Jackson, in character- 
istic fashion, denounced the temporizing policy of Grundy and 
the Unio-n.^ 

The outcome of the state elections and the fact that the sub- 
treasury plan was unpopular in Tennessee^ led Catron and 



4 Jackson to Polk, May 22, 1837, ibid. 

5 Catron to Polk, July 7, 1837, iMd. 
<■> Dunlap to Polk, Aug. 7, 1837, iMd. 

■ Johnson to Polk, Aug. 7, 1837, ibid. One gets an interesting glimpse 
of the prevailing professional ethics from his remark that he is going 
to Mississippi to practice law, for ' ' I cannot charge my friends & my 
enemies will not employ me. ' ' In another letter to Polk, August 14, 
Johnson tells a story which indicates that election methods in his day 
were not unlike those of our own: "I was beaten in the last two days 
by the almost united action of the merchants & iron makers — who as if 
by concert upon my leaving a county for the last time went to work, 
under the pretence of collecting their debts, telling the people that they 
would be compelled to collect in gold & silver if I were elected — the price 
of property be reduced to almost nothing and the people ruined. Some 
of the iron makers, told their workmen, that they could not be employed 
if I was elected.' ' 

8 "Davidson [County] has resulted as I expected, from the imbecile 
councils, of the NashviUe politicians. The Union has been Muzzled by 
some unseen hands, and has been a great help to the enemy instead of 
benefit to the republican party. Mr. Grundy will feel the effects, of the 
combination, which has been produced by supineness & want of courage" 
(Jackson to Polk, Aug. 6, 1837, Poll: Papers). 

9 James Walker informed Polk on August 27 that if the Van Buren 
administration should adopt the sub-treasury plan, it would find itself in 



SPEAEEE OF THE HOUSE UNDEB VAN BUEEN 115 

other prominent Democrats to believe that the state could never 
be regained by pursuing Grundy's conciliatory policy. It was a 
battle of numbers against wealth, said Catron/° and war to the 
knife was therefore the true Republican policy. He favored the 
sub-treasury plan, for "the Treasury is the arm of power" and 
must not be placed in private hands ; the possession of government 
money by private banks ' ' will convert the keepers into Federalists 
in principle & practice in a few years. ' ' Unlike Jackson and Van 
Buren, he advocated the emission of paper money by the Treas- 
ury, for the people want it and "numbers will govern in fact, 
in Congress, & out of it.'' Although he approved in general the 
idea of a sub-treasury, still, after reading the new President's 
message on the subject, he pronounced the plan there suggested 
to be sound in principle, but hardly possible in practice. The 
people, he said, demanded something more tangible, and unless 
provision were made for issuing paper money, the party would 
surely go down to defeat.^^ "Strike boldly," was his advice to 
Polk, "it is your habit, & the means of your elevation ; it is 
expected of you."^- 

The echo of Jackson 's farewell address had scarcely died away 
before the long-gathering financial storm burst upon the country, 
leaving in its wake the wrecks of shattered banks, ruined busi- 
ness enterprises, and a panic-stricken people. So desperate were 



the minority in Tennessee, as the plan was too unwieldy and costly. White, 
he said, had announced that he was not opposed to a bank located in the 
District of Columbia, with branches in the states. Walker thought that 
this idea w^ould win in Tennessee if states instead of individuals were 
made stockholders (Poll; Papers). 

1*5 ' ' Open war, & to the knife, has ever been the course for the Eepublican 
side — no other position is left for it, nor has there been, since the days 
of Jefferson. It is the contest of Wealth against numbers; sapped by the 
statutes of descents when wealth consisted of Estates: but the European 
policy is here basing itself upon incorporated & merchantile wealth ' ' 
(Catron to Polk, Sept. 2, 1837, ibid.). 

11 Catron to Polk, Sept. 10, 1837, ibid. 

i-"Go in for 30 or 40 millions, to be circulated fast as may be by 
the Govt — go for 20ties & over in gradations of tens. Strike "^out the 
interest feature — boldly declare that the farmers will hoard the notes 
bearing 5 per cent" (Catron to Polk, September 27, 1837, ibid.). 



11(5 JAMES K. POLK 

financial conditions that Van Buren felt constrained to convene 
the twenty-fifth Congress in extra session on September 4, 1837, 
for the purpose of laying before that body his plans for relief. 
His principal reconnnendation was the establishment of a sub- 
treasury ; for experience had shown, he said, that depositing pub- 
lic money in state banks was little better than leaving it in the 
hands of the federal bank. The only safe custodian of the public 
funds was, in his opinion, the government itself. As a temporary 
remedy, he advised Congress to wathhold further deposits with the 
states under the distribution act, and to authorize the emission of 
treasury notes. Although his recommendations w^ere straight- 
forward and sensible, they were, for that very reason, unlikely 
to be followed. Even the members of his own party were divided 
in opinion concerning the cause of the trouble, consequently they 
did not agree on remedies to be applied. Catron, as we have seen, 
was an advocate of paper money, while Jackson and the President 
still believed in hard money. Jackson received advance informa- 
tion concerning the character of the message and was delighted 
with the news that the President would recommend a separation 
of government finances from all banks, and the collection of public 
revenues in gold and silver coin.^^ 

The members of Congress who had striven so hard to defeat 
Van Buren at the polls were not disposed to aid him now by 
sympathetic cooperation. In the House they were far more 
intent upon making life uncomfortable for the Speaker and the 
President than they were on relieving the financial stress of their 
fellow-citizens. It was known, of course, that Polk would be 
reelected, and before the ballot had been taken, Mercer, of Vir- 
ginia, proposed to transfer from the Speaker to the House itself 
the power to appoint committees. While the suggestion was not 
adopted, Mercer had the satisfaction of insulting Polk by imply- 
ing that he could not be trusted. On the other hand, Patton, of 
Virginia, wished to have the rules so amended that the Speaker 

13 Jackson to Polk, Aug. 6, 1837, ibid. 



SPEAKER OF TEE HOUSE UNDER VAN BUREN 117 

might have a vote on all questions, but his amendment was re- 
jected by the House. As most of the business of the session would 
necessarily pass through the hands of the Committee of Ways 
and Means, Polk safeguarded the interests of the administration 
by selecting seven of its nine members from the ranks of his own 
party. 

Although the President, when convening Congress, had defi- 
nitely limited the scope of legislation, Adams was more terrified 
by the possible annexation of Texas than he was by the magnitude 
of the financial crisis. On September 13, he moved to ask the 
President whether Texas had offered to join the United States, 
and, if so, M^hat had been the reply made by our government. Any 
proposition to annex it, declared Adams, would be unconstitu- 
tional — one which neither the President nor Congress "had any 
right to receive, entertain or consider." It was his firm opinion 
that "a very large portion of the people of this country, dearly 
as they loved the Union, would prefer its total dissolution to the 
act of annexation of Texas." The House, on September 18, cur- 
tailed his dissertations on the subject by passing a rule which 
limited discussions to questions included in the President's 
message. Adams tried by various devices to inject the subject of 
Texas into later discussions, but Polk rigorously enforced the rule 
just adopted. 

The rule for limiting discussion did not deter Wise from offer- 
ing a resolution which provided that a committee be chosen by 
ballot to investigate the causes, delays, and failures of the Florida 
war. Adams approved this method of selecting committees, for, 
said he, experience had proved that no real investigation would be 
prosecuted by any committee selected by the present Speaker. 

Having failed in his attempt to deprive the Speaker of the 
power to make appointments. Wise welcomed the appearance in 
the House of the Senate bill for creating a sub-treasury. This 
subject gave him an opportunity to vent his wrath and sarcasm 
not only upon the "Greatest and Best," as he called General 



118 JAMES E. POLK 

Jackson, but upon Van Buren and Polk as well. The late and 
present administrations, he said, ' ' have deliberately and wickedly, 
with malice aforethought, wrought this mischief" and should be 
indicted by the people for their crimes. He took special delight 
in reading one of Jackson's messages which had incorporated a 
part of Polk's report — as chairman of the Committee of Ways 
and Means — highly commending the safety and efficiency of state 
banks. And now we read in the message of Van Buren, shouted 
Wise, "that the experiment has failed" — the great chief, whom 
all had been taught to regard as a god, was after all a weak 
mortal whose wisdom was as fallible as that of other men.^* 

Little was accomplished during this brief session. The sub- 
treasury bill was defeated, and Congress contented itself with 
the enactment of emergency measures. The first three install- 
ments paid out under the operation of the distribution act were 
permitted to remain with the states, but the fourth was postponed 
and never paid. To meet the immediate needs of the govern- 
ment, the President was authorized to prepare interest-bearing 
treasury notes to be issued to an amount not exceeding ten mil- 
lion dollars. Having failed to agree upon any permanent financial 
policy. Congress, on October 19, adjourned until the regular 
session in December. 

Before Congress had adjourned, the Tennessee legislature met 
in regular session. Governor Cannon assailed with some vehe- 
mence both Jackson and his successor. The Whigs began at once 
to formulate plans which they hoped might insure Polk's polit- 
ical downfall and prevent the reelection of Grundy. Some of 
the Democrats were in favor of silently ignoring their critics, but 
Polk, who was still in Washington, urged the adoption of an 
aggressive course and the prevention of the election of a Senator, 
for the present at least. ^^ Before he set out for Tennessee, Polk 
was authorized by Grundy to withdraw his name, as candidate 



14 Con<7. GJohc, 25 Cong., 1 sess., App., 318. 

15 Jonas E. Thomas to Polk, Oct. 5; Polk to Nicholson, Oct. 9, 18.'{7; 
Polk Papers. 



SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDEB VAN BUEEN 119 

for Senator, should it develop that the interests of the adminis- 
tration might be promoted by so doing.^''' Grundy was reelected, 
but not without difficulty, for the ranks of the Whigs were 
steadily increasing. 

The Democrats were alarmed but not disheartened. A new 
editor, Cunningham, was put in charge of the Union; for to the 
moderation of Bradford, under Grundy's guidance, had Jackson 
attributed the recent defeats." Most hopeful of all was Jackson 
himself; he prophesied that Tennessee would be "herself again" 
in less than two years, in spite of Bell's New England tour, 
which was designed to transfer the state to "Webster and the 
Federalists.^^ 

When the twenty-fifth Congress met in December for its 
second session, a rather unusual problem was presented to the 
House for solution. It was a question of settling a contested 
election of members from Mississippi, and, as the decision ulti- 
mately devolved upon the Speaker, Polk incurred the enmity of 
Sergeant S. Prentiss, a man quite as venomous as Wise or Peyton, 
and far more able than either. 

In July, 1837, the Governor of Mississippi had called a special 
election in order that the state might send members to the extra 
session of Congress which had been proclaimed by President Van 
Buren. Claiborne and Gholson, the men chosen at the special 
election, were, at the extra session, declared by the House to be 
members for the entire term of the twenty-fifth Congress. Not- 
withstanding this decision of the House, Mississippi held another 



iG Grundy to Polk, Oct. 17, 1837, ihid. 

17 Although removed for the moderation of his editorials, Bradford 
was, on the other hand, dropped from the roll of divinity students by 
the Whig bishop for being so ardent a Democrat. The incident well 
illustrates the political intolerance of the period. 

18 "The course of Mr. Bell in attending the aristocratic, federal & 
shin-plaster meetings in Boston & New York, & his speeches at those 
meetings, which is a transfer of Tennessee to Mr. Webster & the blue 
lights, abolitionists and vagrants, is working well here — it has opened 
the eyes of the democracy of Tennessee, and none of his Whigg friends 
here will guarantee the sale. ' ' Jackson to Grundv, Dec. 16, 1837 {Am. 
Hist. Mag., V, 138-139). 



Y 



120 JAMES K. FOLK 

election in November and chose for Representatives S. S. Pren- 
tiss and T. J. Ward. Claiborne and Gholson were supporters 
of the administration, and their friends in Mississippi, relying 
on the decision made by the House, took no part in the November 
election. As a result, Prentiss and Ward were easily elected. 
Each side now claimed its representatives to have been lawfully 
elected and appealed to the House for a decision. After pro- 
longed debate the House reversed its former decision and pro- 
nounced the election of Claiborne and Gholson void. It then 
proceeded to ballot on the validity of the second Mississippi elec- 
tion at which Prentiss and Ward had been chosen. On this ques- 
tion the vote stood 117 to 117. Polk cast his ballot in the nega- 
tive, and the whole matter was referred back to the people of the 
state, who later reelected Prentiss and Ward. The "glorious 
infamy" which attached to the Speaker's vote against him, 
Prentiss never forgot. In a flight of oratory he told the people 
of Mississippi that "the still small voice of James K. Polk de- 
prived you of that which a hundred thousand bayonets could 
not have forced upon you. ' '^^ On his return to Congress he had 
the supreme satisfaction, not only of harassing the Speaker on 
•every possible occasion, but of opposing the ordinary vote of 
thanks to Polk on his retirement from the Speakership. 

Slade, of Vermont, precipitated a stormy debate on slavery 
by presenting, on December 20, two memorials which asked for 
the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. After mov- 
ing that the memorials be referred to a select committee, he 
entered into a prolonged and scathing discussion of the slavery 
question in its various phases. Having recognized the member 
from Vermont, Polk found it difficult to prevent his continuing, 
since Slade for some time was careful to keep within the bounds 
of parliamentary rules. When he finally launched into a dis- 
cussion of slavery in Virginia, a member entered a protest and 



19 Clipping from some Philadelphia paper, dated Feb. 7, 1S38 {Polk 
Papers). 



SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER VAN BUEEN 121 

Polk ordered Slade to his seat.-*^ Wise, Rhett, and other soiithern 
radicals were choking with rage. Several exhorted their colleagues 
to leave the hall in a body. After adjournment a meeting was 
held, and, although threats of disunion were freely made, few 
members were ready for so drastic a procedure. 

On the following day Patton, of Virginia, introduced, as a 
".concession . . . for the sake of peace, harmony, and union,'' 
a gag rule more drastic than its predecessor. It directed that 
all petitions on the subject of abolition should be laid on the 
table "without being debated, printed, read or referred," and 
that no further action should be taken thereon. The rules were 
suspended, the previous question invoked, and the vote hur- 
riedly taken. When his name was called, Adams shouted that 
the resolution violated the federal Constitution, whereupon the 
Speaker forced him to take his seat. Polk then ruled to be out 
of order the demand made by Adams that his reason for not vot- 
ing should be entered in the journal. A few days later, Polk even 
extended the new "gag-rule," by deciding that a resolution of 
the Massachusetts legislature asking for a repeal of the gag rule 
also came under the rule itself and could not therefore be 
considered.'^ 

Sectional feeling was still more embittered during this session 
by the killing, in a duel, of Jonathan Cilley, of Maine, by another 
member of the House, William J. Graves, of Kentucky. The 
demands made upon Cilley by Graves and his second. Wise, were 
held by many to have been extremely unreasonable. By such 
members the killing of Cilley was regarded as little better than 
premeditated murder. The appointment of a committee to inves- 
tigate the circumstances of the duel with a view to punishing 
members who had taken part, led to a strange alignment in 

20 Polk said that, while his position would not permit him to state 
his own opinions on such agitation of this question, ' ' they might readily 
be inferred by the House. ' ' 

21 January 3, 1838. Polk seems, however, to have felt that he had 
gone too far in this matter, for on February 5 he ruled to be in order a 
petition of similar purport from citizens of Massachusetts. 



122 JAMES K. FOLK 

defense of the participants. Friends of Graves and Wise charged 
that Polk had "packed" the committee to the prejudice of the 
defendants; while Adams, declaring the investigation to be "an. 
administration measure," not only condemned the committee for 
having prepared an opinion, but objected to receiving their 
report. So intense was i3artisan feeling that Sawyer, of North 
Carolina, objected to receiving a message from the President 
which arrived while the clerk was reading the report of the com- 
mittee, but Polk promptly decided that the constitutional right 
of the President to send a message to the house at any time 
transcended the rule which required unanimous consent to its 
reception. 

Hectoring of the Speaker continued to the end of the session. 
On June 23, Adams reached the climax of absurdity by demand- 
ing that Polk should reduce to writing some irrelevant remarks 
which Adams had made and which the Speaker had declared to 
be out of order. On Polk's refusal, Adams appealed from the 
decision. Needless to say, the House sustained the Speaker. 

While Polk was successfully parrying the shafts of his enemies 
in Congress, his friends in Tennessee were compassing the down- 
fall of Bell, as well as formulating new plans for the Speaker 
himself. Donelson was indefatigable in his efforts to expose Bell's 
treachery. From his retreat at the Hermitage "the chief" for- 
warded documents to the Speaker and requested him to answer 
Bell's charges against himself [Jackson], either in Congress or 
through the Glohc.-'- Desirous of representing Polk's district in 
Congress, Nicholson saw in the Speaker excellent Vice-Presi- 
ential timber, but Polk was inclined to agree with other friends 
that he might be able to accomplish more good in the governor's 
chair. Ex-Governor Carroll had announced to Polk his willing- 
ness to become once more a candidate for the office, and promised 
to handle Cannon "without gloves";-^ but the politicians, fear- 
ing that he would be defeated, did not rally to his support. 



22 Doneldson to Polk, Jan. 4; Jackson to Polk, Feb. 2, 1838; Polk Papers. 

23 Carroll to Polk, Feb. 17, 1838, ibid. 



SPEAEEB OF THE HOUSE UNDER VAN BUREN 123 

Even before Polk had consented to run for governor, each 
party was striving to strengthen its own position in the state and 
to weaken the hold of its opponent. In Boston, C. G. Greene, 
under Polk's direction, collected evidence to prove that Bell, on 
his New England tour, had been entertained by Hartford Con- 
vention Federalists;'-"' wdiile in Tennessee, the Whig legislature 
instructed Grundy to vote against any sub-treasury bill that 
might come before the Senate. Although the purpose of this 
move w^as to force his resignation, he disappointed the Whigs by 
promptly announcing that he would obey his instructions. Much 
Whig literature was franked from Washington. White and 
Bell scattered widely the speech in which Wise had castigated 
Polk and the President. 

From many sources Polk was importuned to accept the guber- 
natorial nomination, for it w^as believed that he could regain the 
state for the Democratic party.-^ Apparently the office was not 
attractive to him, yet duty to his party seemed to point in that 
direction. Late in the summer, after mature consideration, he 
finally consented to become a candidate. Many letters told him 
of the good effect which his acceptance had produced. One from 
Cave Johnson reported that in many places "whole neighbor- 
hoods" had returned to the Democratic party.^*' 

The Democrats were still embarrassed by the weakness of 
their local papers, for Cunningham had proved to be quite as 
unsuccessful a journalist as Bradford. When seeking a more 
competent editor for the Vnion, Polk offered the position to 



2* Green to Polk, Jan. 18, 1838, ihid. 

25 One correspondent intimated that prospects of success might be 
better in the state than in Congress. Polk, he said, would redeem the 
state if any one could, and "If there is any possible chance of the 
opposition getting the upper hand in the ensuing Congress, perhaps this 
course might be the prudent one; as your friends would as soon be 
annihilated at once, as to see that viost ustfamous of all infamous 
PUPPIES, John Bell, triumph over you in a contest for the Speaker 's chair. 
Should the opposition succeed in their views, this must and will be the 
result, as you are now the most dreaded and consequently the most 
hated by them" (W. S. Haynes to Polk, July 24, 1838, ihid.). 

26 Johnson to Polk, Nov. 2, 1838, ibid. 



124 JAMES K. POLK 

several persons in succession. Among the number were Edmund 
Burke-' and C. G. Greene, of Boston. It was Greene, who, when 
declining the offer, suggested Jeremiah George Harris, then edi- 
tor of the Bay State Democrat:-^ For the Democrats this proved 
to be a most fortunate Suggestion. In Harris they found a man 
in every way suited to Tennessee politics — one who was more 
than a match for his adversaries of the quill, with the possible 
exception of Parson Brownlow. The Union was enlarged, and 
on February 1, 1839, the proprietor, J. M. Smith, introduced the 
new editor to the people of Tennessee. In the same issue Harris 
announced his policy: namely, to fight for the principles of 
Jefferson and his Republican successors, and for the overthrow 
of "Federalism" in the state.-'' A week later Smith reported 
to Polk that a war of words with Hall, editor of the Banner, had 
already begun and that he [Smith] was much pleased with 
Harris.^" 

The proprietor of the Union had no reason to revise his 
opinion. Harris launched at once into a campaign of vitupera- 
tion and merciless denunciation of the Whigs which endeared him 
to his friends and made him dreaded by his opponents. He was 
the type of editor in whom the people of the West delighted. He 
and General Jackson became fast friends, but, in the main, it was 
to Polk that he looked for counsel and guidance. He plunged 
with zeal into the campaign against Governor Cannon and an- 
nounced that ' ' Tennessee has not seen so proud a day since the 
election of her own Jackson to the Presidency as will that on 

27 Burke was later a Kepresentative from New Hampshire. In 1845, 
Polk put him in charge of the General Patent Office. 

28 Greene to Rives of the Globe, Dec. 3, 1838, Poll: Papers. 

29 "That tory federalism of 1798, Hartford convention federalism 
of 1814, and 'whig' Federalism of this day are identical, so far as they 
relate to the two grand party divisions of the country, is too susceptible 
of the clearest letter of proof to admit of a doubt." 

30 "Mr. Hall of the Banner has commenced the war with the new 
editor of the ' Union ' and if I am not mistaken he will find that he will 
have a little more to do than he at present imagines" (Smith to Polk, 
Feb. 7, 1839, Poll- Papers). 



SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER VAX BUREN 125 

which the sovereigns of her soil shall by their unbought suffrage 
call Mr. Polk to the gubernatorial chair. ' '^^ 

This is not, however, the place for a prolonged discussion of 
Polk's gubernatorial campaign. Reserving this for another chap- 
ter, we may follow his career through his last session as Speaker 
of the House. Selected by the Democrats for the avowed purpose 
of bringing Tennessee back into the party fold, Polk, as he called 
to order the third session of the twenty-tifth Congress, was more 
cordially hated than ever by Bell, Wise, Prentiss, and other 
enemies of the administration. 

Van Buren's message, which reached the House on December 
4, 1838, was optimistic in tone. He informed Congress that the 
rapid improvement of financial conditions and the resumption of 
specie payment by the principal banks had proved beyond ques- 
tion that a federal bank is not indispensable. Reiterating the 
belief that a sub-treasury would prove to be the best agency for 
collecting and disbursing the public revenue, he again recom- 
mended its creation by law. He alluded to Swartwout 's defalca- 
tion and asked for legislation which would make such peculation 
in future a felony. 

The lawmaking body of the nation paid little heed to the 
President's recommendations. Jockeying for position suited their 
present mood far better than constructive legislation. Having 
made gains in recent political contests, the Whigs had high hopes 
of carrying the next Presidential election. Without as yet 
announcing any program for themselves, they employed all of 



31 Nashville Union, Feb. 8, 1839. In the same issue Harris quoted an 
article from the Pennsylvania Reporter in which that paper urged that 
Polk should be made Vice-President. Concerning Polk's record the 
Reporter said: "Knowing that the Bank of the United States was about 
to bring the whole of its mighty influence to bear against the administra- 
tion of Gen. Jackson, it was deemed of the highest importance to be well 
fortified at the point where the attack was to be made, and the chair- 
man of the Committee of Ways and Means, as the financial organ of the 
administration, became the most important position in the House. Col. 
Polk's known position in opposition to the re-charter of that institution, 
his intimate accpiaintance with its history and transactions, and his 
powers as a ready and able debater, recommended him for its occupancy. 
And well did he justify the confidence so reposed in him." 



126 JAMES K. POLK 

their energies in heaping odium upon the administrations of A'an 
Buren and his predecessor. In the House the session was stormy 
from the beginning. When they could enlist the votes of the 
so-called conservatives, the Whigs were able to outvote the Demo- 
crats, and the task of the Speaker was made still more difficult. 

On the second day of the session, and before the President 's 
message had been received, Adams fanned the flame of sectional 
discord by moving that all petitions, remonstrances, and resolu- 
tions, for or against the annexation of Texas, should be referred 
to a select committee. His resolution was laid on the table by 
a vote of 136 to 61. His solicitude on this subject proved to be 
unwarranted, for the President in his .message assured Congress 
that all proposals for annexation had been withdraAvn. Adams 
then submitted a resolution which called for a committee to inves- 
tigate the controversy of Andrew Stevenson, late Speaker of the 
House and present minister to England, with Daniel O'Con- 
nell, a member of Parliament. This also was sent to the table, 
but it had accomplished its intended purpose of attaching odium 
to the administration. 

Abolition petitions again made their appearance. The per- 
sistence of the reformers aroused the fears as well as the wrath 
of southern members, and slaveholders required guaranties for 
the protection of their "peculiar institution." On December 11, 
Atherton, of New Hampshire, submitted a series of resolutions 
the purport of which was to declare unconstitutional any inter- 
ference with slavery either in the states or the District of 
Columbia, and to reenact the gag rule regarding petitions. After 
a brief debate these resolutions were adopted by the House. The 
adoption of the gag rule did not, however, eliminate the slavery 
question. On the thirteenth, Adams tried to introduce a resolu- 
tion to the effect that no enactment of Congress could add to or 
deduct from the powers of Congress which had been conferred 
by the Constitution. On the same day, Wise offered a series of 
resolutions which were designed to deprive Congress of all power 



SPEAKEE OF THE HOUSE UNDEB VAN BUBEN 127 

to interfere with slavery. In both eases permission to introdnce 
the resohitions was denied by the House. While Polk applied 
the gag rule whenever possible, Gushing, of Massachusetts, won 
applause from the reformers by forcing the Speaker to decide 
that a protest against the constitutionality of the gag rule, 
although itself out of order, must be inserted in the Journal, if 
brought up on the following day in the form of a correction of 
the minutes.^- 

For the Whigs, the news of Swartwout's defalcation was an 
unusually sweet morsel, for it gave them an excuse to explore 
wath telescope and microscope the administrations of Jackson and 
Van Buren. And, as the Democrats no longer had a majority 
in the House, it incidentally gave them a chance to humiliate 
Polk by depriving him of the power to appoint the investigating 
committee. In disposing of the questions mentioned in the Presi- 
dent's message, Cambreleng had moved that the part relating to 
the defalcation be referred to the Committee of Ways and Means, 
of which he was chairman. On December 21, Garland, of Vir- 
ginia, moved to amend by referring the question to a select com- 
mittee of nine to be chosen by 'ballot. In a scurrilous tirade. 
Wise asserted that any committee appointed by the present 
Speaker w^ould conceal rather than disclose the facts. He had, he 
said, been chairman of another committee selected by Polk to 
investigate the affairs of the General Post Office, and all his efforts 
to ascertain the truth had been defeated. Kendall, the Post 
Master General, ^^ had declined to furnish information on the 



32 Dec. 21, 1838. Cong. Glohe, 25 Cong., 3 sess., 59. 

33 Wise called Kendall "the President's thinking machine, and his 
writing machine — ay, and his lying machine! Sir, if General Jackson had 
been elected for a third term, one great good would have come of the 
evil — Amos Kendall would have been worTced to death.' Poor wretch, as 
he rode his Eosinante down Pennsylvania avenue, he looked like Death 
on a pale horse — he was chief overseer, chief reporter, amanuensis, scribe, 
accountant general, man of all work — nothing was well done without 
the aid of his diabolical genius." Shielding Kendall, said Wise, was the 
more reprehensible because Jackson had so relentlessly pursued Tobias 
V/atkins: "When the indictments, the prosecutions, were pressed unre- 
lentingly against poor Watkins — when the Administration was crying. 



128 JAMES K. POLK 

ground that he was responsible to the President alone, and the 
majority of the committee had excluded everything that might 
reflect upon the administration. "Now, sir," said Wise to the 
Speaker, 

I propose to show that your committee obeyed the will of their master. 
Yes, as you had done, by pacMng aud stocking the committee. It was your 
committee — peculiarly and emphatically yours — its appointment, its conduct, 
its honor or infamy, will forever attach itself, sir, to your name. In illus- 
trating the conduct of that committee, I could consume days to show how 
the plainest and most obvious and undeniable propositions were voted down ; 
how resolution after resolution, question after question to witnesses, going 
into the very vitals of inquiry, were unblushingly rejected and stifled by 
the majority of the committee . . . yo^t, the Speaker, the President of the 
United States, the heads of Executive Departments, your committee, and 
your whole party, combined and conspired to stifle investigation. 

Some of Wise's friends asked him to yield the floor for a motion 
to adjourn. He declined oiii the plea that he might never get it 
again, for, said he to the Speaker, ' ' I distrust you, sir. ' '^' Polk 
bore the onslaught with dignity and composure, and without 
interference until Wise referred to Benton as the "monster" 
who was to perpetuate the present dynasty. On January 8, 1839, 
he again assailed the Speaker and compared him to a gambler 
who plays with loaded dice.'' 

It was believed by the Speaker's friends that Wise, Peyton, 

and Clay were trying to provoke him into sending a challenge,^*^ 

'for the "murder" of Jonathan Cilly had not been forgotten. 



Shylock-like, 'my bond, my bond!' against one of Mr. Adams's default- 
ers, then 'general and minute inquiries' were not only lawful, but a 
duty; but, sir, the moment the band of investigation touched one of his 
'little ones,' then inquiry was worse than a 'Spanish Inquisition.' " 

34 Dec. 21, 1838. Cong. Globe, 25 Cong., 3 sess.j App., 386-387. 

35 "My colleague," said he, "wants the committee appointed by 
ballot, in order to avoid imputations on the Speaker; I Avant it appointed 
by ballot, to avoid the Speaker himself. ' ' 

30 According to a story printed in the Globe, August 21, 1844, on the 
authority of General Jackson, Clay at' one time appeared at the bar 
of the House and said to Speaker Polk: "Go home, G-d d-n you., where 
you belong!" In 1844 this ejaculation was made the theme of a cam- 
paign song. During a heated debate in the House, Wise shouted to Polk: 
"You arc a damned little petty tyrant; I mean thi.s personally — pocket 
it!" 



SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER VAN BUBEN 129 

But Polk treated their insults with silent contempt, and by so 
doing did much to establish a new precedent in such ' ' affairs of 
honor." His personal bravery was questioned by none except 
his bitter enemies, and even the impetuous Jackson commended 
him for ignoring such flagrant indignities.^'^ 

The committee was chosen by ballot, and, needless to say, a 
majority of its members were opposed to the administration. The 
Democrats asked for the privilege of selecting the minority mem- 
bers, but their request was denied. Both majority and minority 
reports were tabled by the House on February 27, 1839. The 
investigation had been successful only in intensifying political 
discord. In a letter to Polk, Jackson asked for an account of 
the investigation, and expressed the belief that Swartwout could 
not have invested all of the million and a quarter which he had 
taken. "Where is the balance?" he asked, "The Whiggs have 
it. ' '^* To Grundy he suggested that William B. Lewis and Daniel 
Jackson, if put on oath, might tell how Swartwout had invested 
some of his money. ^^ 

Defalcations had been both frequent and brazen, and their 
cause, as Underwood, of Kentucky, pointed out,^° could be traced 
to Jackson's policy of filling offices with those "whose subserv- 
iency to the will of the President, and devotion to the interests 
of party, constituted their principal recommendation." But 
undoubtedly Bynum's statement was equally true — that, when 
demanding that the select committee be chosen by ballot, the 
Whigs were less interested in political purity than in blasting 
Polk's prospects in his gubernatorial campaign.*^ 



37 Jackson to W. P. Bowles, Aug. 24, 1840. Printed in Washington 
Globe, July 19, 1844. 

38 Jackson to Polk, Feb. 11, 1839, Polk Papers. 

39 " I have no doubt, ' ' he continued, ' ' if the truth can be reached, 
that the Whigg merchants of New York hold in their hands of the revenue 
chargeable to Swartwout, from $600,000 to $800,000 if not more, and it 
is suggested that he loaned to our little Whigg printer, Hall of the Banner, 
some thousands. ' ' Jackson to Grundy, Feb. 20, 1839 (Am. Mag. of Hist., 
V, 141-142). 

40 Cong. Gloie, 25 Cong., 3 sess., App., 375. 

41 Idem, 125. 



130 JAMES K. POLK 

Unquestionably disintegration of the Jackson party was due 
in part to the jealousy of ambitious politicians who had failed to 
obtain what they considered to be an adequate reward for services 
rendered. But there was a deeper cause for defection — one based 
on the nature and ends of government itself. For example, a 
man of Bell's type — one who believed in constitutional govern- 
ment, and one whose penetrating mind enabled him so clearly to 
see the inevitable results of administering the government accord- 
ing to Jacksonian methods — never logically belonged in the ranks 
of the party which followed so loyally the dictates of the "old 
hero. ' ' Bell, and all others who viewed things as he did, were con- 
stitutionalists, and they gravitated naturally to the party which 
accepted the precepts of Hamilton, Marshall, and Webster. Dur- 
ing Jackson's first term, and to some extent during his second, 
there was much confusion of thought on governmental principles 
and functions. Admiration for the man had obscured the vision 
of many who would otherwise have been quick to detect the 
inherent evils of Jacksonism. By the time Van Buren became 
President, the personal element had, to a considerable degree, 
disappeared from politics. In the party realignment which re- 
sulted, personal qualities were not entirely ignored; but of far 
greater importance was the attitude of statesmen and their sup- 
porters toward the fundamentals of government itself. On this 
question the issue was clear cut. 

Several speeches delivered during this session show that their 
authors fully understood the nature of Jacksonism and its para- 
lyzing influence upon constitutional government. The President 
in his message had attributed the success of our institutions to 
the "constant and direct supervision by the people over every 
public measure." With this as a text. Bell assailed the "demo- 
cratic tendencies" of which the administration boasted, and 
made an ardent plea for a return to constitutional government : 

The People are told that our ancestors, who framed the Cons.tvitution in 
1789, Avere half a century in the rear of the improvements of the present 
age; that they had not the benefit of the new lights which experience has 



SPEAKER OF THE ROUSE VNBEB VAN BUBEN ' 131 

shed upon the subject of government since that time, and which are now 
in full blaze around us. The science of government, we are told, has made 
great strides since our Constitution was framed; and, in deed, that instru- 
ment is beginning to be looked upon by many rather as a device of bad men, 
to advance the interests of the few at the expense of the many, and forming 
an actual obstruction to that full tide of happiness and prosperity which 
awaits us when the inventions of modern democracy shall be substituted 
for it. At all events, it is proclaimed to be the duty of every man who 
would improve the condition of the human family to strengthen the demo- 
cratic tendencies of the Constitution, and to disrobe or rather strip it of those 
limitations and restrictions upon the popular will, with which our unimproved 
ancestors have thought it necessary to encumber it. . . . In truth, sir, it 
cannot be disguised that there are a class of politicians in the country at 
this moment, whose aspirations it does not suit that any restriction, any 
limitation whatever, shall exist in the practice of the Government upon the 
will or absolutism of the majority; and, in the estimation of all their 
followers, our Constitution is defective. ^ 2 

Deploring the attempt to bring about more immediate control 
by the people, Bell boldly asserted that 

according to our system, the People do not, and cannot, exercise any direct 
supervision over any public measure. Their power, their influence, their 
supervision, can be constitutionally exercised only by petition and remon- 
strance, and by the utterance of their voice at the ballot-box. 

This was but a simple statement of facts ; nevertheless, it required 
temerity to proclaim such a truth in the face of clamor for the 
exercise of popular will. To Van Buren's declaration that the 
extension of practical democracy had strengthened the Union, 
Bell replied that never before had there been such a relaxation 
of all ties which bind society together." The power of the 
people, he said, had not in reality been increased, for party 
discipline had deprived them of all voice in public affairs.^* The 



42 Dec. 26, 1838. Gang. Globe, 25 Cong., 3 sess., App., 360-361. 

43 "At no former period has so general a spirit of opposition to legal 
restraints or requirements manifested itself throughout the country, when 
they stand in the way of wilful passions or purposes of any kind. Slight 
regard for the Constitution and laws, commencing with the Government 
itself and its administrators, has gradually diffused itself over society." 

44 ' ' Such is and has been the power of party discipline — such the 
despotic principle of party association for years, that the mass of the 
community have rather stood in the relation of subjects to be governed 
than the controlling elements of power. ' ' 



132 JAMES K. POLE 

truth of this statement, however, only made more deplorable the 
fact that the party which Bell himself had helped to organize 
should keep np the fiction of popular sovereignty, and even 
outdo their opponents in catering to the passions of the multitude. 
When discussing an appropriation bill, on February 19, 1839, 
Kennedy, of Maryland, diverged from his subject to give a 
critical analysis of Jacksonism and to point out its disastrous 
consequences. Jackson, he said, had been singularly unlucky 
as a reformer, although he had been an innovator ' ' in the broadest 
and worst sense ' ' : 

His admiuistration "vvas one ceaseless change: change, sometimes steal- 
ing along in noiseless advance, sometimes bursting forth in bold, open-day 
achievement ; one while sweeping with the breath of spring, at another with 
the rage and havoc of the tornado. We had ever change of men, change 
of measures, change of principles. . . . The pervading characteristic of that 
most anomalous and extraordinary administration was mutation — uncer- 
tainty — experiment. It lived in perpetual motion, defying all hope of 
repose; it rejoiced in turmoil, and revelled in paradox. . . . The idea of 
political consistency never entered the President's head — he had no per- 
ception of the meaning of the term. 

Jackson's idol, continued Kennedy, was popularity, and what- 
ever sustained popularity constituted the theory of his conduct. 
It was not that wholesome popularity based on services rendered, 
"but a domineering, wayward, arrogant popularity — an im- 
patient, hectoring assumption of the right to lead, which repu- 
diates all law, despises all observance, and maintains its supre- 
macy by personal and party force." Jackson, said he, used his 
popularity to increase his power ; and, in turn, he used that power 
to increase his popularity.'*" 



45 ' ' The very boldness of his designs seemed to fascinate the public 
admiration: he dazzled the popular mind by that fearlessness which we 
were, for a time, accustomed to intei-pret as a proof of his honesty and 

uprightness of purpose He flattered the People with the address 

of a practiced courtier, startled and amused them by the thunderclaps 
of his policy, identified his success w-ith the gratification of their favorite 
passions, grappled himself w^ith wonderful adroitness to the predominant 
sentiments, wishes, and prejudices of the great and massive majority — 



SPEAKEE OF THE HOUSE UNDER VAN BUEEN 133 

On February 22, Slade, of Vermont, obtained the floor for 
the purpose of discussing the general appropriation bill. His 
time was mainly occupied, however, in a masterful arraignment 
of Jackson and Van Buren, and of their methods. He attributed 
the gift of prophecy to Benton, Van Buren, and R. M. Johnson, 
who, in 1826, had reported to the Senate on the evils of executive 
patronage. Patronage, they said, would inevitably lead to one 
man power. By exchanging patronage for votes the President 
would soon control not only both houses of Congress, but the 
entire country.'^ "What was prophecy in 1826," said Slade, 
"has become history in 1839." 

Under the caption of the "Pretensions of Democracy," he 
contrasted the now obsolete Republicanism of Jefferson with 

and became a monarch, an autocrat, by the sheer concentration of repub- 
lican suffrage. ' ' 

Having discussed in detail the methods by which Jackson had arro- 
gated all authority to himself while professing reverence for the Con- 
stitution, Kennedy depicted most admirably the effect of Jaeksonism, 
not alone upon the character of the government, but upon society itself. 
It Jed not merely to corruption in official circles, but it demoralized the 
masses, as well.' "We lived," said he, "in the midst of convulsions. 
The public taste was vitiated and fed by the stimulous of constantly 
recurring political eruptions; it delighted in strange conjectures — the 
heavings and spasms of that capricious power which displayed itself in 
such fantastic action at the capital. A spirit of insubordination, of mis- 
rule and riot became diffused through the community. Wild and visionary 
theories of political duty were disseminated abroad and showed them- 
selves, in the most mischievous forms, in the proceedings of the State 
Legislatures. The most abstruse and difficult problems of political 
economy — questions of currency, finance, constitutional power — were 
summarily but authoritatively disposed of by the shallowest pretenders 
to statesmanship; and the oldest and best institutions of the country 
attacked and beaten down by political charlatans. Knowledge, delibera- 
tion, experience, all were obliged to give way to this newly-inspired 
intuition; and the greatest pains were taken by party leaders and dema- 
gogues to deceive the people into the belief that the profoundest ques- 
tions of government might be consigned to the decision of men of the 
lowest scale of qualification in political science" {Cong. Globe, 25 Cong., 
3 sess., App., 410-412). The whole speech is well worth reading. 

46 ' < We must look forward to the time when the nomination of a 
President can carry any man through the Senate, and his recommenda- 
tion can carry any measure through the two Houses of Congress; when 
the principle of public action will be open and avowed — the President 
wants my vote, and I want his patronage; I will vote as he wishes, and 
he will give me the office I wish for. What will this be but the govern- 
ment of one man"? and what is the government of one man, but a mon- 
archy?" Quoted from their report by Slade. 



134 JAMES E. POLE 

the madness of Jacksonian Democracy — "the Democracy," as it 
is called. Its chief characteristic, said he, is sham, and it relies 
for its success upon fomenting class prejudice.*' He read the 
well-known letter to Monroe in which Jackson urged the Presi- 
dent to crush the "monster, party spirit," and contrasted the 
sentiments expressed in that letter with the practice of the admin- 
istration of its author. Hypocritical as had been the pretensions 
to political virtue of those who had brought General Jackson 
forward for the Presidency, Slade did not believe that even they 
had fully realized the political debauchery upon which they were 
entering.*^ 

The Speaker, to whom this merciless, but for the most part 
well-merited, arraignment of Jacksonism was officially addressed, 
listened, undismayed by the perils which were being depicted. 
None believed more thoroughly in party discipline than he, and 
few had been more closely identified with the administrations of 
Jackson and A^an Buren. He had efifeetively served his party 
in many capacities, from conducting the bank war in the House 
down to establishing local party newspapers. His enemies fully 
recognized his skill as a political strategist, even though they 
denounced him as the tool of those whom he served. 



47 "Thus, the rich arc made an object of jealousy to the poor. The 
laborer is excited against the capitalist — the indolent and improvident 
against the industrious and frugal — the ignorant against the learned and 
intelligent — and even the vicious and abandoned against the virtuous and 
upright. Associated wealth, no matter how widely it may embrace men 
of small means, is declared to be monopolizing and dangerous. Banks, 
however prudently and safely managed, are denounced as the money 
making machines of the wealthy, designed only to make the rich richer 
and the poor poorer. Factitious distinctions are created. Jealousies are 
excited. An imaginary aristocracy is raised up in the midst of every 
community; and nothing can be heard but the war-cry — down with 
monopolies, and down with the aristocracy." 

48 "It seems impossible they should have dreamed that General Jack- 
son, the author of the noble sentiments I have tjuoted, could ever be 
brought to enact, in his own administration, an utter falsification of every 
profession they contained — a falsification so complete, that there should 
not be, as in truth,, there is not, found a single one of his friends whose 
face does not crimson with blushes at an exhibit of the contrast" (Cong. 
Globe, 25 Cong., 3 sess., App. 323 ff). 



SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER VAN BUREN 135 

Jacksoiiism was not without its defenders, although they 
failed to match their opponents in oratorical powers or in logical 
arguments. Crary, of Michigan, saw in the Supreme Court a 
political body "of the worst character," and he commended 
Jackson for having assumed the right to construe the Constitution 
as he pleased. As soon as men are elevated to that court, said 
Crary, they apply themselves to the study of British law and 
British precedents, and "they cannot be operated upon by the 
healthy influence of a sound public opinon."*'' Rhett, of South 
Carolina, said that the country had always been divided into 
two great political parties — one which feared government and 
another which feared the people. Inasmuch as strength in the 
government could be attained only at the expense of popular 
freedom, he believed, like Jefferson, in restricting the functions 
of government within the narrowest possible limits. ^° 

The entire session was characterized by intense party and 
personal recrimination. The Democratic party was no longer 
omnipotent. It was reaping the harvest of its own misdeeds, 
and, in addition, it was held accountable for the distressed con- 
dition of the country, although this had resulted from causes 
economic rather than political. Hope of success added boldness 
to the attacks of its opponents. Twelve years earlier, an attack 
upon Jackson and his policies would have meant political suicide 
for the assailant ; it was now one of the surest means of acquiring 
popularity. 

More than any other member of the House, Polk was given 
credit by one party, and blame by the other, for the success of 
the legislative part of the Jackson program. Consequently his 
adversaries were unwilling to permit him to withdraw from na- 
tional politics without making one more attempt to humiliate him 
in the eyes of the nation. They had been unsuccessful in their 
efforts to confuse him in the complexities of parliamentary 



^^ Cong. Glohe,. 25 Cong-., 3 sess., App., 154. 
50 Idem, 134. 



H 



13G JAMES E. POLE 

procedure. Their insulting invectives and their invitations to 
personal combat had been received with a dignity and composure 
that did credit to the Speaker. Unable to gratify their desire 
to injure the Speaker in a more effective manner, his enemies 
resorted to the petty and unprecedented course of opposing the 
ordinary vote of thanks on his retirement from office. Prentiss, 
who had, at a previous session, been deprived of a seat in the 
House by Polk's casting vote, was chief actor and stage manager 
in this puerile opera houffe. The resolution which thanked the 
Speaker for "the able, impartial, and dignified manner" in which 
he had presided over the House, Prentiss moved to amend by 
striking out the word impartial. Prentiss did not "deny the 
capacity of the Speaker, his dispatch of business, or his full and 
thorough knowledge of parliamentary law," but he could not 
agree that he had been impartial. He argued that the House 
had expressed its distrust of the Speaker by taking from him the 
appointment of the Swartwout committee. On the other hand, 
he frankly admitted that his main objection to the resolution 
was the favorable effect it would have upon Polk's gubernatorial 
canvass in Tennessee. The Speaker, he said, was "playing a 
political game," in which this resolution would constitute an 
important part. Reviewing the personnel of the House commit- 
tees, he condemned the Speaker for having put on all ' ' political 
committees" a greater number of administration men than the 
small majority of that party would justify. He charged Polk 
with being a tool of the President and of the party. "A more 
perfectly party Speaker," said he, "one who would be more dis- 
posed to bend the rules of the House to meet the purposes of his 
own side in polities, never had pressed the soft and ample cush- 
ions of that gorgeous chair. "^^ 

There was little justification for this intemperate arraignment 
and for the conduct of the other fifty-six members''- who co- 
operated with Prentiss in opposing the customary vote of thanks. 



51 Cong. Globe, 25 Coug., 3 sess., 251-252. 

52 The vote stood 94 to 57. 



SPEAKER OF TEE HOUSE UNDER VAN BUREN 137 

When forming his committees, Polk had simply followed prece- 
dent. Many Whigs bore testimony to the justness of his de- 
cisions. And yet, he could hardly complain because of this par- 
tisan attack, for he had himself, on a former occasion, quite as 
unjustly accused a Speaker of subserviency to ''the throne."''^ 

Polk's farewell address to the House, in response to the reso- 
lution of thanks just passed, did much to destroy the effect of 
the shafts which had been hurled at him, and to elevate him in 
the opinion of fairminded men of all parties. He did not de- 
scend to answer the charges made against him or to indulge in 
recrimination. Without boasting, he alluded to his record of 
"constant and laborious" service,^* and to the peculiar difficul- 
ties which attach to the office of Speaker. All Speakers, said he, 
have borne testimony to the impossibility of giving entire satis- 
faction to all, but 

it has been made my duty to decide more questions of parliamentary la-w- 
and order many of them of a complex and difficult character, arising often 
in the midst of high excitement, in the course of our proceedings, than 
had been decided, it is believed, by all my predecessors, from the formation 
of this Government. 

Ignoring the minority, he thanked the majority for the evidence 
of their approbation. With good-tempered adroitness, he belit- 
tled the effect of the negative vote by declaring that he regarded 
the resolution just passed "as the highest and most valued testi- 
mony I have ever received from this House, ' ' because, under the 
circumstances, it was not a mere and a meaningless formality.-" 
Many who, for partisan reasons, had voted against the resolution, 
as soon as Congress had adjourned, hastened to assure the late 
Speaker of their personal good will.^''^ Instead of discrediting 



53 See pp. 19-20. 

5-t"I can, perhaps, say what fe-^' others, if any can — that I have not 
failed to attend the daily sittings of this House a single day since I 
have been a member of it [14 years], save on a single occasion, -when 
prevented for a short time by indisposition. ' ' 

55 Cong. Glohe, 25 Cong., 3 sess., 2.52-253. 

5'3 The Nashville Union, March 22, 1839, quoted a letter from a 
person who had been present -when Polk made his farewell address : "I 



138 JAMES K. POLK 

the Speaker, the minority had really made him an object of 
interest throughout the Union. Their conduct was generally con- 
demned, while his dignified reply raised him in the estimation 
of all except the most zealous partisans.^^ His ability as a pre- 
siding officer w'as made still more apparent during the following 
session by contrasting him with his successor, R. M. T. Hunter, 
of Virginia. In the opinion of Cave Johnson, Hvmter displayed 
"ignorance of rules and a want of energy & power to command" ; 
he feared that the House had chosen a boy to do the business of 
a man.""'^ J. W. Blackwell likewise reported that Hunter was 
too young for the position. "While you were Speaker," said 
he, "your friends praised, and your enemies abused you, but it 
is now admitted, on all sides, that Jas. K. Polk was the best pre- 
siding officer that we have had for many years, and some say — 
the best we ever had."''" 

At the close of the session Polk set out for Tennessee to 
engage in an active campaign for the governorship. After four- 
teen years of service in the House of Representatives, his party 
had assigned him duties in a new field of labor. Whatever his 
success in the new field might be, no one even dreamed that the 
retiring Speaker would next appear in Washington as President- 
elect. 



never witnessed more enthusiasm than the Speaker's admirable reply to 
the vote elicited. Many of those who had voted in the negative expressed 
their admiration of it, and gave evident signs of shame and regret at 
the partisan course they had pursued. Even Mr. Graves, of Kentucky, 
declared to a friend at his elbow that the Speaker had done as well as 
any one could do under such circumstances, and stepping forward took 
manly leave of him — as also did most of the members, a few bitter and 
envious partisans excepted. ' ' 

57 For example, the Worcester (Mass.) PaUadium, an independent 
paper, said: "The disreputable conduct of the opposition members of 
Congress, towards the Speaker of the House, at the close of the session, 
makes that gentleman an object of peculiar interest, at the present 
moment, to the whole democratic party of the Union. An effort was 
made, as violent as it was nncourteous, to prevent the passage of the 
usual complimentary resolution to the Speaker on his retiring from the 
Chair. But it was an unavailing effort." Quoted bv Nashville Union, 
April 8, 1839. 

5s Johnson to Polk, Dec. 21, 1839, Polk Papers. 

59BlackAvell to Polk, Dec. 30, 1839, ibid. 



CHAPTER VIII 

POLK VERSUS CANNON, 1839 

In May; 1838, shortly before he consented to become a candi- 
date for the governorship of Tennessee, Polk was examined by 
a phrenologist, who, unless he had made a thorough study of his 
client beforehand, made some exceedingly shrewd guesses} "He 
is very quick of perception " ; so reads the prepared statement, 

when he enjoys, he enjoys remarkably well, and when he suffers, he suffers 
most intently. . . . His is a remarkably active mind, restless unless he has 
something of importance to do; cannot be idle' for a moment, is by nature 
one of the most industrious of men; loves mental labour & hard study as 
he does daily food; . . . and is throughout a. positive character. 

The traits pointed out in another part of the statement are mani- 
fest throughout Polk 's public career, but especially so during the 
four years of his Presidency : He 

thinks well of himself; often asks advice, & does just as he pleases; is 
one of the firmest of men; slow in committing himself, but once committed, 
does all in his power to carry through his measures . . . has many acquain- 
tances, few bosom friends . . . has an astonishing command of facts and 
can call to mind with great precision what occurred long ago. 

To those who are familiar with Polk's career in national 
politics only, one part of the phrenologist's statement might 
seem very wide of the mark. In it, the phrenologist says tliat 
Polk would have succeeded on the stage, for he has abilit,v in 
the use of pungent sarcasm and ridicule and "could 'take off' 
the peculiarities of others if he would indulge this propensity." 
During the campaign which followed, Polk indulged this pro- 
pensity to the full — especially against his opponent and Bailie 
Peyton — for ridicule and mimicry were among the chief weapons 

1 The phrenologist's name was O. S. Fowler, and the statement which 
he prepared bears the date of May 30, 1838 {Poll: Papers). 



140 JAMES K. POLK 

used in assailing his adversaries. He is usually regarded as "a 
man who never smiled"; however this may have been, he was 
very successful in the art of amusing others. 

There was rejoicing among the Democrats of Tennessee when, 
in September, 1838, Polk announced that he would enter the 
^ contest with Governor Newton Cannon for the highest office of 
his state. He received many letters in which the writers ex- 
pressed their delight, promised support, and assured him of vic- 
tory. It was the general opinion that he alone could restore the 
state to the Democratic party. It was, indeed, this belief that 
induced him to abandon his career in the national legislature. 
The unholy work of White and Bell must be undone ; Old Hick- 
ory 's state must be redeemed. 

While he was still in Washington, presiding for the last time 
over the House of Representatives, Polk received many letters 
from Tennessee friends urging him to put the chief emphasis 
of his gubernatorial campaign on national issues and state in- 
ternal improvements. It was pointed out that the Whigs would 
confine themselves almost exclusively to an attack upon the na- 
tional administration and that the people of the state were much 
interested in internal development. The advice seems to have 
accorded wdth his own views. At any rate the topics suggested 
were the ones on which he placed the most emphasis. 

As stated elsewhere, one of the most important events of Polk's 
campaign against Cannon was the advent of Jeremiah George 
Harris as editor of the Nashville Unimi. In response to the pop- 
ular taste of the period, the press of the state had been notorious 
for extravagance of statement and personal abuse. It now en- 
tered upon a campaign of scurrility and abandon that has seldom 
been equaled ; Mark Twain 's employer could scarcely have nmde 
his editorials more "peppery and to the point."- Equipped 
w-ith a style that was cutting without descending to mere ribal- 
dry, and with a pen dipped in wormwood, Harris goaded his 



See Mark Twain, "Journalism in Tennessee," in Sketches New and Old 



FOLK VERSUS CANNON, 1839 141 

opponents to a frenzy that was unprecedented. Lacking the 
ability to imitate his style, his enemies often resorted to coarse 
and vulgar abuse. No Whig editor in the state, except the in- 
imitable Parson Brownlow, could cope with him in picturesque 
invective. Harris had a spread-eagle woodcut prepared, large 
enough to cover a considerable portion of the front page of his 
paper. As its appearance in the Union was always accompanied 
by news of Democratic victory, the Whigs expressed their con- 
tempt by calling it "Harris's buzzard."^ 

When Harris took charge of the Union, February 1, 1839, 
A. A. Hall, of the Nashville Banner, was already making capital 
of the charge made in Congress, by Wise and others, that Polk 
had "packed" the committees of the House. The new editor 
plunged at once into a vigorous defense of the Speaker and at- 
tributed the charges to jealousy of Polk's success aiid to a desire 
to injure him in Tennessee. When the House voted to select the 
Swartwout committee by ballot, the Banner exultingly heralded 
the event as proof positive that the House, having learned by 
experience that "Speaker Polk could not be trusted, proclaimed 
the fact to the world."* 

Some of the other Whig papers were even more scurrilous 
than the Banner. For example, an article in the Knoxville 
Register, signed "Curtius," spoke of Polk as "lost to a sense 
of honesty, decency and integrity, laboring under insanity and 
disgrace, pliant tool, traitor, apostate and tory."" The Memphis 
Enquirer called him ' ' a crouching sychophant ' ' who lacked even 



3 It was said that a leading Whig, who had gone to the Murfrees- 
borough post-office in quest of election news, saw through the window a 
package of "Unions" and exclaimed in disgust: "It's all over; there is 
Harris's infernal buzzard in the mail" (Phelan, Hist, of Tenn., 381). 

4 ' * He has been tried by his peers and found wanting. A brand is 
upon him that no time can efface. He may cry 'Out d — d spot,' but it 
will abide with him for life" (Quoted in Nashville Union, February 8, 
1839.) When criticizing a speech made by Dr. Duncan, candidate for 
Congress, the Banner called it "the roaring, staving, bellowing, howling 
Doctor 's fanfaronade of bombast and nonsense ' ' February 13, 1839. 

5 Quoted in Union, March 4, 1839. 



142 JAMES E. POLE 

the sense of shame. *^ A friend had written to Polk that "your 
election is dovetailed into that of every candidate for Congress 
in the State. "^ The Whigs apparently believed this, also, and 
were resolved at all hazard to defeat him. 

In April, 1839, Polk formally opened his gubernatorial cam- 
paign by publishing a long and argumentative "Address to the 
People of Tennessee.'"^ The address deals almost entirely with 
national issues, the nature of the government, and the principles 
of the two great political parties. It was pronounced by the 
Banner^ to be "a poor enough concern"; but Phelan, with 
sounder judgment, has called it "the ablest political document 
which appeared in this State up to the time of the war."^" For 
the student of history, it is one of the most interesting documents 
ever penned by its author, for in it. he has stated fully and with 
clearness the principles and doctrines which he considered to be 
essential to all just government. It was evidently prepared with 
great care, and nowhere else does he give so full a statement of 
his views on so varied a list of subjects. 



6 ' ' Condemned and spit upon by a majority of the U. S. House of 
Representatives, in taking from him [Mr. Polk] the power of appoint- 
ing committees, freely entrusted to all of his predecessors, but which he 
basely prostituted for the benefit of the party — of loeofocoism — plainly 
told in language of thundering indignation that has been heard even to 
the shores of the seas, that he was no longer worthy of the confidence of 
Congress, like a crouching sychophant, instead of resigning his narrowed 
trust with shame, and disdaining tamely to see his integrity assailed bj' 
even those who exalted him, he submits, ignobly bears the rankling con- 
tumely, and in hope of political reward for 'self-sacrifice' upon the altar 
of loco-focoisiiif, he still patiently ministers at its shrine reeking in cor- 
ruption with a zeal that can only be inspired by a hope of reward." When 
quoting this, the Union replied in the same issue that ' ' the raving of 
Mr. Prentiss, the ranting of Mr. Wise, and the management of Mr. Bell 
in reference to the appointment of the ' Swartwout Committee,' were 
all calculated for efect in Tennessee, ' ' and would be so regarded by the 
people (Nashville Union, March 4, 1839). 

7 A. Balch to Polk, February 21, 1839, Poll: Papers. 

8 A copy in pamphlet form may be found in the Polk Papers, vol. 83. 
It is printed in full in the Nashville Union, April 10, 12, 15, 1839, as well 
as in other papers. 

9 Nashville Banner, April 11, 1839. On April 17 the Banner called it 
"an elaborate and ingenious production, but characterized by a want 
of manliness, candor and sincerity." 

10 Phelan, Hist, of Tenn., 381. 



FOLK VERSUS CANNON, 1839 143 

In stating his reasons for confining his address so largely to 
national questions, Polk asserted that the chief objections urged 
against him were based on the principles and policies which he 
had upheld as a member of Congress. He gave a historical sum- 
mary^^ of the perennial contest between those who distrusted and 
ignored the will of the people and those who believed that gov- 
ernment should carry into effect the popular will. The popular 
party, he said, had triumphed in the convention which drafted 
the Constitution, but Hamilton and his adherents soon procured 
by construction what they had failed to have embodied in the 
Constitution. Democracy triumphed under Jefferson, but under 
J. Q. Adams the 

latitudinarian doctrines, with all the consolidating tendencies of the 
Hamilton school, as practiced under the administration of the elder Adams, 
■were resuscitated and revived. It was publicly proclaimed that the whole- 
some restraints of the public will on the action of the servants of the 
people were to be disregarded, and that the 'Eepresentative was not to 
be palsied by the will of his constituents. ' It was declared by the Chief 



11 "In the origin of the Government there were two parties. In the 
Convention that framed the Constitution one party distrusted the power 
and capacity of the people for self-government, and wished a strong 
central government. They admired the British Constitution — they were 
in favor of a President and Senate for life — they were for forming a 
strong government, far removed from the popular control; they wished to 
abstract from the power of the States — to restrict the right of suffrage, 
and to create other influences than the will of the peopl(i to control the 
action of their public functionaries. This party was not successful in 
the convention, and a constitution was formed which invested the new 
government wdth a few delegated and well defined powers, leaving all 
others to the States and the people, to exercise according to their sovereign 
will. The parties in the convention were the germ of the two great 
political divisions, which afterwards contended, and are still contending 
for the mastery in the Government. 

' ' No sooner was the government put in operation under the Constitu- 
tion, than the enemies of popular control over public authority, attempted 
by a latitudinous construction of the Constitution, to make the govern- 
ment in practice what they had in vain attempted to make it in principle 
and form. Alexander Hamilton, a professed monarchist in principle, and 
in the Convention the leading advocate of a strong central government, 
was the first Secretary of the Treasury, and immediately began, by 
strained and unwarranted constructions of the Constitution, to enlarge 
the power and influence of the Federal Government, with the view of 
diminishing the power of popular will over the administration of the 
Government." Jefferson himself could scarcely have penned a more 
telling indictment against the Federalists. 



Ui JAMES E. POLE 

Magistrate to be ineffably stupid to suppose that the Eepresentatives of 
the people were deprived of the power to advance the public weal, thereby 
substituting the unrestrained discretion of Congress and of the Federal 
Government for the specific grants of power conferred by a Constitution 
of limitations and restrictions. 

Polk's recital of historical occurrences was accurate and well 
put ; but it was begging the question to imply, as he did, that 
the framers of the Constitution had intended that representatives 
should divest themselves of all judgment and become mere auto- 
matons for registering the popular will. Custom and a desire 
for reelection may prevent members of Congress from exercising 
their own judgment, but undoubtedly Adams rather than Polk 
reflected the views of those who drafted the Constitution. 

It was thought by many politicians of both parties that Clay 
would be the candidate of the Whigs at the approaching Presi- 
dential election. Polk, therefore, devoted a considerable portion 
of his address to Clay and the policies which he advocated. The 
principal achievements of the Federalist administrations were, 
in Polk's opinion, the grasping of power by the general govern- 
ment and the creation of the money power. Their successors, 
the Whigs, likewise stood for these evils, and in addition, had 
adopted Clay's ''miscalled 'American System' of high tariff and 
internal improvements, the result of which combination would 
oppress the poor and increase the evils of executive patronage. 

The administration of Jackson he eulogized without stint. 

The adherents of White were told that they had supported the 

judge because he had been represented to be a better "Jackson 

man" than Van Buren, consequently there was no reason now 

why they should not return to the party of the people. It was 

untrue, said he, that Jackson had changed since his elevation to 

power ; his detractors, not he, had deserted to the enemy. " I, " 

continued Polk, 

in common with the whole Eepublican party, am represented to you as 
one of these changelings. In what have I changed"? T opposed Henry 
Clay on account of his odious Federal doctrines, and his coalition with 



POLK VEBSUS CANNON, 1839 145 

Mr. Adams, and I oppose him still. I opposed the high tariff policy, and / 
I oppose it still. I opposed Internal Improvements by the General Govern- A 
ment, and I oppose them still. I supported the removal of the deposits, 
and I have not changed my language or my opinions in relation to that 
great measure. In fine, what single point is there, involving the principles 
of the great Republican party, in which my course has not been uniform 
since 1825, when I was first honored with a seat in Congress, down to the 
present day? 

From a man who had a reputation for concealing his views, 
this was certainl.y a most unequivocal declaration. Moreover, 
it was a true declaration, and it required courage to make it 
under the existing political conditions in Tennessee. Whether 
right or wrong, Polk had not swerved from his original political 
platform, although many of the policies for which he stood had 
become unpopular in his state. He may have broken with Judge 
White for personal as well as political reasons, but on national 
issues he had been consistent. He pinned his faith now, as he 
had always done, on government by the will of the majority; 
and however chimerical this may be in practice, his most private 
correspondence indicates that his belief in its practicability was 
sincere. Passing lightly over state issues, he asked for approval 
or condemnation on his record in national politics — a record 
which was being grossly misrepresented by the Whig papers of 
the state. ^- 

At Murfreesborough, on April 11, 1839, Polk made his first 
speech of the campaign. Governor Cannon attended and was 
invited by Polk to speak first, on account of his age and office. 
This he declined to do, saying that, although he had not come 
prepared to speak, he might make a reply. Polk talked for two 
and a half hours, mainly on national issues and in commendation 
of the Jackson party. He said little on state issues, of which 
the Banner (April 15) ungenerously credited him with knowing 
"very little more than the man in the moon." 



12 "For months past I have been the unceasing and almost exclusive 
object of their calumnies and misrepresentation. ' ' 



146 JAilES K. POLK 

Cannon in reply said that he had never "chins: to the coat 
tail" of General Jackson, and when "dano^er approached, jumped 
into his pocket. ■■ but. instead, he had had to "stem the hutt'et- 
ings of his wrath. "" Before the Creek war, according to his own 
story. Cannon was a member of a jury selected to try one Magnus 
on the charge of having murdered Patton Ander.son, a personal 
friend of Jackson. When Cannon voted for acquittal. Jackson, 
pointing his finger at the young juror, exclaimed, "Til mark you. 
young man!" Cannon insinuated, also, that, in fultillment of 
this promise. Jackson had. during the Creek war, purposely ex- 
posed Cannon and a small detachment of troops to almost certain 
death, while the General himself remained in safety on the other 
side of the river. He was a "tyrant by nature and education," 
and no one could be his follower "who would not be his tool and 
his slave. "^^^ 

In a brief rejoinder Polk, according to the Union (April 12), 
made the "roof ring" with his "jiower of ridicule." The 
Banner, on the other hand, reported that "the locomotive can- 
didate seemed to feel deeply that he had caught a Tartar.'' and 
that Governor Cannon "triumphantly overthrew" him.^"' 

Polk's superiority, both in intellect and debating powers, was 
apparent from the beginning of the campaign. Cannon was 
slow and prosaic — lacking in force and personal magnetism. He 
was unable either to hold the attention or to arouse the sympathy 
of the multitude. He had until recently professed loyalty to 
Democratic doctrines, and he still seemed uncertain as to whether 
he had become a full-fledged Whig.^ ' There was. on the contrary, 



13 Nashville Sep. Banner, April 16; Nashville Union, April 12. 1S39. 

14 The Banner made much sport of Polk's "grins aiul grimaces" in 
imitation of Bailie Peyton and Henry Clay. "James K. Polk, the nar- 
row minded, superficial, little, grimacing politician attempting to expand 
his outward man, gesture and voice into something his hearers might 
take for Henry Clan!" He tried, also, it said, to imitate Webster {Banner, 
April 13. 1839). 

15 In his reply to Polk, Cannon said: "I believe 1 have always been 
a Democrat. Indeed, they used to call me an Ultra Democrat, a Eadical. " 
He claimed to be a Democrat still, but not in favor of Van Bureu {Banner, 
April 16, 1839). 



POLK VERSUS CANNON, 1839 147 

no uncertainty about Polk's views, and he knew how to state them 
most effectively. He was, says Phelan,^*^ 

the first great ' ' stump speaker "... always full of his subject, ready at 
retort, sophistical, quick to capture and turn the guns of the enemy against 
him, adroit in avoiding an issue whose result must be unfavorable, thor- 
oughly equipped with forcible illustrations, humorous anecdotes, and a 
ridicule which ranged through all the changes from burlesque to wit. 

With no pretensions to oratory, his strength lay in his abilit}' to 
state the issues clearly and forcibly, and to argue these issues in 
language that was simple and convincing. 

On April 13, the candidates met again at Lebanon. On state 
issues they were in substantial agreement, and once more their 
time was occupied mainly with a discussion of national affairs. 
At the close of the debate Governor Cannon, pleading important 
state business, set out for Nashville. Polk informed his wife 
that the Governor and himself got on ' ' very harmoniously, ' ' but 
there was little harmony in his relations with Bell. 

Polk and Cannon had consumed the entire afternoon, and 
Bell, who was not expected to take part, took the stump at 5 :30 
in a "rage of passion." He talked until sunset, and then an- 
nounced that he would continue at the courthouse after supper. 
His first address, as reported, was most abusive in character.^' 
Polk wrote home that even Bell's friends were disgusted by the 
speech, and that he had no difficulty, in his reply, in putting 
Bell in the wrong and winning tremendous applause. ^^ 

Governor Cannon resumed the debates, at McMinnville, on 
April 18, but shortly after he retired from the stump entirely. 
At McMinnville, having been taunted with indecision, he at last 



16 Sisi. of Term., 377. 

17 He said that Hopkins L. Turner, Eepresentative from Tennessee, 
"was not good enough for the Penitentiary — that Amos Lane was a 
scoundrel — that Dr. Duncan was a moral pestilence — that these were the 
tools which Col. Polk set forward to make speeches in Congress, instead 
of coming out and answering him [Bell] on the floor of Congress face to 
face" {Union, April 17, 1839). 

18 Polk to Mrs. Polk, April 14, 1839, Polk Papers. 



148 JAMES E. POLK 

came out squarely for Clay, in the event of his nomination.^" 
Because Polk had declared here and elsewhere that he and Can- 
non difitered little in their views on state questions, the Ban no- 
called Polk a "Government emissary" and regarded it as ex- 
tremely impudent in him to try to depose the Governor for his 
dislike of Van Buren.-" 

The people in those days took keen delight in political cam- 
paigns. They attended in large numbers, and no debate was 
long enough to be tedious if it were spiced with personal recrimi- 
nation and with what passed for witty retorts. The popular ear 
in Tennessee of that day was not attuned to a very high grade 
of humor, while, in argument, pungent thrusts rather than logic 
won the sympathy of the audience. The festal side of a campaign 
was quite as important as the forensic, consequently political 
debates were usually held in open air, accompanied by a banquet 
or a barbecue. When Polk reached East Tennessee, the Whig 
section of the state, special pains were taken by the Democrats 
to give his journey the appearance of a triumphal procession.-^ 
Even though he could not hope to gain many votes in this section, 
the appearance of popularity in a Whig stronghold might aid him 
in other parts of the state. 



10 Nashville Union, April 22, 1839. 

20 "Is it not a most impudent, unheard of request, then, on his part, 
to the people of Tennessee, that they should turn Governor Cannon out 
and put him in, all because the Governor is opposed to Mr. Van Buren's 
election? Is it not apparent that he is a Government emissary, traversing 
the State, county by county, with the sole view of revolutionizing it on 
the subject of national polities?" {Banner, April 19, 1839). On May 22, 
the same paper called Polk a deserter from genuine republican doctrines, 
' ' a political changeling — a weather cock, pointing ever in the direction 
from whence comes the breath of the President's nostrils — a devourer, 
eater-up of his own sentiments, formerly proclaimed in tones of self- 
gratification — a palace slave laborer for his master at Washington." 

21 The Tennessee Sentinel thus described a Polk meeting at Jones- 
borough on May 17, 1839: "As a means of enhancing the enjoyments of 
the day, suitable arrangements were made for a dinner, free to all of 
each party, without distinction, who might think proi>er to participate. ' ' 
After dinner there were toasts to Washington, Jackson, Van Buren, Polk, 
Amos Kendall, et. al., — and one to "Newton Cannon — the friend and 
supporter of Henry Clay for the next Presidency. Will the freemen of 
Tennessee be thus trausfererd bv dictation from the mouth of any Cannon? 
Cries of No! No! " Quoted in iSTashville Union, June 3, 1839. 



POLK VEESUS CANNON, 1839 149 

The political contest was by no means confined to the stump 
and the platform. Wherever a group of people gathered, issues 
and candidates were freely discussed. Personal encounters not 
infrequently resulted-- when arguments had failed to convince. 
Despite his surroundings, however, Polk always maintained his 
own dignity; although his language on the stump was often 
scathing and exasperating, he never descended to vulgarity or 
mere personal abuse. 

Accuracy was not a desideratum in a political newspaper. 
That editor was most popular who could hurl grotesque epithets 
at his opponents and who always reported as well as prophesied 
victory for his own side. Harris of the Union fully measured 
up to the Democratic ideal, -^ and for this reason his paper 
wielded great political influence. 

In June, A. A. Hall, of the Banner, caused consternation in 
Democratic ranks by quoting anti-slavery articles which had been 
written by Harris while he edited the New Bedford (Massachu- 
setts) Gazette.-^ By befogging the issue and heaping abuse upon 
his accusers, Harris was quite successful in extricating himself 
from the difficulty. Nevertheless, the charge that Harris had 
been an abolitionist did Polk some injury in the canvass, for it 
was he who had been mainly responsible for bringing the editor 
to Nashville.-^ In order to divert attention from his own past 
record and to give new impetus to Democratic enthusiasm Harris 



22 For example, Polk's brother-in-law, Dr. Eueker, is reported to have 
thrashed a "bully" whom the Whigs had brought to Murfreesborough 
to provoke a quarrel with him (John W. Childress to his sister, Mrs. Polk, 
May 27, 1839, Polk Papers). 

23 For example, in reporting a debate between Bell and his opponent. 
Burton, the Union said that Bell abused Van Buren, eulogized Clay and 
called Polk "the travelling missionary," but Burton "literally dissected 
his opponent who has been schooled in the sophistries of partizanship, and 
laid the diseased limbs of Modern Whigism bare to the bone" (May 
27, 1839). 

2i One of them, dated May 13, 1836, in opposing the annexation of 
Texas, called slavery "the blackest, the foulest, blot on our national 
eseutchen, ' ' and said that it would be ' ' the height of madness ' ' to extend 
it over more territory {Banner, June 11, 1839). 

20 John W. Childress to Mrs. Polk, June 18, 1839, Polk Papers. 



150 JAMES E. POLE 

printed in the Union (June 24) the "Mecklenburg Declaration 
of Independence" and suggested its ratification on the Fourth of 
July. He dilated at length on the fact that Polk had been born 
in Mecklenburg county — a fact which proved that he had come 
from pure Democratic stock. 

The Whigs hoped for good results from a speech made by 
Judge White in Knoxville, on the Fourth of July. He still pro- 
fessed adherence to Jeffersonian Republicanism, but denounced 
the Democrats, whose whole creed consisted in "always acting 
with the same man, or set of men." Far from being democrats 
they were, said he, "in reality monarchists."-'^ Harris was hor- 
rified because White had talked politics on the Fourth, of July, 
but concluded from the ' ' claptrap ' ' which the judge had uttered 
that he must be in his "dotage."-' 

White's warning against monarchists did not produce the 
effect which the Whigs had anticipated, for Polk succeeded in 
w'inning back a considerable number of those who had supported 
the judge in 1836. Before the close of the campaign he received 
many letters telling of the good results which his canvass had 
achieved.-^ 

Cannon was easily vanquished, and he retired from the stump, 
but Bell dogged Polk's footsteps, bringing into full play his great 
ability and oratorical powers. On July 17 he spoke at Nashville 
"from early candle-lighting until midnight" in an effort to de- 
feat Polk in Middle Tennessee. He was, however, doomed to 
disappointment. On August 1 Polk was elected by a majority 
of three thousand votes, and Harris got out his "buzzard" to 
adorn the front page of the Union along with the election re- 
turns. The result of the campaign was justly regarded as a great 



26 Copied from Knoxville Times in Nashville Banner, July 18, 1839. 

2T Nashville Union, July 19, 1839. 

28 C. W. Hall, writing from Kingsport on July 12, told him that "one 
of mv neighbors said the other tlay, 'Sir, I did not understand my 
political position, until I heard Col. Polk, and I then discovered most 
clearly, that I u-a.s acting with men, who are opposed to mij principle.i, and 
I instantly resolved to quit their company'. . . . This is a common 
observation" (Folic Papers). 



FOLK VEBSUS CANNON, 1839 151 

personal victory for Polk, inasmuch as the Whigs elected seven 
members of Congress and the Democrats only six.-^ The Demo- 
crats elected a majority of the state legislature, which gave them 
the power to get rid of the Whig Senators by hampering them 
with obnoxious instructions. 

Up to the very last the Whigs of the state seemed confident 
of victory. They were reluctant to admit defeat even after the 
election had been held. But the Banner, on August 9, mourn- 
fully informed its readers that owing to a lack of proper organ- 
ization in Middle Tennessee^" the "Spoilsmen for a season will 
have the management of affairs in the State." Two days before 
this, prominent Whigs held a meeting in Nashville. Resolutions 
were passed urging the organization of committees in every 
county for the purpose of retrieving the state. They invited Clay 
to visit Tennessee, but he was unable at the time to accept the invi- 
tation. Although the Banner from time to time reported enthu- 
siastic Whig meetings, it was several weeks before there were 
signs of recovery from the shock of the recent defeat. 

In their elation over Polk's election, the Democrats rather 
overrated its significance. It has already been noted that they 
regarded the result as a personal victory for Polk over his 
enemies ; but, in addition, they interpreted it to mean that Tenn- 
essee had returned, or at least was returning, to the party of 
Jackson and Van Buren. Polk had been nominated for the 
avowed purpose of regaining the state for the national adminis- 
tration;, he had made his canvass almost entirely on national 
issues ; and Bell, as well as others, had opposed him on his record 
as an administration member of Congress. As his friend Maclin 
said in a letter, more importance was attached to Polk's success 
than to the election of any other candidate. There was, in his 



20 One of these was Cave Johnson. Writing to Polk on August 11 
he said that he had been elected by a majority of 1300 votes, and, as 
he had entered the race only on account of Polk and Grundy, he expected 
to retire from politics at the end of his term {Folic Fapers). 

30 On August 13 the same paper- attributed the result to bribery and 
illegal voting. 



152 JAMES E. POLK 

opinion, but one thing lacking to make the triumph complete — 
namely, the success of Burton over John Bell."^ 

To no one did the national effect of Polk's victory appear of 
greater importance than to General Jackson. As soon as the 
news reached him, he hastened to congratulate Polk and the 
country on his election and "the return of old democratic Tenn- 
essee to the republican fold again." With customary hyperbole 
he predicted that "it will be at least a century before she will 
permit herself to be again duped into her late false position by 
such Jesuitical hypocrites & apostates as Bell, White & Co."^- 
Polk was doubtless well aware of the program that was to be 
carried into effect in the event of his election, and presumably 
he aided in formulating it ; therefore Jackson did not allude to 
it in the letter just quoted. In a letter to Van Buren, however, 
the General outlined the party plans in characteristic fashion. 
As the Democrats have elected both governor and legislature, 
said he, 

of course Mr. Fosterss & his gagg law will not any more trouble the U. 
States Senate — Judge "White must resign, or he will feel the weight of 
instructions & a Senator elected over his head — the precedent set by our 
last Legislature will justify this proceedure. My own opinion is, White 
will resign — Bell being disappointed in going into the Senate to fill White's 
vacancy, which was the price of his apostacy, if he is disappointed in get- 
ting into the Speaker's chair, will resign or cut his throat in despair & 
disappointment; and this catastrophy will end the existance of bluelight 
federalism in Tennessee. 

For so great a triumph, he gave the principal credit to Colonel 
Polk and General Robert Armstrong.^* As will appear in the 



31 Sacfield Maclin to Polk, August 10, 1839, Polk Papers. 

32 Jackson to Polk, August 13, 1839, ibid. 

33 E. H. Foster was elected to the Senate when Grundy resigned. 

34 Jackson to Van Buren, August 12, 1839, Van Buren Paperss "I 
hope," wrote Eichard Warner to Polk, September 29, "we shall be able 
to adopt such measures as will compel Foster to give up the seat he and 
his friends usurped at the last session." The legislature should instruct 
the Senators to vote for the sub-treasury bill. If this does not bring 
"poor old White" to his senses, it should then be ascertained whether 
he is a Senator at all. (On account of ill health, Wliite had tendered his 
resignation to Governor Cannon, but it had not been accepted.) 



POLK VEESUS CANNON, 1839 153 

following chapter, the program here outlined, except the suicidal 
role assigned to Bell, was carried into successful operation. 

When the election took place, the ' ' old hero ' ' was sojourning 
at Tyree Springs, in Sumner County. After it had been ascer- 
tained beyond question that the state had been redeemed, the 
leading Democrats of Middle Tennessee, including Polk, Attor- 
ney-General Grundy, Judge Campbell, and General Armstrong, 
reported, with their ladies, to that place in order to join with 
the General in celebrating the victory. Burdens of state as well 
as the infirmities of age were, for the time being, forgotten, and 
the company once more indulged in the frivolities of youth. 
Each morning, after breakfast, a mock court was held, of which 
Grundy was Chief Justice and General Jackson, Associate. From 
fines levied by this "court," provisions for the day were sup- 
plied — a proceeding which seems to have added much to the 
enjoyment of the company. ^^ 

Polk did not remain long within the jurisdiction of this 
improvised court. He soon returned to his home in Columbia 
to complete his plans for ousting the Whig Senators, and to 
prepare for his inauguration. Unlike many who offered him 
advice. Cave Johnson believed that the program of persecution 
would do the Democrats more harm than good, and therefore 
urged Polk to oppose it. " It is essential, ' ' he wrote, 

to the existence of our party that every selfish consideration be laid aside 
& act in concert & no man can do so much to effect this as yourself. . . . 
It has struck me with some force, that our friends should go to work & 
do the business of the State without the slightest interference with Federal 
politics — let White and Foster take their course — go to Washington if 
they choose — if Foster adopts that course he is forever disgraced — toward 
the conclusion of the Session we can instruct. 

He did not "wish our party to have the semblance of coercing 
either until it is absolutely necessary. ' ' He believed that Foster 
would resign even without instructions, but however that might 
be, "by all means let the necessity for interference be manifest 



35 Nelson, Memorials of Sarah Childress Folic, 60-63. 



154 JAMES K. FOLK 

before it is done, rather let it be urged upon the Legislature by 
the people rather than upon the people by the Legislature."^^ 
Johnson's advice may have been prompted by political sagacity 
rather than by a sense of justice, but whatever the motive his 
recommendations were good. 

As will appear in the following chapter, other counsels pre- 
vailed, and the Democrats elected to make the most of their 
political power. Their choice gave them a temporary advantage, 
although eventually their unfair treatment of the Whig Senators 
helped to transfer votes from their own party to that of their 
opponents. 



30 Johnson to Polk, Clarksville, September 28. The year is not given. 
The letter has been put with the Folk Papers for 1838, but evidently it was 
written in 1839. 



CHAPTER IX 

GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 

In accordance with an absurd custom, a governor of Tenn- 
essee, in the closihg hours of his administration, enacted the * 
solemn farce of submitting to the legislature a message in which yr 
he made elaborate recommendations for its consideration. This 
was done with a full knowledge that within a few days a new 
governor would be inaugurated and that he, in turn, would pre- 
sent entirely different recommendations. 

On October 8, 1839, Governor Cannon submitted his final 
message to a legislature composed of thirteen Democrats to ten 
Whigs in the Senate, and forty-nine Democrats to thirty-three 
"Whigs in the lower house. It is unnecessary to dwell on his 
suggestions concerning state affairs, for, needless to say, no heed 
was paid to them. For political reasons, however, the Democratic 
majority in the new legislature felt that his severe condemnation 
of the national administration merited both consideration and 
rebuke. Unanswered, the Governor's remarks might tend to in- 
fluence the wavering, and a refutation would afford another op- 
portunity to herald the glorious achievements of the "party of 
the people." 

Among other things the retiring Governor had expressed a 
hope that "the country will ere long be delivered from the mal- 
administration of the present rulers, Math its pernicious train of 
experiments and spoliations." This part of his message was 
referred by the legislature to a "Committee on Federal Rela- 
tions" which was created early in the session. The most active 
member of the committee was Samuel H. Laughlin, former editor 
of the Nashville Union and a personal friend of both Polk and 



156 JAMES K. POLE 

Jackson, and it was easy to foretell what the verdict would be. 
On January 29, 1840, Laughlin reported that his committee had 
been 

wholl}^ unable, from anything contained in said message, or in the past 
action of the Federal Government, executive, legislative or judicial, during 
the late or present administrations, which can, in the slightest degree, even 
by implication, afford the least warrant of authority for the imputations 
contained in that portion of said message.i 

The verdict of the committee was approved by the legislature, 
and little attention was paid to a minority report which upheld 
the contentions of the former Governor. Laughlin 's report 
served as a vindication of the national administration. In addi- 
tion, it served as the basis for one of the instructions given to 
the federal Senators from Tennessee — the instruction to vote 
against the bill to prevent interference in elections by certain 
federal officers. 

On October 14, 1839, Polk was inaugurated as governor of 
Tennessee. Among those present to witness the ceremony it gave 
Harris of the Union ' ' great pleasure to notice ex-President Jack- 
son, with health apparently improved." The inaugural address, 
according to the same writer, was "an effort of great happiness 
on the part of Gov. Polk." "It was," wrote Old Hickory, "a 
great address well suited to the occasion — there was a great 
contrast bet wen his and Mr. Cannon 's."- 

On account of its supposed influence on national politics, 
more importance was attached to Polk's inauguration than is 
usually the case when a state executive is installed. Levi Wood- 
bury voiced the sentiment of most Democrats when he wrote: 
"I have seldom known the result of any election to be more 
triumphant & gratifying over the whole Union than that of 
yours. ' '^ 



1 Tenn. Sen. Jour., 1839-40, 7, 504. 

2 Jackson to Van Buren, Oct. 18, 1839, Fan Biiren Papers. 

3 Woodbury to Polk, October 20, 1839, Poll' Papers. 



GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 157 

The new Governor 's first message was submitted to the legis- 
lature on October 22, and the subjects most emphasized in it 
were banks and internal improvements. He expressed the belief 
that there had been no necessity for the suspension of specie 
payments by the banks of Tennessee. On the assumption that 
they had suspended such payments simply because eastern banks 
had done so, he urged the enactment of measures which would 
compel resumption, for "like individual debtors, they should 
meet their liabilities honestly and promptly as long as they are 
able to pay." Banks often, said he, do their most profitable 
business during suspension, while the loss is borne by labor. He 
denied that the federal government had been responsible for de- 
rangement of the currency or that a national bank could have 
prevented it. The main cause of financial distress, he said, was 
speculation on borrowed capital. For remedy, therefore, he did 
not seek new legislation, but suggested something far more sensi- 
ble — a remedy which in no degree depended on governmental 
action. "The only substantial and permanent relief," said the 
Governor, 

is to be found in habits of economy and industry, and in the productive 
labor of our people. By the observance of these, another crop would more 
than liquidate our eastern debt. We must bring our expenses within our 
income. Our merchants and traders must cease to indulge in hazardous 
and wild speculations which they are unable to meet. 

This was very sound advice, far too sound to be widely accepted 
in a period when most people believed that the government was 
able to dispense or withhold j^rosperity at will, regardless of their 
own reckless speculative ventures. 

Another recommendation was that the legislature should, by 
law, prohibit the Bank of Tennessee from emitting notes under 
twenty dollars, because excessive issues of paper tended to drive, 
out metal money, and in addition, to facilitate speculation. 

Polk declared himself to be strongly in favor of internal im- 
provements made by the state. He asked, however, that existing 



158 JAMES E. POLK 

laws on that subject should be so modified as to prevent extrava- 
gance. For example, tlie legislature at the preceding session had 
enacted a law which required the state to subscribe for one-half 
of the capital stock of all railroads, macadamized turnpikes, 
graded turnpikes, and sanded turnpikes for which acts of incor- 
poration "have heretofore been granted or for which acts of 
incorporation may be hereafter granted." Such a law had great 
possibilities for evil, and under it worthless enterprises had 
already been undertaken. Polk now urged that the law should 
be so modified that subscriptions in future must be limited to 
works of real improvement, and that a board of public works 
should be created to authorize and supervise such enterprises.^ 

On the whole the Governor's message was a creditable docu- 
ment, although it lacked the vigor and elaboration which usually 
characterized his written productions. It was evident that his 
interests were national rather than local. His recommendations 
were duly considered by the legislature, but even tlie members 
of that body seemed to be more interested in "doing practical 
politics" for the national party than in enacting laws for the 
good of the state. At any rate practical politics was given first 
place on their program. 

It was well known to all that the main reason for making Polk 
the gubernatorial candidate was the belief that he alone could win 
the state back to Democratic allegiance. For this same reason 
he had consented to make the race. The question which soon 
presented itself was: What does he expect as his reward, if he 
succeeds ? During the campaign the Whigs made the charge that 
Polk did not care for the governorship, and that his nomination 
had been simply a ruse to win Tennessee for Van Buren and the 
Vice-Presidency for himself at the approaching federal election. 
In such an event he would, of course, resign in the middle of his 
term. The charge was re])elled by Polk's friends, but the prob- 
ability of its truth was so great that many, especially in East 



iTenn. Sen. Jour., 1839-40, 64-68. 



-\ 



GOVE EN OB OF TENNESSEE 159 

Tennessee, declined to vote for him under the circumstances. He 
was urged^ to make an emphatic denial of the charge, but he fol- 
lowed his usual policy of keeping silent. When, therefore, the 
state senate, within forty-eight hours after his inauguration, ^» 
began to consider the question of nominating Polk for Vice- 
President, the Banner charged that this had been the sole pur- 
pose of making him governor, and that the people had been 
grossly deceived." 

The senate with little opposition passed a resolution nomin- 
ating Van Buren and Polk, and on October 22, the same day on 
which it received the Governor's message, the house proceeded 
to consider this senate resolution. Two amendments were offered 
by the opposition — one to require the candidates to support a 
federal bank, another to strike out the name of Polk — but both 
were promptly rejected. After prolonged and animated debate 
the house, on November 4, concurred in the senate resolution and 
formally nominated the two candidates.' Until the question had 
been decided, the local newspapers kept up a war of words on 
the subject, each trying to surpass its rival in vulgar abuse, which 
doubtless pleased the readers but which made few converts in 
the legislature.^ 

In Washington the Democratic members of the Tennessee 
delegation in Congress were busily engaged in an effort to pro- 
cure for Polk the second place on the national ticket. His prin- "H- 
cipal competitor was the incumbent, Colonel Richard M. Johnson, 
of Kentucky. Johnson had the support of the conservative 

5 H. W. Anderson, of Bro^^'nsville, to Polk, September 10, 1839, Polk 
Papers. 

6 Nashville Banner, Oct. 19, 1839. One enthusiastic friend urged 
Polk not to leave the governorship for the Vice-Presidency : ' ' The plan 
that I had laid off was for you to be our Governor six years and then 
Senator Six and at the end of Benton's eight years make you President" 
(Amos Kirkpatrick, of Meigsville, to Polk, Oct. 17, 1839, Polk Papers). 

'! Tenn. House Jour., 1839-40, 68-69. 

8 To quote one sample of their ability in vivid description: The Union, 
on October 16, informed its readers tliat John B. Ashe, a state senator, 
^'came very near bursting his boiler and collapsing his flue on yesterday," 
in condemning the Union. 



160 JAMES K. POLE 

element of the party — of the class of people whose main rule of 
action is leaving well enougli alone. But a portion of the party 
desired a more vigorous candidate, a man who would conduct a 
more energetic campaign, and a man w^ho would be more accept- 
able to the southern states. These qualities were especially 
desired in the candidate for Vice-President in order to offset the 
want of them in Van Buren, their candidate for President. 

The supporters of Polk fully realized that it would be difficult 
to procure for him the coveted nomination. They knew that there 
was little genuine enthusiasm for Johnson in any quarter, still 
they feared that he might be nominated by the national conven- 
tion simply because that body would not know how to get rid 
of him. Their only hope seemed to lie either in preventing the 
calling of a national convention, or in preventing any nomination 
of a Vice-Presidential candidate if such a convention should be 
held. A letter outlining the situation was sent to Polk by six 
Democratic members of Congress from Tennessee.^ It stated that 
a national convention had been recommended by New Hampshire, 
and that it now seemed to be a certainty. If so, it was their 
opinion that Johnson would probably be nominated, although 
New England, New York, Virginia, North Carolina and other 
states preferred Polk. Johnson was a "dead weight" on the 
party, they said, but it was hard to drop him. It was possible, 
they believed, that the convention might fail to nominate any one, 
and break up in confusion, but at all events Tennessee should be 
fully represented in the convention. In a separate letter (dated 
February 4) Brown tells Polk that Calhoun is for him on the 
ground of "your position, your abilities & your principles." 

A few days after the receipt of the above-mentioned letter 
Polk informed Hubbard, a member of the House from New Hamp- 
shire,^"^ that his position was "passive" — that he would accept 



9 The letter was dated at Washington, February 3, 1840, and was si^ed 
by Felix Grimdy, A. McCleUan, H. M. Watterson, H. L. Tiirney, C. Johnson, 
and A. V. Brown (Polk Papers). 

10 Polk to Hubbard, Februaiy 7, 1840, Polk Papers. 



GOVEENOE OF TENNESSEE 161 

the nomination at the hands of his party, but wouki not seek it. 
Such at attitude was in line with his usual adherence to party 
unity. His passive attitude, however, seems to have been some- 
what affected by his unanimous nomination by a Virginia con- 
vention. This nomination Mas made, it was said" at the instance 
of the friends of Calhoun. In response to Polk's letter, Hubbard 
strongly urged Polk to put aside all delicacy and run. Johnson, 
he said, was in favor of both tariff and internal improvements, 
and was unpopular with many in the party. For these reasons, 
said Hubbard, Democrats should oppose a national convention, 
and should nominate Polk in some other way ; Virginia had done 
so, and why should other states not follow her example ? Should 
the election eventually devolve upon the Senate, he was certain 
that Polk would be chosen.^- In Washington, A. J. Donelson was 
using his influence to procure Polk's nomination. On March 4 
he wrote that, although the South was unequivocally for Polk, 
yet he feared that the convention would choose Johnson instead.^^ 
Polk was willing enough to run, but being a firm believer in 
party solidarity, he was reluctant to become the candidate of a 
portion of the party unless it should develop that the party as 
a whole could not agree upon a choice. Writing to Cave Johnson 
on March 27, he said that "up to now" he had maintained that 
he would not run unless nominated by the undivided party. But, 

said he, the refusal of Virginia and South Carolina to send dele- 

> 
gates to the Baltimore convention had changed the situation by 

making unanimity in any case out of the question ; consequently 

if the convention should fail to make a nomination, in other 

words, in the event of there being no party nominee, he might 

in that case consent to run.^^ 



11 Theophilus Fisk to Polk, Richmond, February 21, 1840, Poll Papers. 
In reporting the news to Polk, Fisk added: "Wherever my paper, the Old 
Dominion, circulates, and it has a very wide one, the people will hear of 
no candidate but yourself. ' ' 

12 Hubbard to Polk, February 23, 1840, Polk Papers. 

13 Donelson to Polk, March 4, 1840, ibid. 

14 Polk Papers. He Avrote a similar letter to Hubbard on April 5, 1840. 



1G2 JAMES K. POLK 

Ready as ever to aid his friends, General Jackson used his 
influence in an attempt to procure Polk's nomination by the 
national convention. In a letter to Van Buren he said that 

A man ought to be chosen that all the republicans in every state would cheer- 
fully unite on, and if this is not done it will jeopardise your election — it 
ought to be a man Avhose popularity would strengthen you, not one that 
would be a dead weight upon your popularity. 

Polk, in his opinion had double the popularity of Johnson, and 
his nomination by the party would insure victory. He was 
pained to learn from Major Donelson that many in Congress 
believed it advisable to make no nomination for the Vice-Presi- 
dency ; ' ' surely our friends have not taken a common sense view 
of the whole subject. ' '^^ 

Before leaving Tennessee, Laughlin and some of the other 
delegates to the Baltimore convention held a conference in Nash- 
ville with Polk, Jackson, and other political leaders. The Gen- 
eral was firm in his belief that candidates ought to be nominated 
for both President and Vice-President, and that Van Buren and 
Polk should be the nominees. Polk, he repeated, Avould add 
strength to the ticket, while Colonel Johnson would be an encum- 
brance. On the other hand, Polk made it clear to the delegates 
that in no event would he run as a sectional candidate, as Judge 
White had done in 1836 ; should Johnson be nominated, he would 
earnestly support him. Should no nomination be made at Balti- 
more, and if within a reasonable time a sufficient number of 
states had not indicated a preference for himself, he would then 
take field in support of Colonel Johnson or any other candidate 
that seemed most likely to bring success to the party.^'' 

Laughlin arrived in Washington on April 25, and three days 
later, after conferences with Tennesseans, he recorded in his 
diary that "all were now agreed that Gov. Polk could not be 
nominated — that Jolmson could not witliout New York, and that 



15 Jackson to Van Buren, April 3, 1840, Van Buren Papers. 
le S. H. Laughlin, "Diary," April 14, 15, Tenn. Hist. Mag., March, 
1916, 45-47. 



GOVE EN OR OF TENNESSEE 163 

the best way, if possible, was to make no nomination. This matter 
was in treaty between Mr. Grundy and Mr. Wright." On the 
day following, Laughlin reported to Polk that Benton and 
Buchanan were secretly in favor of Johnson and that "such 
creatures as Walker and Sevier are only fit to do mischief, ' ' but 
that Calhoun was heartily in favor of Polk's nomination. ^^ At 
a meeting held in Grundy's room on May 1 it was agreed that 
Polk's only hope lay in preventing any nomination by the con- 
vention, and some believed that a refusal by delegates to attend 
would be the most effective way of procuring the desired result. ^^ 
This plan was not followed, however, and a few days later Laugh- 
lin wrote from Baltimore that the convention had nominated 
Van Buren but, by a vote of one hundred and thirty-two to 
ninety-nine, had declared it inexpedient to nominate a candidate 
for Vice-President. 

After the convention had adjourned without naming a candi- 
date for Vice-President, Polk prepared a statement in the form 
of a letter to Grundy and requested him to have it published in 
the Washington Glohe}^ It had been his wish, he said, that the 
Baltimore convention might nominate a candidate, but, as it had 
not done so, he still hoped that the opinions of the majority could 
in some way be ascertained. In that event he would cheerfully 
support the choice, but, as he had been nominated by some of the 
states, he would let the party decide whether to settle on one or 
more. He hoped that some one would be chosen by the electoral 
college. In answer, Grundy told him-*^ that no doubt he would 
have won if there had been no convention, but as matters now 



ITS. H. Laughlin, "Diary," April 28, 29, op. cit. Laughlin to Polk, 
April 29, 1840, Poll: Papers. In his diary for May 4, Laughlin recorded 
that ' ' Mr. Buchanan from hostility to Gov. Polk 's future prospects had 
allied himself to King, and by contrivance, their friends were trying first 
to effect a compromise with the friends of Johnson and Polk and thereby 
get King nominated upon the half-way house principle; but if they could 
not get this done, they united and were to unite with Johnson 's friends 
and press for a nomination. ' ' 

IS Laughlin to Polk, May 2, 1810, Poll Papers. 

19 Polk to Grundy, May 27, 1810, ibid. 

20 Grundy to Polk, June 1, 1840, ihid. 



164 JAMES K. FOLK 

stood, he thought, that Johnson would be elected. The Nashville 
U)iio7i, he said, had injured rather than aided Polk by calling on 
the states to declare their preference. As it would not look well 
to withdraw formally from the race, Grundy advised Polk simply 
to do nothing. 

The contest between Polk and Johnson for second place on the 
Democratic ticket was more than a rivalry between the two men. 
Back of it was a party cleavage which four years later was to 
land Polk in the White House. Despite Jackson's loyalty to Van 
Buren, many of the General's best friends did not like the "little 
magician ' ' ; they supported him only from a sense of party duty. 
Still less did this wing of Democracy like Colonel Johnson, and, 
if they must support Van Buren, they wished at least to have 
a Vice-Presidential candidate for whom they could willingly 
vote. There seems to be no evidence that Polk himself had, up 
to this time, been opposed to Van Buren, nevertheless he was on 
very intimate terms with the insurgent faction of the party. 
This wing of the party was impelled mainly by a desire to promote 
southern interests, although a revolt against "old fogyism" M^as 
already becoming a political factor. Its adherents regarded Polk 
as sound on southern questions, while they had doubts in the case 
of both Van Buren and Johnson. Party cleavage had existed 
before Polk liad been suggested for the Vice-Presidency, but the 
apparent hostility of the administration to his candidacy aided 
in widening it. Although the President himself seems to have 
expressed no preference, those who were in his confidence and 
who were supposed to voice his wishes were directly or indirectly 
supporting Colonel Johnson. Among them were Benton, 
Buchanan, Kendall, and Blair.-^ For a second time-- Blair 
appeared reluctant to give aid to Polk when he was sorely in 
need of it. These instances alone furnish a very good reason 



21 Jackson 's attitude toward the candidates had no connection with this 
party split. He favored Van Buren and Polk, and opposed Johnson, purely 
for personal reasons. 

22 The first time was wlien Polk was a candidate for Speaker of the 
House. 



GOVE EX OB OF TENNESSEE 165 

why Polk, when he became President, declined to adopt the Glohe 
as his official organ. 

Shortly after the Democratic convention had adjourned, Cave 
Johnson informed Polk-^ that a Life of Van Buren ayid Johnson 
had appeared and that he believed it had been published at the 
office of the Glohe. Blair, he said, had declared himself to be 
impartial as to Colonel Johnson and Polk, but "I have no faith 
in that establishment so far as your interests are poncerned." 
For this reason he (Cave Johnson) and his friends were not eager 
to extend the circulation of Kendall's "Extra Globes," which 
had been prepared especially for campaign purposes. On May 
25, five of the Tennessee delegation-* addressed a letter to Kendall 
himself. In it they stated that while they were anxious to advance 
the cause of the administration, they were unwilling to prejudice 
the cause of their favorite candidate, and therefore, ''before we 
undertake the circulation of the Extra Glohe, we are desirous of 
being informed, whether the Extra will take any part, & if any 
what part, in the election of Vice President." Kendall gave a 
rather evasive reply-^ in which he stated that, while he thought 
well of their ' ' favorite candidate, ' ' he would attempt to promote 
the cause of the party by speaking well of any or all candidates 
as the occasion might require. With this reply, which was re- 
garded as a virtual endorsement of Johnson, they had to be con- 
tent, but the hostility to Kendall and Blair by no means abated. 
The element that supported Polk became more and more alienated 
from Van Buren and his intimates until, in 1844, they succeeded 
in preventing his nomination. 

The other question of a purely political nature that engrossed 
the attention of the Tennessee legislature was that of forcing 
White and Foster out of the United States Senate by the use of 
humiliating instructions. 



23 Johnson to Polk, May 24, 1840, Folic Papers. 

24 Cave Johnson, A. V. Brown, H. L. Turney, A. McClellan, and H. M. 
Watterson. 

25 June 9, 1840. Both letters are in the Polk Papers. 



166 JAMES K. POLK 

In White's case another method was first attempted, for the 
judge was still popular in the state, and, if he could be eliminated 
without resorting to instructions, less odimn would attach to his 
adversaries. In the fall of 1838 White had, on account of ill 
health, tendered his resignation to Governor Cannon. The Gov- 
ernor suspended action in the hope that White's health might 
improve. As it did improve sufficiently to enable him to make the 
journey to Washington, the resignation, at Cannon's request, was 
withdrawn without having been accepted. 

Eumors of White's letter of resignation had found their way 
to Democratic ears and suggested the possibility of disposing of 
the judge by maintaining that by his own action his seat had 
become vacant. Accordingly, when the legislature convened in 
October, 1839, the senate by resolution asked Governor Cannon 
for copies of the correspondence which had passed between him- 
self and White relative to the latter 's resignation. Cannon replied 
that White's resignation had never been accepted and that his 
letter had been returned ; all other correspondence had been per- 
sonal, not official, and had not been preserved. Attorney-General 
Grundy wrote-'' from Washington urging that White's successor 
should be chosen without delay, and expressing the opinion that 
Foster would resign if instructed to vote for the sub-treasury bill. 
Such a program, if successful, would give the Democrats an 
opportunity to choose both Senators, one of whom was to be 
Grundy himself. 

Notwithstanding Grundy's advice, the difficulty of proving 
that White's seat had become vacant seemed to be so great that, 
on October 25, Levin H. Coe introduced in the state senate a 
series of resolutions which instructed the Senators and requested 
the Representatives to carry out the wishes of the legislature on 
certain enumerated subjects.-' While the resolutions were being 



26 Grundy to Polk, October 17, Polk Papers. 

27 (1) To vote against the chartering of a United States bank. (2) To 
vote for the sub-treasury. (3) To vote against any bill for the prevention 
of interference in elections by certain federal officers, as such a bill would 



GOFEENOE OF TENNESSEE 167 

discussed by the legislature, Judge White wrote to one of the 
members of the lower house stating that he would resign rather 
than support the sub-treasury bill.-** His letter was read to the 
legislature, and soon afterwards that body, by a strict party vote, 
passed the resolutions. General Jackson's program was thereby 
successfully carried into effect, and once more he had the satis- 
faction of humiliating the man who had dared to run for Presi- 
dent against his wishes. It was a contemptible transaction, and 
those who participated in it are deserving of nothing but con- 
demnation. It remained to be seen, of course, whether the Whig 
Senators would repudiate their instructions, but there was little 
doubt that White at least, would resign. 

On his way to Washington, early in November, John Bell 
stopped at Knoxville to deliver a public address in which he 
scathingly denounced the administration and its supporters. In 
response to a call from the audience, White addressed the same 
meeting in language which was reported to have been violently 
intemperate.-" 

While White was yet on his journey to Washington, Polk, in 
a letter to Van Buren, congratulated him on recent Democratic 
victories, and pointed out that they were a good omen for 1840. 
' ' Judge White, ' ' said Polk, ' ' forgetting the dignity of his station, 
as well as the former character of which he boasted, descended 
into the political arena, and became an active partisan and 
travelling electioneer." He told Van Buren that the legislature 



violate the Constitution of the United States. (4) To vote against dis- 
tribution among the states of revenue derived from the sale of public lands — 
and for reducing the price of such lands. (5) To vote for a repeal of the 
duty on salt. (6) To support in good faith the leading measures of the 
present administration {Tenn. Sen. Jour., 1839-40, 77-79; Scott, Memoir 
of Hugh Lawson White, 370). 

2s White to Jacobs, September 5, 1839 (Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson 
White, 371). 

29 Lewis P. Roberts to Polk, Nov. 11, 1839, Polk Papers. Roberts 
doubtless exaggerated in reporting that White "characterized the whole 
of the V. B. party as gamblers and blacklegs ' ' and accused Van Buren of 
pocketing the money which the people had lost from a derangement of 
currency. 



168 JAMES E. POLE 

had instructed the Senators to support the President 's measures, 
and expressed the helief that Foster would resign and White 
obey the instructions. Grundy, he said, woukl be the best man 
to succeed Foster ; he therefore urged the President to give up 
his Attorney-General for the good of the cause. ^" 

Foster promptly resigned on November 15, thus leaving one 
seat in the Senate at the immediate disposal of the Democrats. 
Catron, who was holding court in Louisville, believed that White, 
too, would soon be forced to resign. Tennessee, he wrote, must 
be held loyal to the administration, and the best way of insuring 
this was to make Polk the candidate for Vice-President.^^ 

The legislature by a party vote chose Grundy to fill Foster's 
unexpired term. As soon as the news reached Washington, how- 
ever, one of his friends, H. C. Williams, pointed out to him that 
he was not eligible for the oflfice.^- The constitution required that 
a Senator, at the time of his election, must be a local resident, 
and it was thought that Grundy was not such a resident so long 
as he remained in the cabinet. He therefore resigned his seat in 
the Senate, and the technicality was obviated by his reelection 
after his return to Tennessee. ^^ 

On receiving his instructions from the legislature, White 
decided that instead of resigning at once he would wait until 
some question had been presented which woidd compel him either 
to vote contrary to his i)rinciples or to violate his instructions. 
The Democrats, therefore, hastened to bring forward an obnox- 
ious measure. On January 13, 1840, Silas Wright called up the 
sub-treasury bill and thereby forced the issue. White rose and 
explained to the Senate the embarrassment of his jiosition, and 
then read the letter of resignation which he was about to send 



30 Polk to Van Buren, Nov. 11, 1839, Van Burcn Papers. 

31 Catron to Polk, Nov. 19, (1839 ?). Polk Papers. 

32 Williams to Polk, Nov. 28, 1839, "Most stririln confidential." 
On December 1 Cave Johnson gave a similar opinion, and said that Grundy 
■would go to Nashville to look after the matter (Polk Papers). 

ssNiles' Bcgistcr, Jan. 11, 1840. 



GOVEBNOB OF TENNESSEE 169 

to the Tennessee legislature.^* Grundy and others had expected 
from the persecuted Senator a bitter arraignment of the admin- 
istration party. They had come prepared to answer him, but 
Grundy himself admitted that White's letter to the legislature 
had been ''drawn with some ability" and was too respectful to 
call for a reply. ^^ 

While no one questioned the legal right of a state to instruct 
its Senators, it was generally felt that the legislature had used 
its power for the unworthy purpose of punishing White and gain- 
ing a political advantage to which the Democrats were not en- 
titled. A dinner was given in the deposed Senator's honor at 
which all of the prominent Whigs were present. His public career 
and his loyalty to principle were exalted in toasts and addresses 
made by Clay, Preston, and many others.^^ It was his last public 
appearance. An attack of pneumonia before his departure from 
Washington and the fatigue caused by the journey home greatly 
impaired his vitality, and his death occured on April 10, 1840. 

White's resignation gave the choice of his successor to the 
Democratic majority in the legislature. As the judge was from 
East Tennessee, custom required that his successor should be a 
resident of the same section of the state. The legislature selected 
Alexander Anderson, a lawyer of fair ability but a man without 
national reputation. 

As noted above, the principal recommendations made by 
Governor Polk in his message dealt with banks and internal im- 
provements. To these topics the legislature gave its attention 
when it was not too busily engaged with practical politics. Like 
most banks in the Union those of Tennessee had suspended specie 
payments. In response to the Governor's suggestion Yoakum, on 
October 28, 1839, presented a resolution which, if adopted, would 

31 Both explanation and letter are printed in Scott, Memoir of Hugh 
Lawson White, 375 ff. 

33 Grnndy to Polk, Jan. 13, 1840, and other letters on the same sub- 
ject in the Polk Papers. 

36 An account of this dinner is given in Scott, Memoir of Huoh Lawson 
White, 395 ff. 



170 JAMES E. POLK 

compel the Bank of Tennessee and its branches forthwith to 
resume and continue specie payments on all notes of and under 
ten dollars. Another resolution moved by Jennings, an opposi- 
tion member, required the committee on banks to interrogate the 
president and directors of this bank as to whether financial ac- 
commodations were made on the basis of political sentiments. On 
November 11, Jennings presented a bill which embodied and 
made more explicit the ideas included in his resolution. The bill 
required the committee on banks to call on the Bank of Tennessee 
for the following items of information : (1) whether the choice of 
officers of the branch banks was influenced by polities; (2) 
whether contracts were so influenced; and (3) whether politics 
was considered in making loans. Another bill was proposed by 
Wheeler the purpose of which was to compel all banks of the 
state to resume specie payments within thirty days on penalty of 
forfeiture of their charters. On January 15, 1840, Jennings 
proposed an amendment to the state constitution the intent of 
which was to prevent the state in future from becoming the sole 
proprietor of, or a partner in, any bank, and from raising money 
on the credit of the state, except for defense.^' 

None of these proposals was enacted into law. The Demo- 
crats easily disposed of the political measures of their opponents, 
but, with the exception of a few minor remedial regulations, they 
were unable to carry their own. Toward the close of the session 
Laughlin submitted a report from the committee which had been 
appointed by the senate to investigate the banks. It stated that 
no evidence of politics in bank transactions had been discovered 
and that specie payments would, in the opinion of the banks, be 
resumed by July 1, 1840.^^ This belief, however, proved to be 
erroneous. 

In response, also, to suggestions made in the Governor's mes- 
sage, the legislature undertook to modify existing laws on the 



37 Tom. Se7i. Jour., 1839-40, 85-8(5, 109, 156-157, 407. 

38 Ibid., Appendix. 



GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 171 

subject of internal improvements. Yielding to a popular clamor 
for state aid, the legislature under Cannon's administration had 
made it obligatory for the state to become a partner in all im- 
provement ventures regardless of the nature of the enterprise. 
Wholesale extravagance had been the result ; nevertheless it was 
not an easy matter to eliminate the abuses without doing injury 
to those who, relying on continued support from the government, 
had invested capital in various projects.^'' The secretary of 
state reported to the senate that, under the act of 1836, 
$2,732,541% had been subscribed by the state to improvement 
enterprises, and under the act of 1838, $889,500 had been sub- 
scribed for turnpikes and river improvements, $65,000 to the 
Louisville, Cincinnati, and Charleston Rail Road Company, and 
a similar amount to the Hiawassee Rail Road Company.^" 

In order to save the state in future from such ruinous expen- 
ditures, the legislature repealed all laws which had required the 
governor to subscribe for stock in improvement corporations. In 
the repealing act provision was made for the withdrawal, so far 
as possible, from partnerships already formed. By another act, 
passed on January 28, 1840, the legislature recalled $150,000 
in state bonds which had been placed with banks to be sold and 
the proceeds invested in stocks of improvement companies. This 
legislation was substantially what the Governor had recommended, 
and, although there was no remedy for the waste that had already 



39 In responding to a vote of thanks at the close of the session, Speaker 
Coe, of the Senate, stated very clearly the difficulty which confronted the 
legislature: "In 1836 and 1838 laws were passed for the encouragement 
of Internal Improvement and Avorks of the most extensive character have 
been commenced, and are now in progress of erection. If we continued 
to advance under the law as we found it, many saw in it the germ of a dis- 
ordered and bankrupt treasury, and a people loaded down with taxes, levied 
to pay the interest on an onerous State debt — whilst it was asserted by 
others, with much reason, that the State had voluntarily tendered the right 
hand of assistance to large bodies of our fellow citizens, and had invited 
enterprises, having for their object the cultivation and improvement of our 
common country; and under such circumstances the sudden withdrawal 
of all aid, would involve individuals in private ruin and consign public 
works to dilapidation" (ibid., 545-546). 

40 Eeports of Luke Lea, secretary of state, Oct. 25 and Nov. 23, Tenn. 
Sen. Jour., 1839-40, 74, 142. 



172 JAMES K. POLE 

occurred, so long as Polk remained in the governor's chair care 
Avas taken to restrict expenditures and to reduce the state debt. 

During Polk's first year as governor of his state, the people 
of the nation were engaged in the whirlwind Presidential cam- 
paign of 1840 — the first and most boisterous of its kind. In 
every state in the Union the contest was waged with unpre- 
cedented fury, and especially so in Tennessee. Reason and logical 
argument were cast to the winds, while noise and caricature 
became the order of the day. The "stump speech" played a less 
important part than usual ; while both sides, but especially the 
Whigs, expended their energies in fantastic processions. The 
greater the din of deafening and discordant noises, the more 
spectacular or grotesque the banners and other devices designed 
to excite the emotions of the crowd, the more successful w^as the 
pageant considered. 

For sentimental reasons, as well as for the importance of her 
electoral votes, the contest in Tennessee was regarded as of 
national significance. Failure to redeem "Old Hickory's state" 
was thought by Democratic politicians to be nothing short of 
disgrace, while the hope of thus humiliating their opponents 
spurred the Whigs to untiring effort. But the Whigs had the 
advantage from the outset. The rank and file of the Democrats 
did not share the feeling of the party leaders; they could not 
wax enthusiastic over Van Buren. In the Whig camp, on the 
contrary, there was unity. 

In 1839, as soon as it became known that Polk had been elected, 
prominent Whigs held a convention in Nashville and arranged 
for the appointment of local committees throughout the state. 
These committees were effective engines of agitation, and the 
Union promptly denounced them as "new and strange fermenta- 
tions in the body politic to be put down by all lovers of peace 
and social order. "^^ Clay was invited to visit Tennessee by a 
delegation sent to Kentucky for that pui-pose by the Nashville 



41 Phelan, Hist, of Tenn., 384. 



GOVEBNOR OF TENNESSEE 173 

convention, but, the sage of Ashland, pleading illness and press- 
ure of private business, declined to make a definite promise 
to accept.*- It was expected, of course, that the legislature 
would instruct the Whig Senators and force their resignation, 
and the Banner was certain that such a course would be of 
great advantage to the Wliigs in the Presidential campaign. 
This paper urged the Senators to remain in office until forced 
to resign. In such an event their names were to head the Whig 
electoral ticket, and the state was to be "thoroughly and ably 
canvassed, in every county and every neighborhood and victory 
would be assured."*^ 

The national convention of the Whig party met at Harris- 
burg, Pennsylvania, on December 4, 1839. Due to prejudice 
against national conventions, the Whigs of Tennessee refused to 
send delegates, for it will be remembered that opposition to the 
convention which nominated Van Buren was a chief factor in the 
creation of the ' ' White Whig" party. As their hearts were set on 
Clay, they were disappointed, and at first somewhat discouraged, 
when Harrison received the nomination. They soon rallied, 
however, and throughout the campaign their loyalty and energy 
were not surpassed by the Whigs of any other state. Bell was 
their most eloquent speaker, although Foster, who canvassed the 
entire state, was more successful in winning votes. In this cam- 
paign the Whigs appealed more to the eye than to the ear. They 
relied more on banners and processions than on oratory or argu- 
ments. "The fact is," wrote one of Polk's Democratic friends 
after the election, "the people like coonery and foolery better 
than good argument."** 

The great event of the campaign was the Whig convention 
held in Nashville on August 17, 1840. Delegations came from 
surrounding states, each joining in the spectacular procession 



i^Niles' Register, October 12, 1839. 

43 Nashville Banner, quoted in Niles' Register, September 7, 1839. 

44 Isaac Goladay to Polk, November 9, 18-40, Polk Papers. 



174 JAMES K. POLE 

and each bearing aloft banners fantastically decorated and 
adorned with mottoes designed to win popular applause.^^ The 
procession wended its way to a grove in the outksirts of the city, 
where the multitude was entertained by speeches made by prom- 
inent "Whigs of Tennessee and other states. Foster, who was 
chairman of the meeting, made the opening address, but the lion 
of the occasion was Clay himself, whose personal magnetism and 
oratorical flights electrified the audience, although his address 
was rather commonplace. 

The Democrats were not so well organized as the Whigs and 
their speakers were decidedly inferior to those of their opponents. 
Their most effective debater, Polk, was prevented by his office 
from actively entering into the canvass, although he made a 
few speeches in favor of Van Buren, which led to his present- 
ment as a ''nuisance" by the grand jury of Sevier county," and 
the Whig papers circulated the story that the Governor's grand- 
father had been a Tory during the Revolution.*' Nicholson met 
Bell in debate ; Cave Johnson, A. V. Brown, and H. L. Turney did 
their utmost to stem the Whig tide; Jackson wrote letters in 
which he lauded Van Buren, and denounced Harrison as a Fed- 
eralist, but the people would not listen as of yore. On the eve 
of the election the Democrats tried to brand Harrison as an aboli- 
tionist. At the last moment, they distributed handbills on which 
they had printed a letter which Harrison was alleged to have 
written to Arthur Tappan declaring himself to be such. But 
the plot had been discovered, and the Whig was ready with 
Harrison's denial as soon as the handbills appeared. 

Tennessee refused to be "redeemed"; the vote for Harrison 
was 60,391, while Van Buren polled but 48,289. It was a signal 
victory for the Whigs, and, unlike four years earlier, it could 
not be said that voters had supported the Whig candidate simply 
because he was a favorite son of the state. Undoubtedly one of 



45 The parade is described in some detail by Phelan, Hist, of Tenn., 387 ff. 

i& Ibid. 

47 Edwin Polk to Polk, August 27, 1840, Poll- Papers. 



GOVEENOB OF TENNESSEE 175 

Polk's correspondents was right in saying^^ that many Democrats 
had refrained from voting because they "could not be rallied to 
Van Buren, ' ' and that the Democratic loss was much greater than 
the Whig gain. Still, any hopes built on such calculations were 
illusive, for in national politics the state was irretrievably lost to 
the Democrats. 

Not realizing the real strength of the Whigs, the leading 
Democrats, almost before the smoke of battle had lifted, began 
to formulate plans for winning the next state election. First 
of all, Harrison and his administration must be vigorously 
assailed, regardless of the course he might pursue. The difficulty 
of finding anything of sufficient importance to attack caused 
them no little anxiety. A. 0. P. Nicholson put the case frankly 
in a letter to Polk, written before it had been definitely ascer- 
tained that Harrison had been elected. The Democrats, he said, 
must 

keep up a rakiBg fire upon the whole of Harrison 's inconsistent and imbecile 
history. It is unfortunate for us that Harrison's administration (if elected) 
will not be developed before our August elections, but still enough will 
probably have transpired to present available points of attack.*^ 

And yet the politicians who uttered such sentiments claimed to 
be followers of Jefferson, one of whose cardinal principles was 
"absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority. "^° 

Although the Democrats were hopeful and even confident, 
the Whig victory of 1840 made them realize that Polk's defeat in 
1841 was within the realms of possibility. When, therefore, in 
December, 1840, it was reported in Washington that Grundy 
could not live, the Democratic members of Congress from Tenn- 
essee counselled together and decided that Polk ought to succeed 
him as Senator from his state. In a letter to Polk,^^ Hopkins L. 



48 Samuel P. Walker to Polk, November 4, 1840, Polk Papers. 

49 Nicholson to Polk, November 6, 18-40, PoJlc Papers. Other letters to 
Polk also expressed regret that there would probably be little to attack. 

50 See Jefferson 's first inaugural address. 

51 Turney to Polk, December 21, 1840. On the same day A. V. Brown 
wrote a letter of similar purport. Both in Pollc Papers. 



176 JAMES K. POLK 

Turney pointed out to the Governor that his reeh^ction was doubt- 
ful and, even if such were not the case, he would stand a better 
chance of promotion if elected Senator. Both Cave Johnson 
and A. V. Brown, he said, concurred in this view. Before this 
letter had reached its destination, however, Polk had appointed 
Nicholson to succeed Grundy, whose death had occurred on the 
nineteenth of the month. So gratified was Nicholson by his 
appointment that, on his arrival in Washington, he saw visions 
of his benefactor's certain elevation to the Presidential chair. 
After telling the Governor of his popularity in Washington and 
of the anxiety for his reelection, he added : "I shall be disap- 
pointed if your success in this contest does not lead on certainly 
to your elevation to the Presidency. ' '^- 

While the politicians on either side were speculating on the 
probability of Harrison's calling an extra session of Congress, 
considerable excitement was caused in Nashville by the shooting 
of J. George Harris, editor of the Union, by Robert C. Foster, 
a son of the deposed Senator. Harris quickly recovered, but the 
affair furnished Democrats with something to denounce while 
they were awaiting further political developments. 

In case Harrison, after his inauguration, should call Congress 
together in extra session, Tennessee would have no representa- 
tion in the House^^ unless the Governor should see fit to call a 
special election. Anderson, who had been chosen to fill Foster's 
unexpired term, would cease to be Senator on March 4, and the 
official term of Nicholson, who was serving on the governor's 
appointment, would be automatically terminated should Polk 
decide to call an extra session of the legislature. Should no 
extra session be called, Nicholson would continue in office until 
the regular session which would open in October, 1841. As the 
probability of a called session of Congress increased, the Demo- 
crats differed as to whether it would be wiser to convene the 



52 Nicholson to Polk, Jan. 13, 3 841, ibid. 

53 The terms of present members Avould expire on March 4 and a regular 
election would not be held until autumn. 



GOVERNOB OF TENNESSEE 177 

legislature and attempt to elect two Senators, or to be contented 
with one Senator, Nicholson, leaving the other seat vacant. 

When sounded on the subject, Polk expressed himself as 
opposed to convening the legislature. He gave, as his reasons, 
economy, and the fear that the Whigs would make political 
capital of such a procedure. On the other hand, Jackson, who 
had lost none of his political zeal, strongly favored an extra ses- 
sion in order that two Senators might be chosen and instructed 
as to how they should cast their votes. "If it cau be done with 
propriety," he advised Governor Polk, 

if there is a called session of congress, the Legislature should, be convened to 
give us a full representation in the Senate ; and to instruct our senators & 
request our rejjresentatives to vote against a high Tariff, a distribution of 
the Public Funds, against a national Bank of any kind, or deposits in the 
State banks, and against a repeal of the sub-treasury act, and, altho last 
not least, to pass a law to compell our Banks to resume specie payments or 
wind up.s-t 

From Washington, Anderson urged the necessity of a full repre- 
sentation in the Senate. ^^ Turney seconded this appeal and 
once more tried to induce the Governor to become a candidate. 
Polk, he said, could do much good in the Senate, for since 
Grundy's death there was no one able to cope with the Whigs. 
On this same subject Polk received what appears to be his first 
letter from Andrew Johnson."*^ In it Johnson advises the Gov- 
ernor to convene the legislature for the purpose of electing mem- 
bers of Congress whose terms, unless he is ' ' rong, ' ' expire on the 
fourth of March. 

While Nicholson was in Washington, still worrying for fear 
there would be little in the Harrison administration to assail,^^ 



54 Jackson to Polk, Feb. 8, 1841, Folk Papers. 

55 Anderson to Polk, Feb. -17, 1841, ibid. 

56 At least it is the first letter from Johnson in the Polk collection. It 
seems that Polk had written to Johnson, stating that either he or Blair 
must run for Congress. Johnson declined to become a candidate (Johnson 
to Polk, March 4, 1841, Polk Papers). 

57 "I do not calculate that we will be able to make any capital out of 
the Inaugural; but the Cabinet will be enough for our purposes, if we use 



178 JAMES E. POLK 

the much-reviled administration of Van Buren passed into his- 
tory.^^ Ignoring his critics, the "little magician" remained 
unperturbed and courteous to the end. When his successor 
arrived in Washington, an invitation to dine was extended by 
Van Buren and accepted by Harrison, and the Nashville Vnion 
marvelled that Harrison could take "vermacilla soup from those 
horrible gold spoons!"^" The Whig newspapers never tired of 
contrasting the democratic simplicity and generous hospitality'^*' 
of Harrison with the royalistic pomp and cold exclusiveness of 
Van Buren. It was unkind of the Whigs thus to purloin from 
their opponents the very arguments — almost the exact phrases — 
which had done such effective service in winning popular support 
for General Jackson. Such utter disregard for the proprietary 
rights of others fully justified J. George Harris in trying to 
render harmless the stolen implements of war. Shortly after 



it with skill." It is rumored, he said, "that Webster will be Secretary 
of State; Granger, Post-Master-General; Ewing, Secretary of the Treasury; 
Bell, Secretary of War; Preston, Secretary of the Navy; and Crittenden 
Attorney-General. What think you now of the Cabinet! I think you 
may set it down as settled that we are to have an anti-war fed. for 
Secretary of State, an abolition fed. for Post-Master-General, a uni- 
form fed. for the Treasury, a gag-bill Clay fed. for Atty. Gen., a gag- 
bill-no party-White Whig fed. for the War, and a Nullification fed. for the 
Navy. Will not this open the eyes of Tennesseaus! If not, then may we 
surrender at discretion" (Nicholson to Polk, Feb. 12, ISil, Polk Papers). 
^8 "Tomorrow night, at tAvelve o'clock," said the Madisonian., "the 
administration of Martin Van Buren tenninates. That administration, acci- 
dental in its beginning, and unfortunate and profitless in its career, will 
then have gone, with all its powers, its prerogatives, its follies, its malign 
influence, and with whatever streak of virtue may have been jiossibly 
mingled in its texture, to control us, to agitate us, to injure us, no more. 
Four years it has lived, and its principal achievement has been the passage 
of the sub-Treasury, by trampling with contempt upon tlie broad seal of 
a. sovereign State. What good it has done, we are unable to point out. 
What harm it has accomplished, we may possibly conceive of, by consider- 
ing the present condition of the Treasury, of our foreign relations, of our 
Navy, of the Army and the defences, of the Post Office, and of the public 
morals, and the condition of the people. But we congratulate the country 
that it has at last come to an end. It is gone" (The Madisonian, March 
3, 1841). 

59 Union, March 4, 1841. 

60 Under the heading ' ' Hospitality at the White House ' ' an article in 
the New Haven PaUadium said: "He [Harrison] keeps his house open 
to all comers. . . . The servants at the White House find more diflfieulfj' 



GOVEENOE OF TENNESSEE 179 

his inauguration, the President had directed Webster to issue a 
most wholesome order stating that any interference in elections, 
state or federal, by federal officers, would be regarded as cause 
for removal. The plain farmer of the Whigs was promptly 
branded by Harris as a usurper of royal powers and a violator 
of the rights of states, for ' ' the Autocrat of all the Russias never 
issued an Ukase more potent. ' '®^ But before these unjust charges 
against the President had been put in type, the career of the 
"autocrat" had been cut short, and the same issue of the paper 
which contained them chronicled, also, the news of Harrison's 
death. 

As Polk's campaign for reelection began as soon as his com- 
petitor had been nominated on March 5, 1841, the incidents of 
the remainder of his gubernatorial term will be treated in the 
succeeding chapter, which deals primarily with that spirited 
political contest and with the transfer of Tennessee to the Whigs. 



in adapting themselves to the change of Administration than any other 
officeholders. He breaks in on all the elegant aristocratic usages of the 
jjalace, and plays the mischief vnth that systematic courtly etiquette which 
with the Sub-Treasury constituted the two great radical refonns of the 
late President. He gets up at sunrise, like a plain farmer as he is, and 
wants his breakfast within an hour after, (the vulgar man!) — and eats 
with au appetite of a common day laborer. He gave one of his servants 
a regular ' blowing up ' the other day, for leaving a visitor dripping wet 
and muddy in a cold ' ante-chamber, ' because the President was at break- 
fast and could not be disturbed, and because the carpet would be injured 
by the muddy feet of one Avho came on foot! The President brought the 
visitor into the breakfast parlor, and insisted on making him comfortable 
at the fire at once. At all these things the demooracy are much shocked, 
and look aghast at this desecration of the 'palace! ' " Quoted in Nashville 
Banner, April 5, 1841. 

ci Harris quoted from the Evening Post: "this document has added 
the last insult that can be given to a free and independent people, and 
will be held up to popular execration by every man w^ho is not disposed to 
yield his neck to the yoke of party, or who is not a base and degraded 
slave. It is so insolent in spirit and dictation, breathes an air so vile and 
debasing, that it is difficult to speak of it without subjecting* one 's self to 
an unwonted excitement" (Nashville Union, April 12, 1841). 



CHAPTEE X 

DEFEATED BY JONES IN 1841 

From the day of their defeat in 1839 the Whigs of Tennessee 
had been marshalling their forces for the next gubernatorial eon- 
test, and the great national victory of 1840 gave them reason 
to hope for success. It had also, by example, indicated the type 
of campaign that would be most likely to win that success. Can- 
non 's main weakness as a candidate had been his inability to 
adjust himself to the guerrilla variety of campaign by which 
manj^ a less brilliant politician had endeared himself to the peo- 
ple. Capable but painfully serious, Cannon was a shining mark 
for the shafts of wit and ridicule which Polk had hurled with 
unerring aim whenever they had met in joint discussion. On 
the contrary, Polk had demonstrated his adaptability to a degree 
that surprised his closest friends. Distinguished for his dignified 
and learned discussions in the national House of Representatives, 
Polk had, in 1839, discomfited his rival and won the people by a 
most skilful use of mimicry and sarcasm. The Whigs were there- 
fore familiar with the campaign methods of the Governor as 
well as the predilections of the people, and the convention which 
assembled at Murfreesborough on March 5, 1841, displayed polit- 
ical wisdom by nominating the one man in the state who was 
thought to be capable of "beating the governor at his own game." 
This man was Major James C. Jones,^ a "horny-handed" farmer 
from Wilson County, who had represented his county in the 
legislature, served as a Presidential elector, and acquired a local 
reputation as an effective "stump speaker." Tall and ungainly 
in appearance, Jones possessed many of those grotesque personal 



1 Jackson declined to call Jones, major, "for he never Avas a corporal" 
(Jackson to Polk, March 20, 1841, Po/fc Papers). 



DEFEATED BY JONES IN 1841 181 

qualities which had made John Randolph famous. Even the 
sobriquet "Lean Jimmy," with which his admiring friends had 
christened him, served as a valuable asset in a contest so closely 
following the "great whirlwind campaign" of 1840. Realizing 
that, in knowledge and debating powers, he was no match for his 
adversary, Jones resorted to hectoring tactics and relied more 
on amusing than on convincing his audience. Nevertheless he 
was a man of considerable ability, and he displayed a fair knowl- 
edge of the political issues of the day. In spite of the picture 
drawn by Phelan and others, there was a serious side to the cam- 
paign of 1841. Jones did not devote all of his time to "coonery 
and foolery," but at times displayed alertness and skill as a 
debater. 

As in 1839 the canvass dealt principally with national issues. 
In his "Address to the People," Polk stated that his views on 
national questions had been given in detail in his address of 
1839, and that nothing had since occurred to alter them. He 
had, he said, been forced to begin the campaign early because of 
the untiring efforts of the Whigs to defeat him.- 

Each side accused the other of being Federalists, and Har- 
rison's "autocratic" order against interference in elections, and 
Van Buren's regal splendor, were offered as evidence to prove 
the opposing contentions. The death of Judge White nearly a 
year before did not prevent his name from being dragged into 
the contest. Jackson, in exhorting Polk to answer the "false- 
hoods" of Bell and Foster regarding Van Buren's extravagance 
in furnishing the executive mansion, provided him with a state- 
ment that it was Bell's disappointment at not being made a 
member of Jackson's cabinet, on White's recommendation, that 
had caused Bell to desert the party and to bring White out for 



2 "From the moment of my election in 1839, it had been manifestly an 
object of no minor importance -with my leading political opponents in the 
State, to prostrate and destroy me. Their attacks -were constant. Their 
presses kept up an incessant war upon me. No calumny or misrepresenta- 
tion of my political opinions and course had been too gross to fill their 
columns" (Nashville Union, March 29, 1841). 



182 JAMES K. FOLK 

the Presidency.^ A friend in Albany* furnished Polk with sev- 
eral letters written by Granger, the Postmaster-General which 
were to be used for the purpose of proving him to be an Aboli- 
tionist. Jones and other Whigs tried to counteract the effect pro- 
duced by these by asserting that Polk's grandfather had been 
a Tory. 

Early in March Jones published a list of his speaking appoint- 
ments. He opened the campaign at Murfreesborough, wiiere he 
boasted that he could tell a greater number of anecdotes than the 
Governor himself.^ He promptly accepted an invitation from 
Polk to meet in joint debate whenever possible,*' and they met 
for the first time at Murfreesborough on the twenty-seventh of 
March. 

Polk opened the discussion with a spirited attack upon the 
Harrison administration. He denounced Granger as an Aboli- 
tionist, and Webster as a Federalist who, in 1835, had been so 
unpatriotic as to declare that he would not support a certain bill 
to appropriate money for defense ' ' though the enemy were batter- 
ing down the walls of the Capitol." Unfortunately for himself, 
Polk tried, as he had done in the canvass with Cannon, to weaken 
his opponent by making him an object of ridicule. Among other 
shafts of sarcasm, he said that his friend Jones was a "promising 
young man," but "as for his being Governor, that's all a 
notion."" As soon as Jones took the platform, he referred 
repeatedly to Polk as "my venerable competitor." This he con- 
tinued to do whenever they met in debate, much to the amuse- 
ment of the audience, for Polk at that time was only forty-six 
years of age. 

Before the candidates met again, Governor Polk issued a 
public statement in which he gave his reasons for not convening 



3 Jackson to Polk, March 20, 1841, Foil:. Fapers. 

4 E. Crowell to Polk, March 19, 1841, ibid. 

5 Yoakum to Polk, March 15, 1841, ibid. 

« Polk to Joues, March 15; Jones to Polk, March 18, 1841, ihid. 
7 Nashville Union, March 29, 1841. 



DEFEATED BY JONES IN 1841 183 

the legislature in extra session so that Senators might be chosen 
in time for Harrison 's called session of Congress. He had already 
called a special election for the purpose of choosing members of 
the House of Eepresentatives. In declining to convene the legis- 
lature, Polk, as we have already noted, disregarded the wishes, 
not only of General Jackson, but of nearly all of the leading 
Democrats of the state. It was thoroughly characteristic of 
Polk to follow his own judgment rather than the wishes of his 
friends, even of "Old Hickory," and yet he was often charged 
with being a weak tool of General Jackson. 

The main reasons assigned in his public statement for not 
convening the legislature were unnecessary expense and the 
impropriety of taking advantage of an accident to strengthen his 
own party in the federal Senate. The members elected to the 
legislature in 1839 had not, he said, been chosen with the selec- 
tion of Senators in view, and "my opinion is that the frank, fair, 
and honest course, is to leave the choice open for the decision 
of the people at the next August election." Harrison, he said, 
had given him an opportunity to disregard the popular will, for 
it is 

certain that if I had availed myself of them that the present General 
Assembly, if convened, would choose two Democratic Senators. If, how- 
ever, the President under the influence and control of inflamed partisans, 
maddened with their late success . . . has committed a capital political 
blunder, it is no reason why I should commit one also. 

He denounced the President for unnecessarily convening Con- 
gress, for, as there was plenty of money in the Treasury, the call 
must have been made for purely political reasons.^ 



s ' ' Large and extravagant promises which can never be redeemed had 
been made to the people, and it was doubtless deemed to be necessary to 
do sometliing, or to aypear to do something to keep up the public expecta- 
tion, and thereby possibly to operate upon the elections wliich are to take 
place in States during the present year. . . . They probably fear to let 
the public mind sober down to a state of calm reflection, lest peradventure 
they may not succeed in their favorite measures of Federal policy, at the 
next regular session of Congress. ' ' Printed in Nashville Union, April 1, 1841. 



184 JAMES K. FOLK 

Whether the Governor was influenced solely by a spirit of 
fairness, no one but himself could know, but, whatever his motives 
were, he received no thanks from the Whigs for his magnanimity. 
The Banner bitterly assailed him for impugning the motives of 
the President, and for praising himself. It pronounced his action 
hypocritical and declared that his forbearance had been due to 
a knowledge that the legislature would not dare to choose two 
Democrats in the face of the late election, and to fear that an 
attempt to make such a choice would injure his own prospects 
of reelection.^ At a debate held at Lebanon shortly after the 
publication of Polk's statement, Jones won applause by remind- 
ing the Governor that his solicitude for the popular will had not 
prevented him from appointing Nicholson Senator after the peo- 
ple had repudiated him (Nicholson) by refusing to make him a 
Presidential elector. The Whig paper of the town commended 
Polk's wit and added that "he makes as much of it with his face 
as with his tongue. "^° Most effective of all were his impersona- 
tions of Bailie Peyton, the chief feature of w^hich was what the 
Whigs called ' ' Polk 's horrible grin. ' ' 

The candidates visited the principal towns of the state. From 
the press notices, one would be led to believe that their time was 
occupied almost entirely with the relation of humorous anec- 
dotes and the coining of witty remarks. Nevertheless, their 
printed speeches show that a serious discussion of political issues 
was by no means omitted. Polk, especially, displayed great power 
as a debater. He thoroughly understood the questions under 



9 Nashville Banner, April 5, 1841. The most abusive of all papers Avas 
Parson Brownlow's Jonesborough Whig. In an article addressed to Polk, 
the editor said that the Governor while "under the influence of lUiuor or 
opium, being half drunl:" had denounced the Whig for criticising his 
ancestors who had been lying in the tomb for forty years. Brownlow 
reminded Polk that he had criticized both White and Harrison since then- 
death, and then continued: "You canting, cringing hypocrite— you dema- 
gogue and time-serving politician, you advise mankind as to prudence and 
moderation! " Undated in Polk Faiiers. 

10 Lebanon Chronicle, quoted by Nashville Banner, April 5, 1841. 



DEFEATED BY JONES IN 1841 185 

discussion, and few could excel him in clear and logical presenta- 
tion. Had his opponent attempted to meet the Governor's argu- 
ments by a frank and fair discussion, he would have been easily 
vanquished, for his knowledge of political questions was super- 
ficial and limited. To Jones, however, ignorance of the subject 
was never a cause of embarrassment. By substituting bold asser- 
tion for knowledge, he was able to discuss any topic without hesi- 
tation, and, so far as his audience was concerned, he had dis- 
proved every contention of his adversary. It availed Polk little 
to demolish these assertions by clear presentation of historical 
data. Like Douglas in his debates with Lincoln, Jones would 
calmly reiterate his assertions, no matter how often they had been 
refuted, or else he would divert the attention of the audience by 
a humorous anecdote or by a dissertation on the beauties of coon 
fur. In either case the effect of Polk's argument was entirely 
lost, while his adversary succeeded in winning the vociferous 
applause of an uncritical audience. No wonder that a Democrat 
who heard their debate at Somerville exclaimed in disgust : ' ' Mr. 
Polk made an ass of himself, talking sense to a lot of d — d fools, ' ' 
and urged that the Governor "ought to get a stick and crack 
Jones's skull, and end this tomfoolery ! "^^ 

One of Jones's most exasperating characteristics was his 
never-failing good humor. As he had declined to become em- 
barrassed by the most complete demonstration of his ignorance, 
so, also, he refused to be angered by sarcasm or ridicule. At 
times Polk tried to crush his opponent by belittling his abilities 
and by holding him up to scorn. In reply, Jones would solicit 
the compassion of the hearers for his "irascible but venerable 
competitor." Polk said that he had tried to discuss questions of 
state in a serious manner and that his opponent had wisely made 
jest of things which were beyond his comprehension. When he 
asserted that Jones was better suited to the circus ring than to 
the Governor's chair, Jones good-naturedly admitted that they 



11 Phelan, Eist. of Tenn., 403. 



186 JAMES E. POLE 

would both do well in the ring — himself as a clown, and the 
Governor as "the little fellow that is dressed up in a red cap 
and jacket and who rides around on a poney."^- The Governor 
wearied of the travesty, and would gladly have abandoned joint 
meetings, but, as they had been undertaken upon his own invi- 
tation, there was no way of breaking gracefully with his trifling 
antagonist. 

The debates attracted attention in all parts of the state, and 
everywhere large audiences greeted the speakers. Much import- 
ance was attached to their meeting at Nashville, which was not 
only the capital, but the political headquarters of the state. 
Here, on May 19, they were greeted by a large and enthusiastic 
concourse of people, and each candidate according to agreement 
spoke for two and one-half hours. "Polk," as Phelan has well 
said, ' ' made a speech that would have swept from the stump any 
man who had ever been Governor of Tennessee before him, and 
any man who was Governor after Jones until Andrew Johnson 
came forward. "^^ It was a forceful and logical presentation 
of the issues, replete with historical data and spiced with humor- 
ous illustrations. Jones's address was a compound of sophistry 
and nonsense. Intead of answering Polk's arguments he con- 
structed innumerable "men of straw" and then demolished them 
to the entire satisfaction of his audience. He misquoted and 
distorted everything that the Governor had said, after which 
he amused the crowd by poking fun at his opponent and by re- 
lating preposterous stories." No man of Polk's training and 
dignity could cope with such politcal bushwhacking. 

Had the people been really interested in political issues, 
Jones could not have commanded a liearing. But since 1840, 

nlbkl., 402. ^-^ Ibid.. 404. 

i^The Union of May 24 thus described him: "Maj. Jones is a floater; 
amusins at times, but superficial as a bubble. He drifts along on the sur- 
face of today and plays with the uppermost passions and prejudices ot his 
hearers • trifles with important matters and converts important matters into 
trifles. . . . In a word, he is quite possible as an electioneer for his party- 
good of the kind, but the quality is none of the best. ' ' 



DEFEATED BY JONES IN 1841 187 

the Whigs had abandoned serious discussion and had staked 
everything on an appeal to the emotions. For this reason Polk 's 
training and success were used to prejudice the people against 
him. Not only had his grandfather been a Tory, but the Gov- 
ernor himself was said to be an aristocrat, who, at heart, held 
the people in contempt. Ignorance, uncouth appearance, and 
slovenly dress were regarded as attributes of honest statesman- 
ship, and Jones always emphasized the fact that he had followed 
the plow.^^ The Governor, however, deserved little sympathy 
on account of these misrepresentations, for with similar weapons 
he had aided in "putting down" the able and upright John 
Quincy Adams. 

Up to the close of the canvass, no one could predict, with 
any degree of certainty, what the result would be. The Whigs 
did most of the shouting. They made extravagant claims, but 
many Democrats could not believe that a majority of the people 
would be willing to cast out a man of Polk's ability and repu- 
tation and put in his place a man whose sole claim to fame rested 
on a grotesque personal appearance and low-grade wit. The 
Democrats, however, had overrated the people's sense of pro- 
priety, and on that account were doomed to disappointment. 
At the election, which was held on August 5, Polk was defeated 
by a majority of over three thousand votes, but the Union con- 
gratulated the Democrats on their "signal triumph of prin- 
ciple in sweeping away ten thousand of the last year's ma- 
jority. "^° It was generally conceded, even by the Whigs, that 
no other man in the party could have polled so many votes, and 
instead of losing prestige, Polk was credited by his party with 



15 The Kuoxville Register in contrasting the candidates said that Jones 
was ' ' free, manly, undisguised, plain, and carrying conviction with every 
sentence." Polk was "hidden, dissembling, artful, shrinking and hypo- 
critical in the extreme" Quoted in Nashville Banner, August 2, 1841. 

16 "Never," said Harris, tlie editor, "did Gov. Polk win for himself 
more laurels than he has won in this contest. The Democracy of the whole 
Union will appreciate his Herculean efforts at the expense of health to 
maintain the princijjles that he has uniformly supported, the principles 
of Jefferson and Jackson" (Nashville Union, August 12, 1841). 



188 JAMES K. POLK 

having won a great personal victory. In a letter to A^an Buren, 
General Jackson rejoiced in the reduction of the "Whig majority 
and said that ' ' Gov. Polk deserves the thanks of the Democracy 
of the whole union, he fought the battle well and fought it alone, 
I may say." Strange to say, Jackson commended rather than 
criticized Polk for having disregarded his advice about conven- 
ing the legislature. He pointed out to Van Buren that, had the 
legislature been called, two Democratic Senators would have been 
elected, but "the Governor threw aside policy, and adopted the 
real republican creed — that a majority have the right to rule."^' ' 

In the legislature which was elected with Jones, the Whigs 
had a majority of three in the lower house. In the senate the 
Democrats still had a majority of one. But one of their number, 
Samuel Turney, w^as regarded as rather independent in politics, 
and, when the time came for him to take a definite stand with 
his colleagues, he proved to be weak and vacillating. Nominally, 
however, the Democrats had a majority of one and thereby pos- 
sessed the power to block any measure of the lower house that 
required their separate approval. But on any question which 
required the joint vote of the two houses the Whigs, by virtue 
of their majority of three in the lower house, were in a position 
to outvote their opponents. 

In Tennessee, politics had precedence over legislation. There- 
fore the defeated party began at once to devise ways and means 
of preventing their opponents from filling the two vacant seats 
in the United States Senate. The term for which Judge White 
had been elected, and M'hich since his resignation had been filled 
by Alexander Anderson, had expired. The other vacancy had 
been caused by the death of Senator Grundy, and had been 
filled temporarily by A. 0. P. Nicholson, by virtue of the Gov- 
ernor's recess appointment. 

Following the election, Polk received many letters, the main 
object of which was to congratulate him for having reduced the 



1" Jackson to Van Buren, Aug. 16, 1841, Van Buren Papers. 



DEFEATED BY JONES IN 1841 189 

Whig majority. In these letters several of his friends expressed 
the opinion that the Democrats ought to demand the privilege 
of choosing one of the Senators, and that Polk himself should 
be the man. Among others, Hopkins L. Turney advised such a 
course. He assured Polk, also, that his brother, Samuel Turney, 
would vote with the Democrats.^® 

When plotting to force the Whigs to concede them one Sen- 
ator, Democratic leaders tried to ease their conscience by assert- 
ing that in 1840 Whig members of the legislature had threatened, 
in the event of Polk's convening the legislature, to remain at 
home and thus prevent an election of Senators. It was further 
alleged that these threats had been made on the advice of Henry 
Clay.^^ It was said, also, that, during the recent campaign, 
when it was believed that the Democrats would elect a majority 
of the legislature, Jones had boasted that the Whig members 
would not permit the Democrats to hold an election for Sen- 
ators. -° Polk at first was noncommittal, but he soon made it 
known that he was not a candidate for the office. The reason 
which he gave for not permitting the use of his name was that 
he would not accept any office except one conferred upon him by 
a vote of the people.-^ With Polk out of the race, the politicians 
turned their attention to other candidates, but nothing could be 
done, of course, until the meeting of the legislature and the 
inauguration of a new governor. 



IS Tm-ney to Polk, Washington, Aug. 2i, ISil {Polk Papers). Laugh- 
lin, Huntsman, and others assured Polk that some of the Whigs had agreed 
to vote for him. 

19 H. L. Turney to Polk, Jan. 2, 1842, ibid. 

20 Alex. Anderson to Polk, Aug. 20, 1841, ihid. Anderson urged that 
the Democrats should now practice this plan upon those who had invented it. 

21 Geo. W. Smith, of Memphis, advised Polk "not to permit the use of his 
name for two reasons: (1) possibility of defeat and loss of prestige; (2) 
it would lend color to the Whig' charge that he had never cared for the 
governorship, and had wished it only as a stepping-stone to a higher office. 
(Smith to Polk, Sept. 2, 1841, ibid.) Polk may have been influenced by con- 
siderations of this kind. 



190 JAMES E. POLK 

As soon as the legislature had convened, Polk, on October 7, 
submitted his final message as governor.-- It was a long docu- 
ment and filled with detailed information on various topics, but 
mainly on banks and internal improvements. For a man who 
had only a week longer to serve, Polk was surprisingly free with 
advice and suggestions for the future. He expressed satisfaction 
with the degree of prosperity which had been enjoyed by the 
people during the last two years, and he attributed it to cor- 
rective legislation and the consequent elimination of extravagant 
speculation. He regretted that banks had not been compelled 
by law to resume specie payments, and once more recommended 
the enactment of such a law. "There is," said he, "no sound 
principle of ethics or of public policy which should exempt Banks 
from the moral and legal obligations which rest upon individuals 
to pay their debts." He pointed out that the bank note circu- 
lation amounted to about three million dollars and that the aver- 
age rate of depreciation was eight and one-half per cent ; this 
unnecessary burden was borne by the people, while the banks 
were prosperous— even paying dividends. He reported that the 
law recently enacted which provided for "the reduction of the 
State debt" had enabled him to recall and to cancel fifteen hun- 
dred state bonds of one thousand dollars each. The outstanding 
internal improvement bonds amounted to $1,816,916.66%, while, 
so far, only one company had paid a dividend to the state — the 
small sum of $1620. The currency, he said, had been much im- 
proved by the law which prohibited the emission of notes under 
ten dollars ; as a further remedy for financial ills, he recom- 
mended that commercial houses and improvement companies 
should be prevented by law from issuing checks designed to 
circulate as money. The internal improvement board had, in his 
opinion, accomplished much good by requiring various companies 
to reduce their stock and to conduct their affairs in a more 
economical manner. Among other things the retiring Governor 



22 Tcnn.. Sen.. Jour., 1841-42, 22-42. 



DEFEATED BY JONES IN 1841 191 

recommended that improvements be made in hospitals for the 
insane, that sexes be segregated in penitentiaries, and that the 
governor be given power to commute the death penalty to life 
imprisonment.-^ His recommendations were salutary and sensi- 
ble. Some of his suggestions indicated grave need for improve- 
ment in social conditions. 

One paragraph in the Governor's message is especially inter- 
esting, for in it Polk expressed his views on the slavery question, 
a subject which he usually avoided. He informed the legislature 
that he had, during the past year, received two communications 
from friends of negroes convened in London, on June 12 to 20, 
1840, in which they had asked for the abolition of slavery and 
the slave trade. Viewing these communications ' ' as an imperti- 
nent and mischievous attempt on the part of foreigners to inter- 
fere with one of the domestic institutions of the State," he had 
declined to enter into any correspondence with this convention. 
Doubtless he was governed more by his belief in state rights than 
by an interest in the institution of slavery itself ; still, he was 
ready to resent outside interference with the "peculiar insti- 
tution. ' ' 

On October 14 Polk delivered his valedictory, and on the 
same day James C. Jones was inaugurated as his successor.-* 
While it is true that Polk's interests were national rather than 
local, yet the state was indebted to him for causing the enact- 
ment of beneficial laws. Under his leadership the state had been 
freed from a ruinous internal improvement policy, and he had 
done much to check currency inflation and to reduce the debt of 
the state. His reform measures were all in the line of sound 
statesmanship, and, if we may judge from the suggestions made 
in his final message, the people might have profited by continuing 
him in office. 



23 He eould now pardon only. 

24 Tenn. Sen. Joxir., 1841-42, 78. 



CHAPTER XI 

POLK IN RETIREMENT 

On October 14, 1841, James C. Jones became governor of 
Tennessee, and on the nineteenth his first message was sent to 
the legislature.^ His recommendations differed little from those 
which had already been submitted by his predecessor,- and, also 
like Polk, he attributed most of the distress of the people to their 
own fault — to buying more than they could reasonably hope to 
pay for. In one respect only did Jones differ radically from the 
former governor. The crisis in the monetary affairs of the coun- 
try, he said, had been produced by the destruction of the Bank 
of the United States. Such a statement was naturally to be ex- 
pected, for some part of a "Whig governor 's message must needs 
indicate the change of administration, and the bank was a sub- 
ject of general interest. 

As usual the legislature was far more interested in ' ' practical 
politics" than in the less sportive business of lawmaking. The 
paramount question was the election of United States Senators, 
hut first of all, the opinions of both legislators and constituents 
must be molded so as to accord with those of the leaders. The 
Democrats were most active in the senate, for in this branch they 
had, counting Samuel Turney, a majority of one. The leaders 
in the senate were Samuel H. Laughlin, former editor of the 
ZJnimi, and Andrew Johnson, who, at the recent election, had 
been promoted to the upper house. Johnson had ability and 
force, but Laughlin excelled him in political cunning and effec- 
tiveness as a manipulator. In the Polk-Bell contest, Johnson 



1 Tenn. Sen. Jour., 1841-12, 116-125. 

2 Jones Avas accused of having borrowed from Polk's inaugural of 1839, 
and to prove the claim the Union published the two addresses in parallel 
columns (Laughlin, Diary, Oct. 21, 1843). 



POLK IN EETIEEMENT 193 

had supported the latter. Laiighlin had ever been subservient 
and therefore enjoyed the entire confidence of Polk and other 
prominent Democrats. 

On October 18, Laughlin, as chairman of the committee on 
federal relations, submitted a series of eight resolutions to which 
four more were added on the fifth of November.^ The preamble 
recited the Virginia and Kentucky Kesolutions of 1798 and de- 
clared that many of the laws enacted by Congress at the late 
extra session violated the spirit of the Constitution quite as much 
as did the laws against which those historic resolutions had pro- 
tested. The first resolution reaffirmed those of 1798 and asserted 
that they were "universally true at all times and especially 
applicable to the present crisis and state of affairs." The suc- 
ceeding seven resolutions condemned the convening of Congress 
by Harrison and, also, the various measures* proposed or enacted 
by the Whigs at that session. This indictment of the Whigs 
was intended to prepare public opinion for the items which were 
to follow — the four resolutions that were added on the fifth of 
November. The first of these, the ninth of the entire list, de- 
clared that the legislature had full power to instruct Senators 
chosen to represent the state in Congress, and that it was the 
duty of these officials to obey or resign. The second asserted 
that it was the duty of candidates for legislative offices to give 
explicit answers to queries made by citizens or members of the 
legislature concerning their views on public questions. The third 
affirmed the right of the people to instruct members of the legis- 
lature. The fourth formally instructed the Senators (not yet 
chosen) and requested the Representatives from Tennessee to 
conform their votes to the opinions expressed by the foregoing 
resolutions. 

The last four resolutions displayed far more shrewdness than 
principle. On their face they contained nothing which any 

3 The resolutions may be found in Tenn. Sen. Jour, under the dates given. 

4 For example, the "bankrupt biU' and the tariff, distribution, and 
bank bills. 



194 JAMES K. POLK 

advocate of representative government could very well decline to 
support. But they were designed, as every one knew, for the 
purpose of harassing the Whig candidates with embarrassing 
interrogations and for rendering them ineligible should they de- 
cline to answer. By asserting the right of the people to instruct 
their representatives in the legislature, the Democrats hoped 
to hold in line their own members who might be inclined to 
follow their individual judgments. Their party had nothing to 
lose by obstructive tactics, and, by blocking their opponents at 
every turn, they might worry the Whigs into conceding one seat 
in the Senate. 

Ephraim H. Foster and Spencer Jarnagin were selected as 
the Whig candidates and on November 16 the lower house sent 
to the senate a resolution urging the immediate election of two 
United States Senators lest delay ' ' may lead to bargain, intrigue, 
and management, to the detriment of the public interest." As 
soon as the resolution was read in the senate, Andrew Johnson 
moved to amend by making it read that delay "may lead to 
bargain, intrigue, and management, to the great detriment of 
E. H. Foster and Spencer Jarnagin, and thereby promote and 
advance the public interest, by keeping them out of power for 
the next four and six years. "^ The Democratic majority in the 
senate soon came to be called "the immortal thirteen" and ex- 
cept for an occasional desertion by Samuel Turney they voted 
as a body on all questions of party politics. 

The customary method of electing Senators in Tennessee was 
by a joint "convention" of the two houses. As the Whigs had 
a majority of three in the lower house and the Democrats a 
majority of but one in the senate, it was obvious that if the usual 
method were to be followed the Whigs would outnumber their 
rivals in the convention. The Democrats now made the discovery 
that the usual method was unconstitutional, for, as they alleged, 
the constitution of the state required that each house should vote 



5 Protests against the amendment were made, but it passed the senate 
by a vote of 13 to 12 {Tenn. Sen. Jour., 1841-42, 227, 232-233). 



POLK IN BETIBEMENT 195 

separately for Senators. For their own purposes it was an im- 
portant discovery ; by no other method, could they hope to prevent 
an election until the Whigs were ready to compromise on choosing 
one Senator from each party. 

Up to November 22 the Democrats were confident of their 
ability to prevent an election unless the Whigs would yield to 
their terms. A few days before, Turney had introduced a reso- 
lution calling for an election by convention, but he had subse- 
quently voted with the Democrats on the above-mentioned John- 
son resolution. On the twenty-second, however, Turney caused 
consternation in Democratic ranks by announcing that he would 
call up and support his resolution in favor of a convention 
election.*' According to William H. Polk, Turney had, for the 
last two weeks, "been shivering in the wind," due to the fact 
that the Whigs had "brought every influence to bear on him 
within the range of human ingenuity."^ On November 22 
Gardner moved to amend Turney 's resolution by fixing the fol- 
lowing Saturday as the date on which the Senate w^ould vote 
separately for federal Senators. Turney accepted the amend- 
ment, but it was the younger Polk's opinion that, after one trial, 
Turney would revert to the convention plan. The Democrats 
offered another compromise resolution the purport of which was 
to declare elected Hopkins L. Turney and Thomas Brown, a 
Whig from East Tennessee. It was hoped that, having passed 
the senate, this resolution could be forced through the lower 
house. ^ On the tv/enty-third Gardner modified his amendment. 



6"0u Saturday last the '13' were safe against the world, and the 
Whigs considered themselves as beaten. Guess then, what our astonish- 
ment was, when coming into the Senate on Monday morning [November 22], 
Sam Turney announced that he had changed his mind, and would call up 
and vote for his own resolutions to bring on the Senatorial election at an 
early day on joint vote in Convention. ' ' Turney said that his change of 
mind was due to letters from his constituents (Laughlin to Polk, November 
24, 1841, Polk Papers). 

7 W. H. Polk to J. K. Polk, November, 22, 1841, ibid, 

8 ' ' My own impression is, that if the resolution passed the Senate, as 
now amended, declaring Turney and Brown the Senators elect — Ave can 
force it through the House, by lashing the doubtful men into a redemption 
of their former pledges .... can at least produce a tie" {Idem). 



196 JAMES E. POLE 

The legislature was now asked to choose one Senator from each 
party on the ground that the popular vote at the recent election 
had been nearly equally divided. Other modifications were sug- 
gested, but these, as well as Gardner's resolution, were rejected. 
The Democratic majority in the senate succeeded in passing a 
resolution which named Hopkins L. Turney as Grundy's suc- 
cessor, but, on December 1, the lower house refused to concur in 
its adoption. On the same day Speaker Samuel Turney joined 
the Whigs of the senate in making an agreement with the lower 
house to meet in joint convention on the second and third of 
December for the purpose of electing Senators. It was under- 
stood that each of those days would be devoted to filling one of 
the vacancies. 

On December 2, therefore. Speaker Turney and the twelve 
Whigs proceeded, according to agreement, to the chamber of the 
lower house to join with that body in choosing one of the Sen- 
ators. The other twelve Democratic senators declined to attend 
the election. When summoned by the doorkeeper, they sent 
written notice to their speaker (Turney) that they were in the 
senate chamber, ready for "constitutional business."" The joint 
convention, for want of a quorum, was forced to adjourn. On 
the morning of the third the lower house again notified the 
senate that it was ready to receive the senators and to proceed 
to the election of one of the federal Senators. It had already 
been arranged to hold the other election in the afternoon and for 
this reason Speaker Turney deemed it to be unnecessary to join 
the house in convention twice in one day, inasmuch as both elec- 
tions could be held during the same half-day. He therefore 
voted with the Democrats in declining to attend the forenoon 
session of the convention. This vote so angered the Whig sen- 
ators that they left the senate chamber in a body. By so doing 
they gave a distinct advantage to the Democrats, who now ad- 
journed to the following day, thereby nullifying the original 



sTenn. Sen. Jour., 1841-42, 280. 



FOLK IN EETIEEMENT 197 

resolution which had designated December 2 and 3 as the days 
on which elections by convention should be held. 

By seceding from the senate the Whigs had committed the 
tactical blunder of releasing Turney from his agreement. He 
now blamed them for the failure to elect Senators, and once more 
became one of the "immortal thirteen."^" Five of the twelve 
Democratic senators submitted a written statement of reasons 
why they had refused to participate in the proposed election. 
The proposed method of election, they asserted, would violate the 
Constitution of the United States, which vests the election of 
Senators in the legislature of the state — not in a convention. It 
would violate, also, the state constitution, which says that Sen- 
ators shall be chosen by the concurrent vote of the two houses 
'^ sitting separately'' — not together. Both statements were un- 
true, and besides, the convention method had been thoroughly 
established by custom, and up to this time its validity had never 
been questioned. This new-born solicitude for constitutional 
limitations was simply a clever bit of pettifogging. 

Before any attempt to elect Senators had been made, two 
interesting resolutions for dividing the state were offered in the 
senate. The first was introduced by Andrew Johnson, on De- 
cember 7, and provided that a joint committee of the two houses 
should be appointed to consider the expediency and the consti- 
tutionality of ceding East Tennessee to the United States so that 
it might be made an independent commonwealth and called the 
' ' State of Frankland. ' ' The resolution directed Governor Jones 
to correspond with the governors of Georgia, North Carolina, 
and Virginia with a view to procuring portions of those states 
for inclusion within the limits of "Frankland." On December 
15, Gardner offered a similar resolution which provided for the 



10 Tumey 's explanation, ibid., 304-305. On December 13, J. Geo. Harris 
informed Polk by letter that there was no prospect of an election. ' ' Thank 
God and the immortal thirteen Ephraim's [Foster] fiddle is broke. No 
more Avill its dulcet strains minister to the desponding faculties of faction ' ' 
(Polk Papers). 



198 JAMES E. POLE 

creation of the state of '' Jacksoniana." It was to include the 
"Western District" of Tennessee and portions of Kentucky and 
Mississippi.'^ The senate rejected Gardner's proposal by a vote 
of eleven to fourteen. Johnson's resolution passed the senate 
by a vote of seventeen to six (January 18), but after consider- 
able discussion and many futile attempts to amend, this too was 
finally rejected by the lower house. 

In accordance with the Laughlin resolutions,^- Democratic 
members of the legislature had addressed queries to all senatorial 
candidates concerning their views on public questions. Foster 
and Jarnagin treated these queries with silent contempt. Hop- 
kins L. Turney, the Democratic aspirant, gave satisfactory an- 
swers as a matter of course, and so, also, did Thomas Brown, a 
Whig of Roane County, East Tennessee. On December 20, 
Laughlin offered in the senate a resolution which differed little 
from the one previously submitted by Gardner. Whereas, in 
choosing Senators, the popular will should be consulted, so read 
the preamble, and, as the recent election had shown the people 
to be about equally divided in politics, and as neither party was 
able to choose Senators without the cooperation of the other, it 
was therefore resolved that Turney and Brown, having responded 
to all interrogatories, be declared the Senators to represent the 
state in the Senate of the United States. Turney was to fill the 
unexpired term of Grundy, and Brown Avas to have the full term 
of six years.^^ The resolution passed the senate but failed in 
the other house, and that body once more invited the senate to 
join them in an election by convention. The Whigs of both 
houses refused to cooperate with the Democrats in electing a 



11 Tenn. Sen. Jour., 1841-42, 288, 345. 

12 Those Avhich he had introduced on Nov. 5, relating to the interrogation 
of candidates for office. See above. 

13 TfHtt. Sen. Jour., 1841-42, 366-67. "Some of our friends here are 
of opinion— that after all our Senators should be elected — if the Whigs 
can be brought 'to elect one and one' " (A- V. Brown to Polk, Washing- 
ton, Dee. 23, 1841, Polk Papers). This seems to indicate that the Demo- 
crats had counted more on preventing an election than on effecting a 
compromise. 



POLK IN RETIREMENT I99 

comptroller and a treasurer unless the Democrats would agree 
to choose Senators by a joint vote. Of this refusal the Democrats 
tried to make political capital ;^^ by exploiting it they endeavored 
to divert the attention of the people away from their own ob- 
structive tactics. 

Polk kept in close touch with the contest that was being 
waged at Nashville and from time to time gave directions to his 
political friends. He was one of the first to doubt the loyalty of 
his old friend A. 0. P. Nicholson, and to suspect him of courting 
an alliance with Foster for the purpose of procuring their elec- 
tion to the Senate. ^=5 He was most severe in his denunciation of 
Nicholson and predicted that he would follow in the footsteps 
of John Bell.^*' Hearing that some of Bell's friends had made 
overtures offering to settle the senatorial deadlock by choosing 
Bell and some Democrat, Polk stated to Senator Maclin^' that it 
M^ould never do "to elect Bell by Democratic votes. It would 
not only be placing him in a position to do mischief but it would 
be rewarding his apostacy." He had heard also, he said, that 
similar overtures had been made by Foster's friends. "To no 
man in the State, ' ' he continued, ' ' would it be more grating than 
to myself to be driven to the necessity of making a compromise 
by which he might obtain a seat in the Senate, and yet it is not 

i*"Our whole object is," wrote Wm. H. Polk, who was a member of 
the lower house, ' ' to place them [the Whigs] in the position of refusing to 
elect State ofiicers, necessary and essential to the proper administration of 
our State Government, because we prevent them from placing in the Senate 
men who stand Mum" (W. H. Polk to J. K. Polk, Jan. 6, 1842, Folic 
Papers). 

15 In answer to one of Polk's letters, J. P. Hardwick ■v\Tote from Nash- 
ville that "I have no doubt a great effort is being made to carry out an 
unholy alliance between F. & N. " (Hardwick to Polk, Jan. 16, 1842, ihid.) 

16 "Every day convinces me more and more that he [N] is now travelling 
in the broad road — that John Bell travelled for several years before his 
apostacy — whilst lie was making loud professions of his adhesion to our 
principles. We all know where John Bell now is, and mark what I now 
say to you, that five years, perhaps not one will pass — before he is where 
Bell now is, unless it shall be his personal interest shall make him seem 
othermse. I am not viistaken" (Polk to State Senator Sackfield Maelin, 
Jan. 17, 1842, Andrew Johnson Papers, vol. 1). 

1- Ibid. 



200 JAMES K. POLK 

impossible that our safety as a party in the State might require 
such a sacrifice. "^^ Should an agreement with Foster be made, 
Polk believed that the Democrat ought to be chosen from East 
Tennessee; but if any western Democrat was to be selected, it 
should be Hopkins L. Turney. He preferred a Whig Senator 
to Nicholson, because he had ' ' more respect for an open opponent 
than a hypocritical friend. "^^ Some of the "immortal thir- 
teen, ' ' however, were unwilling to accept any compromise which 
did not eliminate both Foster and Bell. 

On February 7, the last day of the session, Laughlin, prob- 
ably acting under instructions from Polk, offered a new reso- 
lution "in the spirit of harmony, concession and compromise." 
This resolution authorized the Whig members of the legislature 
to choose a Senator from any of the three divisions of the state 
(east, middle or west), and provided that the Democrats should 
then select a Senator from one of the other divisions. The reso- 
lution passed the senate by a strict party vote, but not until an 
amendment had been added which required that both Senators 
must be ' ' selected from men who have not been in public life for 
the last four years." Such a limitation had not been contem- 
plated by either Laughlin or Polk, but some of the thirteen 
would accept nothing less. The lower house would not, of course, 
agree to the resolution ; all hope of compromise was at an end ; 
and the legislature adjourned without having filled either va- 
cancy. On the same day the thirteen had the satisfaction of 

IS ''It would be a hitter inll," said Polk, "to take Mr. F. even upon a 
compromise, and yet if nothing else can be done I have been brought very 
seriously to doubt, whether we had not better take him with some good and 
true Democrat than to have the State unrepresented in the Senate and thus 
raise up a perplexing troublesome issue of Senators or no Senators in the 
State, which may and probably will be the test question in our elections in 
1843. Before you can compromise at all with him or any other Whig — 
they must yield to yov-r mode of elections and agree to obey instructions. 
If they mil do this and agree to give us a Democratic Senator Avith him — 
my conviction is, that it is the course of safety to yield to it. ' ' 

19 Polk to James Walker, Jan. 17, 1842, Folic Papers. Whether well 
founded or not, the belief in Nicholson's disloyalty was quite general. 
H. L. Tumey wrote from Washington to Polk, April 25, 1842: "I think 
A. O. P. N. has put his foot in it. Can it be possible that he can longer 
deceive the democray of Tennessee?" 



FOLK IN EETIEEMENT 201 

rejecting for a second time a list of persons whom Governor 
Jones had nominated to be directors of the Bank of Tennessee, 
and as a result, the Democratic incumbents retained their posi- 
tions. 

In their game of obstruction the Democrats had won a de- 
cided victory — much greater than they had any reasonable hope 
to expect. Had any of the "immortal thirteen" failed them, 
everything would have been lost, and more than once Samuel 
Turney had threatened to desert to the enemy. By bad manage- 
ment, the Whigs had failed to take advantage of his willingness 
to cooperate with them, while the Democrats spared no effort to 
hold him in line. The tactics employed by the senate to attain 
its ends were as unscrupulous as they were successful. The aid 
given by Polk and Jackson was something of which neither man 
had reason to be proud, but politicians are seldom overscrupulous 
when party interests are at stake. 

Just as the Democrats were rejoicing over their success in 
thw^arting the Whigs, their own party suffered a real loss in the 
retirement of J. George Harris from the editorship of the 
Union.-'^ He had taken charge of the paper when it was bank- 
rupt and impotent, and under his management it had become 
one of the most influential papers in the state. His style was 
not always elegant nor his assertions true, but he was peculiarly 
fitted to perform the task to which he had been assigned. After 
his retirement the Union rapidly deteriorated, until Polk and 
his associates had to take its rehabilitation in hand during the 
campaign of 1843. 

After the adjournment of the legislature, the thoughts of 
politicians turned to plans for the future. Although it was an 
open secret that Polk would, in 1843, again be the candidate for 
governor, both he and his friends were ever on the alert to pro- 
mote his prospects for the Vice-Presidential nomination in 1844. 



20 In the issue of March 31 Harris announced that he was going to 
Europe for a few mouths and that the owners, Hogau and Heiss, would 
conduct the paper themselves. 



i 



202 JAMES E. POLK 

The more apparent it became that Van Buren would again head 
the Democratic ticket, the more necessary it seemed to be to find 
a running mate that would be acceptable to the South and "West. 
Maclin, of the Tennessee senate, voiced the general sentiment 
when he told Polk that "Our friends intend to fight the battle 
with YOU, and keep Van Buren as much out of sight as possible." 
In these two sections of the Union, influential leaders fully ap- 
preciated Polk 's great services to the party and looked with favor 
upon his nomination for the Vice-Presidency, but, as Maclin 
frankly told him, it had been urged that he was not well known 
to the people in other parts of the country."^ 

Politicians of both parties attached much importance to Van 
Buren 's visit to the Hermitage in the spring of 1842. Knowing 
Jackson's warm friendship for Polk, the Whigs expected and 
many Tennesseans hoped that the visit would result in a formal 
agreement between Van Buren and Polk. But, despite the ef- 
forts of Polk's friends in his behalf, the New Yorker remained 
noncommittal to the point of exasperation-- and left Tennessee 
without having mentioned to Polk the subject of the Vice-Presi- 
dency.-^ 

Although Van Buren declined to take any part in promoting 
Polk's candidacy or even to discuss it, and even though his in- 
different attitude during his visit had still further alienated the 
supporters of Polk, yet both the Whigs and the Calhounites were 



21 Maelin to Polk, May 4, 1842, PoJk Papers. Maclin had just returned 
from Mississippi, where he had been sounding Polk's praises and urging 
the people to call a convention for the purpose of nominating Van Buren 
and Polk. 

22 ' < I am at a loss to know what to say to you, I can learn nothing. . . . 
Mr. Van Buren seems disposed to say nothing on the subject Ave spoke of 
when I last saw you. I made an effort tlirough Donelsou again this evening 
but it was all Mum. ... It may be that he Avill say to you what he will 
not say to another person. The old Genl will tell him before leaving tli-e 
Eenni'iage, to have a conversation with you" (Gen. R. Armstrong to Polk, 
May 4, 1842, Polk Papers). 

23 Polk himself said in a letter that during Van Buren 's A-isit neither 
had "mentioned verbally or in writing" the subject which the Whigs say 
brought him to Tennessee (Polk to Elmore, of South Carolina, June 13, 
1842, Polh Papers). 



POLK IN BETIBEMENT ' 203 

certain that an agreement between the two candidates had been 
effected and that one of its objects was to crush Calhoun.-* Van 
Buren was not popular in Tennessee, and many Democrats felt 
that Polk's election would be more certain if some other than 
the New Yorker could be nominated for President.^^ Cass was 
most frequently mentioned by those who held this belief. Others 
were inclined to await developments. Benton, like Van Buren, 
had declined to commit himself in Polk's favor, but his denunci- 
ation of Richard M. Johnson was regarded by Tennesseans in 
Washington as a hopeful sign.-** Realizing the general indiffer- 
ence toward Van Buren in southern states, friends of Calhoun 
began to entertain hopes that he would be nominated for the 
Presidency in 1844;-' but, believing, as they did, that Polk was 
in agreement with Van Buren, they did not, it appears, seek 
assistance from his friends. Then, too, the adherents of the great 
nullitier could hardly hope for the cooperation of a man who was 
thought to be under the dominating influence of General Jackson. 
When the Tennessee legislature convened in the autumn of 
1842, another futile attempt was made to fill the vacant seats in 
the federal Senate. J. George Harris, who had returned to Nash- 
ville, reported to Polk that Bell's supporters had offered to make 
an agreement whereby Bell was to answer the queries which had 



24 "It is thought," Avrote Dixon H. Lewis, "Van has effected his pur- 
pose with Polk," while according to Gentry, of Tennessee, no one doubted 
that Van Buren and Polk would be the Democratic candidates (Lewis to 
Richard Cralle, May 31, and June 10, 1842, CraUe Papers). 

25 " I assure you, sir, ' ' A\Tote J. P. Hardwicke, ' ' there is a disinclination 
to take up Van Buren again. I have taken some pains to arrive at this 
conclusion at our little caucuses" (Hardwicke to Polk, Nov. 13, 1842, 
Polk Papers). 

26 Cave Johnson to Polk, Jan. 29; H. L. Turney to Polk, Jan. 31, 1843, 
PoTk Papers. 

2v One of the hopeful was Duff Green. He thought that, if the Van 
Burenites' plan of an early nominating convention could be thwarted, Cal- 
houn would be nominated. "It has now narrowed down," he wrote, "to a 
choice between Calhoun and Van Buren and the demonstrations are 
becoming more decided for Mr. Calhoun so that, in my opinion, the con- 
centration in his favor will become so apparent as public opinion develops 
that the convention will indeed become obsolete" (Green to CraUe, February 
8, 1843, Letters of Duff Green- in Library of Congi-ess). 



A 



204 JAMES K. POLK 

been ignored by Foster and Jarnagin. Having done this, he was 
to be elected as one of the Senators, and the Democrats were to 
fill the other vacancy with a candidate of their own choice. 
Harris was in favor of such an agreement if Polk would consent 
to be the Democratic Senator ; Foster would be killed, politically, 
while Bell if properly instructed would be less powerful than at 
present.-^ Nothing, of course, resulted from the suggestion. 
Polk had already declined to make any compromise with Bell, 
and besides, the overtures of Bell's friends were probably made 
without his knowledge. During this session the Democrats made 
little attempt to force a compromise, but simply contented them- 
selves wuth blocking the Whigs from electing their candidates. 
Their greatest fear seems to have been that Nicholson, by some 
treacherous agreement with the Whigs, would attempt to pro- 
mote his own selfish interests.-^ 

Feeling that both his own and his party's interests could be 
best served by defeating Governor Jones, Polk once more entered 
the race. The campaign was opened by a joint debate at Spring- 
field, March 25, 1843. Jones scathingly denounced the conduct 
of the "immortal thirteen." Polk retorted by charging that 
Jones had originated the idea which they had put into practice. 
The TJmon^° published letters from Whigs who claimed to have 
heard Jones boast that, in case the Democrats should have a bare 
majority on joint ballot, the Whigs would prevent a choice of 
Senators by refusing to participate in the election. Throughout 
the campaign the Union defended the thirteen for preventing 
the election of men who refused to be bound by the wishes of 
their constituents. The refusal of the state senate to confirm 
Jones's list of bank directors was purely for political reasons. 
The truth Avas reprehensible enough, but on the stump Jones 



28 Harris to Polk, Dec. 11, 1842, Folh Papers. 

29 W. H. Polk to J. K. Polk, February 14, 1843, Polk Papers. Andrew 
Johnson, fearino^ that his knoA\ni friendship for Nicholson might be mis- 
interpreted, wrote to Polk that * ' yon have always been my first choice for 
anything" (Johnson to Polk, February 20, 1843, ibid.) 

30 Mareli 31, 1843. 



TOLK IN BETIBEMENT 205 

won applause by asserting that the Polk directors were corrupt 
and time-serving partisans who, for fear of exposure, did not 
dare to relinquish their offices. 

In many respects the campaign was a repetition of that of 
1841. There was, perhaps, more argument and less burlesque, 
although both candidates made use of anecdotes and sarcastic 
retorts. Polk was not unmindful of his own powers of wit. 
When writing to his wife of a debate held at Jackson with Milton 
Brown, he said that his opponent tried to turn the "occasion 
into a frolic . . . but I turned the laugh upon him & almost 
laughed him out of the Court House. "^^ 

In his "Letter to the People"^- Polk, as usual, emphasized 
national issues such as the tariff, the national bank, and the 
general extravagance of the Whigs. Once more Tennessee was 
regarded as the pivotal state — the index to the approaching Pres- 
idential campaign. As it was practically certain that Clay would 
be the Whig candidate, much of Polk's time on the stump was 
devoted to Clay and his policies. Incensed by a revival of the 
old "bargain and corruption" charge of 1825, Clay challenged 
Polk to a discussion of this question at a time and place to be 
fixed by the Tennessean himself .^^ Apparently the challenge was 
not accepted. 

Early in the campaign a group of persons in Memphis sub- 
mitted to the two candidates a list of questions on political topics. 
Jones replied at once, and among other things expressed the 
following views. He favored a national bank, but was not fully 
satisfied with Clay's bill that had been vetoed by Tyler. He 
believed in a tariff for revenue, with incidental protection to 
home industries. In his opinion the legislature had full power 
to choose Senators in any manner which it saw fit. The last 



31 Polk to Mrs. Polk, April 4, 1843, PoUc Papers. 

32 It bore the date of May 17, 1843, and was printed in the Union, May 
23 and 26. 

33 TypeAvi-itten copy of a letter from Clay to Polk dated Ashland, May 
20, 1843, Pom Papers. 



206 JAMES K. POLE 

answer did not harmonize very well with his condemnation of 
the Democratic senate for insisting that each house should vote 
separately.^* 

In answer to the same queries Polk stated that he believed 
in the sub-treasury, and in metal money for the nation supple- 
mented by a limited amount of paper issued by state banks. 
He opposed direct taxes and endorsed tariff for revenue only. 
Like Jones, he thought that the legislature possessed the right 
to elect Senators in any manner agreeable to itself. He held, 
on the other hand, that all candidates for office were under obli- 
gation, when called upon, to express their views before election 
on all public questions. "The chief, if not the only value of the 
right of suffrage, ' ' said he, 

consists in the fact, that it may be exercised understandingly by the 
constituent body. It is so, whether the immediate constituency consists 
of the Legislature, as in the case of the election of United States Senators, 
or of the people in their primary capacity, in the election of their Execu- 
tive or Legislative agents. In either case the constituent has a right to 
know the opinions of the candidate before he casts his vote. 33 

Except on the bank question the views expressed by the two 
men were very much alike. Indeed, the paramount issue was: 
Shall Tennessee be returned to the Democratic column in national 
politics ? 

Throughout the campaign the Democrats were handicapped 
by the weakness of their party press. Since Harris 's resignation 
the Union lacked both spirit and influence, and was rapidly drift- 
ing into bankruptcy. On the other hand, the Whigs had several 
vigorous papers, the most invincible of which was Brownlow's 
Jonesborough Whig. Polk was condemned for the part he had 
taken in the administrations of Jackson and Van Buren, and 
again it was said that he sought the governorship merely as 
a stepping-stone to the Vice-Presidency. Polk's "Tory" 



34 Jones's reply is dated April 24, 3843, and is printed in the Memphis 
American Eagle, May 2, a copy of which is among the PoR- Papers. 

35 The answer is dated May 15, and is printed in the Union, June 2, 1843. 



FOLK IN RETIREMENT 207 

grandfather was again held up to scorn, while a Chattanooga 
paper charged the Democratic candidate with being an aristocrat 
who had ' ' refused to eat with some wagoners who were stopping 
at the same tavern with him some years ago."^^ 

Although Polk made a thorough canvass and demonstrated 
his superiority over his rival, Jones was reelected by a majority 
of nearly four thousand votes. This time the Whigs elected a 
majority of the legislature as well as the governor, and the power 
of the "immortal thirteen" had been broken. Polk attributed 
the victory of the Whigs to their success in drawing the attention 
of the people to local questions and away from great national 
issues. He was still confident that his party would carry the 
state in the federal election of 1844.^^ 

Soon after the election the defeated candidate's friends once 
more turned their attention to procuring for him the Vice-Presi- 
dential nomination. They were interested of course in his per- 
sonal advancement, and besides, they had hopes that, with their 
favorite on the ticket, Tennessee might be restored to the Demo- 
cratic party. On September 5 the Union, in a series of edi- 
torials, urged his nomination and declared him to be "one of 
the ablest men in the democratic party in the Southwest." In 
a letter to Van Buren, General Jackson expressed the belief that 
the former President would be nominated — and elected, also, if 
Polk were put on the ticket with him. Such a ticket, he said, 
would surely carry Tennessee ; Polk would add strength to the 
party in all of the states, while Colonel Johnson would 
weaken it.^^ 

The new legislature met on October 2, 1843. In the senate 
the Whigs had fourteen members, the Democrats, eleven ; in the 
lower house the Whigs numbered forty, the Democrats, thirty- 
five. The two main political questions which confronted the 



36 Both articles and a denial are in the Union, June 27, 1843. 

37 Polk to Van Buren, August 8, 1843, Van Buren Papers. 

38 Jackson to Van Buren, September 22, 1843, ibid. 



208 JAMES K. POLK 

legislature were fixing a permanent location for the state capital, 
and the election of federal Senators. Although now in the 
minority, the Democrats planned to prevent the election of Foster 
and Jarnagin by supporting two other Whigs, A. R. Alexander, 
of "West Tennessee, and Joseph L. "Williams, of East Tennessee. 
Some of the Whigs, especially the Rutherford delegation, were 
eager to have the capital removed from Nashville to some more 
central location. The Democrats therefore concocted a scheme 
by which they hoped to procure a sufficient number of Whig votes 
to elect Alexander and Williams by offering to vote for the re- 
moval of the capital. Polk was then in Nashville and gave his 
support to the plan.^" Their plotting was in vain. On October 
7 both houses voted to retain the capital at Nashville, and on 
the seventeenth Foster and Jarnagin were elected Senators, the 
former to fill Grundy's unexpired term, the latter to succeed 
Anderson. *" 

Repeated defeats annoyed but did not discourage Democratic 
leaders. Harmony within their own ranks was the first desider- 
atum, and Laughlin undertook the task of bringing Nicholson 
and his adherents back into the fold.*^ The task did not seem 
hopeless, for since the seats in the Senate had been filled by the 
Whigs there was no reason why Nicholson should not cooperate 
with his former associates. The "little magician" was the chief 
cause of embarrassment. Democrats, generally, were ready to 
support Polk, but from all parts of the state came reports of 
indifference or hostility to Van Buren. 

Laughlin 's "missionary" work was not confined to the Nich- 
olson faction. As soon as tlie question of locating the capital 
had been settled, it was a foregone conclusion that Foster and 
Jarnagin would be elected. Freed from the responsibility of 



39 S. H. Laughlin, "Diary," October 1-4, 1843. 

io Ibid., Oct. 17. "Jonalin has gone home a Senator — and Ephe is 
running about, grinning and jumping like a pleased monkey — with just 
about the dignity of one, at best" (Laughlin to Polk, Oct. 20, 184.3, 
Polk Papers). 

•11 Laughlin to Polk, Oct. 12, 1843, Polk Papers. 



POLK IN EETIEEMENT 209 

manipulating the scheme to defeat this election, Laughlin could 
devote his entire energy to procuring for Polk the nomination 
for Vice-President. In letters to influential leaders and news- 
paper men, he almost demanded that Polk should be taken up by 
"the press and the People." He proposed that the former Gov- 
ernor should be nominated by the state convention which was 
to meet in November, and that the Tennessee delegation should 
go to the national convention "supporting his claims, and un- 
committed as to Presidential candidate, but committed to abide 
its nomination." He told his correspondents that if Polk were 
put on the ticket with Van Buren or any other good Democrat 
the party would surely win, "but without Polk's name we would 
be beaten and tied down in federal chains in Tennessee for the 
next six or ten years. ' '*- His remark concerning the national 
convention seems to be the first indication of the plan, later 
adopted, to nominate Polk, and to remain noncommittal as to the 
Presidential candidate. The determination to make no nomi- 
nation for President was strengthened, no doubt, by a letter 
written from New York by Harvey M. Watterson to A. 0. P. 
Nicholson. Van Buren M^as Watterson 's own choice, but, fearing 
that his favorite could not be elected, he did not believe it wise 
to nominate him. Cass, in his opinion, was the most availahle 
candidate. He said that "the Van Buren party intend to give 
Polk the go hy as to a nomination for the Vice Presidency," and 
that Johnson would be nominated by the national convention.*^ 
On October 18, two days after the receipt of Watterson 's letter, 
Laughlin conversed with A. V. Brown. Brown advised serving 
notice on the New Yorkers that the Tennesseans would support 
Van Buren if his adherents would agree to support Polk ; other- 
wise they would go for Cass. To this Laughlin and Armstrong 
assented, and Donelson was selected to state their views to Silas 
Wright and other friends of Van Buren.** Probably this threat 



42 S. H. Laughlin, "Diary," Oct. 9, 1843. 
*3 Ibid., October 16, 1843. 
44 Ibid., October 18, 1843. 



210 JAMES K. POLK 

was not carried into effect. At any rate Polk later disclaimed 
any knowledge of a project to drop Van Buren for Cass.^^^' In 
January, 1844, he asked Heiss to place Van Buren 's name along 
with his own at the head of the political columns of the Union,*'' 
but, for the time being, the editor refused to comply. 

The State convention met at Nashville on November 23, 1843. 
Polk was nominated for Vice-President by a unanimous vote, 
but no one was named for the Presidency. The convention sim- 
ply agreed to support whatever candidate the Baltimore conven- 
tion might see fit to nominate. The reason assigned for not 
nominating Van Buren, as stated to him in letters from both 
Polk and Jackson,*' was a fear that the Cass supporters might 
resist such action, and that a breach in the party would result. 

On hearing from Cave Johnson and A. V. Brown that Van 
Buren was stronger in Washington than Cass and that he would, 
in all probability, be nominated at Baltimore, Polk advised the 
editors of the Union to come out for the ex-President.*'* His 
real feeling toward Van Buren is not easy to determine, but 
from his silence rather than his words, one always gets the im- 
pression that his support of the New Yorker was based, as in 
this case, on expediency instead of admiration for the man. It 
was quite natural that this should have been so, for Van Buren 
had more than once shown indifference when Polk needed his aid. 

Realizing that the party had suffered from the want of a 
vigorous newspaper, Polk turned his attention to rehabilitating 
the Nashville Union. Since its purchase by Hogan and Heiss, 
it had been edited by the senior partner. He had never been a 
forceful writer, and of late his health had become so impaired 
that the paper was practically without an editor. With the con- 
sent of the owners, Polk asked Laughlin to take charge of the 



45 Polk to Cave Johnson, March 18, 1844, " Polk- Johnson Letters." 

46 Polk to Heiss, Jan. 21, 1844, "Heiss Papers." 

•47 Jackson to Van Buren, Nov. 29; Polk to Van Buren, Nov. 30, 1843, 
Van Buren Papers. 

48 Polk to Heiss, Dec. 21, 1843, "Heiss Papers." 



FOLK IN RETIREMENT 211 

paper and promised him financial support from the party. Fear- 
ing, however, that he might jeopardize his chances of being 
elected to Congress (from his home district), Laughlin at first 
declined to accept the position."*^ His subsequent acceptance 
and his editorial services to his party will be considered in the 
following chapter. 



«Polk to Heiss, Dec. 21, 1843, "Heiss Papers." Laughlin to Polk, 
Dec. 7; Heiss to Polk, Dec. 19, 1843, Folic Fapers. 



CHAPTER XII 

SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 

The campaign of 1844 may be said to have opened with the 
new year. From early in January announcements from pros- 
pective candidates, declarations of principles, and notices of nom- 
inations made by local bodies, began to occupy leading places 
in the columns of the party journals. There was little doubt 
that Clay would be chosen to head the Whig ticket, although, 
in response to an inquiry from friends, Webster announced his 
willingness to accept a nomination at the hands of the Whig con- 
vention. Tyler had been read out of the Whig party, and, since 
the Democrats had not shown a disposition to adopt him as their 
own, it seemed likely that he would enter the contest as an inde- 
pendent candidate. Van Buren's nomination by the Baltimore 
convention was fully expected by all parties not so much because 
any considerable portion of his party wanted him, as because 
there seemed to be no one who had a better claim. He had been 
left by General Jackson as a legacy to the party, the position he 
had occupied gave him prestige, and, as Dixon H. Lewis re- 
marked, he had the advantage of "being considered the candidate 
of the party. "^ These influences combined would insure him 
the nomination unless something should happen before the meet- 
ing of the convention to change indifference into active hostility. 
For some time, of course, there had been active hostility in certain 
quarters, but this came generally from those who were promoting 
the interests of some other still more unpopular candidate, such 
as Calhoun or Tyler, consequently there was little danger from 
that source. Unless something should occur to cast doubts on 



1 Lewis to Cralle, Juue 10, 1842, Cralle Papers. 



SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 213 

his orthodoxy or his personal fitness, Van Buren was reasonably 
certain of the nomination, but unfortunately for him, that some- 
thing did occur — the unexpected turn in the Texas question. 
Before the appearance of this firebrand, friends of other aspirants 
were exerting every effort to weaken his hold on the party and 
to strengthen that of their favorites. The most active were the 
supporters of Calhoun and Cass ; some were ready to join with 
the followers of Tyler; and a few, like W. C. Rives,- announced 
that, as Van Buren 's nomination seemed assured, they would 
vote for Henry Clay. 

Early in the year, when Van Buren 's nomination seemed to 
be a foregone conclusion, the main topic of discussion in Demo- 
cratic ranks was the choice for the second place on the ticket. 
The persons most frequently mentioned were Colonel Richard 
M. Johnson, of Kentucky, and James K. Polk, of Tennessee. As 
in Van Buren 's case, many were ready to support Colonel John- 
son simply because they did not see how the party could drop 
him gracefully.^ The Van Burenites favored Johnson, but for 
this very reason his nomination was vigorously opposed, especially 
in the South and Southwest. It was felt by many that if Van 
Buren must be accepted, the Vice-President should be a man 
more agreeable to the southern wing of the party. For some 
time the Tennessee Democrats had been urging Polk's claims to 
this office, and since his second defeat by Jones they were still 
more determined to procure for him the nomination. 

Ardently desiring this office, Polk began as early as the fall 
of 1843 to ask his friends to use their influence with politicians 
of other states. In a letter to Donelson he expressed the belief 
that Van Buren would be made the candidate for President, and 
if so, ' ' the candidate for the Vice Presidency must come from the 
West, — and from a slave-holding state." He hoped that the 



- His letter, dated January 1, is printed in Nat. Intell., Jan. 12, 1844. 

3 It was rare to see a person, wrote Cave Johnson, who did not prefer 
Polk. The main trouble was getting rid of ''Old Dick" (Johnson to Polk, 
Jan. 31, 1844, PoJk Papers). 



214 JAMES E. POLK 

press and party leaders would come out early for Van Buren and 
himself, at least before R. M. Johnson had yielded his "preten- 
sions for the Presidency" and had become his competitor for the 
second place. Even this early he expressed distrust for the 
Washington Globe. 

I do not imderstand Blair's course. ... I do not think he is inclined to 
do me justice. Why I know not, unless it be that he has strong attach- 
ments for Col. Johnson, and looks to his restoration with Mr. Van Buren. 

The attitude of Ohio and Mississippi, he said in another letter, 
would go far to settle the question, therefore Donelson and other 
Tennessee friends should send letters to prominent politicians in 
those states.^ 

Early in January, 1844, Laughlin and others procured from 
General Jackson letters to political leaders in various states. 
These letters were used in an effort to induce state conventions 
to declare their preference for Polk.^ A letter signed "Amicus" 
that appeared in the Glohe and advocated the nomination of 
William R. King, of Alabama, gave Cave Johnson and A. V. 
Brown an opportunity to sound Polk's praises and to urge his 
nomination. In an article signed "A Tennessee Democrat," 
they pointed out that King, voluntarily, and Van Buren, under 
instructions, had voted for the United States Bank, and that it 
would never do to have two candidates who had endorsed that 
discredited institution. But, they asked, who does not remember 
in Jackson's battle against the bank "the unterrified ability dis- 
played by Governor Polk on these trying occasions ? ' ' The very 
fact that Tennessee was a doubtful state was an additional reason 
for nominating Polk.*' To a friend in Tennessee Johnson wrote 
that old-line politicians such as Buchanan, Calhoun, Benton, and 
Blair were doing their utmost to ruin Polk's prospects, and other 



4 Polk to Donelson, Oct. 19, Dec. 20, 1843, " Polk-Donelson Letters." 
The Ohio politicians mentioned were Allen, Tappan, Medary, Dawson, and 
Medill. 

5 Letters of W. H. Polk and Laughlin to Polk (Polk Papers). 

Washington Globe, Jan. 15, 1844. Johnson to Polk, Jan. 13, 21, 31, 
1844, PolJc Papers. 



SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 215 

letters told Polk that these men feared him as another rival for 
the Presidency." 

In general, conservatives evinced a preference for either King 
or Colonel Johnson,^ but the more aggressive element favored 
Polk. The Mississippi state convention at its Jackson Day 
(January 8) celebration drank toasts to Polk and nominated him 
for Vice-President/' and in many other states there was growing 
sentiment in his favor. The attention of the country had recently 
been called to the state of Tennessee by the introduction in Con- 
gress of a bill to reimburse General Jackson for the thousand 
dollar fine imposed upon him at New Orleans in 1815. William 
H. Polk moved in the Tennessee legislature to instruct the Sen- 
ators and request the Representatives from that state to vote for 
the bill. Although such an action was only to be expected from 
any Tennessee Democrat, it is not unlikely that Polk had consid- 
ered the probable effect on his brother 's candidacy.^" 

The private correspondence of this early part of 1844 is very 
interesting in view of the assertion made later that an anti-Van 
Buren plot had been hatched in Tennessee by the intimate asso- 
ciates of Polk. The letters show conclusively that instead of 
opposing the ex-President's nomination the leading politicians 
were trying hard to bring it about. On the other hand, the rank 
and file of the Democracy of the state cared little for Van Buren 
and feared that he would be a "dead weight" upon the party. 
Even Hogan and Heiss, the proprietors of the Union, at first de- 
clined to place his name at the head of their political column, 



' Levin H. Coe to Polk, Jan. 27, 1844, ihid. 

s In a letter to the editor of the Globe, dated January 28, Johnson stated 
that he had, at various places, been nominated — sometimes for President, 
sometimes for Vice-President. He would accept either, he said, if ratified 
by the national convention, but in any event he would support the regular 
nominees. 

9 Nashville Union, Jan. 23, 1844. 

10 When Polk's resolution reached the senate, a Whig member moved 
that the preamble should be changed to read that the "question is now 
brought before the American people not with a view to relieve Gen. 
Jackson . . . but alone for political effect" (Nashville Union, Jan. 25, 
1844). 



21(5 JAMES E. POLE 

although Polk had requested them to do so.^^ Urged by Laughlin 
as well as by Polk, the editors finally, though reluctantly, con- 
sented. His name appeared for the first time on February 8, 
1844, and the editors stated frankly that 

in placing Mr. Van Buren 's name at the head of our paper, subject to the 
action of the National Convention, we assume no new position either in 
reference to our views or the preferences of the great body of the democ- 
racy in Tennessee. 

They would support, they said, the nominee of the convention, 
whoever he might be.^- On March 12, after much urging by Polk, 
Laughlin assumed the editorship not only of the Union but of 
the Star Spangled Banner, a weekly campaign journal which 
was to be published from the same office. ^'^ The tone of the Union 
now became more favorable to Van Buren, and there seemed to 
be little doubt that he would be nominated at Baltimore. 

Up to the time that Van Buren 's Texas letter was published, 
there was no indication that influential Tennesseans had any 
intention of opposing his nomination. Cave Johnson, who, with 
R. J. Walker, was charged later with having instigated the plan 
to defeat him at Baltimore, w'as a hearty supporter of the ex- 
President. In a letter written from Washington he told of a 
movement in that city to nominate Cass. This movement, he 
believed should be vigorously opposed, for "in my opinion your 
only chance for the position we wish" depends upon the nomi- 
nation of Van Buren. ^* At a large meeting held at Nashville 
on March 15, 1844, to celebrate the anniversary of Jackson's 



11 "Tell the General," said Polk in a letter to Donelsou, December 20, 
1843, "that 1 had an interview with both Editors of the Union, when I 
was at Nashville and both agreed to take decided and bold ground for 
Van Buren in their paper. If they do not do so, in their next paper, I 
will write to them and urge it upon them. The paper here has done so" 
("Polk-Donelson Letters"). 

12 Nashville Union, Feb. 8. Polk to Heiss, Jan. 21 "Heiss Papers"; 
Laughlin to Polk, Feb. 4, PolJc Papers. 

13 Polk 's letters to Heiss advising the employment of Laughlin are in 
the "Heiss Papers." Various letters of Polk and Laughlin on the sub- 
ject are in the Polk Papers. 

1^ Johnson to Polk, March 6, 1844, Polk. Papers. 



SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 217 

birth and the remission of his fine by Congress/^ efforts were 
made to create enthusiasm for both Van Bnren and Polk. While 
at Nashville Polk answered Johnson's letter and fully concurred 
in the views he had expressed. A few days later he wrote again 
on the same subject and said that ''the movement which you say 
is on hand — to profess publicly to support Mr. Van Buren, with 
a secret intention to attemjDt to nominate Genl Cass in the Con- 
vention, — can receive no countenance." If there is any move- 
ment in Tennessee, said he, to couple his name with that of Cass 
to the prejudice of Van Buren, he is not aware of it, and if dis- 
covered, he will not permit it. 

It is now settled that the preferenr-e of a large majority of the party is 
for Mr. Van Buren, and the whole party should yield to his nomination 
and make it unanimous. Such men as Duf Green, and the discontented 
in our ranks may attempt to produce confusion by resisting the popular 
choice of the party, but their movements can receive no countenance or 
support from me.i'' 

Immediately following the Nashville meeting Laughlin sounded 
the trumpet more vigorously than ever for Van Buren and Polk, 
and insisted that four-fifths of the Democrats in Congress were 
in favor of the ex-President's nomination. Although a friend 
of General Cass, Laughlin deplored the agitation in his behalf. 
Ca^s himself, said he, "has frowned upon the design." Those 
who had come out for Cass had, in Laughlin 's opinion, done so 
for the purpose of dividing the party, and most prominent among 
them was Duff Green, "a renegade deserter."^' 

On March 20, the day before the appearance of Laughlin 's 
editorial, Polk had declined an unofficial offer of a place in the 
cabinet of John Tyler. Abel P. Upshur, Secretary of State, and 
Thomas W. Gilmer, Secretary of the Navy, had been killed in 
the Princeton disaster of February 28, leaving two vacancies in 

15 Laughlin submitted a resolution which declared that revenge had 
led Judge Hall to impose the fine. Polk seconded the resolution and made 
a speech on political questions (Union, March 19, 1844). 

16 Polk to Johnson, March 18, 1844 ("Polk-Johnson Letters"). 
IT Nashville Union, March 21, 1844. 



218 JAMES E. POLK 

the cabinet. Calhoun had been selected to succeed Upshur/^ but 
John Y. Mason, who had been invited to take Gilmer's place de- 
clined, at first, to accept the offer. At this juncture Theophilus 
Fisk, former editor of the Old Dominion and a friend of the 
President, sent a letter to Polk asking whether he would accept 
the navy portfolio "without any pledge, shackle, or trammel 
being asked of you, other than is already guaranteed by your 
exalted character and standing. "^^ Mason, however, changed his 
mind,-° and by accepting the appointment left no vacancy to be 
filled. 

Without knowledge of the offer made to Mason, or of his 
accceptance, Polk had already written to Fisk, stating that he 
would not accept a place in the cabinet. In a letter to Cave 
Johnson, which was intended also for the eye of Silas Wright, 
Polk gave a twofold reason for declining a cabinet position. In 
the first place, it would seem like withdrawing from the race for 
Vice-President, and this he had no intention of doing. Again, 
Tyler 's administration was supposed to be hostile to Van Buren ; 
consequently, if he accepted, he would be placed in a false posi- 
tion, for he was heartily in favor of Van Buren. This, in effect, 
was a notice to the Van Burenites that he was still in the race 
for Vice-President and that, as he was loyal to their candidate, 
he expected their support in return. He also called attention 
to Laughlin 's editorial in the Union against the attempted move- 
ment for Cass. In another passage of the letter he not only 
declared his own views on the Texas question, but he intimated, 
also, that he took it for granted that Van Buren would not op- 
pose annexation. Speaking of Calhoun's call to the Department 
of State, he said : 



I'^For the circumstances of Calhoun's selection, see Schouler, Hifii. of 
U. S., IV, 455. 

10 Fisk to Polk, March 9, 1844, Polk Paperi^. Fisk said that the idea 
was his own, but he told Cave Johnson that he was acting by authority 
of the President (Johnson to Polk, March 10, ibid.). 

20 Much to the surprise of both Tyler and Fisk — so said the latter in 
a letter to Polk, March 13 (ibid.). 



SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 219 

I think it probable that he will see that it is his interest to co-operate 
thoroughly with the Democratic party, so heartily for Mr. Van Buren, 
harmonize his friends at the South, and make a great effort upon the 
Texas and Oregon questions.21 

At the time that Polk declined to accept a place in Tyler's 
cabinet, the Texas question was fast approaching its critical stage. 
Since Polk was soon to become closely identified with this im- 
portant question, it seems necessary to give a brief summary of 
its history up to this point and to ascertain, if possible, whether 
he or his friends had any part in bringing it forward. 

The idea of annexing Texas was not new ; but since the failure 
of the first attempt, during Jackson's administration, no party 
had made annexation an active political issue. That it was made 
an issue in the campaign of 1844 was due, according to Benton,-- 
to the machinations of Calhoun, who hoped by this means to 
prevent the nomiiiation of Van Buren and the election of Henry 
Clay. The first move in this direction was made in the winter 
of 1842-43. At that time a letter, written by Thomas W. Gilmer 
but inspired by Calhoun, was printed in a Baltimore paper. It 
advocated the immediate annexation of Texas in order to fore- 
stall the designs of Great Britain. The letter, said Benton, was 
"a clap of thunder in a clear sky," for no one was aware of any 
such design. Webster left the Department of State in May, 1843, 
and after the brief term of Legare, Avas succeeded on June 24 
by Abel Upshur, of Virginia. Upshur was a friend of Calhoun 
and interested in the annexation of Texas. It was probably due 
to the influence of Upshur and Gilmer that Tyler first became 
interested in annexation, but before long the President had de- 
termined to use it for his own purposes. In his third annual 
message, which was sent to Congress early in December, 1843, 



21 In another letter of the same date which was intended for Brown 
and Johnson only, Polk made still more explicit the purpose of the first 
letter, for he pointed out that Wright, if he wouLl, could certainly prevent 
E. M. Johnson from being nominated (Polk to Johnson, March 21, 1844, 
"Polk-Johnson Letters"). 

22 Benton, Thirty Years' View, II, 581 ff. 



220 JAMES K. POLE 

Tyler alluded to the dangers that might result from continued 
war between Texas and Mexico, and hinted pointedly at possible 
annexation. 

At this stage of the question Aaron V. Brown, an intimate 
friend of Polk, became a leading factor in the annexation pro- 
gram. Whether or not he was consciously lending his aid to the 
Tyler-Calhoun project is not easy to determine. In a conver- 
sation with Benton on the first day of the session. Brown spoke 
of annexation as "an impending and probable event," and he 
was rebuked by the Senator who said that it was ''on the part 
of some, an intrigue for the presidency and a plot to dissolve the 
Unionr—on the part of others, a Texas scrip and land specula- 
tion."-'' In a "confidential" letter to Polk, Brown alluded to 
Tyler's message and added : "But this is not all I have reason 
to suppose it will soon be followed up with some definite and 
precise proposition— some think a treaty." The Whigs, said he, 
think that Tyler has brought the question up as a firebrand be- 
tween North and Soutli in order to gain support for himself, and 
that nothing will come of it; but however this may be, it is 
Brown 's opinion that neither Whigs nor Democrats of the South 
and West should connnit themselves against annexation.-* 

This was not the first time that Brown had shown an interest 
in the Texas question. In January, 1843, he had sent to Jackson 
a copy of the Madisanian containing Gilmer's letter and had re- 
ceived in reply the famous letter of February 12 in which the 
General urged the necessity of immediate annexation. Jackson 's 
letter was not made public until a year later, about three months 
after Tyler had submitted his message on the subject of Texas. 
The procurement and the publication of Jackson's letter have 
been declared by Benton to be links in the chain of events which 
had been forged by Calhoun and his fellow-conspirators for the 
purpose of making Texas the leading political issue and Calhoun 
the candidate, although he does not say that Brown was fully 

23 Ibid., 583. 

24 Brown to Polk, Dec. 9, 1843, Polk Papers. 



SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 18M 221 

aware of the part he was playing.-^ He has intimated, also, that 
the letter w^as purposely dated 1844 instead of 1843 ; but Brown's 
own letter — published at the same time — explained the circum- 
stances under which it had been procured and stated explicitly 
that it had been in his possession for a "long time."-*' However, 
Benton's interest in Van Buren's nomination and his opposition 
to annexation seem to have led him to associate events which in 
reality were not related; on the other hand, Brown's own desire 
for Texas is sufficient to explain his soliciting the opinion of 
General Jackson on the subject. 

If Brown was a conscious participant in any conspiracy to 
undermine Van Buren, it is quite evident that his bosom friends, 
Polk and Cave Johnson, were not aware of the fact. Although 
Johnson looked with favor on the acquisition of Texas, he was 
averse to having it made an issue for campaign purposes. At 
the time that Polk's name was mentioned in connection with 
Tyler's cabinet, Johnson stated his opinions very explicitly in a 
letter to Polk: 

I fear some secret movements are making here so as to bring up the 
Texas question here prominently before the Convention meets & to make 
it operate if practicable agt Van in the Convention & agt Clay in the 
election — if it can be brought up fairly & properly & with a reasonable 
prospect of getting it I should have no objection, but if it is designed 
merely as a political question to operate in the ensuing canvass then T 
shall deplore it. An effort no doubt will be made to unite the destinies 
of Oregon & Texas so as to unite the South & West — may you not be 
identified with these movements if in the cabinet? & if unsuccessful what 
follows ?27 

The friends of Calhoun confidently expected that their leader 
would profit from the emergence of the Texas question. Fearing 
that ' ' being considered a candidate ' ' would, if left unchallenged, 
procure for Van Buren the coveted nomination, they began at 
an early date to seek support for their favorite.-^ Due to their 



25 Benton, Thirty Years' Vieiv, II, 584. 

26 The letters of both Jackson and Brown were published in various 
newspapers — among others, the Nashville Union of April 2, 1844. 

27 Johnson to Polk, March 10, 1844, FoJlc Papers. 

28 Dixon H. Lewis to Eichard Cralle, June 10, 1842, Cralle Papers. 



222 JAMES K. FOLK 

efforts the time for holding the national convention was post- 
poned from December, 1843, to a later date, in order that they 
might have a longer time to educate public opinion ; for even 
before Jackson's Texas letter was written, they w'ere confident 
that Calhoun would be nominated.-'^ 

During the summer of 1843 the administration had become 
convinced that Great Britain was about to interfere in Texan 
affairs and effect, if possible, the abolition of slavery there. ' Duff 
Green was in England gathering information, and his communi- 
cations were supplemented by reports which came from Texan 
representatives in London. ^° In December, as we have already 
noted, Tyler called the attention of Congress to the dangers of 
foreign interference in Texas, and soon afterwards he began to 
formulate plans of annexation. The supporters of Calhoun co- 
operated with the President, and there seemed to be no doubt 
in their minds that their patron, and not Tyler, would reap the 
political reward. Their hopes of success mounted high when 
Calhoun was called to take charge of the Dep artment of State. 
Like the President they were intereBt^Tl^^^nnexation per se; 
in addition, they Mlt^' appreciated its importance as a campaign 
issue. "It is the greatest question of the Age," wrote Dixon H. 
Lewis, and he rejoiced that Calhoun was in a position "to direct 
its force & control its fury. ' '^^ Three days after Lewis had made 



29 In a letter written from Washington, February 8, 184.3, Duff Green 
told Cralle that although the Van Buren faction wanted an early con- 
vention, he hoped that it could be delayed until June. "It has now," 
said he, "narrowed down to a choice between Calhoun & Van Buren and 
the demonstrations are becoming more and more decided for Mr. Calhoun 
so that, in my opinion, the concentration in his favor will become so 
apparent as public opinion developes that the convention will indeed 
become obsolete" (Letters of Duff Green, Library of Congress; Benton, 
Thirty Years' View, II, 585). 

30 Smith, Annexation of Texas, chap. vi. 

■''■1 "Every thing depends on the Texas question, which is an element 
of Power so much stronger than Clay, V Buren & their conventions that 
it unsettles all calculations as to the future course of men & parties. It 
is the greatest question of the Age & I predict will agitate the country 
more than all the other public questions ever have. Public opinion will 
boil & effervesce . . . more like a volcano than a cider Barrell — but at 



SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 223 

this assertion Jackson's Texas letter appeared in the Richmond 
Enquirer. No doubt it fitted into the Calhoun program, yet it is 
not at all certain that this was Brown's motive in having the letter 
published. Surely General Jackson did not write it for any such 
purpose. ^- 

The emergence of the Texas question was not welcomed by 
Henry Clay. Early in December, 1843, he stated his opinions on 
the subject in a letter to John J. Crittenden.^^ There were, he 
said, already a sufficient number of issues without ' ' adding freak 
ones" of this character, and he did not think it right to allow 
John Tyler to make capital out of this exciting topic. In his 
opinion, annexation, either by treaty or by conquest, was entirely 
out of the question ; however, unless Tyler should present some 
definite project of annexation he did not feel called upon to make 
public expression of his views. In the following March, when 
it was rumored that the President was negotiating with Texas, 
Clay — with his usual faith in his own ability both to shape and 
to direct political issues — still felt confident that he could stem 
the tide of Texas agitation. ^^ 



last will settle clown with unanimity for annexation in the South & West 
& a large majority in the North. It will in the meantime unite the hitherto 
divided South, while it will make Abolition & Treason synonymous & thus 
destroy it in the North. 

"The beauty of the thing is, that Providence rather than Tyler has 
put Calhoun at the head of this great question, to direct its force & con- 
trol its fury. It is understood by letters from him that he accepts. 

"P. S. It is understood the preliminaries of the Treaty have already 
been arranged & only awaits the special minister who is daily expected." 
(Lewis to Cralle, March 19, 1844, Cralle Papers). Alexander H. Stephens 
believed that "the dissolution of the present Confederacy" lay "near 
Mr. Calhoun's heart" (Stephens to James Thomas, May 17, 1844, Rep. 
Am. Hist. Assn., 1911, II, 58). 

32 Benton says tliat Blair declined to publish the letter in the Globe 
{Thirty Years' Vietv, II, 587). Later, however, it was printed in that 
paper, along with Brown 's letter explaining his reasons for publishing it. 

33 Clay to Crittenden, December 5, 1843, Crittenden Payers. 

34 Writing from Savannah, he said: "I thini I can treat the question 
in- a manner very different from any treatment which I have yet seen of it, 
and so as to reconcile all our friends, and many others to the views which 
I entertain. Of one thing you may be certain, that there is no such anxiety 
for the annexation here at the South as you might have been disposed to 
imagine" (Clay to Crittendon, March 24, 1844, Crittenden Papers). 



224 JAMES K. POLE 

The time was fast approaching when candidates must take a 
definite stand either for or against annexation. Despite the de- 
sire of some of them to eliminate this topic from the issues of the 
campaign, every day brought the subject more into prominence. 
Calhoun's position was already well known, for in his letter ac- 
cepting the cabinet portfolio he had come out strongly in favor 
of annexation. Clay would probably be nominated by his party 
no matter what position he might choose to take with respect to 
the all absorbing tojDic. Of greater importance, therefore, was 
the stand to be taken by Van Buren ; for on this would depend, 
in all probability, his success or failure in the nominating con- 
vention. 

On March 27, 1844, W. H. Hammet, a member of Congress 
from Mississippi and an "unpledged delegate to the Baltimore 
convention," addressed a letter to Van Buren asking for his 
views on the annexation of Texas. In writing this letter Hammet 
was evidently cooperating with the most loyal friends of Van 
Buren, and not, as Benton has intimated, with the supporters of 
Calhoun."' After taking ample time for consideration Van Buren 
on April 20, drafted his reply and sent it to his most intimate 
friend, Silas Wright. When it reached Wright on the evening 
of the 26th, it was read to a number of Van Buren 's friends, 
including Fairfield, King, and Benton. They approved it and 
decided that it should be published immediately in the Globe. 
This course was decided upon before Hammet had even seen the 
letter.^** The ex-President began his letter by asserting his be- 
lief that the United States had the constitutional right to annex 
Texas. He then gave a history of the quesion and of his own 
attempt to purchase it while Secretary of State under Jackson. 



35 Benton, Thirtij Years' Fietv, II, 587. 

36 Wright to Van Buren, Washington, April 29, 1844, Va)i Buren Papers. 
"Hammet was frightened," said Wright, "and it Avas Avith some difficulty 
that we induced him to our proposition for publication, before he had read 
it; but he behaved well and himself and tlie Major remained at the Globe 
office until about midnight, to examine the proof. ' ' 



SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 225 

But, said he, as conditions are now, annexation would in all 
probability bring on a war with Mexico, and 

could we hope to stand perfectly justified in the eyes of mankind for 
entering into it; more especially if its commencement is to be preceded 
by the appropriation to our own uses of the territory, the sovereignty of 
which is in dispute betwen two nations, one of which we are to join in 
the struggle? 

He thought not, for ' ' we have a character among the nations of 
the earth to maintain. ' ' He did not believe that there was danger 
of foreign interference in Texas or that nothing but immediate 
action could prevent Texas from being lost to the United States.^'' 
On the very day that Van Buren penned his answer to Ham- 
met, Cave Johnson sent him a letter from Washington.^^ He 
informed the ex-President that within two days the Texas treaty 
would be sent to the Senate, and, from all appearances, would 
be the controlling factor in the next Presidential election. For 
this reason he and other friends hoped that Van Buren would 
favor annexation, because "they hope such a position will not 
injure you in the North, whilst it must overwhelm Mr. Clay in 
"the South if he hesitates or equivocates." In order to forestall 
intrigues to prevent his nomination, Johnson urged him to make 
his position known at the earliest possible date.^*' Johnson's 
warning, to be sure, came too late ; on the other hand, it seems 



3T The letter was published in the Washington Glolje, April 28, 1844. 

38 Whether Johnson had any knowledge of Hammet 's letter to Van 
Buren, I am unable to say. If he had, Van Buren 's long delay in answering 
probably induced him to Avrite. 

39 ' ' In the event of your being favorable to the treaty, I entreat you 
to take the earliest opportunity of giving your vie-Avs — we have intrigues on 
hand here if practicable, to supersede you in the Baltimore Convention — 
and this question is one of the means used to arouse some of the Western 
& R Western members agt you — from a supposition that you are hostile 
to it — the delay of the Globe in coming out. — your delay and the opinion of 
some of the N. Y. Democrats — all are urged & I fear with some effect among 
the members. ' ' Already, said he, some are expressing fears of Van Buren 's 
* ' availability ' ' and are talking of other candidates, such as Stewart, 
Dodge, and Cass. He is gratified to learn that Nicholson, who had headed 
the Cass movement in Tennessee, now says that Van Buren is the only man 
who can carry that state. Such, also, is the opinion of Governor Polk 
(Johnson to Van Buren, April 20, 1844, Van Buren Papers). 



226 JAMES K. POLK 

to show that he was sincerely desirous of Van Buren's nomina- 
tion until the New Yorker had taken a position which would, 
in all probability, render his election impossible. The sin- 
cerity of Johnson's regret when Van Buren's opposition to an- 
nexation became known is expressed in a letter to Polk. "Many 
of us are in rather low spirits today — his course gives great advan- 
tage to the discontents over us and they will make the most they 
can out of it. ' '*° Two days later he reported that the excitement 
over Van Buren's letter was not abating, and that the friends 
of Texas had called a meeting at the capitol over which R. J. 
Walker had presided. They wanted another candidate — some 
were looking to Cass, others to Calhoun.*^ 

Clay, who was then on a canvassing tour, reached Wahington 
in the latter part of April. While there his letter on the Texas 
question, dated at Raleigh on April 17, was given to the National 
Intelligencer for publication. He was decidedly opposed to an- 
nexation, because it w^ould surely result in a war with Mexico. 
Even if Mexico should agree, he believed that it would be inex- 
pedient to admit Texas into the Union.^- Knowing that Van, 
Buren, whom he supposed would be his opponent, did not favor 
annexation. Clay had not the ' ' smallest apprehension ' ' in stating 
his position.*^ 

Inquiries were not limited to candidates for the Presidency. 
Late, in March a nonpartisan, anti-Texas meeting assembled in 
Cincinnati and a committee of five, including Salmon P. Chase, 
drafted a letter to Polk asking his views on annexation. When 
the letter reached Columbia, Polk was on his farm in Mississippi, 



■10 "A serious & powerful eifort," he continued, "will be made to get a 
new nomination in which I think most of my democratic colleagues will 
unite, from the little I can learn. The discontents are moving heaven and 
earth & will never stop until the Convention is over if they do so then." 
At present, he said, the desertion is toAvard Cass, but he does not believe 
that Cass will get the nomination (Johnson to Polk, April 28, 1844, Polk 
Papers). 

41 Johnson to Polk, April 30, 1844, ihid. 

4-^ Nat. Intell., April 27, 1844. 

43 Clay to Crittenden, April 21, 1844, Crittenden Papers. 



SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 227 

but as soon as he had reached home his reply to the committee 
was prepared without hesitation. It bore the date of April 23 
and advocated unequivocally ' ' immediate re-annexation. ' '** Like 
Jackson in his letter to Brown, Polk emphasized the point that our 
original title to Texas had been valid beyond question and that 
the territory had unwisely been ceded to Spain. He conveniently 
ignored the fact that the cession had been made by those who 
possessed the constitutional authority to make it. And however 
unwise such an action may have been, it is difficult to see the bear- 
ing of this lack of wisdom on our subsequent right to re-annex the 
lost territory. On account of the danger that Texas might become 
a British colony, Polk maintained that all European countries 
should be excluded from both Texas and Oregon. "Let Texas 
be re-annexed, ' ' said he, 

and the authority and laws of the United States be established and main- 
tained within her limits, as also the Oregon Territory, and let the fixed 
policy of our govermnent be not to permit Great Britain or any other foreign 
power to plant a colony or hold dominion over any portion of the people or 
territory of either.*^ 

These remarks on colonization are not without interest, for they 
are a forerunner of what was later called the ' ' Polk Doctrine. ' ' 

Polk's letter was written only three days after that of Van 
Buren and of course without knowledge of its contents. Indeed, 
as late as May 4, after he had read Clay's anti-Texas letter, he 
expressed the hope and the belief that Van Buren would "now 
take ground for annexation."**^ The views which he expressed 
coincided with those held generally by Democrats in Tennessee. 
On the very day that Van Buren penned his indictment against 
annexation, an enthusiastic meeting of Democrats at Nashville 



44 " I have no hesitation in declaring that I am in favor of the immediate 
re-annexation of Texas to the territory and government of the United 
States. I entertain no doubt as to the power or the expediency of the 
re-annexation. ' ' 

45 MS, dated Columbia, April 23, 18-i4, PoR- Papers. Printed in Wash- 
ington Globe, May 6, 1844. 

4G Polk to Johnson, May 4, 1844, ' ' Polk-Johnson Letters. ' ' 



228 JAMES K. POLK 

passed resolutions in favor of it by a unanimous vote.*' It is not 
surprising, therefore, that Van Buren 's letter had a ' ' prostrating 
and cooling effect ' ' upon his supporters in that state or that many 
who had stuck to him from a sense of duty should now feel re- 
lieved from further obligation.'*^ Individuals could express their 
sentiments very freely to one another, but Laughlin, who for some 
time had been sounding Van Buren 's praises, was now in some- 
what of a quandary. As editor of the party organ, he must of 
course make some comment. On May 9, therefore, he pointed 
out in an editorial that, while Clay's objections to annexation 
were permanent, those of Van Buren were temporary — objec- 
tions only until certain obstacles had been removed. Laughlin 
himself advocated immediate annexation, regardless of conse- 
quences; still, if a majority of Democrats should decide to wait, 
he was ready to acquiesce. This left the way open for continued 
support of Van Buren. Since taking charge of the Union, 
Laughlin had been bitter in his assaults upon Clay. The Whig 
candidate had perjured himself by challenging Randolph to fight 
a duel; he was guilty of Cilly's death, because he had written 
the challenge for Graves; but neither crime was surprising in a 
man who had "defrauded Gen. Jackson out of the Presidency, 
for an office worth $6000 per annum. ' '*^ 

Before his treaty with Texas had been consummated, Tyler 
seems to have given up hope that he might be nominated by the 
Democrats. His official organ indignantly denied the assertion 
made by the Glohe that he was knocking for admission to the 
Baltimore convention ; on the contrary, "the friends of the Veto- 
Administration intend having a Convention which will repre- 
sent the Republican party more truly than Mr. Van Buren 's 



47 Nashville Union, April 23, 1844. 

48 "Indeed it has given a pretext for doing that -whifh they have had 
in their minds to do — to declare ag-ainst V. B., and a considerable portion 
of them will never be reconciled to him" (Nicholson to Heiss, May 8, 1844, 
' ' Heiss Papers " ) . 

49 Nashville TJnlon, March 30, 3 844. 



SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 220 

Convention, and the nominee will be elected. ' '^^ Still, the Presi- 
dent was ready to welcome assistance from any quarter, for in 
May his friend Fisk sounded Cave Johnson concerning Jackson's 
opinion of his administration, and at the same time Polk was being 
considered for the War Department or the British mission.^^ 

Cass was the last of the aspirants to declare himself on the 
Texas question. In response to a letter from Hannegan, he, 
too, came out for immediate annexation.'- 

On May 1, four days after Clay's Texas letter had appeared 
in print, the Whig convention assembled at Baltimore. One day 
sufficed for nominating the candidates and adopting a platform. 
Without a dissenting voice, Clay was chosen for the first place, 
and on the third ballot, Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey, was 
selected as his running mate. The platform was drawn to suit 
the candidate. It avoided the Texas and bank questions and 
emphasized tariff, currency, distribution, and usurpation by the 
Executive. With one omission — the bank question — Clay took 
his stand on the traditional Whig policies, and appealed to the 
people to sustain him. 

While the Whigs rallied with enthusiasm to the standard of 
their chief, harmony within Democratic circles was rendered im- 
possible by the appearance of the "lone star" on the political 
horizon. The party which had long been distinguished for its 
effective discipline and its unity of action now appeared to be 
hopelessly divided on the eve of battle. Even the great "chief" 
at the Hermitage seemed to be uncertain as to the proper plan 
of campaign. His commands were ambiguous, for they resulted 
from conflicting emotions; he longed to see his old friend Van 
Buren nominated, but his desire for Texas was still stronger. 
Although few had a definite idea as to the best means of restor- 
ing harmony, as the time for the Baltimore convention approached 



50 Madisonian, April 3. 181-1. 

51 Johnson to Polk, May 8, 1814, Folic Papers. 

52 His letter was dated at Detroit on May 10. There is a copy in Niles' 
Begister, May 25, 1814. 



230 JAMES K. POLK 

the conviction that Van Biiren could not be elected became very 
widesjiread. The Virginia Democratic central committee, by reso- 
lution, released the delegates of that state from the obligation 
to obey their instructions, and delegates of other states announced 
publicly that they would not vote for Van Buren-^^* 

Before the appearance of his Texas letter Van Buren had been 
accepted generally as the candidate ; not because he enjoyed a 
wide popularity, but because a small minority urgently advocated 
his nomination and the rest of the party, being more indifferent 
than hostile, simply acquiesced, since they had no substitute to 
offer. After the publication of his Texas letter, his downfall 
was brought about by much the same process that had procured 
his elevation to party leadership. The few who were violently 
opposed to his nomination had little difficulty in convincing 
others, and especially the friends of Texas, that he could not 
possibly be elected. Those wdio had supported him from a sense 
of duty only, now had no hesitancy in transferring their alle- 
giance to another candidate who would be more likely to win. 
Amos Kendall emphasized this point in a letter written to Van 
Buren. He told him frankly that he had no good news, and that 
unless some one else could be nominated at Baltimore the south- 
ern delegates would put up a third candidate. Kendall did not 
believe that the pro-Texas feeling was due to any organized move- 
ment, but rather to the "continued ding-dong sung in their ears" 
by a few of the most interested. Van Buren 's letters, he said, 
had appeared at the worst possible time ; the guns were being 
trained on Clay, and Van Buren appeared just in time to get 
the shot.^* Cave Johnson reported the political situation as 
apparently hopeless. Benton and the New Yorkers seemed to 



53 Many such details are given in Niles' Beg., LXVI, 162-163. 

SI Kendall to Van Buren, May 13, 1844, Van Buren Papers. Hendriek 
B. Wright, of Pennsylvania, believed that Van Buren could not be 
nominated — and if nominated, could not be elected, and Wni. R. King, 
writing from New York, reported it to be generally admitted that the 
ex-President could not be elected (Wright to Buchanan, May 13; King to 
Buchanan, May 14, 1844, Buclianan Papers). 



SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 231 

be determined not to yield; Calhoun and his supporters were 
equally uncompromising, while each faction claimed a majority 
of the convention. "I see no hope," said Johnson, "unless some 
man can be found disconnected with both these fragments of the 
democratic party & who will yield to the annexation of Texas. ' '^^ 
Polk, the man to whom this letter was written, fulfilled these 
requirements ; and before the letter had reached its destination, 
his availahilitij had already been discussed at the Hermitage. 

The correspondence which passed between Democratic leaders 
in Tennessee about the middle of May shows an absence of 
definite plans for the future. On May 10 Donelson^^ summoned 
Polk to Nashville to consult with General Jackson and others in 
the hope that they might find some means of preventing a split 
in the party over the annexation question. "I feel deeply morti- 
fied," said he, 

that our wise men should differ so much; and particularly that a measure 
of such vast consequences should have been kept so long in the dark and 
precipitated with so much haste. 

Donelson was fully aware that Jackson's indorsement of annexa- 
tion would aid Tyler and Calhoun; and, apparently, although 
his letter is not very clear, he did not approve making Texas a 
leading issue." Polk accepted the invitation and reached Nash- 
ville on the twelfth. On the following day he and General Arm- 
strong repaired to the Hermitage. They were met on the road 
by Donelson, who was taking to Nashville for publication in the 
Union Jackson's well-known letter which appeared a few days 
later under date of May 13th. In it, Jackson insisted that Texas 
must be annexed. 



55 Johnson to Polk, May 12, 1844, PoR: Papers. 

56 Gen. Armstrong and other politicians WTote, also. 

57 " I am particularly anxious that the ground occupied by the Genl. 
should be thoroughly understood by you. What he may noAv say if not 
modified by disclosures recently made will produce important results. If 
the Texas question is urged as it doubtless will be by Tyler & Calhoun, 
and Genl. Jackson gives the weight of his name to sustain their views, 
making it a leading question in the South, the sooner we know it the 
better. Come and talk over the matter with the Genl. and our friends 
generally" (Donelson to Polk, May 10, 1844, Polk Papers). 



232 JAMES K. POLK 

When reporting the interview to Cave Johnson/'* Polk said 

that 

He [Jackson] speaks most affectionately of Mr. Van Bureii, but is com- 
pelled to separate from him upon this great question, and says both he and 
Mr. Benton have by their letters cut their own throats politically. He has 
uo idea that Mr. V. B. can be nominated or if nominated that he can receive 
any Southern support. 

Jackson said that the Baltimore convention mnst select some 
other candidate and that he should be from the Southwest ; and 
Polk's letter hinted that the General had suggested that Polk 
himself ought to be placed at the head of the ticket. Polk asserted 
that he aspired to the second place only, but that his friends 
might use his name as they might see fit ; in any event the party 
should unite on some "one candidate" and he must be in favor 
of annexation. "I have stood by Mr. V. B.," he continued, "and 
will stand by him as long as there is hope, but I now despair of 
his election — even if he be nominated. ' ' In another letter written 
on the following day,'''^ Polk was more explicit concerning Jack- 
son's desire to substitute his name for that of Van Buren. The 
General remarked, said he, that writing the anti-Texas letter 
was the only vital error ever committed by Van Buren ; never- 
theless, it would be fatal to his election. 

He thinks the candidate for the Presidency should be an annexation man 
and reside in the Southwest, and he openly expresses (what I assure you I 
had never for a moment contemplated) the opinion that I would be the 
most available man; taking the Vice-Presidential candidate from the North. 
This I do not expect to be effectecL 

Polk thought it was more probable tliat some northern man 
would be nominated for first place, and himself for the second. 
If Van Buren should be withdrawn, his friends would doubtless 
control both nominations, therefore great pains should be taken 
to conciliate them. Nothing, said Polk, could prevent Clay's 
election except the harmonious selection of a candidate at Balti- 
more. In offering suggestions for bringing about such harmony 



58 Polk to Johnson, May 13, 1844, " Polk- Johnson Letters." 
50 Polk to Johnson, May 14, 1844, ibid. 



SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 233 

he displayed that shrewedness and attention to detail which made 
him one of the most astute politicians of his time.^° Along with 
this went another letter to Johnson, marked ''Highly Confi- 
dential.'"'^ Johnson was authorized to show the first letter to 
Silas Wright, and we are not left in doubt as to the reason. 

Mr. Wright's declaration to you, in the conversation which you detail in 
your letter of the 8th that I was "the only man he thought the Northern 
Democrats would support if Van Buren was set aside, because I was known 
to be firm and true to the cause," is precisely the opinion which Genl J. 
expressed to me Avhen I saw him two days ago. The General had previously 
expressed the same thing to others. 

He once more asserted that he had aspired to the second office 
only and had been loyal to Van Buren ; but since the secret attack 
on the ex-President ' ' ' Fortune is in a frolic, ' and . . . there is 
no telling what may happen." He recommended General Pillow 
■ to Johnson as a shrewd and reliable colleague in carrying out 
all plans. 

In Jackson's letter of May 13 to the Nashville Union, in which 
he commented on Van Buren 's Texas letter, the General said his 
old friend evidently was unaware that conditions had changed 
since he had been President. No difference of opinion could 
change his confidence in Van Buren, but as to Texas, "Let us 



GO " I have but little hope that union or harmony can be restored among 
the members, but I have hope that the Delegates 'fresh from the people' — 
Avho are not members of Congress — and have not been so much excited 
can be brought together. Let a strong appeal be made to the Delegates as 
fast as they come in, to take the matter into their own Imnds, to control 
and overrule their leaders at Washington, ivho have already produced such 
distraction, and thus save the party. The Delegates from a distance can 
alone do this. I suggest as a practical plan to bring them to act, — to get 
one Delegate from each State who may be in attendance to meet in a room 
at- Brown 's hotel or somewhere else, and consult together to see if they 
cannot hit upon a plan to save the party. If you will quietly and without 
announcing to the public what you are at, imdertake this mth energy and 
prosecute it with vigor, the plan is feasible and I think will succeed. If 
the preliminary meeting of a Delegate from each State can agree upon the 
man, then let each one see the other Delegates from his own State, and 
report at an adjourned meeting the result. This is the only way to secure 
efficient action when the Convention meets. ' ' The essential features of this 
plan were followed, and resulted in success. 

ciPolk to Johnson, May 17 [14], 1844, "Polk-Johnson Letters." 



234 JAMES E. POLK 

take it now and lock the door against future danger.""- His 
complimentary remarks about Van Buren were much like an 
epitaph for a departed friend. When he penned them he felt 
certain that his former protege was doomed. In a letter written 
on the following day he told Benjamin F. Butler that nothing 
could restore Van Buren except indorsement of annexation, for 
"you might as well, it appears to me, attempt to turn the current 
of the Miss[iss]ippi as to turn the democracy from the annexation 
of Texas to the United States. ""^^ 

Texas must be annexed, and Van Buren must be dropped. So 
much, at least, was settled ; and if Polk could be substituted, so 
much the better. The TJnion now began to prepare its readers 
for the change. Laughlin had been chosen as a delegate to the 
Baltimore convention, and Heiss took charge during his absence. 
On May 14, Heiss announced that Van Buren 's name had been 
placed at the head of the political column because he was thought 
to be the choice of the Democracy. It would be left there until 
some action had been taken by the convention, although the editor 
disagreed with his w^eak position on the Texas question. On the 
18th, Heiss declared further support of the New Yorker to be 
hopeless, and by the 23rd he was ready to hazard some "guesses" 
regarding the nomination. The first was that Van Buren would 
come out for Texas or withdraw. The second was that one from 
a suggested list would be selected as the candidate. Heading 
the list was the name of Governor Polk," but since Laughlin was 
a member of the pre-convention conference held at Nashville, 



«2 This letter was dated May 13, and published in the Nashville TJnion, 
May 16, 1844. 

63 ' ' Clay 's letter had prostrated him mth the Whiggs in the South & 
West, and nine tenths of our population had decided in favour of Mr. V. 
Buren & annexation of Texas — when tliis, illfated letter made its appear- 
ance and fell upon the democracy like a thunderbolt" (Jackson to Butler, 
May 14, 1844, Van Buren Papers. A full Qo-pv, also, in Am. Hist. Bev., 
July, 1906, 833-834). The letter was carried to Butler by Donelson. Both 
men were delegates to the Baltimore convention. 

64 The others suggested were Calhoun, Cass, Stewart, Tyler, and 
Buchanan. 



SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 235 

the ' ' guess ' ' regarding Polk required no great powers of divina- 
tion.**^ On May 28, Heiss made another significant statement in 
the Union: 

We do not believe Mr. Van Buren will receive one vote from the Tennessee 
delegation. If he does, that delegate who votes knowingly against the wishes 
of his constituents, will be marked, hereaft-er, as a man unworthy of their 
confidence. 

Nearly all the delegates to the Democratic convention gathered 
in Washington on their way to Baltimore. For what transpired 
there, we must rely mainly on letters written by Gideon Pillow.*"' 
Pillow and Laughlin reached Washington on May 21 and began 
a campaign of interviewing delegates to ascertain their views. 
Pillow represented Cave Johnson as being rather apathetic and 
without hope of success. It is true that Johnson was inclined 
to see the dark side ; but he was a shrewd politician and a per- 
sonal acquaintance of most of the delegates, and it is probable 
that he exerted fully as much influence as either Pillow or 
Laughlin. ^'^ 

Pillow reported the party to be hopelessly divided. The 
insurgents declared that they would not attend the convention 
unless the two-thirds rule were agreed upon, and that they would 
not support Van Buren in any event. The Van Burenites were 
equally insistent on a majority rule."^ The pro-Texas Democrats 



65 On June 4 the National IntelJigower quoted the guesses made by 
Heiss and remarked that the * ' inference is irresistible ' ' that the arrange- 
ment for dropping Van Buren and bringing Polk forward was made in the nj 
neighborhood of Nashville. 

66 Pillow Avas both conceited and unprincipled ; still, if allowance be 
made for his exaggeration of his own importance, his account is jjrobably 
authentic. His letters to Polk are among the Polk Papers. Copies edited 
by Professor Reeves are accessible in the Am. Hist. Rev., July, 1906, 835ff. 

6T In his letter of May 24, Pillow said: "I saw your letter to C — J — 
and noted its suggestions." Evidently he refers to the letter to Cave 
Johnson, May 14, 1844. See above. 

68 In a letter written from Washington to Van Buren, May 26, Wright j] 
said that the Texas men Avere plotting to defeat him by means of the two- / 
thirds rule. New Hampshire men were told, said he, that Woodbury Avould / 
get the nomination in case Van Buren should be set aside ; the Pennsyl- I 
vanians were told the same with respect to Buchanan, and the Tennesseans 
with respect to Polk, Van Buren Papers. 



236 JAMES K. POLK 

tried to commit Polk's friends against Van Buren, but all except 
a few of the Tennessee delegates 'maintained a discreet silence 
on this subject. Two of them, Anderson and Jones, were bitterly 
opposed to the New Yorker and would not cooperate with their 
colleagues. Even Andrew Johnson was ready to sacrifice Polk 
in order to get rid of Van Buren. Pillow was satisfied that two- 
thirds of the delegates favored Polk for Vice-President; many 
expressed a preference for him as the candidate for President. 
No agreements were reached before leaving Washington, yet Pil- 
low was quite certain that Van Buren would be forced to with- 
draw, and, if so, that his friends would never support Cass. On 
the other hand, he thought it probable that they would be willing 
to support Polk. If Polk should be brought forward, it must be 
done by the North, because it would never do for southerners to 
suggest his name. 

The Democratic convention assembled in Baltimore on May 27, 
1844. A large majority of the delegates had been instructed to 
vote for Van Buren by state conventions which had been held 
before the publication of his anti-Texas letter — in fact, before 
Texas had been seriously considered as a political issue. But 
Tyler and Calhoun had precipitated the question, and many who 
were bitter opponents of both of them were nevertheless in favor 
of annexation. Because Van Buren had taken his stand against 
annexation, many held that their instructions were no longer 
binding, for the conditions under -which "they had been framed 
had changed completely, and Van Buren no longer represented 
the will of the people. In a few cases, as in Virginia, steps were 
taken to annul the instructions. Some of the delegates from 
other states openly repudiated their instructions, and others went 
to Baltimore prepared to vote for Van Bureii on the early ballots 
and then to use their own judgments. Benton, Welles, and other 
adherents of the ex-President have asserted that there was whole- 
sale intriguing against their favorite. No doubt there was, but 
the widespread defection which preceded the convention was not 
wholly due to intrigue. 



SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 237 

The convention selected as its chairman Hendrick B. Wright, 
of Pennsylvania, and as its secretary William F. Ritchie, whose 
father was editor of the Richmond Enquirer. The friends of 
A^an Buren desired a majority nomination, but his opponents 

succeeded in adopting the two-thirds rule, which had been used ^^^ 

on former occasions. The Van Burenites complained that the 
rule was now adopted for the purpose of defeating their favorite, 
but, although the charge was true, the majority merely followed 
the usual practice of Democratic conventions. In asking for a 
new rule the New Yorkers were requesting a personal favor for 
their candidate, which, under the circumstances, they had no 
right to expect. Van Buren himself had not been overscrupulous 
about accepting a nomination at the hands of Jackson's "made 
to order ' ' convention. He had small reason to complain because 
the advantage was now with his opponents. On the first ballot he 
received a majority of the votes, but not the necessary two-thirds. 
In succeeding ballots his vote steadily decreased. After the 
seventh ballot had been taken, J. L. Miller, of Ohio, moved, by 
resolution, to declare Van Buren the party nominee, on the 
ground that he had, on the first ballot, carried a majority of the 
convention. Hickman, of Pennsylvania, caused much laughter 
by moving that General Jackson be nominated for President by 
a unanimous vote. Both motions were ruled to be out of order, 
and the convention adjourned for the day without having selected 
a candidate. 

The evening of May 28, the second day of the convention, was / 

a momentous one for Polk ; and Pillow and George Bancroft are / 

in substantial agreement as to what happened, except that each 
claims first honors in the transactions which took place. In a 
letter to Polk, in which he chronicled the events of the day, PilloAV 
said : "I have within the last few minutes received a proposition 
from a leading Delegate of Pennsylvania and of Massachusetts to 
bring your name before the Convention for President. ' ' Pillow 
explained to them that if done at all this must be done by the 
North. "There is, I think a strong probability of your name 



238 JAMES E. POLE 

ultimately coming up for President. I do not think it prudent 
to move in that matter now. I want the North to bring you 
forward as a Compromise of all interests. ' "^^ The delegate from 
Massachusetts was evidently George Bancroft, for, in a letter to 
Polk, Bancroft said that after the convention had adjourned on 
the second day "it flashed on my mind, that it would be alone 
safe to rally on you."''' Carrol and Hubbard, of the New Hamp- 
shire delegation, heartily agreed, and likewise Governor INIortou, 
of Massachusetts. 

I then went to your faithful friends Gen. Pillow and Donelson. They 
informed me that if we of N. E. would lead off, they would follow Avith 
Mississippi and Alabama. . . . Certain of this, I repaired with Gen. Donel- 
son and Pillow to the house where were the delegates of Ohio and New York, 
and I spent the time till midnight in arguing with them. 

Medary, of Ohio, was agreeable, and assured Bancroft that Ohio 
would go for Polk in preference to Cass. Kemble, of New York, 
also agreed to support Polk. 

On the morning of the third day, May 29, Tibbatts, of Ken- 
tucky, withdrew the name of Richard M. Johnson and, as Pillow 
reported to Polk, ' ' we brought your name before the Convention 
for the Presidency."'^ On the first ballot of the day, the eighth 
of the session, Polk received forty-four votes.'- As soon as the 



69 Pillow to Polk, May 28, 1884 (Am. Hist. Bev., July, 1906, 841). 

70 Bancroft to Polk, July 6, 1844 (Howe, Life and Letters of George 
Bancroft, I, 253). Years afterward Bancroft wrote a still more detailed 
account of his activities during that evening. He stated explicitly that 
' ' I'olk owed his nomination by the Democratic Convention to me, ' ' and that 
"I was the one who of my own mind and choice, first, on the adjournment 
of the nominating convention, for the day, resolved to secure the nomina- 
tion for Polk" (Bancroft to I. G. Karrisi,' Bancroft Papers. Lenox Librai-y; 
cited by Eeeves in Am. Hist. Eev., July, 1906, 841). Perhaps, without 
realizing it, Bancroft was inspired by Pillow and Laughlin to suggest 
Polk's nomination. 

'1 Cave Johnson told Polk that John Kettlew^ell, of Baltimore, was 
' ' the man who first started your name in the Baltimore Convention ' ' 
(Johnson to Polk, Jan. 11, 1845, Polk Papers). 

72 In his letter of the 29th to Polk Pillow said 42 votes, but the Balti- 
more Sun reported the vote as follows: Van Buren, 104; Cass, 114; Polk, 
44; Buchanan, 2; and Calhoun, 2. Polk received 6 from N. H., 7 from 
Mass., 2 from Pa., 1 from Md., 9 from Ala., 6 from La., and the 13 votes 
of Tennessee. 



SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 239 

result had been announced, Frazer, of Pennsylvania, stated that 
he had at first voted for Van Buren because he had been instructed 
to do so, and then for Buchanan as the favorite son of his state ; 
but seeing that neither could be nominated, he had cast his vote 
for "James K. Polk, the bosom friend of Gen. Jackson, and a 
pure, whole-hogged democrat, the known enemy of banks and 
distribution.'' His remarks were greeted with applause and 
several warm friends of Van Buren now announced that for 
similar reasons they were ready to unite upon Polk. Governor 
Hubbard, of New Hampshire, and General Howard, of Mary- 
land, pleaded for Polk and harmony, and Medary pledged the 
vote of Ohio.''^ Roane took the Virginia delegation out for con- 
sultation and returned to announce that its vote would be trans- 
ferred from Cass to Polk.'^ The ninth ballot had not proceeded 
far before it became evident that it would be the last. The Polk 
list became so large that Butler withdrew the name of Van 
Buren, and many who had supported other favorites now trans- 
ferred their votes to the Tennessean. In this way his vote was 
made unanimous, and although South Carolina was not repre- 
sented officially, Elmore and Pickens were present and pledged 
the support of their state to the new candidate. Silas Wright, 
of New York, a warm friend of Van Buren, was nominated for 
Vice-President ; he declined the honor, and George M. Dallas 
was chosen in his stead.^^ A series of resolutions was adopted, 
one of which declared in favor of "the re-occupation of Oregon 
and the re-annexation of Texas at the earliest practicable period. ' ' 
The committee on resolutions had considered the "one term" 
pledge which had been referred to it by the convention, but 
reported against such a restriction on the ground that it would 



^3 Speaking of Bancroft's influence, Laughlin told Polk that "he and 
old Morton ' ' were mainly responsible for wheeling the ' ' Yankee States ' ' 
into line (Laughlin to Polk, May 31, 1844, Folic Fapers). 

"^Bancroft to Polk (Howe, op. cit., I, 254). 

■^5 The above details, unless otherwise noted, have been taken from the 
report of the convention published in the Baltimore Stm, May 28-30, and 
Niles' Register, June 1, 1844. 



240 JAMES K. POLK 

be inconsistent to take such action after so many had been 
instructed to support Van Bnren for a second term. 

When notifying Polk of his nomination, Pillow"''' was inclined 
to take all the credit for bringing it about. To be sure, he very 
modestly said that "I had good help in some true-men in the 
North," but that he "got no help" from "our home people." 
On the other hand, Bancroft has made it clear that Donelson took 
a leading part in procuring votes for Polk, and it is unlikely 
that two such veteran politicians as Laughlin and Cave Johnson 
were entirely inactive. It appears that the knowledge of Jack- 
son's preference for Polk was by no means confined to Tennes- 
seans,"'^ and it would be interesting to know in what degree this 
fact had a bearing on the ultimate choice of the convention. 

From the above account it will be seen that Polk 's nomination 
resulted from a combination of influences originally distinct. 
Seeing no hope of their own election, both Tyler and Calhoui^ 
were ready, for two reasons, to lend their support to the new 
candidate. In the first place, he believed as they did on the 
Texas question ; in the second, so long as the office was beyond 
their own reach, they would rather see it go to a new man than 
to one of the competitors who had so roundly abused them. In 
the long run the Van Burenites were, for similar reasons, con- 
strained to acquiesce in Polk's nomination and to contribute 
their support to his campaign. The Calhoun faction and the 
insurgent element led by R. J. Walker were enemies in other 
respects, but they agreed on annexation and therefore combined 
successfully to prevent the nomination of A^'an Buren. There is 
plenty of evidence that the Van Burenites had no love for Polk, 



"6 His letter bore the date May 30, but obviously it was written on the 
29th {Am. Hist. Rev., July, 1906, 84:2). 

"' J. B. Jones, writing from Baltimore to his paper, the Madisonian, 
May 29, said: "It is true I hear it whispered about the streets, that the 
nomination of Mr. Polk was agreed upon at the Hermitage, Mr. B. F. 
Butler, in behalf of Mr. Van Buren and the Globe, concurring" (Madi- 
sonian, May 30, 1844). 



SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 241 

yet their feeling toward him was indifference rather than hos- 
tility. Though they were not strong enough to nominate their 
favorite, they could at least veto the nomination of an objec- 
tionable rival like Cass, and, within certain limits, could deter- 
mine the choice of the candidate. To Polk they had no specific 
objection ; consequently, if all factions would agree to accept him, 
his nomination w^ould be less objectionable than that of Cass 
or Buchanan. Therefore they made a virtue of necessity and 
reluctantly transferred from Van Buren to Polk. They claimed 
afterwards that they had been responsible for Polk's nomination, 
and this was true in the sense that they could have prevented it ; 
still, under the circumstances, Polk had small reason to feel under 
obligation to men who, after all, had acquiesced in his nomination 
merely as a choice of evils. 

Even before the appearance of his anti-Texas letter, Van 
Bureau had little real popularity outside of a small circle of 
friends. After its publication, his defeat at the polls being 
inevitable, his nomination would have meant party suicide. This 
fact should have been obvious to his most ardent supporters, and 
yet they chose to regard his defeat at Baltimore as the result of 
a series of political intrigues. They did not, of course, have all 
the information which is now accessible, consequently the motives 
of many of their contemporaries M'ere misjudged. Benton's 
version of Van Buren 's downfall has already been noted; still 
more elaborate and equally erroneous is the version of Gideon 
Welles. 

In a history of the contest which he prepared but never pub- 
lished,'^^ Welles, like Benton, attributed the shelving of Van 
Buren to a many-sided intrigue in which Calhoun, originally, 
was the chief actor.'^ In a "last desperate struggle for the 



78 MS article, ''A Eeview of the Political History of the United States 
and Presidential Contests" {Welles Papers, Library of Congress). 

79 "If Mr. Calhoun was insatiable in his ambition, he was also fertile 
in his schemes to promote it. They were often visionary and startling, 
so much so as to forfeit rather than beget general confidence, yet to those 



242 JAMES K. POLK 

presidency" he brought forward the Texas question, and, when 
he entered Tyler's cabinet, he believed that the President would 
assist him. His main object, up to this time, according to "Welles, 
was to make Van Buren's nomination impossible. But Tyler 
appropriated the Texas question and resolved to stand for reelec- 
tion ; and while many Democrats were ready to espouse annexa- 
tion, they would not rally to the standard of Calhoun. In other 
words, he had succeeded in weakening A^an Buren, but had failed 
in the attempt to attract support for himself. Robert J. Walker, 
said Welles, was interested in the annexation of Texas because it 
offered an opportunity for land-scrip speculation. Working 
through Mason, Tyler 's Secretary of the Navy, Walker had con- 
vinced the Richmond politicians that the surest means of defeat- 
ing the aspirations of Calhoun was the nomination of some other 
pro-Texas Democrat. The preference of the Virginians, said 
Welles, was Levi Woodbury, but on arriving at Baltimore they 
found that New England would not support him. 

Up to this point, with some modification as to Walker's 
motives, Welles 's account is apparently accurate, but his state- 
ments concerning the promotion of Polk's interests are erroneous 
in detail and give an unfair impression of the attitude of the 
Tennessee politicians. 

Although Calhoun had announced before the meeting of the 
convention that he would not permit his name to be presented, 
Welles believed that he still had hopes of being nominated and 
that they had been blasted by the nomination of Polk. After 
asserting that Polk was ''brought forward" by the friends of 
Van Buren who, under the cii'cumstances, would not support any 
of the other competitors, Welles then proceeds to tell how the 
Tennesseans under the leadership of Cave Johnson and Gideon 



with whom he was intimate, or who were within the circle of his influence, 
there was a charm in his plans that was to the adventurous inviting. 
There were always some one or more prominent points in his intrigues 
that enlisted ardent supporters, and on these points he concentrated the 
energies of an intellect of unusual power, and pursued his object with an 
intensity that had no limits. ' ' 



SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 243 

Pillow had, for some time before the meeting of the convention, 
been playing a "deep and subtle game" to procure Polk's nom- 
ination. They ' ' concealed their purpose from Genl Jackson who 
would give no countenance to the movement "[!] ; they "fast- 
ened themselves on Wright and Benton as friends and partisans 
of Van Buren, which they were except in the contingency of 
securing Polk's nomination," betrayed their confidence and 
secretly intrigued against Van Buren.^° 

Many of the items in Welles 's statement may be true enough, 
but in one of the main clauses the terms are inverted. He con- 
tends that the Tennesseans were ready to support Van Buren 
unless they could nominate Polk ; whereas, they desired to nom- 
inate Polk because Van Buren 's nomination, or his election at 
any rate, was no longer possible. Their efforts in Polk's behalf 
were made not only with Jackson's knowledge, but at his instiga- 
tion. Under the circumstances, neither he nor they considered 
these efforts to be a betrayal of Van Buren. Surely Jackson had 
made it clear to both Van Buren and Butler, as well as to Benton, 
that he favored the nomination of some pro-Texas candidate. So 
successful, however, were the Tennessee delegates in their decep- 
tion, according to Welles, that the friends of Van Buren "had 
no conception of the duplicity in that quarter" until all was 
over, and then they were forced to support the party nominee. 
The "reserve" of Wright and the "indignant resentment" of 
Benton were caused by the discovery of this "treachery." The 
New York Democrats worked loyally for the ticket, and "few 
knew what doubt & repugnance their strongest men entertained 
for the candidate " [ ! ] 

The New Yorkers were chagrined by the defeat of their 
favorite, and not knowing all the facts, it was natural for them 
to suspect the motives of those who had profited by their defeat. 



80 Welles admits that for two years the Tennesseans had been loyal to 
Van Buren while others were intriguing against him. He states that New 
Yorkers desired to associate Polk on the ticket with the ex-President, 
instead of R. M. Johnson. This is extremely improbable. 



2U JAMES K. POLK 

It was rumored at Baltimore that Polk's nomination had been 
agreed upon at the Hermitage, and Whig papers made assertions 
to this effect.'*^ In stating to Polk his reasons for declining the 
Vice-Presidential nomination, Wright said that the people of 
New York believed that there had been intrigue against Van 
Buren in the convention and that votes for Polk could be pro- 
cured in the state only by asserting that the candidate had had 
nothing to do with the intrigue.^- Doubtless Wright shared the 
belief of his associates ; but even if all of the charges against the 
insurgent element had been true. Van Buren 's rejection had been 
brought about not so much by intrigue as by the application of 
the Democratic doctrine of majority rule. To be sure, he received 
the votes of a majority of the convention, but the delegates had 
been selected before his views on Texas had become known ; and 
although there is no means of ascertaining with certainty the 
desire of Democratic voters as a whole, there is ample reason for 
believing that a large majority of them did not prefer Van Buren 
after the publication of his anti-Texas letter. From the first, 
Calhoun Democrats had been openly hostile, and those led by 
Walker, whom Welles had called the "chief engine" of the con- 
vention, made no attempt to conceal their unalterable opposition 
to Van Buren. It is not easy to see why their efforts to defeat his 
nomination should be termed an intrigue any more than the efforts 
of his supporters to procure it. Even "Old Hickory" did not 
hesitate to say that no anti-Texas man could possibly win, and 
surely he could not be accused of plotting against his old friend 
and protege. Naturally Polk's immediate friends did not confide 



81 "There is one circumstance, and only one," said the Nashville Union 
(June 11, 1844) in denying these charges, "which could impress any 
honest mind with the belief that General Jackson controlled the nomi- 
nation—that circumstance is this: the worlc is so well done, that to an honest 
mind, it looks reasonable that, it might luive' been done by old Hickory !" 

82 Wright to Polk, June 2, 1844, Polk Papers. It has been said, con- 
tinued Wright, that Yan Buren was set aside because of his anti-Texas 
letter. Better leave it so. Had he (Wright), who held the same views, 
accepted the nomination on an annexation ticket, the people would have 
concluded that Van Buren had been dropped for some other reason. 



SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 245 

their secret hopes to Wright or to Benton, and the realization of 
these hopes was contingent on the defeat of Van Buren's nom- 
ination ; but if this amounted to deception, it should be remem- 
bered that the ex-President 's doom was sealed by the vote of 148 
to 118 in favor of the two-thirds rule, and even if the Tennessee 
delegates had joined with the minority, such action would not 
have altered the result. Van Buren had always been indifferent 
^ when Polk stood in need of assistance, consequently there was no 
valid reason why the Tennesseans should continue to follow the 
ex-President in his pursuit of a forlorn hope. On the first seven 
ballots they voted for Cass, after which they transferred to Polk. 
Irrespective of intrigues in his behalf, the selection of Polk 
as the compromise candidate was quite natural, if not inevitable. 
Apparently, a majority at least had come to Baltimore prepared 
to support him for the second place. He was the only aspirant 
who was not also a candidate for the Presidency, and for that 
reason, objectionable to the different factions. The Van Burenites 
would not support any of their hero's rivals, w4th the possible 
exception of Colonel Johnson ; and the other factions would never 
consent to make Johnson the Presidential candidate. Some new 
man must be selected ; and of these, who had a better claim than 
Polk's? As a member of Congress he had done valiant party 
service, and had proved himself to be a man of ability and discre- 
tion. The statements made by Welles^^ that he ' ' was destitute of 
personal popularity" and especially that he had "no qualities to 
recommend him" are gross exaggerations. Welles himself had 
expressed a different opinion in 1844.^^ Even Horace Greely, 
although he spoke disparagingly of Polk during the campaign, 
had, in 1839, called him ' ' one of the ablest men and most powerful 



83 Welles, loc. cit. 

84 In a letter written to Van Buren, Nov. 13, 1844, he asked whether 
Polk would have sufficient energy and discernment to make the adminis- 
tration his own, and added that * ' my own belief is, that he will prove 
himself worthy of being the choice of the democracy, after it could not 
have its first choice" {Van Buren Papers). 



24G JAMES K. FOLK 

speakers in the south west. ' '-^ General Jackson aptly summarized 
Polk's qualifications for office when he wrote that 

his capacity for business [is] great — aud to extraordinary powers of labor, 
both mental and physical, he unites that tact and judgment which are 
requisite to the successful direction of such an office as that of Chief 
Magistrate of a free people.ss 

Joseph Storey was ''thunderstruck" by the selection made at 
Baltimore ; Governor Letcher exclaimed * ' Polk ! Great God, what 
a nomination!";*' and the Whig journals predicted an easy vic- 
tory. But the Democrats, in the public press and in private cor- 
respondence, gave abundant evidence of both satisfaction and 
relief because a party crisis had been averted. Of course, due 
allowance must be made for partisan zeal, and for a self-seeking 
desire to stand well with the nominee. No doubt many professed 
a friendship which they did not feel, and, in the hope of reward, 
claimed to have been influential in procuring the nomination.-'' 
Still, he was scarcely less popular than any of the other aspirants, 
and as the campaign proceeded it came to be recognized generallj^ 
that the convention had chosen the leader who would be most 
likely to win. 

The Spectator, which was supposed to voice the sentiments 
of Calhoun, while expressing surprise that Polk had been selected, 
nevertheless approved the choice which had been made.*^ Its 



S5 Biognrphical Annual, 1841, p. 52. When quoting this the Washington 
Globe, July 12, 1844, called attention to the fact that Clay lived in the 
southwest. 

86 Letter dated June 24. Quoted by Nashville Union, Aug. \?->, 1844. 

8" Story to McLean, Aug. 16, 1844, McLean Papers. Letcher to Bu- 
chanan, July 7, 1844, B^ichanan Papers. 

88 "If you were here," wrote Pillow, "you would imagine yourself 
the most popular man in the world, and you would be sure you never Itad 
an enemy in the convention. You cannot know how much pains they take 
to give in to me their adhesion to you, and to impress me with the i/reat 
merit of their conduct." "Never," said Benton, "was such a multitude 
seen claiming the merit of Polk 's nomination, and demanding the reward, 
for having done what had been done before thev heard of it" (Pillow to 
Polk, May 30 (29?), 1844, Polk Papers; Benton, Thirty Tears' View, II, 
594). 

80 Spectator, May 29, 1844. 



SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 247 

editor, John Heart, announced his intention to publish a weekly 
journal, to be called ' ' Young Hickory ' ' in honor of Polk. Tyler 
was nominated by a convention of his own, but his letter of 
acceptance intimated that he might cease to be a candidate if 
Texas should be annexed by treaty or otherwise.''" Polk entered 
the canvass, therefore, supported by an apparently united Democ- 
racy, and with some prospect of eventual assistance from those 
who had recently unfurled to the breeze the banner of "Tyler 
and Texas." 



90 Nat. Intel}., May 31, 1844. Several years later he hinted that his 
main object had been to force the Democrats to stand firmly for Texas 
(Tyler to Wise, Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, II, 317). 



CHAPTEE XIII 
CAMPAIGN OF 1844 

"Who is James K. Polk?" Such was the derisive query 
raised by the Whigs as soon as the result of the Democratic con- 
vention had been announced.^ It was an effective campaign cry. 
More than argument could have done it attached to Polk the 
stigma of mediocrity and obscurity, and, to some extent at least, 
it appears to have influenced the opinion of later generations. 
But as it turned out this very cry recoiled as a boomerang upon 
those who hurled it, for this "obscure" person was soon to be 
known as the vanquisher of their own renowned "Prince Hal." 

Justly or unjustly, both in 1844 and since that time, Clay has 
enjoyed the reputation of being a great man. On the other 
hand, Polk's opponents have rated him as a man possessed of 
scarcely second-class ability — a man whom accident alone had 
placed in an exalted position. Even his friends have usually 
been rather apologetic — not insisting that he was really a great 
man, but that he was more able than he has been represented to 
be by his adversaries. 

The Whigs entered the campaign full of confidence in their 
standard bearer and delighted that the Democratic party had 
made the "blunder" of passing over a man of ability like Van 
Buren, and had as the National Intelligencer put it, ^'let itself 
down" to Polk. The Demcrats, on the contrary, while they rallied 
loyally to the ticket, wei-e manifestly full of misgivings because 
one of the prominent men of the party had not been selected to 



1 Writing from Columbia, S. C, to Crittenden, Wm. C Preston said: 
"The democrats here cry hurra for Polk iu the street and come round to 
ask me who the devil he is" (undated letter in the Crittenden Papers, 
vol. 9). 



CAMPAIGN OF 1844 219 

enter the contest with Clay. Some of the newspapers, while ad- 
mitting that Polk was not of the first rank, argued tliat great 
men and democracy were incompatible. 

And yet, what is a great man, and by what standard is he 
measured? In his long career in the political field. Clay had 
been an opportunist, and, to a considerable degree, an adventurer. 
He had mounted one hobby after another in the hope of political 
advancement. There was little consistency in his record, for the 
panacea which he advocated on any particular occasion might 
differ radically in principle from the one offered only a year or 
two before. Many of the policies championed by Clay were vision- 
ary and impracticable, and few of them would now be considered 
sound. Furthermore, if greatness is to be rated by success. 
Clay's claim to it was not very well founded; for although he 
frequently succeeded in upsetting the plans of others, he was 
seldom successful in inaugurating his own most cherished policies. 
His greatest strength lay in his power of persuasion, and his 
greatest achievements were in compromising the divergent views 
of others and in procuring the adoption of measures after the 
compromise had been agreed upon. 

Polk early adopted the fundamentals of the Jeffersonian 
creed. A conservative by nature, he was wary of experiments 
and shaped his course in accordance with the principles of the 
party which had been founded by his patron. His record, there- 
fore, was consistent, and he could seldom be accused of trimming 
his sails to catch the varying winds of popular opinion. He was 
not a creator of issues, but his judgment on those which were 
presented was far sounder, as a rule, than that of his great 
opponent. With no pretense to oratory, he was an effective and 
convincing debater, while his thorough knowledge on public 
questions was conceded even by his foes. "When he was nominated 
for the Presidency, he could point to a career of almost uniform 
successes, and as President few have had a more definite program 
to carry out or have succeeded so well in accomplishing their 



250 JAMES K. POLK 

purposes. But in spite of all this Clay was conceded a place in 
the first rank of statesmen, while many, even of Polk's supporters, 
did not claim for their candidate more than second-rate ability. 
The Democratic Review,- although it denounced the methods by 
which Clay had achieved his fame, did not deny that in the 
popular mind Clay was rated higher than Polk, so it made the 
best of the situation by saying that "our opponents are welcome 
to all their pride in their chief as a 'great man' — we are content 
with ours as a good one, and great enough for all practical 
purposes. ' ' 

At the time that the two men were nominated, it was natural 
enough that Clay should be heralded as the superior of his rival. 
It was a period that was dominated by great personalities, and 
spectacular qualities were regarded as essential attributes of 
greatness. The influence wielded by Clay, Webster, and Calhoun, 
resulted more from the eloquence of their delivery than from the 
soundness of their arguments. Even the tempestuous and gen- 
erally illogical conduct of President Jackson was easily mistaken 
for statesmanship. 

Polk was not possessed of spectacular qualities, and he never 
tried to cultivate them. He was by nature secretive, even sly,^ 
and the degree of his influence in shaping public policies was 
known only to his intimate friends. In all of those qualities 
w^iich are thought to make men illustnous, Polk suffered by com- 
parison with his rival ; but, as the Review pointed out, a Demo- 
cratic candidate might succeed without possessing them, however 
essential they might be for the Whig. 

In no other campaign has Democracy and Whiggery so 
definitely contested for victory; in no other campaign have the 



2 Article on "First and Second Eate Men," August, 1844. 

3 For example, he made a practice of sending his Nashville correspond- 
ence under an extra cover, addressed to General Armstrong, so that his 
opponents, through the Whig postmaster, might not learn its final desti- 
nation. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1844 251 

candidates so clearly represented the principles and policies of 
their respective parties.* 

Polk was the first "dark horse" ever nominated for President 
by a political party, but while his name had not been previously 
associated with that office, it is not true that he was unknown or 
that his nomination was entirely accidental. The Baltimore con- 
vention did not simply make a grab in the dark, with the hope 
that either Providence or Fate would save the party from disaster. 
The man who, as chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, 
had borne the brunt of the war against the Bank was unknown 
to neither party ; a Speaker who was so thoroughly hated that his 
opponents had wished- to deny him the customary vote of thanks 
could not have been so soon forgotten — least of all by the Whigs. 
He had never filled any of the great executive offices, but he had 
been intrusted by his party, during a most critical period, Avith 
the two most responsible positions in the lower house of Congress. 
No faction of his party doubted his ability, but like John Quincy 
Adams, his personal following was small. For personal reasons, 
many in the party may have preferred another candidate, but, if 
a certain newspaper story is to be credited, Clay, at least, 
recognized that the wisest choice had been made.^ 



4 ' ' The two candidates indeed, with a felicity of adaptation and corre- 
spondence, which is no mere accident, may be said in a remarkable manner 
to represent, respectively, the spirit and character of the two great parties 
by whom they have been chosen. . . . Mr. Clay is truly the living embodi- 
ment and incarnation of his party. Eloquent, showy, versatile, adroit, 
imperious, . . . the first Whig in America. A second-rate man in point of 
eloquence, intellectual force, and eminence of rank, would never have 
answered — could never have been adopted — as the head of such a party. 
We concede them this credit. They are naturally fond of splendor and 
strength — large and sweeping action — bold and brilliant energy and enter- 
prise. Such is precisely the character their instinct has ever tended and 
striven to impress upon the government. ' ' Thus abbreviated, this char- 
acterization of Clay and his party is by no means an inaccurate descrip- 
tion, and it is quite as true that Polk would ' ' have been perfectly satisfactory 
to us for the presidency, even if he possessed in a far less degree than he 
has already amply proved, the further addition of the latter qualification 
[intellectual eminence], for the high office to which he is about to be 
called" {Dem. Eev., August, 1844). 

5 ''When the news of the democratic nomination reached Ashland, 
young Clay, who was impatiently waiting its announcement at the office. 



252 . JAMES K. POLK 

Apparently the Democrats of all sections received the news 
of the nominations with genuine satisfaction — only in the Van 
Buren camp were there signs of resentment and reluctant sup- 
port. They had not looked with favor on Polk's claim to the 
Vice-Presidency, and now he had beaten their patron in the race 
for first place. One of Catron's letters throws some interesting 
light on the attitude of political leaders toward Polk. It indi- 
cates also that, aside from the Texas question, Polk had profited 
by a desire on the part of the younger Democrats to get rid of 
the older leaders, by whom they had "been treated as boys.'' 
Together with others to be cited presently, this letter seems to 
make it plain that Polk's desire for a new party organ did not 
result from any bargain with Calhoun, but from a real distrust 
of the Globe, which of course was the organ of Van Buren.'"' 

Polk's nomination was a victory for the annexationists, and 
it was also a victory for the younger element of the party. All 
factions were in duty bound to support the ticket, but it was 
evident from the first that "old fogies" must give way to those 



hastened with the news to his father, who remained at home. 'Well, my 
son, who is nominated?' 'Guess, father.' 'Why Matty, of course.' 'No, 
father; guess again.' 'Cass?' 'No.' 'Buchanan?' 'No.' 'Then who 
the devil have they nominated?' 'James K. Polk,' said the son. The 
old man started from his seat, and rushing across the room, with disap- 
pointed hopes painted on his countenance, exclaimed, 'Beat again, by 
G-d' " (N. Y. Plebeian, copied in tlie Washington Globe, Oct. 29, 1844). 

6 "Mr. Van B.," said Catron, "was out of luck — -we again have it. 
Had the Dem. Con. met a month sooner, we w'd have been ruined in the 
west & South for ten years. Clay is out fully — many of the undermen 
are out, on annexation- — and we have the strength added of a rejection 
of our V. P. on the precise ground, drawing in all the Calhoun strength — 
a vast, & controlling power, in the South. Among the leaders, you have 
many jealousies to quiet; they feared to see you on any ticket as vice, for 
fear you would set up for chief, after the first success. My position has 
let me into the deepest recesses of these things. I traversed the city night 
after night, last winter, encountering and pledging myself to the contrary 
of this opinion: But, sir, I made no converts, as I then believed. Bu- 
chanan was for Johnson — Benton for King; the Van B. men for either, 
sooner than yourself" [Both Calhoun and Tyler friendly to Polk]. "The 
coarse brutality of the Globe, was loathed last winter, by a large majority 
of our party." . . . "Your strength lies mainly as I think in this; you 
are of the present generation — the old leaders are thrown off; to do this 
has been an ardent wish by nineteen in twenty of our party in the House 



CAMPAIGN OF 1844 253 

who were abreast of the times. Old in years, but young in spirit, 
Jackson gave his enthusiastic support to both platform and candi- 
dates;^ nevertheless, even his wishes went unheeded in cases 
where he desired to restore any of the ' ' old guard ' ' to power. 

Within a few days after Polk's nomination, his Tennessee 
friends in Washington began to formulate plans, not only for 
the campaign, but for his course as President of the United States. 
The most active — not to say presumptuous — of all was A. V. 
Brown, who did not hesitate to draft a list of instructions for the 
guidance of the candidate. First of all Polk was told that he 
must, in his letter of acceptance, commit himself to a one-term 
policy.^ The Democratic platform had said nothing on this 
point, but it was evidently thought necessary to checkmate the 
Whigs, whose platform had limited their candidate to a single 
term. Besides, as Brown seems very clearly to intimate, other 
"deserving Democrats"^ with high aspirations might be expected 
to support the campaign with more enthusiasm if they could be 
assured that the way would be open for them at the end of four 



E. for two sessions — but they would not do it, as they believed — not as I 
believed. They are now gone" (Catron to Polk, June 8, [1844], Polk 
Papers). 

~ "Although I regret losing Mr. V. B. and the cause, yet T rejoice that 
the Convention have made choice of those worthy Democrats, Polk and 
Dallas. They are the strongest and best selection that could have been 
made" (Jackson to Gen. Planche, June 14, 1844, Polk Papers. Same to 
W. G. Reeves et at., June 5, 1844, Wash. Globe, June 28, 1844). Polk 
doubted that the Planche (often spelled Plauche) letter was intended for 
publication, and thought it imprudent in Planche to publish it. He feared 
the cry of "dictation" (Polk to Donelson, July 11, 1844, "Polk-Donelson 
Letters"). 

8 "In your acceptance you must some way or other express yourself in 
favor of the one term system. This is important — I might say all im- 
portant — you will know exactly how it will be highly useful. The thing is 
right i)er se & under all the circumstances I think you ought- not to hesitate 
to do it" (Brown to Polk, May 30, 1844, Polk Papers). 

9 Laughlin, although not without some doubt as to the wisdom of such 
a declaration, thought that "perhaps all in all it may be best — and will 
be making assurance doubly sure, and put us on an equality with the 
Whigs on that question" (Laughlin to Polk, .May 31, 1844, Polk Papers). 



254 JAMES K. POLK 

years. Although Brown's suggestion may have been entirely 
superfluous, the one-term pledge found a place in Polk 's letter of 
acceptance.^*' 

The next instruction was for Polk to prepare data on his life 
and career for Brown to turn over to Bancroft, Kendall, or some 
other person who would incorporate it into a biography.^^ An- 
other thing to be considered, said Brown, was whether the Glohe 
was to be continued as ''the Polk organ"; and while he was not 
yet certain that it should not be so continued, it is apparent that 
the discarding of that paper was already being discussed. ^- 

Cave Johnson, as well as Brown and Catron, distrusted the 
Glohe,^^ but he by no means believed in courting the favor of or 
permitting the domination by the southern wing of the party. 
On June 1 he wrote to Polk that the party was more united than 
at any time since the election of Jackson, but he pointed out that 
danger might result from the fact that the South had been zealous 
in procuring Polk's nomination. The Glohc, he said, is noncom- 
mittal, and is already expressing doubts of Democratic success — 
a new paper of unquestioned loyalty is very much needed. Two 
weeks later he wrote that matters are growing worse and must 
soon come to a head. "The struggle now is by a few Southern 
men to appropriate you & the nomination to their exclusive bene- 
fit whilst the northern Democrats are determined to vield no such 



10 Tn 1835 Polk had, ou the floor of the House, advocated a single term 
for all Presidents {Cong. Globe, 23 Cong., 2 sess., part 2, 292). 

11 Brown had asked Laughlin to write the biography and it was he in 
turn who had suggested Bancroft (Laughlin to Polk, May 31, 1844, Poll- 
Pa per s). 

12 "Much is said here by some as to continuing the Globe as the Polk 
organ — this we will manage with sound discretion. The Globe will change 
its tone & perhaps take back much that it has said & go in warmly if not 
heartily — if so — well. But we will not commit ourselves to it after the 
election. ' ' 

13 "Benton & the Globe falls in but not with so good a grace as we 
expected" (Johnson to Polk, May 31, 1844, Polk Papers). He referred 
to an editorial of the 29th in which Blair had said that the nomination of 
Polk would at first be received with disappointment by those who had 
stood for favorites, but that a little reflection would convince all tliat it 
was for the best. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1844 255 

thing. ' ' Johnson had called a caucus in the hope of compromising 
differences, but the northern men became alarmed for fear the 
Calhoun members would get control ; and Johnson decided that 
the best thing he could do was to prevent anything from being 
done. 

I have been to see S. W. Jr. [Silas Wright] hoping to have it controled 
in some way & ended — he is furious and I think determined to push 
C[alhoun] and his clique to the wall or finish — in this battle. The object 
of hotli will be to make us take sides — the Northern know, that you have 
always been with them, whilst the South think that the question & the posi- 
tion of Genl J[ackson] will take you Avith them — how both are to be kept 
I cannot see — already we have much secret talk of upsetting the Globe — 
turning Benton overboard «&c. I was disgusted to day, even Eeuben Whit- 
ney talked of turning Benton out of the Democratic church. I am sick of 
this state of things & see no means of avoiding the explosion & most anxious 
to leave here.i* 

Johnson's fears increased rather than abated, for a few days 
later he expressed a belief that the combined obstinacy of Benton 
and the South Carolinians would lead to a southern movement 
that might imperil not only the Democratic party but the Union 
itself.^" It seems very evident that Johnson had entered into no 



14 Johnson to Polk, June 13, 1844, Folk Papers. 

15 He has seen, he said, many prominent Democrats and all are pleased 
with the nominations, but ' ' the only difficulty I fear arises from the course 
of T. H. Benton, when connected with the movements of S. C. The latter 
uses immediate, annexation for the purpose of uniting the South and killing 
T. H. B. & will if practicable identify you & Genl J. with all their future 
movements — fears are entertained in the North, that this may he so — & 
if any incident takes place to confirm the suspicion, our cause is jeoparded. 
I have given every assurance to S. W. Jr. & a few others that you could 
not be induced to separate yourself from the Northern Democracy — in- 
stanced your former course, in the case of White &c &c and also thought 
it impossible that Genl J. should lend himself to any such purpose. The 
only danger of the latter taking any step to favor the Southern movement 
they think will arise, from some letter from him, that will seem to favor 
the movement without sufficiently weighing the consequences. 

' * Can not you see him & have a free conversation as to the Southern 
movement & put him on his guard?" Johnson fears that there will be a 
southern convention called to meet at Nashville, and advises that this 
should be forestalled by an earlier meeting to which Wright and other 
northern men should be'invited. "I have the most serious apprehensions 
from the Southern movement not only to our cause but the country. 
Mason & Dickson's line now divides the Methodist church & will soon 



256 JAMES K. FOLK 

agreement with southern delegates to procure Polk's nomination, 
and it is equally clear that he had no desire to see the party 
brought under southern domination. He desired harmony, to 
be sure, and support from all factions, but harmony that would 
leave Polk indebted to neither section — free and unhampered in 
shaping his own course. Polk's replies show that he fully agreed 
with the views expressed by Johnson. He promptly warned 
General Jackson and took other steps to forestall a sectional con- 
vention ; "no countenance must be given to any attempt should 
it be made."^*^ A few days later he asked Donelson to prepare an 
article on this subject for the Nashville Union. "The idea," 
said he, "of a Southern convention or a sectional meeting at Nash- 
ville or elsewhere must not for a momoit he entertained." He 
did not believe it to be necessary to allude specifically to disunion 
sentiments in South Carolina, but 

Let the article strongly enforce the leading idea, that a meeting of the 
masses from all sections of the Union is what is intended, and let every 
thing giving it the appearance of a sectional or Southern affair be expressly 
negatived. This would have the effect of allaying the fears of the North, 
by satisfying them that we in Tennessee gave no countenance to the sugges- 
tion for a Southern Convention upon the Texas or any other subject. i" 

While Johnson was warning Polk against the southern wing 
of the party, Catron was exhorting him not to listen to those 
who insisted that the salvation of Democracy depended upon the 
restoration to office of the old guard that had been ousted by 
Harrison, "cabinet & all," leaving no place for the rank and 
file whose money and talents would be responsible for the victory. 
"You who fought in the very van," said Catron, 



divide the other churches. This movement will tend to divide political 
parties by it. The Texas question brings into the contest the fanaticism 
of the North with increased fervor. Our only safety for the country & 
our cause depends upon the Southern Democracy maintaining the position 
we have hitherto occupied — firm & consistent friends of the Northern 
Democracy — yielding much for conciliation & harmony" (Johnson to PoHv, 
Louisville, June 21, 1844, Polk Papers). 

10 Polk to Johnson, June 21 [?], 1844, Julv 1, 1844, "Polk- Johnson 
Letters," Tenn. Hist. Mag., Sept., 1915, 245-246). 

I'Polk to Donelson, June 26, 1844, "Polk-Douelson Letters." 



CAMPAIGN OF 1844 257 

and who the wortliy old gentlemen thought last winter, had died in the 
ditch, have been brought out alive, not by their eonseut, nor help, but [by] 
those who look to chances for themselves. ' ' Treason & Traitor, " " rotten 
to the core, ' ' — have been the gentle epithets that have greeted every move 
tending to wrench the power, as a party, from the old clique. Mr. Van 
Buren thought this public opinion, if Col. Benton let him think at all, 
which I doubt.18 

Like Johnson, Catron warned Polk against unnecessarily express- 
ing his views, and, as he had "a soul to be saved," he should 
avoid answering letters of the Sherrod Williams type.^** 

Benton had written a letter in which he had exonerated Polk 
and Dallas from any part in the "intrigue which had nullified 
the choice of the people, "-° but on June 13 he openly accused 
A. V. Brown of having "vicariously" procured from Jackson 
the letter in favor of annexing Texas.-^ While General Jackson 
was charitable enough to attribute Benton's outbursts to insanity, 
caused by the Princeton disaster,-'- others knew that he was simply 
expressing M'hat Van Burenites generally were thinking; and, 
although the appearance of harmony prevailed during the cam- 
paign, mutual distrust was manifest in private correspondence,-^ 
and a break was almost inevitable as soon as the election had 
been held. 

In general, the Democratic press of all sections and factions 
rallied to the support of the candidates without reservation or 



18 Catron to Polk, June 10, [1844], Folk Fapers. 

19 In 1836 Williams had catechised Van Buren, Harrison, and White 
as to their opinions on certain campaign isues. See Shepard, Martin Van 
Buren, 264. 

20 Dated June 3. Nat. Intel!., July 1, 1844; Benton, Thirty Years' Fieiv, 
II, 595. 

21 "A card," printed in the Wash. Globe, June 13, 1844. 

22 "Gen. Jackson was a good deal excited at Benton's course — said 
'he shall hear from me soon'; and asserts that ever since the explosion of 
the big gun Benton has not been in his right mind. I think so too" (J. 
Geo. Harris to Bancroft, June 25, 1844, Polk Papers). 

23 For example, Sactield Maclin, of Tennessee, wrote from Little Eock, 
Arkansas, to Polk, on June 14, that * ' Colo Benton and the Globe for the 
last eighteen months have done our party more damage than all the Whig 
papers in the Union. I have no doubt, and our friends here believe with 
me, that if Colo Benton thought he could hold his place in the affections 
of the Democratic party, and go against you, he would do so with all his 
energy ' ' (Polk Papers) . 



258 JAMES K. POLK 

qualification. Most enthusiastic and influential of all, perhaps, 
was the Richmond Enquirer,-* but Calhoun's Washington organ 
was hardly less effusive in its praise.-^ 

Cass bore his defeat with better grace than any of the 
other aspirants. At a ratification meeting held in Detroit he 
commended the action of the Baltimore convention and promised 
his support. He spoke of Polk as a man who would follow in 
the footsteps of Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Jackson, a 
statement which caused the Charleston Courier to remark that 
Polk, in order to do this, would have to "walk all sorts of 
ways. ' "-'' He took an active part in the campaign-^ and spent his 
energies freely in preaching the Texas gospel in a northern 
latitude. 

Polk's letter accepting the nomination bore the date of June 
12, 1844. In it the most significant phrase, aside from approval 
of the Baltimore platform, was that 

I deem the present to be a proper occasion to declare, that if the nomination 
made by the convention shall be confirmed by the people, I shall enter upon 
the discharge of the high and solemn duties of the office with the settled 
purpose of not being a candidate for reelection. 

This self-denying declaration resulted evidently, as we have 
noted, from an effort to checkmate the Whigs and a desire to 



24 "Mr. Polk's nomination has been received at Baltimore, at Wash- 
ington, and at Eichmond, with enthusiasm. It heals all divisions, unites 
our party with bands of iron. It thwarts every hope the Whigs had in- 
dulged of discord and divisions. It blasts the election of Mr. Clay, and 
saves our country from the sceptre of the dictator. Mr. Polk is true to all 
our republican principles, and he is the friend of Texas." Quoted by 
Nashville Union, June 11, 1844. 

25 ' ' The great mass of the people wantd a man pure in morals, sound 
in political principles, and in favor of the immediate annexation of Texas, 
and such they have in James K. Polk. He is a consistent and sound poli- 
tician, of the Jeffersonian Democratic school; talented, firm and discreet" 
(Washington Spectator, May 29, 1844). 

26 Quoted in Nat. InteU., June 24, 1844. 

2T Geo. N. Sanders to Polk, July 12; Austin E. Wing to Polk, Aug. 2, 
1844, PolJc Papers. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1844 259 

harmonize factional discords in Democratic ranks. ' ' I said noth- 
ing to commit the party upon the one term principle," he told 
Cave Johnson, "but expressed simply my own determination."-* 
The pro-Texas Democrats may be said to have included three 
fairly well defined groups. The first was made up of the fol- 
lowers of Calhoun whose interest centered mainly in promoting 
his advancement. The second comprised those who were not 
friends of Calhoun, but who were interested primarily in wresting 
the control of the party from the hands of the older leaders. 
They saw in the Texas question a possible means of accomplish- 
ing this purpose ; and, in addition, annexation w^ould enlist 
southern sympathies and place the party reins in southern hands. 
Some of them were accused, and perhaps not unjustly, of being 
influenced by prospective profits from Texas land scrip. The 
third group was composed of men like Cave Johnson, and appar- 
ently Polk, who favored annexation but wdio, at the same time, 
did not desire southern domination. They wished above all things 
to harmonize differences which were threatening to disrupt the 
party, if not the Union itself. The second group was most active 
in the nominating convention, and Robert J. Walker, of Missis- 
sippi, was its reputed head. Catron and A. V. Brown were close 
friends of Polk but, unlike Cave Johnson, they had strong lean- 
ings toward the southern groups. Walker had long been inter- 
ested in Texas. During Jackson's administration he had worked 
hard for the recognition of the new republic. In February, 
1844, he had written a long letter in which many reasons were 
assigned why Texas should be annexed.-^ It was alleged by his 
opponents that he was influenced by the hope of profit from land 
speculations, but undoubtedly this personal motive was greatly 
exaggerated. 



28 Polk to Johnson, June 21 [?], 1844, "Polk -Johnson Letters," Tenn. 
Hist. Mag., Sept., 1915, 245. 

29 For an excellent summary, see Smith, Annexation of Texas, 140-144. 



4. 



260 JAMES E. POLK 

The annexation of Texas was not the only question on which 
the Democrats of 1844 were unable to agree. For a time con- 
siderable anxiety was felt for fear that Polk's well-known views 
on tariff might cost him votes in northern states, particularly 
in Pennsylvania. The discussion of Polk's views on this subject 
was precipitated by the so-called Irvin-Hardin correspondence. 
Shortly after Polk's nomination James Irvin, of Pennsylvania, 
had addressed a letter to John J. Hardin, of Illinois,'"^ asking 
about the candidate's opinions on tariff. Hardin replied that 
Polk was a believer in free trade. As soon as Polk read the 
letters in the papers, he asserted that, although the second letter 
had been signed by Hardin, it must have been written by Milton 
Brown, a member of Congress from Tennessee. He asked that 
the "trick" be exposed. ^^ 

Walker undertook to instruct the nominee as to the stand he 
should take on this perplexing subject, and also as to the proper 
treatment of Democrats who had left tlie part}' in 1840. He 
suggested that Polk should make it known tliat he would welcome 
"all Jacksonian Democrats." On the tariff he M'as to declare 
for a revenue basis, adjusted in such a manner as to give "inci- 
dental aid" and a "reasonable profit" to every branch of domes- 
tic industries. He urged especially that the word aid should 
be used instead of protection.^- But before Walker's letter had 
left Washington, Polk had already announced his views on the 
tariff in a letter to J. K, Kane, of Philadelphia. Wlien he penned 
his "Kane letter," Polk had not of course read Walker's sug- 
gestions, but their ideas were practically identical and even 
the phraseology of their letters was very much the same. More 
straightforward than Walker, however, and less southern in his 
leanings, Polk did not sugar-coat incidental protection by calling 



30 Both men were members of Congress. Their letters, dated May 30, 
1844, are printed in Nilcs' Beg., LXVI, 234. 

31 Polk to Johnson, June 8, 1844, "Polk-Johnson Letters.'" 

32 Walker to Polk, June 18, 1844, Polk Papers. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1844 261 

it an " aid. ' '^^ It was said at the time that Polk in drafting his 
letter made a definite attempt to face both ways — that his 
emphasis on incidental protection was for the North, while the 
substance was for the South. But if the tariff Democrats were 
in any sense deluded it must have resulted from a meaning- which 
they had read into the letter, for, as Polk had pointed out in the 
letter itself^ his present views were to be found in his own record, 
the record of his party, and the declarations that had been 
adopted at the Baltimore convention. In such a statement there 
was nothing equivocal — nothing to which a protectionist had 
reason to pin his hopes. "On all great questions," wrote Gen- 
eral Jackson in a letter commending Polk, "from the Panama 
mission to the present day, he has been consistent, orthodox, 
and true to the' standards of old-fashioned Jeffersonian democ- 
racy";" and the Kane letter promised no departure from such 
a course. To an intimate friend Polk wrote that his letter had 
been sent to Kane 

with a request that he Avould show it to Mr. Dallas and Mr. Horn, and if in 
their judgment, it was absolutely necessary, they were at liberty to publish 
it, but not otherAvise. It was but a re-declaration of the opinions upon 
which I have acted on that subject ; it was carefully prepared and upon 
its doctrines I am ready to stand. ss 



33 "I am," said Polk, "in favor of a tariff for revenue, such a one as 
will yield a sufiicient amount to the Treasury to defray the expenses of the 
Government economically administered. In adjusting the details of a 
revenue tariff, I have heretofore sanctioned such moderate discriminating 
duties, as would produce the amount of revenue needed, and at the same 
time afford reasonable incidental protection to our home industries. I am 
opposed to a. tariff for protection merely, and not for revenue." [Cites 
his votes on tariff bills.] "In my judgment, it is the duty of the Govern- 
ment, to extend as far as it may be practicable to do so, by its revenue 
laws & all other means within its power, fair and just protection to all the 
great interests of the whole Union, embracing agriculture, commerce and 
navigation" (Polk to Hon. J. K. Kane, June 19, 1844; copy of original in 
Polk Papers; printed copies in newspapers). 

3i Jackson to M. M. Jones, Utica, N. Y., June 25, 1844, Wash. Globe, 
July 20, 1844. 

35 Polk to Johnson, June 21 [?], 1844, " Polk- Johnson Letters." 



262 JAMES K. POLK 

Shortly after the adjournment of the Democratic convention 
the Senate took a vote on Tyler's treaty of annexation. Instead 
of the two-thirds in its favor which the President had promised 
the Texan diplomats, more than two-thirds (35 to 16) voted to 
reject it. Many who were not averse to annexation voted against 
the treaty, for they resented the manner of its negotiation and 
despised the renegade President and his Secretary of State. 
Tj'ler's friends tried to cast the blame for ill feeling on Calhoun 
and his Pakenham correspondence, while Calhoun regretted that 
the question had been brought forward under such a weak 
administration."-' In the Senate, Benton now introduced a bill 
of his own for annexing Texas whenever Mexico should be ready 
to acquiesce, while McDuffie presented a joint resolution wliich 
would require simply a majority vote of both houses of Con- 
gress. Both failed, and without taking further action Congress 
adjourned on June 17, to await the result of the pending 
campaign. 

Wlien, on May 1, Clay was nominated at Baltimore, all signs 
seemed to augur success for the Whigs. The party was united 
and the choice of the candidate was unanimous. Tyler's annex- 
ation treaty had caused some annoyance to be sure, but by his 
"masterly" Raleigh letter Clay was thought to have made his 
own position unassailable. Besides, it did not appear that Texas 
would be an important issue, for Van Buren, whose nomination 
by the Democrats seemed a foregone conclusion, had also taken 
a stand against immediate annexation. Altiw«i^ Van Buren 's 
nomination was fully expected, it was known that many Demo- 
crats had set their hearts on procviring Texas, consequently 
division and weakness appeared to be the inevitable result. 

At first it did not seem that Polk's nomination had solved 
the difficulties which had confronted the Democrats, for despite 
the professions of harmony it was well known that Benton, Van 



36 Schouler, Hist, of the U. S., IV, 470. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1844 263 

Buren, and their followers were dissatisfied with, if not indeed 
hostile to, their party. Tyler had been nominated on an annex- 
ation ticket, barring any accessions from Democrats who with 
him had deserted to the Whigs in 1840. His official organ even 
insisted that Polk should decline the nomination in favor of the 
man who had been responsible for bringing the Texas question 
forward.^^ 

The Democrats had trouble in plenty, but the Wliig program 
was likewise going awry. Van Buren had not been nominated 
as they had expected, and Clay's Raleigh letter, instead of 
settling the Texas question, bid fair to cost him many northern 
votes. In August, 1843, the Liberty party had nominated James 
G. Birney, of Michigan, on an anti-slavery ticket, and, after the 
publication of Clay's letter, many who under ordinary circum- 
stances would have voted for him now announced their intention 
to support the Liberty candidate. Although Clay was a slave- 
holder and did not oppose the annexation of Texas with the 
consent of Mexico, still the Whigs had, originally, no reason 
to believe that the Liberty Party would be more hostile to him 
than to the Democratic candidate, who was likewise a slaveholder 
and, in addition, an advocate of immediate annexation. Never- 
theless the unexpected happened, for on the stump Birney 
avowed a preference for Polk, arguing that Clay's superior 
ability, coupled with his equivocal attitude, made him the more 
dangerous and objectionable of the two."^ 

The Raleigh letter was denounced even more bitterly in the 
South, and, as w411 appear later, it was defection in this quarter 
which caused the candidate most alarm. No wonder that a 
leading Whig declared the Texas question to be " an enigma and 



ST ' ' Mr. Polk is too wise a man to suffer the Blairs and Kendalls to set 
him up as a mark for the shafts of the Whigs ... to enter the contest, 
with Mr. Tyler already in the field, and with the certainty of an over- 
whelming defeat awaiting him" (The Madisonian, June 1, 1844). 

3s Sehouler, Hist, of the U. S., IV, 475; Smith, Aruiex. of Tex., 306, 308. 



264 JAMES K. POLK 

a puzzle to the most astute,""^ for the most ardent advocates 
of annexation would lose, economically, by its consummation, 
while the opponents of annexation, for the sake of principle, 
were indirectly aiding Polk. 

After Congress had adjourned, all parties were free to devote 
their energies to the campaign. The Democrats fully realized 
that the contest would be close, that defection must be prevented, 
and new recruits gained. Benton and the Glohe must be whipped 
into line, and if possible, Tyler must be made to withdraw in 
favor of Polk. No one was in a better position than Old Hickory 
to perform this valuable service, and no one was more ready 
to undertake the difficult task. Jackson was much excited by 
Benton's heated reply to McDuffie while discussing his own 
annexation bill, and still more so by the report that his old 
friend had solicited the cooperation of John Quincy Adams. ""^ 
His irritation was increased because Benton had not been con- 
vinced bj' a letter he had sent him stating that the Union could 
not be preserved except by annexing Texas and extending the 
laws of the United States over Oregon. He was certain that 
Benton had induced Van Buren to declare against annexation. 
He called Blair's attention to Polk's one-term pledge, and 
prophesied that Van Buren would succeed Polk if he should 
take the proper course. "My dear friend," he pleaded with 
Blair, "permit not Col. Benton to have controle over your 



39 Chas. A. Davis to Crittenden, New York, June 5, 1844, Crittenden 
Papers. It was a curious fact, said Davis, that on two important questions 
party considerations had made people in the South and West blind to their 
own interests; they had crushed the bank and thereby driven much needed 
capital back to the North and East, and were now clamoring for Texas, 
although the other sections would profit more by its annexation. 

■40 Jackson to Blair (confidential) , June 25, 1844, Jaclson Papers. "The 
last Washington papers give an account of the very irrated reply of Col. 
Benton to Mr. McDuffie on Benton 's annexation Bill in the Senate after 
which Col. Benton seized J. Q. Adams by the hand & said 'we are both old 
men, we must now unite & save the constitution' — do my dear Mr. Blair 
inform me if this can be true — if it is, I want no better proof of his 
derangement, & it politically] prostrates him." 



CAMPAIGN OF 1844 265 

editorial column, as he will ruin y^ paper. If he will, he must 
pursue his eratic course, which has, & will politically] destroy 
him if not already done.'' Blair assured Jackson that Benton 
was zealous in- the cause of Polk and Dallas, but that he dis- 
trusted Calhoun and opposed his program of Texas with or 
without the Union. These views were shared by Blair himself. 
Jackson wrote again to Blair on July 12, criticizing Benton's 
attitude and urging Blair to attend the ratification meeting to 
be held at Nashville on the fifteenth of August.*^ 

Before Jackson had received his reply from Blair he 
expressed his opinion of Benton in a letter to Polk.*- Benton's 
hatred of Calhoun and his jealousy of the growing popularity 
of Tyler, said Jackson, had deranged him, but 

you will perceive I have estopped Benton or any others from believing that 
you or I could countenance nullification or disunion. Every letter I get 
gives us joyfull neAvs — You will get 20 states at least & your one term 
[pledge] will get you 22. 

He told Polk that, while it was quite unnecessary for Cave John- 
son to put him on his guard lest he should inadvertently give 
aid to the nullifiers, still every Democrat should "put his face 
against any meeting of disunion, or nullification — we must & will 
have Texas, with & in our glorious Union. The Federal Union 
must be preserved — A. J. "*^ 



41 Blair to Jackson, July 7; Jackson to Blair, July 12, 1844, JacJcson 
Papers. The ' ' Texas, with or without the Union, ' ' program mentioned 
by Benton was an attempt made in South Carolina, while Tyler's treaty 
was before the Senate, to call a southern convention and annex Texas to 
the southern states if it should be rejected by the federal government. 
See Benton, Thirty Years' View, II, 616. 

*2 Jackson to Polk, June 29, 1844, Polk Papers. "In my reply to Col. 
Benton 's first letter td me in which he adverted to my toast, — ' The 
Federal Union must be preserved,' amongst other things, I said to him. 
The Federal Union must be preserved, and to do this effectually & perma- 
nently — Texas must be reunited to the United States — the laws of the 
Union extended forthwith over the Oragon, which would place this Federal 
Union on as permanent basses as the Rocky mountains, and preserve our 
glorious Union, & our Republican system as long as time lasted." 

« iMd. 



2G6 JAMES K. POLE 

Johnson was still iiineh concerned for fear that something 
mig-ht be said or done at the Nashville meeting which might 
be construed as an approval of the South Carolina program of 
' ' annexation or a dissolution of the Union. ' ' Doubtless he exag- 
gerated both the strength and the determination of the disunion 
element. So far as the success of the campaign was concerned, 
much more was to be feared from the attitude of Benton, whose 
irascible temper could not be held in check. He did not hesitate 
to discuss, even with Whigs, ^* the ''villany" of the Baltimore 
convention, and no plea for harmony could induce him to abate 
his attacks on those who had been responsible for reviving the 
Texas question. To be sure he had, in a public declaration 
exonerated Polk and Dallas from participation in the "intrigue," 
but in a speech made at St. Louis he said that the Texas question 
had been "exploded" only forty days before the Baltimore 
convention — "just time enough for candidates to be interrogated, 
and for the novices to amend their answers."^" Polk was evi- 
dently the novice whom he had in mind. 

As the campaign progressed Polk came more and more to 
distrust both Benton and Blair. "Since the nominations," he 
said in a letter to Donelson, 

uone can fail to have observed the coldness or indifference of tlie Globe. 
After Blair's professions made confidentially to you, I had expected that 
he ■would come zealously into the support of the nominations, and not 
throw cold water upon theni. 

After quoting a letter in which Dallas sjioke of this hostility, 
Polk suggested that Donelson and Jackson should urge Blair 
to alter the tone of his paper.**' 



*■* Letcher to Buchanan, July 19, 1844, Buclwnan Papers. 

45 Speech printed in Wash. Globe, Nov. 6, 1844. Yoakum, of Tennessee, 
in calling Polk's attention to this speech says that he has "no doubt but 
Col. Benton has injured us 100,000 votes"! (Yoakum to Polk, Nov. 22, 
1844, Polk Papers). 

■ioPolk to Donelson, July 22, 1844, "Polk-Donelson Letters." 



CAMPAIGN OF 1844 267 

Toward the end of June certain overtures made by close 
friends of President Tyler gave hope that he might yet with- 
draw from the race. J. B. Jones, the editor of the Madisouian, 
approached A. V. Brown and others with a suggestion that 
J. George Harris should be brought to Washington to assist in 
editing that paper. Harris was an intimate friend of both 
Polk and Jackson, and had made the Nashville Union an 
effective party organ. Harris suggested to Polk that a new 
paper might be started with which the Maclisonian (Tyler) and 
the Spectator (Calhoun) might soon be merged. A new paper, 
in his opinion, would be more likely to succeed because of preju- 
dices against those already in existence. General Armstrong, 
like Harris, thought favorably of the plan to merge these papers, 
and believed that after the election even the Glohe might be 
joined with the rest. Both Johnson and Brown, however, were 
opposed to this plan, and especially to putting Harris in charge 
of the Madisonian.*'' 

Early in July R. J. Walker, who had from the first urged a 
friendly attitude toward the deserters of 1840, called on Tyler 
in order to ascertain his views. The President told Walker that 
he would withdraw at once were it not for the fact that his 
friends felt hurt by the abuse heaped upon them by the Glohe 
and other papers. There were, he said, about 150,000 of his 
friends who had voted for Wliigs in 1840; he would withdraw 
and liis friends would support Polk and Dallas, provided that 
assurance be given that they would be welcomed by the Demo- 
cratic party as brethren and equals. "Now I think," said 
Walker when reporting the conversation to Polk, "that the 
importance of this union & co-operation cannot be overrated"; 
therefore he suggested that Polk and Jackson might write letters 
to political friends, speaking kindly of Tyler and his followers.^® 

47 Harris to Polk, June 27, 29; Johnson to Polk, June 28; Armstrong to 
Polk, June 30, 1844, Polk Papers. 

48 Walker to Polk, July 10, 1844, ibid. 



268 JAMES K. FOLK 

After reading' Walker's letter Polk sent it to the Hermitage 
by Gideon Pillow. In a letter of his own, sent by the same 
messenger, he told Jackson that, however desirable the object 
sought by Walker might be, he would not write any letter or 
make any promises. He would like of course to see a reunion 
of "all the old Jackson Democrats of '28 & '32, V but he would 
neither write a letter to Tyler nor "make any pledges to any 
one — except as it regards m}^ public principles, in advance of 
election." He sugg'ested, however, that if the attacks of the 
Globe were responsible for Tyler's continuing in the race and 
thereby jeopardizing the result in certain states, something 
should be done to induce Blair to cease abusing the President. 
He told Jackson that he v»^as the only one who could intluence 
Blair, but as to the wisdom of exercising such influence Jackson 
must judge for himself.'*^ 

Jackson was disgusted with Walker's "want of common 
sense" in suggesting that he and Polk should write letters in 
commendation of the President. Such letters, he told Polk, 
would "damn you & destro}^ your election," for the WhigS 
would at once charge "bargain & intrigue. "•"'^ Although not yet 
ready to ask favors from John Tyler, he was quite willing to 
remove, if possible, the cause of the President's injured feelings. 
On that very same day he dispatched a letter to Blair in which 
he condemned Benton's conduct, urged the importance of annex- 
ation, and ordered Blair to "support the cause of Polk & Dallas, 
& let Tiler alone — -leave Calhoun to himself we in the South & 
West will attend to the Federal Union, it must be preserved. "^^ 
Indeed, on the same day, he authorized Major Lewis to express 
to the President his (Jackson's) wish for the success of the 



^» Polk to Jackson, July 2.S, 1844, Jaclson Papers. See also Polk to 
Donelson, same date, " Polk-Douelson Letters." In this he doubted the 
propriety of Jackson's writinj^- a letter for publication; still, he seemed 
anxious that the general should write a private letter "which might reach 
the President 's eye. ' ' 

50 Jackson to Polk, July 26, 1844, Polk Papers. 

51 Jackson to Blair, July 26, 1844, Jaelson Papers. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1844 269 

admmistration and the assurance that Tyler's friends would be 
received as brethren into the Democratic fold.^- 

From various quarters pressure was brought to bear upon 
Tyler, and appeals to his vanity were not wanting. Ritchie, of 
the Richmond Enquirer, who was called the "king of the Demo- 
cratic press," warmly urged the President to withdraw, while 
Democratic electors agreed to support Tyler in case it should 
develop that he was stronger than Polk. The Democratic general 
committee of New York, on August 6, drafted resolutions laud- 
ing the President and asking his support ;^^ and on August 1 
Jackson sent another letter to Major Lewis in which he argued 
that Tyler ought to withdraw, for if he did not, it would be said 



52 Jackson to Lewis, July 26, 1844 (Tyler, Letters and Times of the 
Tylers, III, 143-146). The letter read in part: "You know I have a great 
desire that Mr. Tyler should close his term with credit to himself. It is 
certain he can not now be elected, and he has now a fair field by with- 
<lrawing, to add great and lasting popularity to himself by the act, and 
free himself from the imputation that his exertions to re annex Texas 
were to make himself President, and show that his energy in this case was 
from imperious public duty, to prevent a country so important to the 
defence, safety and great interest of our whole Union from falling into 
the hands of England, our most implacable enemy. On Mr. Tyler's with- 
drawal from the canvass every true American" will say, Amen to his 
patriotism in the case of Texas. 

"Several of Mr. Tyler's friends yesterday visited me, and washed me 
to cause it to be known to him their wishes, as his withdrawal at once 
would unite all the Democrats into one family without distinction. This 
would render our victory easy and certain by Isringing Mr. Tyler's friends 
in to the support of Polk and Dallas, received as brethren "by them and 
their friends, all former differences forgotten and cordially united once 
more in sustaining the Democratic candidate. 

". . . It is impossible now that Mr. Tyler should be elected, and if 
he does not withdraw he will be charged with conniving with the Clay 
Whigs to defeat the Democratic nominees. Although this would be untrue, 
yet really it would have that affect and would do Mr. Tyler much injury. 
I told Mr. Tyler's friends T could not write to him on such a subject, but 
that 1 had such confidence in his good sense and patriotism, that I was 
sure he would withdraw in due time, as I believe him to be a good Demo- 
crat, and that he would do nothing to promote Clay or injure Democracy. 
If you think it prudent, you can make these suggestions to Mr. Tyler. 
I think he would receive them kindly, be his determination what it may. 
His proper dignified course is a magnanamous withdrawal, with such 
reasons as his good sense may suggest for the occasion. These hints flow 
from a real regard for Mr. Tyler and a sincere wish that he may retire 
with much credit." 

53 Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, II, 337-339. 



270 JAMES E. POLE 

that he had adopted the annexation program merely to obtain 
a reelection and that he was remaining- in the field in order to 
defeat Polk. Tyler soon informed Jackson that this letter had 
determined him to retire,^* and on August 20 his letter of with- 
drawal appeared in the JIadisonian. His present action, he said, 
had resulted from changed conditions. The people had vindi- 
cated him by driving from power those who had tried to crush 
him ; the Democrats had adopted his policies, and he no longer 
felt compelled to run. On the next day this paper stated that 
its sole object all the time had been to defeat Henry Clay, and, 
as the principles of Polk and Tyler were identical, it would 
henceforth support the Democratic candidates.^^ Two years 
later Tyler wrote that he had accepted the nomination "for the 
sole purpose of controlling events .... for the public good" 
and, having accomplished his purpose, he withdrew.^*' 

The Spectator, also, gave Polk and Dallas its enthusiastic 
support, and Calhoun predicted that the results would "equal 
the defeat of 1828."^' Doubtless he indulged hopes that he, in 
the event of Polk's election, would be the guiding spirit of the 
administration. 

During the summer considerable anxiety was caused by the 
fear that British and French influence might induce Houston 
to agree to some arrangement with jMexico. Major Lewis was 
authorized by Calhoun to communicate "confidentially" to 
General Jackson that the State Department was in possession 
of reliable information that these nations had offered to acknowl- 
edge the independence of Texas without any pledge of abolition, 



5* Smith, Annexation of Texas, 310. 

^^ The Madisonian (Aug. 24) even supplied an election pun: "Change — 
It is James Enox Polk now, it will be Polk knocks Clay, about election 
time. ' ' 

56 Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers. II, 341. 

57 Alex. Anderson to Polk, Aug. 22, 1844, Polk Papers. "We should 
have carried North Carolina, ' ' said Anderson, ' ' but for the course and 
speeches of that arch Traitor Benton — so say our letters from North 
Carolina. " ' Anderson was a strong adherent of Calhoun. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1844 271 

provided that Texas would agree to remain an independent 
nation. Similar information was given to Polk by Calhoun's 
friend, Alexander Anderson. Before he had seen these letters, 
however, Jackson had written to Houston "as strong a letter 
as he [I] could dictate," exhorting him not to yield to the wishes 
of foreign nations.^* 

Wliile politicians w^ere emphasizing the foreign menace, the 
Democratic Review was trying to win votes in northern states 
by maintaining that the area of slavery would be restricted by 
acquiring Texas, for slaves would be drawn to the new fields, 
leaving the border states to the Yankees. ^^ Some of the slavery 
advocates, too, believed that such would be the result, and for 
this reason violently opposed annexation."*' 

There was some defection from their own ranks and there 
was fear that annexation might be defeated by an act of Texas 
itself, but the Democrats as a party never wavered from 
their position in favor of annexation. They had, therefore, the 
advantage of a consistent program. Clay, on the other hand, 
in order to retain his hold on both North and South, adopted a 
shifty course and modified his views from time to time, as the 
occasion seemed to demand. In his Raleigh letter of April 17 
he had definitely opposed immediate annexation, but he soon 
discovered that such a stand had made him unpopular in the 
South and West. To retrieve his fortunes in those sections he 
wrote to Stephen F. Miller, on July 1, his first "Alabama letter." 
"Personally," said he, "I could have no objection to the annex- 
ation of Texas; but certainly I would be unwilling to see the 
existing Union dissolved or seriously jeoparded for the sake of 



5s Lewis to Jackson, July 19, 1844, Jaclson Papers. Jackson to Polk, 
July 23, 1844, PoW Papers^ See also, Polk to Donelson, July 22, 1844, 
"Polk-Donelson Letters." 

59 Dem. Rev., July, 1844. 

60 Letter of Wadcly Thompson to editors of National Intelligencer, 
printed in that paper, July 6, 1844. 

61 Printed in Nat. Intelh, Aug. 8, 1844. 



272 JAMES E. POLE 

aeciuiring- Texas. "'^^ As this was not strong enough to win votes 
in the South, he wrote again on the twenty-seventh that if annex- 
ation might be accomplished "without national dishonor, without 
war, with the general consent of the States of the Union, and 
upon fair and reasonable terms, I should be glad to see it.''*'" 
Both Democrats and Abolitionists seized upon the last phrase 
and widely advertised the fact that "Clay would be glad to see 
it." Other letters followed in an attempt to show that he had 
not changed his original views, but the more he explained the 
more he became the target of denunciation and ridicule. The 
papers made much sport of his ' ' six manifestoes, ' ' while Jackson 
charged that Clay by his letters had made a "perfect devill" 
of himself.*'^ 

Although this was a campaign in which party principles were 
clearly defined and important questions involved, nevertheless 
the personal element was not wanting. The Whig ignorance even 
of Polk's identity was soon replaced by a minute knowledge not 
only of his own shortcomings but of those of his ancestors. It 
devolved, therefore, upon the candidate's friends in Tennessee 
to enlighten the public on his past record and to defend his 
reputation against the slanders of his opponents. As soon as 
the news of his nomination had reached Nashville a mass meeting 
was called to celebrate the event. Speeches were made by prom- 
inent Democrats, and A. 0. P. Nicholson ridiculed the Whig 
cry of "Who is Polk?" Arrangements were made for another 
meeting in July to be composed of delegates from all parts of 
the state."* Biographical materials had already been forwarded 
to George Bancroft under the frank of General Jackson. But as 
Bancroft, according to Harris, was "somewhat sensitive on the 



62 Fourth Alabama letter, in which former letters are quoted (Nat. 
Intel!., Oct. 1, 1844). The letter of July 27 is printed in Niles' Beg., 
LXVI, 439. 

63Sehouler, Bist. of V. S., IV, 477. Smith, Annex, of Texas, 309. 

«4 Nashville Union-, June 8, 11, 1844. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1844 273 

point of authorship," and declined, it was decided that editorials 
in the Union would do quite as well as a biographj'.'^^ 

Some of the Whig papers charged Polk with being a duelist, 
while others said he was a cringing coward who had feared to 
fight Wise. The first allegation was refuted in letters written 
to the Glohc by Cave Johnson and A. V. Brown, and the second, 
by the publication of an old letter of Jackson's in which he had 
expressed approval of Speaker Polk for having treated Wise with 
contempt.''" For the purpose of injuring Polk in the North, the 
Whigs circulated widely the "Roorback" canard the gist of 
which was that a gang of slaves branded with the initials "J. K. 
P, ' ' had been seen on their way to southern markets."^ 

Polk was most annoyed by the revival of the story that his 
grandfather. Colonel Ezekiel Polk, had been a Tory during the 
Revolution. The Washington Glohe and various northern papers 
repelled the charge, and the Nashville Union printed many letters 
and affidavits from persons who had certain knowledge that the 
elder Polk had been a Revolutionary officer; it published, also, 
a copy of his commission dated June 18, 1775. Under Polk's 
direction this material was printed in pamphlet form under the 
title of "A Vindication of Colonel Ezekiel Polk," and General 
Armstrong was instructed to send copies to prominent Demo- 
crats all over the United States."^ To these Wliig campaign 
stories the Democratic press retorted in kind. Clay's use of 
profane language was emphasized and he was called a drunkard, 
a duelist, a gambler, and a perjurer.^^ 



65 J. Geo. Harris to Polk, June 25, July 17, 19, 1844, FolTi Papers. 
Doubtless Bancroft's sensitiveness on authorship resulted from his ex- 
perience as campaign biographer of Van Buren. 

66 Wash. Globe, June 13, 19, 1844. 

67 See Niles ' Beg., LXVII, 73. 

6s Union, Sept. 11. Polk to Heiss, Sept. 13; Polk to Armstrong, Sept. 
16, 1844, "Heiss Papers," Tenn. Hist. Mag., June, 1916. 

69 The perjury consisted in the alleged violation of his oath of office 
by challenging John Eandolph to fight a duel for words spoken in debate 
during the campaign. Henly, of Indiana, said on the floor of the House 



274 JAMES K. POLK 

Naturally Polk was especially desirous of carrj'ing- liis own 
state, and his energ}' and skill as a machine politician are mani- 
fested in many ways. Realizing, as usual, the importance of a 
spirited party press, he induced Heiss to make J. George Harris 
joint editor with Laughlin of the Nashville Union. "The 
Union," he wrote, "should be made in Tennessee what Medary's 
Statesman is in Ohio, and what the Union itself was in 1839. 
It is looked to from all parts of the Union and nnist be a great 
paper during this canvass." In another letter he urged that 
"fire and spirit and power should be thrown into it" in order 
to counteract the Wliig falsehoods and misrepresentations. '° 

On Jul}" 13 a dinner was given in Polk's home town, Colum- 
bia, in honor of delegates to the late nominating convention, 
Presidential electors, and members of Congress from Tennessee. 
To Cave Johnson was assigned the duty of inducing prominent 
Democrats to be present in order to counteract the effect of a 
Whig rally held at the same place.'^ Early in the campaign 
arrangements had been made for a great mass meeting to be 
held at Nashville on the fifteenth of August. Both Polk and 
Johnson were anxious that the northern states should be well 
represented at this meeting so that it could not be said that it 
was a gathering of disunionists. Once more it fell to Johnson 
to send the invitations and to urge the importance of a large 
and representative attendance. '- 

On the appointed day the multitudes assembled, and Nash- 
ville, according to the TJmon, "was from sunrise to sunset as 



that "the standard of Henry Clay should consist of his armorial bearings, 

which ought to be a pistol, a pack of cards, and a brandy-bottle ' ' (Adams, 

Memoirs, XII, 45). 

TO Polk to Heiss, July 31, Aug. 21, 1844; Heiss to Polk, Aug. 3, 1844, 

Folic Papers. 

n Polk to Johnson, July 1, July 6, 1844, "Polk-Johnson Letters." 

'- Johnson to Polk, June 21, 1844, Poll- Papers. Polk to Johnson, July 

16, 1844, "Polk- Johnson Letters." Among those invited were Wright, 

Cass, Buchanan, Woodbury, Hubbard of New Hampshire, and Duncan and 

Medary, of Ohio. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1844 275 

a Military Camp."" In the evening- the Honorable Thomas F. 
Marshall, of Kentucky, addressed "thousands" in front of the 
courthouse on the annexation of Texas. On the second day, 
August 16, the throng gathered at Camp Hickory where by 
noon, "the great grove at the Camp, fifty acres in extent, was 
as full as it could hold," and there "were two miles of table 
on which the Great Dinner was served. ' ' Speaking followed the 
dinner, and Cave Johnson, as presiding officer, made the open- 
ing address. We have already noted his solicitude lest a dis- 
union character might be attributed to this meeting, and he 
now embraced the opportunity 

in the presence of this great assembly, to give a direct contradiction to the 
false charge of disunion, and a wish to dissolve the Union, which had been 
propagated by the whig press of this and other states, against those con- 
cerned in calling and getting up the present meeting. 

The number in attendance was so great that speakers addressed 
crowds simultaneously in various parts of the grove; each 
speaker, following Johnson s lead, repelled the charge of dis- 
union. General Case was the principal orator of the day ; among 
the others were Gansevoort Melville ;^* Governor Clay, of Ala- 
bama; Colonel Terry, speaker of the house from the same state; 
and J. B. Bowlin, a member of Congress from Missouri. Letters 
were received from leading Democrats of both sections, regretting 
their inability to be present and expressing hearty cooperation.'^^ 
Among these was Judge Douglas, but within a few days he was 
in Tennessee stumping the state for Polk and Dallas.^" 



73 Nashville Union, Aug. 17, 1844. Also NUes' Beg., LXVII, 3-4. "On 
every road to the city was to be seen approaching companies, battalions 
and regiments, mounted and on foot, with their bands of music, their 
banners and their mottoes, on their way to this great encampment of the 
sovereign people. ' ' 

"* A Tammany Hall leader. 

'3 The same number of the Union contains copies of letters from 
Franklin Pierce, Silas Wright, Levi Woodbury, James Buchanan, Stephen 
A. Douglas, Geo. McDuffie, Eobt. J. Walker, R. M. Johnson, et al. 

-GPolk to Johnson, Aug. 20, 22, 26, 1844, "Polk-Johnson Letters." 



\ 



/( 



276 JAMES K. POLK 

Despite tlie absence of so many of the party leaders the 
Democratic meeting- was regarded as highly successful, but in 
glittering pageantry and boisterous enthusiasm it was far ex- 
celled by the "Great Whig' Convention" which, on August 21, 
likewise essemblcd in the city of Nashville and was, to quote 
Phelan, "the finest of the kind ever held in the Southwest."'^ 
While the chief feature of the meeting was the display of gor- 
geous battalions and expensive campaign banners, there were 
soul-stirring- addresses by prominent AVhig orators. The great 
speech of the meeting was made by Sergeant S. Prentiss, of 
Mississippi, who was regarded" by many as the peer of either 
Webster or (Hay. On this occasion Prentiss surpassed even his 
own brilliant I'ceord, for to ])ai-tisan considerations was added a 
personal hatred for the Democratic candidate whose casting vote 
had once deprived him of a seat in the House of Representa- 
tives.''® 

The enthusiasm caused by the Whig meeting spurred the 
Democrats to a still more vigorous effort to win the electicm in 
Teiniessee. Custom did not permit Polk to mount the platform 
in his own behalf, but from his home at Columbia he directed 
the campaign, even to the miiuitest details. . lie planned itiner- 
aries, assigned speakers, and even arranged for barbecues.'^ 
Local orators were assisted by prominent politicians from other 
states. This list included Douglas, of Illinois, Pickens, of South 
Carolina, Melville, of New York, and Clay, Terry, and McClung, 
of Alabama. Of local men the most notable were the veteran 
cam])aigners, Nicholson, Brown, and Cave Johnson. Johnson 
was much broken in healtii, but so highly did Polk value his 
services that he goaded him to an active part in the campaign. '^'^ 



-7 Phelan, Hist, of Tenn., 419. 

"8 See above, p. 120. 

"9 Various letters of Polk to Johnson, Aug.-Oct., "Polk-Johnson Letters." 

"0 Ihid. On Oct. 14 he told Johnson that "all our energies are necessary 
to keep the State safe, as 1 believe she now is. The least relaxation at the 
close of the canvass might loose her." 



CAMPAIGN OF 1844 277 

Near the close of the canvass Polk was couticlent of carrying' the 
state by a "handsome majority," but, instead, he lost it by the 
small margin of one hundred and thirteen votes. 

In southern states the "Whigs had little hope of success 
in opposing- the Democratic annexation program, nevertheless 
strenuous efforts were made to prevent defection from their own 
ranks because of this annoying issue. The indomitable Prentiss 
labored to show that Polk was not entitled to profit from the 
revival of this question,^^ and in a speech at Natchez he referred 
to Polk as a "blighted burr, that had fallen from the mane of 
the war-horse of the Hermitage." In an attempt to counteract 
the work of Prentiss and others, and to win Whig votes in the 
South, Senator Walker, of Mississippi, wrote a most inflamma- 
tory pamphlet entitled "The South in Danger"*^ in which he 
argued that as Wliigs and Abolitionists had joined hands in the 
North, therefore all parties in the South should unite in the 
interest of annexation. The pamphlet probably did little good 
in the South, and many Democrats were fearful that it might 
do serious damage in the North. °^ 

In Ohio the contest bid fair to be close, and, after Clay's 
repudiation of the utterances of his relative, Cassius M. Clay,-* 
leading Democrats had hopes that many Whigs would desert him 
and vote for Birney.®^ But the result of the state elections made 



SI "If ever I join the Mormons," he wrote in August to the editor of 
the Vicksburg Whig, "I shall attaeh myself to Joe Smith, the founder of 
the sect, and not to one of his rival disciples, and should I ever turn 
Locofoco on the question of the immediate annexation of Texas, I will 
support John Tyler, not James K. Folic" {Memoir of S. S. Frentiss, II, 316). 

82 This pamphlet was issued by the Democratic Association of Wash- 
ington, D. C, Sept. 25, 1844. Copy in Library of Congress. 

83 For example, William E. Cramer, editor of the Albany Argus, in- 
formed Polk that New York could never be won on the program outlined 
by Walker, while Ohio and other states would surely be lost (Cramer to 
Polk, Oct. 4, 1844, Folic Fapers). 

8* C. M. Clay had rejjresented Henry Clay as opposed to slavery. The 
latter in a letter contradicted the former 's statements. 

85 Gansevoort Melville to Polk, Oct. 3; Cass to Polk, Oct. 4, 1844, Folh 
Fapers. Both wrote from Cleveland and expressed the opinion that the 
Democrats would carry the state. 



278 JAMES K. POLE 

it evident that Clay's letter had not produced any defection,*^''' 
while Walker's ill-advised pamphlet added strength to the 
Whigs.*" The so-called "Garland forgery" transferred many 
votes from Birnej^ to Clay, and may possibh^ have brought 
victory to Clay in Ohio.®® 

Pennsylvania was normally Democratic, yet there were 
misgivings lest the strong sentiment in favor of tariff might 
jeopardize Polk's success in that state. His "Kane letter" had 
been generally accepted as satisfactory, but the Whigs repre- 
sented him to be an unqualified free-trader. The Fcnnsijlvanian 
refuted this charge and, on October 15, published extracts from 
his speeches to prove that he had alwa^'S favored incidental 
protection. As noted above, Polk, in his letter to Kane, did not 
pretend to favor tariff except that which might be necessary for 
revenue, but by means of construction Pennsj-lvanians were able 
to hold voters in line by representing him to be in favor of tariff. 
"We have succeeded," wrote the oily-tongued Simon Cameron, 
"in fixing the belief that you 'are as good a tariff' man as Clay,' " 
and he added significantly that no man known to be opposed to 
protective tariff' could possibly carry the state.""' Polk did not 
of course take pains to undeceive his supporters in Pennsylvania ; 
on the other hand, he did not, in any of his public utterances, 
commit himself to tariff for protective purposes. However, 
Cameron's ruse met with success, and Polk's strength in Penn- 
s.ylvania greatly exasperated the AVhigs.^° 



80 H. C. Williams wrote from Washington that "the letter repudiating 
C. M. Clay has had no effect in the northern states, while it satisfies the 
Southern Whigs. The Whig papers will not publish it." Democrats, he 
said, have to oppose all "fag end" parties, and Greely is now trying to 
stir up the Irish (Williams to Polk, Oct. 14, 1844, Polk Papers). 

8" Armstrong to Polk, Nov. 5, [1844], PoJk Papers. 

88 See Birney, James G. Birney and Ms Times, 355. 

89 Cameron to Polk, Oct. 18, 1844, Polk Papers. 

!>o Governor Letcher, of Kentucky, scoffed at the idea of Polk being 
in favor of tariff, and lie tried to persuade Buchanan to refrain from advo- 
cating his election. "I*olk," said Letcher, "has no more chance to be 
elected than if he were dead and buried, and d — )id, as he will be in due 
time" (Letcher to Buchanan, Aug. 3, 1844, Buchanan Papers). 



CAMPAIGN OF 1844 279 

"Native Americanism" was said to have cost the Democrats 
votes in Pennsj-lvania. Catholics, as a rule, affiliated with that 
party, and the Whigs made political capital out of the fact that 
Shunk, the Democratic candidate for governor, had been induced 
to march in a Catholic parade.^^ 

It was alleged that the Whigs used money freely in Pennsyl- 
vania,^^ and that they were guilty of practicing frauds,^^ but it 
is unlikely that the Whigs were the sole transgressors in these 
respects. 

New York was regarded as the pivotal state. There thirty- 
six electoral votes were to be won or lost, and the result seemed 
to be highly problematical. In this state various extraneous ele- 
ments helped to complicate the political situation. Both ' ' Native 
Americans" and Abolitionists commanded a considerable num- 
ber of votes in the state, but it was by no means certain just how 
these votes would be cast. At the beginning of the campaign it 
was feared that the followers of Van Buren might not rally with 
enthusiasm to the party standard, and besides, there was lack of 
harmony in Democratic state politics with respect to policies and 
candidates. In order to carry the state it was necessary to hold 
the Van Burenites in line, and since the Baltimore convention 
many of them had been silently nursing their resentment. Gov- 
ernor William C. Bouck wrote that a number of Wright's friends 
had tried to get up a secret intrigue to procure Polk's defeat, 
but that Wright had been nominated for governor and his ad- 
herents brought into harmony.'-*^ Van Buren told Jackson that 
Wright had accepted the nomination reluctantly and not until 



91 J. Miller to Polk, Oct. 12; J. M. Porter to Polk, Oct. 12, 1844, Folic 
Papers; also, newspapers. 

'■>- For example, Kane informed Polk that $20,000 had been subscribed 
at the office of John Sergeant, of Philadelphia. Sergeant's nephew, Wm. 
B. Eeed, had by mistake sent a letter regarding this money to some Demo- 
crat (Kane to Polk, Oct. 24, 1844, Polk Papers). 

!»•"• Henry Horn, for example, wrote that desponding letters had been 
sent to his friends with his forged signature attached (Horn to Polk, 
Oct. 31, 1844, Polk Papers). 

94 Bouck to Polk, Sept. 7, 1844, Polk Papers. 



280 JAMES K. POLK 

lie had been told that it was the only means of saving- New York,""' 
but the supporters of Bouck felt that he had been unceremon- 
iously sacrificed to satisfy the ambitions of Wright and his 
friends.'"' Some of the extreme anti-Texas leaders in New York 
supported the candidates, but repudiated the annexation plank in 
the platform.'-'' This was the policy of the New York Evening 
Post. 

According to William E. Cramer, of the Albany Argus, the 
Democrats in New York "were on a volcano" until Clay repu- 
diated the statements of Cassius M. Clay and changed his posi- 
tion on the Texan question. The Abolitionists, he said, held the 
balance of power and would poll from fifteen thousand to twenty 
thousand votes. "Before Mr. C's fatal letter they were hesitat- 
ing whether they should not vote for him," but "this puts an 
impassable gulf between them."*^* On the other hand, in pre- 
dicting victory for Polk and Dallas in New York, Wright re- 
ported that "Never have I witnessed an equal degree of enthu- 
siasm among our democracy, not even in the days of Genl Jack- 
son, nor have I, at any time, known greater harmony, activity or 
confidence. ' '^^ Late in October another letter from Cramer stated 
that the Whigs were putting forth every effort to form coalitions 
with "Native Americans," Abolitionists, and Anti-renters, and 
that they were confident of winning the election. Prospect of 
success, he said, had brought them much campaign money from 
manufacturers who desired high tariff.^"" 



95 Jackson to Polk, Sept. 26, 1844, ibid. 

06 In a letter to Polk, Sept. 11, Marcy stated that Bouck had made a 
satisfactory governor, and that Wright had been nominated for political 
reasons; while an anonymous letter, Sept. 14, said that Bouck had been 
set aside without reason, and that the action might cause Polk to lose the 
state. 

97 See the signed statement of Bryant and others in Nilcs' Eeg., LXVI, 
371. 

08 Cramer to Polk, Sept. 17, 1844, Polk Papers. 

90 "Wright to Buchanan, Sept. 23, 1844, Buchanan Papers. 

100 "The report is that the Bostonians promised $100,000 provided 
they could receive ample assurance that it would secure New York for Mr. 
Clay! ! " (Cramer to Polk, Oct. 22, 1844, Polk Papers). 



CAMPAIGN OF 1844 281 

Still other factors complicated the political situation in New 
York. The Abolitionists who had formerly voted the Whig 
ticket were appalled when Birney came out in favor of free 
trade and opposed to distributing among the states the proceeds 
derived from the sale of public lands, and it was feared in Tam- 
many circles that his announcement might cause them to vote 
for Clay.^°^ In order to win votes for their national ticket the 
Whigs withdrew some of their candidates for Congress and the 
state legislature in favor of the "Native American" candi- 
dates."- It availed them little, however, for Polk and Dallas 
carried the state. ^°^ 

It appears that the Democrats, also, withdrew some of their 
candidates in favor of "Native Americans,""* and in the process 
of rapid naturalization they outrivaled their opponents. ' ' Tam- 
many Hall," wrote Melville, "is a perfect jam from 8 a. m. till 
after midnight. Naturalization going on among our friends to 
an immense extent. On Saturday 260 — all Democrats — rec'd 
their papers.""^ Charges of wholesale frauds were made by 
both parties,"" but it may be doubted that such frauds materially 
affected the election results. 

The Texas question was of course the paramount issue of the 
campaign, although it was not, apparently, the chief factor in 
winning the election for Polk. Many contemporaries believed that 
Clay's defeat was not caused by the emergence of this question, 



101 Melville to Polk, Oct. 26, 1844, Polk Papers. 

102 Alex. Jones to Polk, New York City, Oct. 30, Nov. 6, 1844, ibid. 

103 Jones told Polk in a letter dated November 21, that some of the 
Whigs had been so confident of winning that they had bet all of their 
money, and even their homes. One had lost $38,000; another, $40,000. 
One Whig's wife lost her mind because of his losses (Polk Papers). 

lo-t John P. Heiss to Polk, Nov. 3, 1844, Polk Papers. 

105 Melville to Medary, Nov. 4, 1844, Hid. 

106 A correspondent from New London, Conn., informed Polk that in 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Ehode Island "the lords of the spindle 
compelled the degraded operators to vote their will, and thus obtained 
large majorities for your opponent" (Dr. Charles Douglas to Polk, Nov. 
22, 1844, Polk Papers). For a useful summary of press opinions on frauds, 
see Smith, Annexation of Texas, 316 ff. 



282 JAMES E. POLE 

and this belief is held by Justin H. Smith, ^"'' who has recently 
made a thorongh examination of conflicting opinions and care- 
fully weighed their value. The Democratic Review evidently 
stated the truth when it said on the eve of the election that 
neither party had won or lost many votes on account of the Texas 
issue, and that "the issue is between the principles of the two 
parties more than ever before. "^°' If Polk owed his success in 
the election to the Texas issue, it was due to the fact that it 
brought him the support of President Tyler and his followers. 
While we can not be sure that Tyler would have remained in the 
y field if the Democrats had not espoused annexation, certainty 
that they would continue his Texas program at least furnished 
him with a plausible excuse for retiring from the canvass.'"^ 

Polk received 170 electoral votes ; Clay only 105. In the 
North, Polk carried the great states of New York and Pennsyl- 
vania, while New Hampshire, also, contributed her six votes. 
Much to their delight the Whigs carried not only Polk's own 
state, Tennessee, but even the very precincts of both Jackson 
and Polk.^^° The Tennessee Democrats were keenly disappointed, 
of course, because they had failed to win the election in their 
candidate's own state; but their disappointment soon gave way 
to rejoicing over the general party victory. On receiving the 
news that New York had gone Democratic, Jackson sent the letter 
on to Polk with a marginal note, ' ' ' who is J. K. polk, ' will be no 
more asked by the coons — A. J.""^ 



107 Smith. Annexation of Texas, 317. 

los "One Last Word before the Election" {Bern. Eev., Oct., 1844). It 
thanked heaven that Polk was not a ' ' military chieftain ' ' and had never 
even killed an Indian; also, that "there is no peculiar eminent 'popu- 
larity' attaching to him, of a character personal to himself, and distinct 
from his simple position as the representative of the general principles 
and policy of the party whose candidate he is. ' ' 

i"»See correspondence, including his letter of withdrawal, in Tyler, 
Letters and Times of the Tylers, II, 338 ff. 

no Nashville Banner, Nov. 11, 1844. The Union on the 14th retorted 
that these precincts had been carried by non-resident Whigs who had gone 
there and voted illegally. 

Ill Written on a letter from A. C. Flagg to Jackson, Nov. 7, 1844, PoR- 
Papers. The "coons," of course, were the Whigs. The name had been 
attached to them during the ' ' log-cabin ' ' campaign of 1840. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1844 283 

Polk received the news of his election some hours before it 
was known to the people of either Columbia or Nashville. The 
New York mail arrived at Nashville at nine o'clock in the even- 
ing, and on the outside of the package the postmaster at Cincin- 
nati had written a note stating that Polk had been elected. This 
attracted the attention of General Robert Armstrong, postmaster 
at Nashville and one of Polk's most intimate friends. Without 
giving out the news, Armstrong sent a messenger to Columbia 
with a note for Polk. At dawn he read the glad tidings which the 
note contained, but he said nothing about it to his neighbors and 
friends. For the next twenty-four hours he went about his work, 
and calmly received expressions of sympathy on his defeat."^ 
Sphinx-like silence was a role that Polk dearly loved to play, and 
an opportunity to do so on this occasion no doubt added much to 
the gratification caused by the information contained in the note. 

When the result of the election at last became known there 
was great rejoicing in Democratic ranks. On the other hand, 
desperado admirers of Clay, both in Tennessee and Kentucky, 
threatened Polk's life, and friends warned him to "take some 
thought of where you go & eat & drink. "^^^ No violence, how- 
ever, was attempted, and apprehensions were forgotten in the 
din of exuberant celebrations. At Nashville Polk was given an 
elaborate reception. A. 0. P. Nicholson made the principal ad- 
dress, and there was general rejoicing because the "Young 
Hickory" was soon to grasp the helm that had been so firmly 
guided by the ' ' Old Hickory. ' '^" 

Some of the Democratic factions had little love for Polk, but 
all could agree with the Democratic Review in thanking God for 
the defeat of Henry Clay. ' ' Had he succeeded, ' ' said the Review, 
"it would have stamped him, his ideas and his character upon 
the future history of our government, with a fatal depth and 
extent of mischief never perhaps to be again effaced. ""^ 

112 Nelson, Memorials of Sarah Childress Folic, 76-77. 

113 A. V. Brown to Polk, Nov. 13, 1844. Also Gen. John A. MeCalla 
Lexington, Ky., Nov. 22, 1844; both in Polh Papers. 

114 Nashville Union, Nov. 30, 1844. us Dem. Eev., Nov 1844 



-^ 



CHAPTER XIV 

PRESIDENT-ELECT * 

Various individuals and factions claimed the credit for Polk 's 
nomination and election, and as soon as the result of the ballot- 
ing had become known their claims to recognition were presented. 
While in one sense it was true that the successful candidate 
owed his elevation to a number of discordant elements within the 
party, in another sense he was under no obligation to any of them. 
With the exception perliaps of the younger element the several 
groups within the party had united on Polk, not from clioice but 
necessity, and not until each had found it impossible to procure 
the nomination of its particular favorite. The circumstances 
under which he had been nominated — the very fact that he had 
not been generally considered for the first place — relieved the 
President-elect from the necessity of making pledges to any one. 
Although Polk himself fully appreciated this fact and resolved 
to make the most of it, others did not and the "jockeying for 
position" at once began. 

One of the first to congratulate Polk on his victory was James 
Buchanan. The Senator from Pennsylvania was usually num- 
bered "\Yith the old leaders, but his plea, oddly enough, was for 
the recognition of young men in the distribution of offices. ' ' The 
old office holders generally," said he, "have had their day & 
ought to be content. Had Mr. Van Buren been our candidate, 
worthy as he is, this feeling which everywhere pervaded the 
Democratic ranks, would have made his defeat as signal as it was 
in 1840." Even Polk, he added, would have run better in Phila- 
delphia had it not been rumored that he would distribute the 
patronage among the "old hunkers."^ Such a letter from Robert 



1 Buchanan to Polk, Nov. 4, 1844, Polk Papers. 



PBESIDENT-ELECT 



285 



J. Walker would not have been surprising, but Buchanan's 
solicitude for the younger men was significantly of recent origin. 
Tyler's Avithdrawal from the canvass occasioned speculation 
as to the recognition which his friends would receive from the 
Democratic party, and during the campaign Polk received many 
letters which M-ere designed to pledge him in advance. The 
candidate discreetly refrained from committing himself, although 
his supporters may have given assurance that the followers of 
the President would not be proscribed. Special importance was 
attached to a letter written by Jackson to ]\Iajor Lewis- in which 
the General said that Tyler 's friends would be received as breth- 
ren. Then, too. Walker, as chairman of the national Democratic 
committee, had piade promises to influential adherents of the 
President. Nevertheless the Tylerites were apparently unwill- 
ing to run any risks, and soon after Polk's election they were 
charged by prominent Democrats with having concocted a scheme 
whereby they hoped to intrench themselves in office. One part of 
this scheme, according to H. C. Williams, was to procure the 
resignation of Whigs so that President Tyler might fill the offices 
with eleventh-hour Democrats whom it would be embarrassing 
for Polk to remove.^ Probably such reports exaggerated the 
facts, especially as to Whig resignations, but it is certain that 
the Tyler faction believed themselves to be entitled to a share of 
Democratic patronage. In plaintive note, John Y. Mason, 
Tyler's Secretary of the Navy, expressed a willingness to remain 
in the cabinet. He had, he told Polk, from a sense of duty 
resigned a judgeship so that he might take charge of the Navy 
Department, and had felt "very unhappy" since Tyler had be- 
come a candidate. Jackson, whom he had consulted, had advised 
him to remain in the cabinet because Tyler would soon with- 
draw. He would resign of course on March 3 unless Polk should 

2 Dated Julv 6, 1844. See Tyler, Life and Times of the Tylers, III, 
143 ff. 

3 H. C. Williams, Washington, Nov. 15; Henry Simpson, Philadelphia, 
Nov. 21, 1844, Polk Papers. 



/ 



288 JAMES E. POLK 

Although Calhoun denied emphatically that there had ever been 
any understanding between Polk and himself," apparently he 
was not without hope that he would be invited to remain at the 
helm in the Department of State. Late in November one of his 
intimate friends, General James Hamilton, sounded Polk on the 
subject and dwelt on the desirability of having Calhoun con- 
tinued in charge of the Texas and Oregon questions. For a 
southern member of the cabinet, said he, the entire South, from 
the Potomac to Louisiana, would prefer Calhoun.^^ 

The difficulties which might result from any attempt to har- 
monize factions were set forth in a letter from Cave Johnson. 
He said that it was understood in Washington that Calhoun and 
other members of Tyler 's cabinet desired to remain. It was also 
the general opinion that should Calhoun be retained Benton and 
his friends would oppose Polk's administration, while, on the 
other hand, the southern element would be hostile unless Calhoun 
should be continued in office. Calhoun, said Johnson, is the choice 
of southern men for Secretary of State, while many from the 
North want Silas Wright; and Benton is reported to have de- 
clared that should Polk retain any of the Tyler cabinet he would 
open fire on the "rotten eggs."" General Jackson's advice to 
Polk was the exclusion from his cabinet of "all aspirants to the 
presidency, or vice ' ' ; and the General was so confident that his 
advice would be followed that he assured Blair that neither Cal- 
houn nor any other aspirant would be appointed. In another 
letter to Polk, Jackson urged that Calhoun must not be retained, 
because other members of the cabinet could not get along with 
him: "England is the place for him there to combat with my 
Lord Aberdeen, the abolition question." The entire cabinet. 



9 "Nothing has ever passed between Mr. Polk and myself, directly or 
indirectly, on the subject. I neither know his views nor he mine on the 
subject" (Calhoun to J. A. Stuart, Oct. 21, 1844, Sep. of Am. Hist., 1899, 
II, 626). 

10 Hamilton to Polk, Nov. 29, 1844, Polk Papers. 

11 Johnson to Polk, Dec. 1, 6, 1844, ibid. 



PBESIDENT-ELECT 289 

said he, ought to be composed of new men.^- Writing late in 
December, Cave Johnson said that the friends of Benton and 
Calhoun feared each other's influence with Polk, consequently 
the breach between the wings of the party was widening. Espe- 
cially did the northerners fear that Polk would be brought under 
the influence of Calhoun. In a similar strain A. V. Brown 
w^rote that all elements were working to induce Polk not to retain 
Calhoun. There was, he said, scarcely less opposition to Cass; 
while Benton and "Wright opposed Buchanan on account of the 
stand he had taken at Baltimore in favor of the two-thirds rule.^^ 
While others were doing their utmost to prevent his retention, 
Calhoun himself was telling his friends that there was much 
speculation concerning the cabinet and not a little intriguing in 
various quarters. He reported himself to be " perfectly passive ' ' 
and ' ' indififerent. ' ' Whether he would remain or not, if invited, 
would depend on the "probable course of the administration."^* 
His supporters, however, were both active and hopeful. Some 
of them were sanguine enough to believe that Calhoun would 
be able to build up such a strong party following that Polk would 
not dare to remove him.^^ Hearing that Gideon Pillow had re- 
marked that Polk's chief difficulty was ''how to get rid of Cal- 
houn, ' ' even Duff Green felt constrained to w^arn the President- 
elect of the dangers which would result from sacrificing Calhoun 
in order to conciliate Benton and Wright. ' ' I make no pretense 
of friendship for you," he told Polk very frankly; but as a 



\^ 12 Jackson to Polk, Dec. 13, 16, Folk Papers; Jackson to Blair, Dee. 
14, 1844, Jackson Papers. 

13 Johnson to Polk, Dec. 26; Brown to Polk, Dec. 29, 1844, Polk Papers. 

14 Calhoun to his son-in-law, Thos. G. Clemson, Dec. 13, 1844, JBep. Am. 
Assn., 1899, II, 633. Dr. Gwin, who was supposed to be voicing Calhoun's 
views, suggested to A. V. Brown the following cabinet: Calhoun, Sec. of 
State; Walker, Sec. of Treasury; Woodbury, Sec. of War; Eeed, of Pa., 
Atty. Gen.; Flagg, P-M Gen.; Mason, Sec. of Navy. Van Buren was sug- 
gested as minister to England (Brown to Polk, Jan. 5, 1845, Polk Papers). 

15 C. A. Davis, New York, to Crittenden, Dec. 17, 1844, Crittenden 
Papers. 



290 JAMES K. FOLK 

friend of the South, he urged Calhoun's retention." Calhoun 
himself continued to remain passive until February 26, when, in 
a personal interview, Polk informed him that there was to be an 
entirely new cabinet and offered to send him as minister to Eng- 
land. On the day following he sent Polk his resignation and 
assured him that there was neither dissatisfaction nor abatement 
of kind feelings on his own part.^^ 

New England began at an early date to solicit a place in the 
cabinet. In New Hampshire, Hubbard and Woodbury were 
mentioned, but her congressional delegation preferred Pierce.'^ 
Bancroft was suggested as the New England member, but he 
informed Polk that he would prefer a foreign mission.^^ Maine 
was especially insistent in her claims for recognition, and Polk 
received numerous letters from politicians of that state. In 
several of them Governor Fairfield was suggested as Secretary 
of the Navy, and Nathan Weston as Attorney General. 

The greatest rivalry, however, aside from the solicitation in 
Calhoun's behalf, was that between New York on the one side, 
and Pennsylvania and the West on the other. In Pennsylvania 
Buchanan and Dallas were the recognized heads of two rival fac- 
tions, each of which was desirous of gaining a strategic position 
in the new administration. In order to accomplish his purpose, 
Dallas recommended that Robert J. Walker, of Mississippi, be 
made Secretary of State.=° Dallas and Walker w^ere connected 
by family ties as well as by political sympathies. In addition, 
Walker had the support of the aggressive forces in the south- 
western states. Richard Rush urged the claims of Buchanan. 



16 Green to Polk, Jan. 20, 1845, Polh Papers. On January 1, Memucan 
Hunt wrote from Galveston that leading public men in Texas wished 
Calhoun to be retained and Donelson to be made Secretary of the Treasury. 

17 Calhoun to Polk, Feb. 27, 3845, Polk Papers. Same to Clemson, 
March 11, 1845, Sep. Am. Hist. Assn., 1899, II, 647. 

18 John P. Hale to Pierce, Dec. 3, 1844, Pierce Papers. 

19 Lewis Josselyn, of Boston, to J. Geo. Harris, Dee. 4, 1844; Bancroft 
to Polk, Jan. 1, 1845, Polh Papers. 

20 Dallas to Polk, Dec. 15, 1844, ibid. 



PBESIDENT-ELECT 291 

The latter had also received the formal endorsement of the 
Pennsylvania electoral college, but Dallas informed Polk that 
this action had been procured by the intrigue of a man who 
wished to be made collector of the port of Philadelphia. Dallas 
once more recommended Walker, dwelling on his command of 
foreign languages and upon the fact that he would be especially 
acceptable to the Texans.-^ 

The rejection of Van Buren at Baltimore made it desirable 
that the powerful state of New York should be placated if pos- 
sible. Polk very naturally, therefore, turned his thoughts in 
that direction, and his offer of the Treasury Department to Silas 
Wright was the first tender of a cabinet position to any one. 
Wright promptly declined the offer. The reason, as stated in his 
letter, was that he had pledged himself to serve as governor, if 
elected, and should he fail to do so it would be said that his 
nomination had been a trick to enable him to procure a cabinet 
position. When expressing regret because Wright had felt con- 
strained to decline, Polk stated that while he had not yet decided 
upon a person for any of the cabinet positions, he intended to 
select either the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treas- 
ury from the state of New York. He asked Wright freely to 
suggest a man for either position." In his reply Wright recom- 
mended Benjamin F. Butler for the State Department and 
Azariah C. Flagg for the Treasury. Lest Polk might think that 
he would have accepted the State portfolio, he assured the Presi- 
dent-elect that he did not feel qualified to fill that office. Had 
he been at liberty to fill any such position he would have accepted 
the Treasury appointment. 

In a letter dated January 4, 1845, Polk assured Van Buren 
that his nomination at Baltimore had been unsought and unex- 
pected. He prevaricated to the degree of stating that: "Until 



21 Eush to Polk, Dee. 27, 1844; Dallas to Polk, Jan. 10, 1845, Hid. 

22 Polk to Wright, Dee. 7; Wright to Polk, Dee. 20, 1844; Polk to 
Wright, Jan. 4, 1845, ibid. 



292 JAMES K. POLK 

the moment it was made, it Avas very far from my thoughts, that 
any state of circumstances could arise, which could lead to such 
a result." He thanked the ex-President for his "powerful 
support" and requested his advice as to suitable members of 
the cabinet. Wright, he said, was the only selection he had 
made without consulting anyone, but as that offer had been 
declined, he would like to have Van Buren suggest persons for 
either the State or Treasury Departments.-^ In reply, Van 
Buren stated that Polk had acted just as he would have done in 
offering the Treasury portfolio to Wright, and that Wright's 
refusal to accept was due entirely to the political situation in 
New York. He knew of no one so well qualified to take charge 
of foreign affairs as Benjamin F. Butler, and he believed either 
Flagg or Cambreleng to be suitable for the Treasury Depart- 
ment. A month later he told Polk that Donelson would be a 
good man to have near him. He had desired to have Donelson 
in his own cabinet, but had feared that modesty would prevent 
him from accepting.-* Jackson believed that Wright 's refusal to 
accept a cabinet position had been due to the fear that Calhoun 
would be retained. He advised Polk to deliberate well and to 
make no final decisions until he had reached Washington. He 
believed Mason and Wilkins to be worthy men, but ' ' surely you 
will do well to select an entire cabinett fresh from the people 
as your own, & leave Mr. Tylers out to be provided for, if tliought 
worthy otherwise. ' '-^ 

Before making another tender of a cabinet office Polk pre- 
pared a form of invitation to be used in future cases. Its jour- 
pose was to make clear to those who might receive it that a 
cabinet position was not to be used, during the next four years, 
as a stepping-stone to the Presidency, and that each member 



-'■^ Polk to Van Bureu, Jan. 4, 1845, Van Buren Papers. Also, copy in 
PoJk Papers. 

2-t Van Buren to Polk, Jan. 18, 1845, Polk Papers and Van B. Papers; 
Van Buren to Polk, Feb. 21, PoJk Papers. 

25 Jackson to Polk, Jan. 10, 1845, Polk Papers. 



PRESIDENT-ELECT 293 

must devote his whole time to the duties of his office.-® Although 
he was not a military man, Polk possessed at least one attribute 
of a true soldier. As a private in the ranks of his party he was 
ever ready to submit without complaint to -the judgment of the 
leaders; and now, as party chieftain, he required from others 
a similar respect for authority. Jackson, who knew Polk 
thoroughly, assured Blair that "He will have no caball about 
him, his heads of Departments must be a unit. This is my opin- 
ion of the man, and I think you will, when you know the men 
be pleased with his selection."-' 

On January 28, 1845, Polk left his home at Columbia and 
set out for Washington. The fact that he was going to fill the 
highest office of his country 'did not for a moment overcome his 
habitual caution nor prevent him from giving thoughtful atten- 
tion to minute details. He had written to Cave Johnson and 
other friends and asked them to procure rooms for him at Cole- 
man's hotel, but the rates must be reasonable and the bargain 
made in advance.-^ 

When he arrived in Washington in the middle of February 
the President-elect had not, with the exception of Buchanan, 
definitely decided upon any member of his cabinet.-'* Early in 



26 See infra, p. 325. 

-~ Jackson to Blair, Jan. 21, 1845, Jackson Papers. There were, of 
course, those who held a radically different opinion. "Polk," wrote 
Prentiss, "was elected by a union of factions. He has neither honesty 
nor capacity to be the president even of his party — he will become at once 
the tool of those factions" (Prentiss to Crittenden, Dec. 22, 1844, Crit- 
tenden Papers). J. K. Paulding, also, considered Polk weak and unable 
to cope with the situation, "whether he selects a northern, a southern, or 
a mixed cabinet." "He is by no means a great man — nor scarcely one 
of extraordinary mediocrity; and if the truth must be told, I admire Mrs. 
Polk much more than I do the colonel (Paulding to Van Buren, Jan. 19, 
1845, Van Buren Papers). 

28 ' ' You know I have no money to spend unnecessarily, — and to avoid 
being subjected to an extravagant or enormous charge, it is necessary that 
a distinct bargain shall be made in advance" (Polk to Johnson, Dec. 21, 
1844, "Polk- Johnson Letters"). 

29 According to Gideon Welles, he had also settled upon Bancroft for 
the Treasury and Walker for Attorney General, before leaving Tennessee 
(MS "Eev. of Pol. Hist, of U. S. and"Pres. Contests," Welles Papers). 



294 JAMES K. POLK 

the winter, at a meeting held at the Hermitage, Buchanan had 
been discussed as a possible premier for the cabinet, but then 
it was believed that his appointment would cause too much 
jealously on the part of Benton, Calhoun, Cass, and Wright. ^"^ 
However, on his arrival in Washington, Polk immediately invited 
' Buchanan to take charge of the State Department, and the tender 
was promptly accepted. ^^ 

Having thus provided for Pennsylvania, Polk addressed an- 
other letter to Van Buren. When he last wrote, he said, he 
intended to look to New York for either a Secretary of State or 
a Secretary of War. Subsequently he had decided to call a 
citizen of another state to the Department of State, but was still 
desirous that a citizen of New York should take charge of the 
Treasury. Such liad been his intention when he came to Wash- 
ington. On his arrival, however, he found that the South had 
already united on a distinguished individual from that section 
and that Indiana as well as other western states favored the same 
person. 

I was not satisfied that it was proper to appoint him to that Post — but became 
convinced — that if I did not — gi'eat and extensive dissatisfaction would 
prevail — unless I could find some individual in some part of the Union who 
would be unexceptionable to them & also to the North. 

I Believing that Bancroft would fulfil these conditions, "my pre- 
sent determination therefore is to call him to that [Treasury] 
Department." He was inclined, he said, to retain Mason in 

^^harge of the Navy, and would be glad to have either Butler or 
Marcy as his Secretary of War.^- Evidently the distinguished 
individual mentioned in the letter was Robert J. Walker, of 
Mississippi. Writing early in January, A. V. Brown told Polk 



30 J. P. Brawles to Buchanan, Dec. 20, 1844, Budianan Papcrfi. Brawles 
was told this by A. V. Brown, who had been present when Polk discussed 
cabinet ai)pointments with Jackson. 

31 Polk's letter was dated at Washington on Feb. 17 (Eucliatian Papers) 
and Buchanan replied on Feb. 18 (Polk Papers). 

32 Polk to' Van Buren, Feb. 22, 1845, Van Buren Papers, 



PBESIDENT-ELECT 295 

that Joseph A. Wright, Representative from Indiana, had re- 
ported that his own section as well as the Northwest wished 
Walker to be made Secretary of the Treasury so that he might 
have the appointment of land agents and other western officials. 
If, said he, Silas Wright should be given the office, he would 
use it to his own advantage and to the prejudice of Cass. From 
Cave Johnson, also, came the information that the "Cass men" 
all preferred Walker, and he gave the same reasons for their 
preference.^' 

Polk did not yield immediately to the importunities of 
Walker 's friends ; instead he held to his original plan of making 
Bancroft Secretary of the Treasury and Walker Attorney Gen- 
eral. He even drafted a letter in which he invited Walker to 
accept the latter position, but probably it was never sent.^* On 
February 25, without awaiting a reply from Van Buren, he 
offered the War portfolio to Benjamin F. Butler. Butler 
promptly declined because of "domestic and prudential consid- 
erations," although he would have made the sacrifice if he had 
been tendered either the State or the Treasury Department.^'"' 

Van Buren deliberated well before answering Polk's letter 
of February 22 ; but on March 1, he drafted a reply and sent it 
to Washington by his son, Smith Van Buren. In it he said that 
the "honest portion" of the New York Democracy were excited 
by a rumor that Woodbury was to be made Secretary of the 
Treasury, and that New York was to be passed over entirely. He 
did not say, but seemed to assume, that Butler would reconsider 
his refusal of the War portfolio. ^° Polk appears to have felt 



33 Brown to Polk, Jan. 9; Johnson to Polk, Jan. 11, 1845, Polk Papers. 

34 Copy, dated Feb. 19, 1845, ibid. 

35 Butler to Polk, Feb. 27, 1845, Polk Papers. Mrs. Butler wrote to 
Van Buren that she was responsible for her husband's refusing the War 
portfolio; that she had promised that if he were offered the State Depart- 
ment she would not object, but this promise did not apply to other depart- 
ments. Her reason was that she did not like to live in Washington (Mrs. 
Butler to Van Buren, Feb. 27, 1845, Fan Buren Papers). 

30 Van Buren to Polk, Albany, March 1, 1845, Polk Papers. 



n 



296 JAMES E. POLK 

that Butler's prompt refusal and Van Buren's delay had ab- 
solved him from further obligation to that wing of the party, 
for, on March 1, he informed Van Buren that, as Flagg did not 
have a national reputation, he had decided to make Marcy Secre- 
tary of War. He hoped that this appointment would be satis- 
factory to New York. The rumor that Bancroft was to be made 
Secretary of the Treasury had "brought down upon me" the 
delegations from New Hampshire and Maine, and many — on ac- 
count of the patronage he dispenses — were demanding the ap- 
pointment of a southern man to that office.^' 

When Smith Van Buren arrived in Washington with the let- 
ter from his father he was chagrined to learn that Polk had 
already appointed Marcy. "Well," he reported to the ex- 
President, 

the letter which you ree'd dated last night from the illustrious cabinet-maker 
of our day has advised you of the fate of my mission ; and unless the excuses 
& explanations were more skilfully done in writing than in conversation, you 
will have seen through the flimsy pretexts — the contradictory & evasive & 
trimming character of the business, at least so far as New York is concerned. 

Polk, he said, had declined to receive him for half an hour, in 
order to give himself and A. V. Brown time to ' ' concoct ' ' an an- 
swer. Polk wished that he might have seen Van Buren's letter a 
day earlier, but the matter had now been decided. ' ' The Treasury 
arrangement [Walker's appointment] you perceive tells the whole 
story for New York. The only chance now is that your letter 
may upset the whole concern, & start anew the business to- 
morrow." In a letter written on the following day he said that 
when he read his father's letter to Polk, the latter, instead of 
feeling crestfallen, had the "impudence" to say that he felt 
relieved. ' ' I denounced Marcy to him in good round terms ' ' and 



37 Polk to Van Buren, March 1, 1845, Van Buren Papers. Evidently 
Marcy had been expecting an offer, for on Feb. 24 he wrote to Dickinson 
about "my appointment as a member of the cabinet." This must have 
been speculation, because on the day following (25th) Polk offered the 
War portfolio to Butler. 



PRESIDENT-ELECT 297 

said that he was simply an office seeker in whom honest Demo- 
crats had no faith. Polk replied that he had never heard 
these things before and was "thunderstruck," although "Dix 
has told him the same thing over and over again. "^^ 

Instead of beginning anew with his cabinet making, Polk dis- 
patched another letter to Van Buren. If he had committed an 
error, he said, it had been unintentional ; and it pained him to 
think that Van Buren might think he had acted unkindly to him 
or his friends. He had acted, he said under no outside influence ; 
he had followed his own judgment, and harbored no unkind feel- 
ing toward either Van Buren or Wright.^^ Nevertheless, Smith 
Van Buren had formed quite a different opinion. "The sound- 
est judges here," he wrote, "think P. came here all right — but 
has been be-deviled since he arrived. To a large extent this is of 
course evident, but not wholly so. "^° 

It is scarcely to be wondered at that Polk should have dis- 
sembled during the days just preceding his inauguration. He 
was beset on every hand by conflicting demands, all of which he 
was expected to satisfy. That he strove to harmonize factional 
discord so far as his own self-respect would permit, there is no 
reason to doubt. He tried to deal fairly with each faction, but 
to accept the dictation of none. If the Van Burenites suffered 
disappointment they had only themselves to blame, for Polk had 
given them more consideration than he had ever received from 
them. He had tendered cabinet positions to two of their number. 



38 Smith Van Buren to his father, March 2, 3, 1845, Van Buren Papers. 
Tilden and O 'Sullivan, who borp letters from Butler to Polk, were, on the 
other hand, thoroughly capil ^d by the President-elect. The latter re- 
ported that Polk seemed like "one of us" and evinced great admiration 
for' both Wright and Van Buren. ' ' He certainly entirely won the hearts 
of both of us, and has effectually dissipated whatever slight degree of 
anxiety may have rested in our minds in regard to the Adm'n" (O 'Sul- 
livan to Van Buren, Washington, March 1, 1845, Van Buren Papers). 

39 Polk to Van Buren, March 3, 1845, PolTc Papers. 

40 Smith Van Buren to his father, March 4, 1845, Van Buren Papers. 
"Armstrong," said he, "so far as I can observe, is the only honest man 
about him. He [Armstrong] is sick & very much affected by our affairs. 
He doubtless sees the approaching storm from Nashville. ' ' 



298 JAMES K. POLK 

and he bad kept Van Buren fully informed regarding liis plans. 
He had even told the ex-President of liis intention to appoint 
Marcy unless Butler should accept the place offered to him. Van 
Buren had delayed in answering his letter, and it was unreason- 
able to expect Polk to wait indefinitely when inauguration day 
was already at hand. Surely Polk bad the right to make his own 
choice for the office of Secretary of State, and it was cool effront- 
ery on Butler's part to intimate that the position should have 
been bestowed upon himself. 

Walker's assignment to the Treasury evidently was contrary 
to Polk's own wishes, yet he felt constrained to make this con- 
cession to the western element after his own choice, Bancroft, 
was found to be unpopular even in New England states. A new 
adjustment became necessary, therefore Mason was made 
Attorney General so that Bancroft might be assigned to the Navy. 
Mason's retention in the cabinet was due to personal friendship, 
and not to a desire to placate Tyler and his friends. Tyler had, 
in January, bestowed a diplomatic appointment upon William H. 
Polk, but the latter declined to accept it in order to free his 
brother from any obligation to the retiring President.*^ In fact, 
Tyler was much displeased by the ingratitude of his successor, 
and, in 1846, wrote that Polk seemed to be "avenging the sup- 
posed wrongs to Mr. Van Buren."*- Marcy 's acceptance of the 
War portfolio*'^ completed the cabinet, for Cave Johnson had 
accepted the appointment as Postmaster General shortly after 
Polk's arrival in Washington.** Although many persons had 
suggested Donelson as the Tennessee member, Polk evidently 
preferred Johnson, and Jackson assured Polk that Donelson 



41 Cave Johnson to Polk, Jan. 8; J. L. O 'Sullivan to Polk, Jan. 20, 
1845, Polk Papers. 

42 Tyler to Alex. Gardner, Julv 11, 184G (Tvler, Letters and Times of 
the Tylers, II, 342). 

43 Welles says that "Gen. [William O. | Butler of Kentucky accom- 
panied the President-elect to the seat of government in expectation of the 
appointment [War Dept.] then tendered him" (MS "Rev. of Pol. Hist., 
etc."). I have seen nothing else to indicate that such an offer was made. 

44 Johnson to Polk, Feb. 26, 1845, Polk Papers. 



PEESIDENT-ELECT 299 

would be satisfied with a foreign mission. Jackson had made it 
clear to Donelson, he said, that he was the one who had suggested 
a diplomatic appointment in preference to any other.*^ Johnson 
thoroughly deserved a place in Polk's cabinet, for no one had 
stood by him so loyally or had rendered more efficient service dur- 
ing his entire political career. Polk was by nature secretive and 
self-reliant, but to Johnson more than to any other person he 
disclosed his plans and his aspirations. Johnson had never failed 
him in the hour of need, and, both in Washington and in Tenn- 
essee, had done much to aid his political advancement. As a 
statesman, Johnson was conservative and rather narrow ; but he 
was a crafty and capable politician, and a recognized leader in 
the House. 

In selecting his cabinet, as in distributing the patronage, Polk 
had to steer between Scylla and Charybdis. When he tried to 
be fair to all wings of the party, he was charged with weakness ; 
while independent actions were attributed to vanity and conceit, 
or characterized as downright treachery to his benefactors. It 
was freely predicted that leading cabinet members would dom- 
inate the President and reduce him to a mere figurehead, yet, 
from the beginning, Polk was master of the situation. 

Scarcely less difficult than the selection of a cabinet was the 
choice of a party "organ" which would give ungrudging sup- 
port to the new administration. Historians have indulged in no 
small amount of conjecture as to Polk's reasons for discarding 
Blair and the Globe despite General Jackson's vigorous protests. 
His action is usually said to have been the consummation of a 
preelection bargain to obtain votes. Sometimes Tyler is made 
the other party to the contract, sometimes Calhoun ; and in an 
attempt to make out a strong case, some have asserted that Blair 's 
head on a platter had been offered to each of them in return for 
his political support. Usually their information has been derived 

45 Jackson to Polk, Jan. 10, Feb. 15, 1845, ibid. On account of Donel- 
son 's delicate health, Jackson asked that he might be sent as full minister 
to Spain, Brazil, or Mexico. 



300 JAMES E. POLE 

from Benton, and accepted without question. But even von 
Hoist, who had no difficulty in believing the Tyler story, balks at 
the absurdity of a bargain between Polk and Calhoun.*" For 
very good reasons both Tyler and Calhoun despised the editor 
of the Globe, and both supported the nominees of the Democratic 
party, but such a coincidence does not imply any bargain between 
them and the Democratic candidates. Calhoun's letter to Stuart 
concerning the prospective cabinet*' seems to indicate that he 
had no knowledge of Polk's plans for the future, and Tyler lias 
specifically and emphatically denied that he and Polk had ever 
entered into an agreement by which Tyler's withdrawal from 
the canvass was made contingent on Polk's promise not to make 
the Glohc his official organ. As Tyler very aptly remarked, 
' ' Blair was already dead, ' ' and it only remained for Mr. Polk to 
chant his requiem.*^ 

It is unnecessary to seek some mysterious intrigue or pre- 
election pact in order to find Polk's motive for establishing a 
new paper in "Washington. The obvious reason for establishing 
the Union was his desire to have an organ at the capital which 
would give his administration its undivided and loyal support. 
He had always believed Blair to be hostile or indifferent to his 
political advancement when he had been a candidate for Speaker, 
and when he had sought the Vice-Presidential nomination. Both 
Polk and his friends believed that the Globe had supported the 
nominees of the Baltimore convention with great reluctance and 
that its editor was now, and would continue to be, under the 
absolute domination of Senator Benton. This belief is the best 
of reasons for Polk's refusal to make the Globe his official news- 
paper. Walker and others were hostile to Blair and undoubtedly 



4« von Hoist, Historji of the United States, III, 7-8. 

■i- See above, p. 288, note 9. 

■48 Tyler to Eitchie, Jan. 9, 1851; same to John S. Cunningham, Mav 8, 
1856 (Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, II, 409 ff., 415). In 'the 
second letter, Tyler said that the ' ' conspiracy to suiijjlant the Globe, by 
substituting Mr. Ritchie or anybody else as the editorial mouth-piece of 
Mr. Polk, is the sheerest invention that ever was conceived of." 



PRESIDENT-ELECT 301 

desired his elimination. Their feelings may have strengthened 
Polk's determination to look elsewhere for an editor, but there 
is no reason for believing that they caused it. Polk's Tennessee 
friends wrote freely concerning the advisability of establishing a 
new paper, but in his correspondence there is no letter from 
"Walker on this subject.*" 

Polk's feelings toward Blair are manifested in a letter written 
to Cave Johnson on January 21, 1844. "Amicus" had published 
in the Glohe an article which urged the claims of W. R. King to 
the Vice-Presidency. In reply, S. H. Laughlin and H. L. Turney 
prepared an article in Polk 's behalf and sent it to Blair for pub- 
lication. "Blair," said Polk, "surely cannot do me the injustice 
to exclude it from his columns"; if so, he instructed Johnson to 
have it published in pamphlet form. After alluding to his nom- 
ination by the Mississippi state convention, Polk wondered 
whether Blair would suppress this news ' * or stick it in an obscure 
corner as he did the Tennessee and Arkansas nominations ?""° 
Such remarks indicate that he did not, even at that time, regard 
Blair as his friend. 

Immediately after Polk had been nominated at Baltimore, 
A. V. Brown reported from Washington that "much is said here 
by some as to continuing the Globe as the Polk organ — this we 
will manage with sound discretion. The Globe will change its 
tone & perhaps take back much that it has said & go in warmly 
if not heartily — if so — well — But we will not commit ourselves 
to it after the election. ' '^^ The last remark might seem to indicate 
that Blair's fate after election had already been determined, but 
this is disproved by letters written later in the campaign. Cave 
Johnson, who was hostile to Calhoun and averse to the Tylerites, 
wrote that the Glole was noncommittal and that a new paper was 

^" Although Ambler assigns to Walker the chief role in the overthrow 
of Blair, he admits his inability to produce any tangible evidence (Ambler, 
Thomas Eitchie, 252). 

-oPolk to Johnson, Jan. 21, 1844, "Polk-Johnson Letters." 
51 Brown to Polk, May 30, 1844, Polk Papers. 



302 JAMES K. POLK 

needed ; but two weeks later, when he had come to believe that 
the southerners were trying to "appropriate" Polk, he spoke 
with disgust of the "secret talk of upsetting the Globe [and] 
turning Benton overboard.''^- Judge Catron vehemently de- 
nounced the Globe and declared that its "coarse brutality" was 
loathed by a large majority of the party.^^ 

Late in June, J. B. Jones, editor of the Madisonian, invited 
J. George Harris to become joint editor of that paper. Harris 
and General Armstrong looked with favor upon the offer and 
believed that all threeWashington papers — Madisonian, Spectator 
and Globe — might be merged into one. However, A. V. Brown, 
who had come from Washington recently, did not approve such 
an arrangement.^* It was not yet a question of an administration 
organ, for there was no certainty that Polk would be elected, but 
many of Polk's friends felt that Blair's support of the ticket was 
merely perfunctory and that a more vigorous journal was needed. 
This feeling was not caused entirely by w^hat appeared or did not 
appear in the columns of the Globe. The campaign leaders be- 
lieved Blair to be under the thumb of Benton, and the latter was 
vociferously denouncing the "intrigue" which had deprived 
Van Buren of the nomination and, also, the annexation program. 
Despite the need of a reliable party organ there seemed to be no 
satisfactory solution of the difficulty, therefore the matter was 
dropped until after the election. 

The correspondence does not disclose who it was that first 
suggested inviting Ritchie to come to Washington, but Brown 
rather than Walker seems to have been the prime mover. In a 
letter written to Polk, soon after the election, Brown said that 
Walker ' ' entertains the same opinion with us " as to the import- 
ance of procuring Blair's half of the Globe for Ritchie. Blair 
would not be approached, he said, until Cave Johnson had gone 



52 Johnson to Polk, June 1 [1844?, year not given], June 13, 1844, Polk 
Papers. 

53 Catron to Polk, June 8, [1844], ibid. 

54 Harris to Polk, June 27, 29; Armstrong to Polk, June 30, 1844, ibid. 



PBESIDENT-ELECT 303 

to Richmond to sound Eitchie on the subject. "If that dont 
take — then B & Rives must sink into mere proprietors, with an 
able & competent Editor having absolute controul of the political 
character of the paper.""" Cave Johnson, also, had become con- 
vinced that Blair must go. Some of the politicians, said he, fear 
that the Globe will be dominated by Benton and they will there- 
fore oppose giving it the public printing; "I see no chance of 
a reconciliation with them if F. P. Blair is retained." A few 
days later he reported that "the Globe is regarded as Benton's 
organ by the friends of C [alhoun] & will oppose him to the utter- 
most & will in connection with the Whigs defeat him & therefore 
B[rown] & myself have been sounding, to learn the prospect of 
getting Ritchie . . . . T. H. B[enton] has a great dislike to 
Ritchie & I expect will be greatly provoked, if he learns any such 
movement. "^^ This letter shows a desire to prevent opposition 
from the Calhoun faction, but it indicates, also, that there had 
been no preelection understanding. Had there been any such 
understanding Johnson would have been one of the first to learn 
of it. 

As soon as General Jackson heard of the scheme to supplant 
the Globe he took immediate steps to thwart it. Assuming that 
Polk knew nothing about the matter, Jackson warned him that 
an intrigue was being concocted in Washington which might 
divide the party and wreck his administration. Some, he said, 
wished to substitute the Madisonian for the Globe; others wanted 
to make Ritchie editor of the Globe. He urged Polk to discoun- 
tenance such maneuvers for 

the first would blow 7011 sky high & destroy the E epubli can party — The 
second would be an insult to the Editor of the Globe & seperate him from 
you, whose administration he is determined to support — Keep Blairs Globe 
the administration paper, and William B. Lewis, to ferret out & make known 
to you all the plotts & intrigues Hatching against your administration and 
you are safe. 



55 Brown to Polk, Dec. 5, 1844, ibid. 

56 Johnson to Polk, Dec. 6, 12, 1844, ibid. 



304 JAMES K. POLK 

These men luul been sncli n source of str-engtli to Jackson liiniself 
that very naturally he desired his friend Polk to have the benefit 
of their services. But battling for Old Hickory was one thing, 
and loyal support of the nuvn who had profited by the intrigue 
against Van IJuren was (piite another. Polk well knew that both 
men had always been ready to throw obstacles in his way, and 
he had no reason to believe that their feeling toward him had 
undergone any change. 

Jackson may have b(H'n wrong in liis Ix'lief that Blair and 
Lewis would labor for the glory of Polk's adnnnistration, but 
another part of his letter showed that he understood Ritchie's 
weaknesses better than did those who were so anxious to bring 
him to Washington. "Ritchie is a good Editor," he told Polk, 
"but a very unsafe one — lie goes off at half bent, & does great 
injury before he can be set right. "■'^" Before man 3^ months had 
elapsed, Polk realized fully the accuracy of the General's state- 
ment. 

On tlie following day, Jackson informed Blair of the scheme 
to merge the tipcctator and the Madisonian into a Polk organ. 
He attributed this scheme to Calhoun. Believing that his word 
W'as still law, he told Blair that "I am sure polk when he hears of 
it will feel as indignant at the plott as I do."^''* In Washington 
the "plott" had already been discovered, and Cave Johnson (on 
account of his known intimacy with Polk) feared to go to Rich- 
mond for tlie pur})Ose of negotiating with Ritchie. The pre- 
mature discovery greatly annoyed Johnson, and he complained 
that "even old J. Q. A [dams] asked when we were going to 
Richmond."'^" Brown, who facetiously called himself "tlie Presi- 
dent elect ad interim," was somewhat disconcerted by Johnson's 
timidity. He even suspected that his colleague did not desire to 



--' Jackson to Polk, Dec. 13, 1844, ibid. 

•'^ Jackson to Blair, Dec. 14, 1844, Jackson FapcrH. 

5'J Johnson to Polk, Dec. 14, 1844, FoR Faptrs. 



PRESIDENT-ELECT 305 

get rid of Blair/'° General Bayly, of the Virginia delegation, and 
a personal friend of Ritchie, now undertook to negotiate by letter 
with the veteran editor of the Enquirer. "If my road is blocked 
there," said Brown, "I shall then go for sinking Blair & Rives 
into Proprietors only & putting the political controul (absolute) 
into the hands of a new Editor & that man Burke would not 
be a bad one." Brown believed that Blair w^ould not oppose 
the change "if he sees that Benton means to be antagonistic to 
your administration as many of his Western friends think likely 
enough. He shews no mitigation of his opposition & nothing but 
instructions plain & powerful can subdue him. ' '''^ Here again is 
a statement of the main reason for wanting a new party organ — 
not pledges to Tyler or to Calhoun, but distrust of Blair and a 
fear that he would be controlled by Benton, who was considered 
to be an enemy of the incoming administration. Another indi- 
cation that Polk had made no bargain with the Tylerites is the 
sentiment voiced in a letter written by J. B. Jones, editor of the 
Madisonian. The plan contemplated was, in his opinion, the 
only sensible one, for he believed that discord would surely result 
from the employment of any of the Washington editors. 
"When," said he, "Col. Polk shall convince all parties that he 
is in his own hands — that he will be the President, and not a 
partisan of any aspirant, there will be no door left open for the 
ingress of factious schemes. "^^ 



CO "He feared some newspaper squibs at him & I feared he was rather 
indifferent about any matter that was against the Globe Benton & Co 
but perhaps I was wrong. ' ' 

61 Brown to Polk, Dec. 23, 1844, Polk Papers. 

62 Party factions can not "object to the [new] paper because its con- 
ductor entertains no special partiality for any one of the aspirants to the 
succession. But if I were to conduct the paper it would be said that Mr. 
Polk had thrown himself into the hands of the Tyler men — if the editor 
of the Globe, into the hands of Col. Benton — and if the Constitution 
[successor to the SiJcctator], into the hands of Mr. Calhoun" (Jones to 

, Dec. 23, 1844). Apparently this was written to J. Geo. Harris, for 

it was inclosed in his letter to Polk, Jan. 4, 1845, Polk Papers. 



303 JAMES K. POLK 

At first Ritchie did not take kindly to the plan which had been 
arranged for him, and, in a letter to Bayly, he declined the invita- 
tion. He was not able, he said, to purchase the Globe, and rival 
Democratic papers would do the party more harm than good."^ 
After reading Ritchie's letter, Brown concluded that "If Benton 
goes right on Texas & Calhoun is not in the Cabinet there would 
be no insuperable difficulty Math the Globe — but you would find 
it hard to keep in order. ' "^* Edmund Burke was once more con- 
sidered, but his former affiliations with Calhoun were urged 
against his selection.'^^ A few days of reflection seem to have 
convinced Brown that neither Benton nor Blair could be kept 
in order, for he presented for Polk's consideration an entirely 
new solution of the difficulty. He offered to purchase Blair's 
share of the Globe and to continue the paper under the firm name 
of Brown and Rives. Brown was to have exclusive control, and, 
with Kendall's helj), to edit the journal in the interest of the 
administration.'^*'' His new scheme, like the others, came to 
naught, and no arrangement had been made when Po k reached 
Washington. Apparently the President-elect gave no encourage- 
ment to the editor of the Globe, for Smith Van Buren reported to 
his father that "Blair says— 'Where am I to go?' "«^ 

Polk's own opinions concerning a party journal were ex- 
pressed in very definite terms before he left Tennessee. In a 
letter to Cave Johnson, he said : 

As to the irress which may be regarded as the Government organ, one 
thing is settled in my mind. It must have no connection with, nor be under 
the influence or control of any clique or portion of the party which is making 
war upon any other portion of the party — with a view to the succession and 



63 His letter, date<l Dec. 28, is printed in full in Ambler, Thomas 
Eitchie, 247-249. 

64 Brown to Polk, Jan. 1, 1843 [1845], Polk Papers. 

65 Cave Johnson to Polk, Jan. 2, 1844, ibid. 

66 Brown to Polk, Jan. 5, 1845, ibid. He told Polk that if this plan did 
not work out he might consent to run for governor of Tennessee, although 
he would rather "rent a brick yard" than go through that campaign! 

6T March 2, 1845, Van Buren Papers. 



PEESIDENT-ELECT 307 

not with a view to the success of my administration. I think the view you 
take of it proper and of the proposed arrangement the best that can be 
made. I hope it may be effected.^s 

Apparently Polk felt that he was regarded as a sort of charge d' 
affaires who was to keep things running while the great men 
contended for the prize. He had no intention of playing such a 
role, and his determination to make the administration his own 
and to have a paper which would promote its interests was both 
characteristic of the man and an exhibition of sound sense. '^'' 
Even von Hoist, who has found little in Polk's career to com- 
mend, (^bsolves him from the charge of subserviency to factional /^ 
leaders. He says, ' 

Obedience to party commands, was certainly one of the principal articles 
of his political creed. But if politicians had expected that they were now 
going to have the mastery, because he was willing to play the part of a 
manikin, they were greatly mistaken in the man. to 

As to patronage in general the President-elect maintained a 
discreet silence. There was much speculation concerning future 
rewards and punishments, but all had to wait until the new 
President had canvassed the situation and was ready to act. 
Although General Jackson made no exception to his rule of at- 
tempting to provide for his friends, he did not find Polk as 
accommodating as Van Buren had been. His solicitation for the 
welfare of Blair and Lewis has already been noted, and Polk 
had scarcely been elected before Jackson consulted Amos Kendall 
in order to ascertain the position which would be most acceptable 
to the star member of his "kitchen cabinet." Kendall selected 
the Spanish mission and his wishes were forthwith reported to 

68 Polk to Johnson, Dec. 21, 1844, "Polk-Johnson Letters." The 
"proposed arrangement" evidently refers to the attempt to procure 
Ritchie. 

«a A rumor that Laughlin was going to Washington to edit the Madi- 
sonian caused General Jackson much needless worry. He warned Polk to 
keep clear of Tyler influence, for, if he did not, he would be in as bad a 
position as Tyler himself (Jackson to Polk, Feb. 28, 1845, Polk Papers). 

't» von Hoist, History of the United States, III, 21-22. 



308 JAMES K. POLK 

the President-elect. Jackson assured Polk that "there can be no 
delicacy in recalling Erwin [Washington Irving] — he is only 
fit "to write a Book & scarcely that, and has become a good 
Whigg."'^ 

Congress had already consented to annex Texas before Polk 
became President of the United States. Nevertheless, since one 
of the principal planks in the platform on which he had been 
elected related to this subject, and since he had been an indirect, 
if not a direct, participant in this important transaction, it is 
necessary to give a brief outline of the progress of events during 
the period between the rejection of Tyler's treaty and the passage 
of the joint resolution of annexation. 

Tyler's annexation treaty was rejected by the Senate on 
June 8, 1844. Calhoun, we are told,'- disheartened by this action, 
was ready to abandon all further attempts at annexation. His 
dejection was so great that Tyler thought of requesting his resig- 
nation, but he soon recovered his spirits and his old-time vigor. 
Since the treaty method had failed, nothing could be done with- 
out the cooperation of Congress. During the summer, a rumor 
to the effect that Tyler was about to convene Congress in extra 
session caused the Democratic candidate no little anxiety, and 
he appealed to Jackson as the only man who could dissuade the 
President from committing such a political error. A month later 
Jackson assured him that Congress would not be convened, al- 
though it is not clear whether Jackson was instrumental in pre- 
venting such a course.'^ At any rate no call for an extra session 
was issued, and no further action could be undertaken until 
winter; but the death of T. A. Howard, the American charge 
in Texas, gave Tyler an opportunity to strengthen his position 
by assigning A. J. Donelson to the vacant post. When notifying 



71 Kendall to Jackson, Dee. 2; Jackson to Polk, Dec. 13, 1844, Folic 
Papers. 

'- Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, II, 331. 

"3 Polk to Donelson, Aug. 27, 1844, "Polk-Donelson Letters." Jackson 
to Polk, Sept. 26, 1844, Polk Papers. 



PRESIDENT-ELECT 309 

Jackson of Donelson's appointment the President expressed the 
belief that the selection of " a member of your family .... will 
have a controuling influence with Genl Houstin and incline 
him .... to pause ere he declares against annexation." He 
declared his determination to proceed with his Texas program, 
and to protect that country from the threatened aggressions 
of Mexico. Jackson informed Polk of the President's plans and 
remarked that "This is the true energetic course."^* 

On December 3, 1844, Tyler submitted to Congress his last 
annual ^message. In it he called attention to the threatening 
Mexican manifestoes that had resulted from the treaty which 
the United States had negotiated with Texas. Mexico, he said, 
had no cause for complaint ; on the contrary, the measure ' ' should 
have been regarded by her as highly beneficial." The treaty, 
said he, had been rejected by the American Senate on the ground 
that the question had not been submitted to the people, but 
popular approval had since been expressed at the recent election. 
Such being the case, he urged Congress to annex Texas by joint 
resolution.'" He followed this up with another message on Decem- 
ber 18, and along with it submitted a collection of correspond- 
ence. He called attention to the abusive character of this cor- 
respondence and to the barbarous measures which were threatened 
by Mexico. Especially did he resent Mexico's criticism of south- 
ern states, and he declared with emphasis that annexation was 
not a sectional question.^'' His statement that "the subject of 
annexation addresses itself, most fortunately, to every portion of 
the Union" was, to say the least, an exaggeration; still, since the 
election had been decided, there were many indications of a 
change in public opinion, and the question was becoming more 
national every day. Could the subject, when it was presented 
originally, have been divested of its factional and its sectional 



74 Tvler to Jackson, Sept. 17, 1844, Jackson Papers. Jackson to Polk, 
Sept. 26, 1844, Folic Papers. 

75 Eichardson, Messages, IV, 341-345. 

76 Ibid., 353-356. 



310 JAMES E. POLK 

concomitants, doubtless there would have been little opposition 
to annexation. Now that the election was over, those who had 
really wished to see Texas admitted into the Union no longer had 
the same incentive to oppose annexation for mere factional rea- 
sons. They might still cavil over ways and means, yet the pros- 
pect of eventual compromise was perceptibly brightening."' There 
was no certainty, however, that the friends of Texas would be 
able to effect annexation during the present session, for those 
who had been defeated at Baltimore still harbored a bitter re- 
sentment. Late in December, Calhoun believed that the House 
would take favorable action, but that annexation would be de- 
feated in the Senate. ' ' The real opposition is from the Benton 
V. Buren party" who would join with the Whigs against Texas; 
still he was not without hope that "publick opinion will force 
them to give up their opposition. Its effects are already ap- 
parent."''* It was at this time that Calhoun was ready to make 
the "sacrifice" of accepting a place in Polk's cabinet, if the 
probable course of the administration should appear to be satis- 
factory. 

While Calhoun denounced Benton and Van Buren for their 
obstructive tactics, others believed that the South Carolinian 
himself had sounded the knell of the Texas treaty. A long article 
on "Abolitionists" which appeared in the January number of 
the Democratic Review held him responsible, in the main, for the 
widespread hostility to annexation. Although himself in favor 
of annexation, the waiter flayed Calhoun for the position he had 
assumed regarding the slavery side of the question. In the 
writer's opinion, the fanatical demands of the Abolitionists and 
the "gag rule" of Congress were equally to be deplored; but the 
climax of absurdity had been reached when Calhoun, in his letters 
to Pakenham and King, had represented the United States as 



"" See press comments, Smith, Annexation of Texas, 323 ff. 
78 Calhoun to Clemson, Dee. 27; same to Hunter, Pec. 29, 1844, I^ep. 
Am. Hist. Assn., 1899, II, 634-636. 



PRESIDENT-ELECT 311 

desiring Texas in order to protect slavery. In his eltort to nation- 
alize slavery, he had also nationalized abolition. Other critics 
of Calhoun expressed similar sentiments. Since the opposition 
had been aimed, for the most part, at the negotiators of the treaty 
and their methods, acquiescence in annexation was made easier 
when it became practically certain that Calhoun as well as Tyler 
would soon depart from the scene of action. 

Soon after Congress had convened in December various plans 
of annexation were offered in each house, some to admit Texas as 
a state, others to acquire it as a territory. In the House, after 
several projects had met with serious objections, Milton Brown, 
one of Polk's Whig antagonists from Tennessee, offered a reso- 
lution which, after certain alterations, was eventually adopted by 
the House. Brown's resolution provided that the territory right- 
fully belonging to Texas should be admitted as a state. The 
federal government was to undertake the adjustment of the boun- 
daries of the new state, but was not to assume her debt or take 
over her public lands. Slavery was prohibted in all territory 
north of 36° 30' ; south of that line the people were to decide the 
question for themselves. 

In the early days of the session, McDuffie once more presented 
the joint resolution of annexation which had failed to pass in the 
spring. It voiced the sentiments of the Tyler administration 
and was, in substance, a restatement of the rejected treaty. As 
such, it was unacceptable to the Senator from Missouri, and Cave 
Johnson reported to Polk that "the great battle between Mr. 
T. H. B. [enton] & Mr. C. [alhoun] has commenced." Appar- 
ently the main reason for presenting the resolution in this par- 
ticular form was the desire to embarrass the Van Burenites by 
compelling them either to accept a measure which they had de- 
nounced or to incur the odium of opposing annexation after they 
had endorsed the Baltimore platform. Such, at least, was the 
opinion of Cave Johnson: 



312 JAMES K. FOLK 

The friends of T. H. B. Silas Wright, who took general ground before 

the people for annexation but against the Treaty are to be forced to take 
that Treaty or appear before the people as hostile to Texas. Mr. C. 
thinks that he has got the advantage of T. H. B. on this issue & intends 
to drive him home upon it. The N. Y. democrats will go en-mass ag't the 

treaty & I have no idea, that the friends of C will take any thing but 

the Treaty.'" 

On the day following the appearance of McDuffie 's resolution, 
Benton met the issue by reintroducing his own bill which had 
failed at the close of the last session, with a modification for 
making the territory half slave and half free. Since this bill 
could not by any possibility get but a few votes, Johnson consid- 
ered Benton 's conduct to be ' ' outrageous. ' ' He asked the Senator 
to cooperate in offering a joint resolution which w^ould assert the 
determination of the United States to defend Texas against all 
assaults, leaving the question of annexation to Polk's adminis- 
tration. Benton declined to accept this resolution, and continued 
to rage against his opponents.^" Late in December Johnson 
thought that the hostility between the two factions was increas- 
ing; each feared that the other would influence the incoming 
President.-^ Benton blustered, of course, for, under the circum- 
stances, he could hardly do otherwise. Since the election, how- 
ever, he must have known that he was championing an unpopular 
cause. There was also a future ahead, and his course had alien- 
ated a large majority of his party— even many of his lifelong 
friends. In addition, the legislature of Missouri had, by reso- 
lution, requested members of Congress from that state to support 
annexation.^- This made it clear that his conduct did not meet 
with approval at home ; on tlie other hand, such a request made 
it easier for him to modify his attitude on the subject. About 
the same time a letter from Donelson told him "that his course 
is injuring his friends and his country, and that I hoped he would 



79 Johnson to Polk, Dec. 12, 1844, Folic Fapcrs. 

80 Idem, and Johnson to Polk, Dec. 14, Folk Papers. 

81 Johnson to Polk, Dec. 26, 1844, Folk Fapers. 

82 Meigs, Life of Thomas Hart Benton, 351. 



PRESIDENT-ELECT 313 

be willing to modify his position. ' '^^ No doubt all of these mani- 
festations of displeasure had their influence in determining Ben- 
ton to retreat, provided he could do so in good order. His avenue 
of escape was by way of a new bill, and this he introduced on 
February 5, 1845. No mention was made in the new measure of 
obtaining the consent of Mexico. It provided for the admission 
of a state of suitable size and boundaries, said state to be formed 
out of the territory of the republic ; the remainder of Texas was 
to be a territory of the United States. The measure was to 
become effective as soon as an agreement had been reached by 
the governments of the two nations concerned. His plan would 
delay, but not necessarily defeat, annexation, although defeat is 
evidently what its author desired. His bill and the House reso- 
lution seemed hopelessly irreconcilable until R. J. Walker, a few 
days later, offered as an amendment a combination of the two 
methods, and Haywood proposed to leave the choice between them 
to the President of the United States. To this modification 
Walker readily agreed.^* Calhoun, according to a statement 
made later, believed that Benton's bill would have defeated an- 
nexation, and he was scarcely less opposed to the combination 
measure. ^^ He used his "best efforts" to defeat both, but was 
unsuccessful in the second instance. Many counseled delay, but 
at the evening session of February 27, 1845, the Senate was ready 
to vote on Walker's combination amendment. Before the vote 
had been taken, however. Archer, of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, offered a substitute bill. This proposed a transfer of 
the territory of Texas, with the assent of the people thereof, to 
the United States. The vote on the substitute resulted in a tie, 
and it looked for a time as if annexation were doomed. Never- 
theless, relief was already at hand. When the vote on the Walker 



83 Donelson to Calhoun, New Orleans, Dec. 26, 1844, Bep. Am. Hist. 
Assn., 1899, II, 1012. 

84 Smith, Annexation of Texas, 343. Smith gives an exhaustive account 
of the various proposals offered in each house {idem, chap. xvi). 

S3 Calhoun to Donelson, May 23, 1845, Bep. Am. Hist. Assn., 1899, II, 
658. 



314 JAMES K. POLK 

amendment Avas taken in Committee of the Whole, Johnson, a 
Whig from Louisiana wlio had voted for the Archer bill, now 
swung to the Democrats and made the vote twenty-seven to 
twenty-five. According to Judge Catron, Johnson had difficulty 
in supporting the joint resolution on constitutional grounds, but, 
after consulting Catron, finally agreed to do so.^'^ As soon as 
the committee had reported the measure to the Senate, Miller, 
of New Jersey, offered Benton's original bill as a substitute. 
Benton said from his seat that he would vote against this substi- 
tute, and when asked if he would destroy his own child, he re- 
plied, "I'll kill it stone dead." The substitute failed, and 
Walker's amendment passed the Senate by a vote of twenty- 
seven to twenty-five, Johnson again aligning himself with the 
Democrats.^^ The amended resolution M^as transmitted to the 
House for approval, and although it met with strenuous opposi- 
tion there was never any doubt of its passage. This measure was 
given precedence over other matters ; the Speaker, by his rulings, 
prevented filibustering; and, in Committee of the Whole, the 
debate was limited to five minutes. Milton Brown, the author 
of the House resolution, tried to "kill his own child," but the 
measure as amended by Walker passed by a vote of one hundred 
thirty-two to seventy-six.^* 

The President-elect had been in Washington since February 
13, but whether and to what extent his influence was effective 
at this thne is very difficult to determine. Before Polk had left 
Tennessee, Cave Johnson assured Calhoun that the incoming 
President and his friends desired to have Texas annexed during 



so ' * The amendment offered by Mr. Senator Walker, ' ' continued Catron, 
"was rather sudden; it left the slave line at 'A6° 30' N. open. To this 
Gov. Johnson had most decided objections; it threw Mr. Senator Foster 
the other way, and endangered the measure." Johnson, said the judge, 
voted for the measure because he had confidence in Polk, and because he 
believed that 36° 30' would be definitely fixed as the northern boundary of 
slavery (Catron to Buchanan, March 15, 1845, Buchanan Papers). 

87 Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 362; Smith, Annexation of Texas, 344- 
345. 

»>^Cong. Globe (Feb. 28), 28 Cong., 2 sess., 372. 



PHESIDENT-ELECT 315 

the present session, and Donelson informed Calhoun that both 
Jackson and himself hoped for immediate action by the existing 
Congress.®^ While at Coleman's hotel awaiting his inauguration 
the President-elect, according to his own account,^" freely ex- 
pressed the wish that annexation in some form might be effected 
before the adjournment of Congress. Should Congress fail to 
take definite action, he feared that Texas would be forever lost 
to the Union. He did not, he said, have time to examine the 
different measures proposed, but thought that any measure would 
be better than none. That he desired to have this vexed question 
settled before his inauguration, we may very well believe. In- 
deed, it was said that he offered rewards and threatened punish- 
ments for the purpose of influencing votes. Such charges rested 
on no tangible evidence and doubtless, for the most part, were 
unfounded, although it is quite probable that he may have let it 
be known that the disloyal need not look to him for favors. 
Always ready to ' ' play the game ' ' himself, he was a firm believer 
in party discipline. 

Later, a more serious charge w^as brought against Polk in this 
connection — a charge of base deception instead of party disci- 
pline. In a letter printed in the New York Evening Post, July 28, 
1848, Senator Tappan, of Ohio, asserted that, in February, 1845, 
Polk had personally assured Senator Haywood that, should the 
joint resolution pass, he would choose the Benton alternative and 
negotiate under it. In a letter to Tappan, F. P. Blair averred 
that he, also, had discussed the matter with Polk, and that the 
President-elect had promised to choose the Benton plan of nego- 
tiating a treaty with Texas. It was charged, therefore, that at 
least five Senators had voted for the joint resolution because they 
had been deceived by Polk."^ Polk denied all recollection of any 



"it Johnson to Polk, Dec. 9, 1844, Polk Papers. Donelson to Calhoun, 
Dee. 26, 1844, 7?ep. Am. Hist. Assn., 1899, II, 1012. 

90 Polk, Diary, IV, 41. 

91 The essential parts of both letters may be found in Benton, Thirty 
Years' View, II, 6.36-637. 



316 JAMES K. POLK 

conversation on the subject with either Blair or Haywood, and 
called attention to the fact that no complaint of violated pledges 
had been made at the time. In addition, he pointed out that in 
August, 1846, Blair had expressed to him a warm approval of 
the principal measures of his administration/'- The members of 
Polk's cabinet disclaimed all knowledge of such a pledge, and 
even the fine-meshed dragnet of Justin H. Smith has failed to 
find any evidence to substantiate the charges made by Tappan 
and Blair. On the contrary. Smith offers some valuable sug- 
gestions as to why it is highly improbable that the President 
elect made pledges to any one.°^ Polk had committed himself to 
immediate annexation ; and even if he had been as unprincipled 
as his enemies alleged, it seems incredible that so crafty a poli- 
tician should have made so stupid a blunder. Besides, Polk was 
a man who seldom disclosed his intentions until he was ready to 
act, and, as Cave Johnson said in his letter, it was extremely 
unlikely that he would do so to Blair. It is significant, also, that, 
as soon as Texas had approved annexation, Polk wrote a letter 
to Haywood in which he commented on the wisdom of choosing 
the House resolution and expressed the belief that Texas would 
have been lost if the Benton alternative had been selected. "It 
was not," wrote the President, "until after I entered upon my 
duties that I had an opportunity — deliberately to consider the 



'••2 Polk, Diarij, II, 84. 

03 Smith, Annexation of Texas, 347-350. In answer to Polk's request 
for a statement on the subject, Cave Johnson (Oct. 6, 1848) said that he 
conversed with the President-elect while the joint resolution was before 
Congress. Polk said that he hoped one of the alternatives would pass, 
but expressed no preference. After the measure had passed, he expressed 
no preference until the cabinet had met. Walker (Oct. 6) said that when 
the measures were before Congress, Blair came to him and, after saying 
that the House resolution could not pass, asked him to vote for the Benton 
bill. Walker refused. Blair stated that Texas would prefer Benton's 
bill. Walker then said that he would combine the two and let Texas take 
her choice. After consulting Benton, Blair said that they would support 
the combined resolution, if the choice were left to the President instead 
of Texas. Walker agreed, and so it passed. Polk expressed no prefer- 
ence — the cabinet was divided. Bancroft's letter of Oct. 13, Buchanan's 
of Nov. 9, Mason's of Nov. 12, and Marcy's of Nov. 20 all stated that 
Polk had not expressed any preference. All" letters are in the Folk Payers. 



PEESIDENT-ELECT 317 

two propositions — and select between them. I acted upon my 
own best judgment and the result has proved that I was right. "^* 
It is inconceivable that he could write thus to a man to whom 
he had given a pledge to select the Benton method of annexation. 
When the provision was added to the joint resolution which 
gave the choice of alternatives to the President, it was intended 
of course to give this selection to Polk. Nevertheless, it was sug- 
gested during the debate that Tyler and Calhovin might make the 
selection, but McDuffie, who was a close friend of both men, de- 
clared in the Senate that they would not have the "audacity" 
to do such a thing. "When, therefore, the House passed the mea- 
sure on February 28, it was fully understood that the choice 
would rest with President Polk. But the resolution gave this 
choice to the "President of the United States," and for three 
days more that office was occupied by "Captain" Tyler. Despite 
McDuffie 's assurances Tyler possessed the necessary audacity, for 
he immediately took steps both to make the selection and to carry 
it into effect. In 1848 he prepared a statement which gives his 
version of the transaction and explains his reasons for forestalling 
his successor. As soon as Tyler had approved the resolution, on 
March 1, Calhoun, the Secretary of State, remarked that the 
President now had the power to make his selection. Tyler replied 
that he had no doubt of his power, but that he had some doubt 
as to the propriety of exercising it. The danger of delay, urged 
Calhoun, was sufficient to overrule all feelings of delicacy re- 
garding Polk. Next day, at a cabinet meeting, all agreed that 
Tyler ought to select the House resolution and act at once. He 
decided to do so and requested Calhoun to call upon Polk, after 
the meeting, "and explain to him the reasons" for immediate 
action. Calhoun complied with the request, and reported that 
"Mr. Polk declined to express any opinion or to make any sug- 
gestion in reference to the subject." On the. third instructions 
were dispatched to A. J. Donelson, whom Tyler had recently 



/ 



i** Polk to Haywood, Aug. 9, 1845, Polk Papers. 



318 JAMES K. POLK 

appointed to be charge d'affaires at the capital of Texas."^ When 
Polk became President he still had the option of reversing Tyler's 
action'"' and recalling the messenger or of acquiescing in the choice 
made by his predecessor. Since he chose the latter alternative 
there was little delay in carrying out the mandate of the Balti- 
more platform. The progress of annexation under his adminis- 
tration will be considered in another chapter. 



'.'■' See statement, Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, II, 364-365. 
At a later time Tyler was angered by Calhoun 's assertion in the Senate 
that he had selected the House resolution. "7f lie selected, then Texas is 
not legitimately a State of the Union, for Congress gave the power to the 
, President to select, and not to the Secretary of State." He referred to 
v^ Calhoun as "the great 'I am,' " and to Benton as "the most raving 
political maniac I ever knew" Tyler to Gardiner, March 11, 1847, ihid., 
420). 

oC' There was a difference of opinion regarding this. Walker, and per- 
,haps other members of the cabinet, believed that Polk had no power to 
reverse Tyler's action. See Polk, Diary, IV, 44. 



I 

\ 



CHAPTER XV 

ADMINISTRATION AND PATRONAGE 

On March 4, 1845, an unusually large "concourse of people" 
congregated in Washington to witness the inauguration of Presi- 
dent Polk. The "arrangements were admirable"^ and, in true 
American fashion, men who had bitterly assailed each other in 
the press and on the platform now joined in doing honor to the 
new chief executive. Climatic conditions proved to be the only 
disturbing element. Rain began to descend in torrents as the 
procession wended its way to the capitol where, according to the 
picturesque description given by John Quincy Adams, the new 
executive delivered his inaugural address to " a large assemblage 
of umbrellas." "At night," said the same writer, "there were 
two balls : one at Carusi 's Hall, at ten dollars a ticket, of all 
parties ; the other of pure Democrats, at five dollars a ticket, at 
the National Theatre. Mr. Polk attended both, but supped with 
the true-blue five-dollar Democracy. ' '^ 

Not yet fifty years old, Polk enjoyed the distinction of reach- 
ing the highest executive office at an earlier age than any of his 
predecessors — a fact which he did not fail to note in his in-""T"^ 
augural address. This address was in the main a reiteration of 
Jelfersonian principles and of his own oft-expressed opinions. 
Strong emphasis was laid on the value of the Union ; "no treason 
to mankind since the organization of society would be equal in 
atrocity to that of him who would lift his hand to destroy it." 
On the other hand, he frowned upon the "schemes and agita- 
tions" which aimed at the "destruction of domestic institutions 



amies' Beg., LXVIII, 1. 

2 Adams, Memoirs, XII, 179. He added that "my family aud myself 
received invitations to both, but attended neither." 



320 JAMES E. POLE 

existing in other sections, ' ' and urged the necessity of preserving 
the compromises of the Constitution. 

If the compromises of the Constitution be preserved, if sectional jeal- 
ousies and heart-burnings be discountenanced, if our laws be just and the 
Government be practically administered strictly within the limits of power 
prescribed to it, we may discard all apprehensions for the safety of the 
Union. 

Having thus expressed his disapproval of both abolition and 
disunion, he again declared himself to be in favor of a tariff for 
revenue, but not for "protection merely." He congratulated 
the country on the passage of the joint resolution to annex Texas, 
and he pronounced our title to Oregon to be " clear and unques- 
tionable. ' ' Experience, he said, had disproved the old belief that 
a federal system could not operate over a large area, and like a 
true expansionist expressed the opinion that as the system ' ' shall 
be extended the bonds of our Union, so far from being weakened, 
will become stronger." 

The reference to Texas must have been inserted shortly be- 
fore the address was delivered, but certain letters written by 
A. V. Brown indicate that the first draft of the inaugural was 
written early in December and sent to Washington for criticism 
and approval by Polk's political friends. The Brown letters 
are too enigmatical to throw much light on the subject, but as 
Polk had many times before expressed practically all of the views 
contained in his address, there was no reason for believing that 
it was not substantially his own product.^ 



3 On December 14, 1844, Brown wrote from Washington to Polk: "I 
received yours of the 7th Inst, our friend called yesterday & informed 
me that he would be ready in a few days & I shall loose no time after 
examination to forward it to you. ' ' 

On December 28 he wrote: "You must not be impatient— Our friend 
has been sick a few days — has sent me for examination about half to be 
returned with my comments & then the whole to be finished & polish 'd — 
say all by the first January or sooner. So far it is a happy conception 
for instance in allusion to the Union. 

" 'If this be not enough, if that freedom of thought word and action 
given by his Creator to fallen man & left by human institutions as free 
as they were given, are not sufficient to lead him into the paths of liberty 



ADMINISTRATION AND PATEONAGE 321 

Among the rejoicing Democrats none felt more sincere satis- 
faction in the defeat of Henry Clay or expressed a more ardent 
wish for the success of the new administration than did the "old 
hero" at the Hermitage. In a letter written two days after the 
inauguration he told Polk that 

I have the pleasure to congratulate my country on your now being, really, 
president of the United States, and I put up my prayers to the great 
Jehova, that he may conduct you thro' your administration with honor to 
yourself, and benefit to our Glorious Union. 

Success could be attained only by ' ' continuing to take principle 
for your guide, and public good for your end, steering clear of 
the intrigues & machinations of political clickes."^ If the Gen- 
eral had any misgivings regarding Polk's independence, they 
must have been removed by the receipt of a letter from Judge 
Catron — a letter written before his own had reached Washington. 
' ' Our friend, ' ' wrote the judge, ' ' is very prudent, and eminently 
firm, regardless of consequences. He came here to be — the 

«fe peace, whither shall he turn? Has the sicord proved to be a safer and 
surer instrument of reform than enlightened reason? Does he expect to 
find among the ruins of this Union a happier abode for our swarming 
millions, than they now have under its lofty arch & among its beautiful 
columns? No, my countrymen never, until like the blind Israelite in the 
Temple of the Philistines, we find ourselves in chains and dispair, shall 
we be justified in thrusting those pillars from their base; for whenever 
we do, we shall like him be crushed by their fall.' 

"It will be surely ready in time & finished with a polish suitable to 
the occasion. I shall enclose it to you under an envelope to our friend 
J. H. Thomas but securely sealed so that he shall [not] be aware of its 
contents." (Compare the part quoted by Brown with Polk's inaugural. 
See Messages, TV, 376. Query: Was Brown quoting from Polk's original 
draft, or was this paragraph written in Washington and remodeled by 
Polk?) 

On December 26 Brown wrote: "In a few days now I shall hear from 
our friend K again & be ready to meet your wishes. The Major is here 
on yesterday we went up to see the President. He is acting very friendly 
but I shall encourage the idea of his remaining here but a short time or 
the letter writers will be speculating on the purpose of his visit &c." 
(Folk Papers). 

Probably " K " means John Kane, of Philadelphia, but the identity of 
"our friend" and "the Major" is difficult to conjecture. Major Lewis 
was not a close friend of either Brown or Polk, and Major Donelson was 
then in New Orleans. 

* Jackson to Polk, March 6, 1845, Polk Papers. 



322 JAMES K. POLK 

PRESIDENT — which at this date is as undisputed as that you was 
THE GENL at N. Orleans.""' 

On March 5 the new President submitted to the Senate his 
list of cabinet officials. James Buchanan, the Secretary of State, 
had long been a leader in Pennsylvania politics and for many 
years a Senator from that state. His selection was a concession 
to that wing of the party which believed in a moderate protective 
tariff, and his subsequent opposition to the tariff of 1846 caused 
the President no little annoyance. He was a man of more than 
average ability, but he possessed certain traits which made him 
the source of constant irritation to the President. With a timid- 
ity which caused him to quail before responsibility he combined 
an obstinacy and a petulance which manifested themselves in 
obstructive tactics and petty insolence. After four years of inti- 
mate association Polk concluded that ''Mr. Buchanan is an able 
man, but is in small matters without judgment and sometimes 
acts like an old maid.'"' He was the only member of the cabinet 
whom the President found it necessary to discipline, and he was 
the only one whom Polk believed that he could not fully trust. 
Robert J. Walker, the Secretary of the Treasury, was a man of 
ability and industry. He was cordially hated by the Whigs and 
was disliked and distrusted by many Democrats. Originally se- 
lected for the office of Attorney General, he was called to the 
Treasury Department in order to placate the Cass-Dallas element 
of the party. He was the only member to whom General Jackson 
offered objections,' but Polk had full confidence in both his in- 
tegrity and his ability. As Secretary of War, William L. Marcy 



5 Catron to Jackson, March [1845], Jaclson Papers. 

6 Polk, Diary, IV, 355. 

"! "I say to you, in the most confidential manner, that I regret that you 
put Mr. E. J. Walker over the Treasury. He has talents, I believe honest, 
but surrounded by so many broken speculators, and being greatly himself 
incumbered with debt, that any of the other Departments would have been 
better, & I fear, you will find my forebodings turn out too true, and added 
to this, under the rose, he is looking to the vice presidency" (Jackson to 
Polk, May 2, 1845, PolTc Papers). 



ADMINISTBATION AND PATEONAGE 323 

displayed both ability and tact. He was a leader of that wing 
of the party in New York which opposed Van Buren, and his 
appointment greatly imbittered the friends of the ex-President ; 
otherwise his appointment added strength to the administration.' 
George Bancroft, the Secretary of the Navy, had had little ex- 
perience in practical affairs. His appointment seems to have been 
a makeshift, and he was soon given a diplomatic position, for 
which he had originally expressed a preference. His most not- 
able achievement as a cabinet officer was his success in procuring 
the establishment of the naval academy at Annapolis. John Y. 
Mason, a college mate of the President, was made Attorney Gen- 
eral. He had served as Secretary of the Navy in Tyler's cabinet 
and was again put in charge of that department when Bancroft 
was made minister to England. Cave Johnson, the Postmaster 
General, had for many years been Polk's closest political friend. 
Although he was not considered to be a brilliant statesman, his 
good judgment and methodical habits well fitted him for the 
office assigned to him. He was a democrat par excellence, and 
when a member of Congress he was best known as an enemy of 
extravagant appropriations. His friends gave him the sobriquet 
of "watch-dog of the Treasury"; some called him the "scourge 
of private claimants," and Adams once referred to him as the 
retrenchment monsoon. ' '^ 
The appointment of an entirely new^ cabinet caused general 
surprise and considerable press comment. None except his inti- 
mate friends realized that Polk was a man of unusual determi- 
nation, and that he was resolved to be President in fact as well 

as in name. The belief that he would be a mere figurehead 

a pliable instrument in the hands of able politicians — had become 

8 Adams, Memoirs, XI, 223. 

9 Mason, of course, had been a member of Tyler's cabinet, but not in 
the position assigned to him by Polk. "An entire new Cabinet, at the 
accession of a new President without a reverse of politics, is a novelty 
under the present constitution. Rumors of it have been in circulation for 
some weeks, which I did not believe" (ibid., XII, 180). 



I 



324 JAMES K. POLE 

SO firmly fixed in the public mind that the most convincing evi- 
dence to the contrary had little weight. Although it is now well 
known that Polk dominated his cabinet to a greater degree than 
most chief executives, so keen an observer as Gideon Welles could 
at the time write : 

In none of his [Polk's] Cabinet, I am sorry to say, have 1 any confi- 
dence. Yet this cabinet appears to me to have more influence and higher 
authority than any other I have ever known. The Cabinet is a sort 
of council of appointments, and the Presiilent is chairman of this council, 
instead of being President of the United States. It is, as I wrote our 
friend Niles, a sort of joint Stock Company in which the President is, by 
no means the principal partner. Yet several of them have been at particular 
pains to tell me that the President lias ]iis ou'n way — does as he has a mind 
to — males his own appointments cff. There is not, however, a man in the 
cabinet, except Johnson, vfho does not believe himself the superior of the 
President in abilities & qualifications as a statesman. lo 

Writing in 1860, Claiborne says that Polk's cabinet was "one 
of the ablest ever assembled around any executive, ' ' but that the 
President himself "can only be regarded as a man of medioc- 
rity."" Both statements are exaggerations. Although each 
member of the cabinet performed well the duties of his office, 
none except Buchanan, Walker, and Marcy can be included 
among statesmen of the first rank. On the other hand, an ex- 
ecutive who could formulate important and far-reaching policies, 
and successfully carry them out despite strenuous opposition, 
could not have been "a man of mediocrity." To say that the 
President ranked below the members of his cabinet is only to 
add praise to his executive ability, for, as a recent writer has well 
said : "In the Cabinet Council Polk was the unmistakable guide 
and master."^- Welles had been correctly informed. Undoubt- 
edly the President had ' ' his own way. ' ' 



10 Welles to Van Buren, April 29, 1845, Van Buren Papers. The italics 
are mine. 

11 Claiborne, Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman, I, 229-231. 

12 Learned, Some Aspects of the Cabinet Meeting, 128. 



ADMIN 1ST BAT ION AND PAT BON AGE 325 

Polk's control over his cabinet was not the result of accident 
or of incidental circumstances, for, with his usual forethought, 
he had planned to be "guide and master." Before leaving his 
home in Tennessee he prepared the draft of a letter a revised 
copy of which was sent to each prospective member of his cabinet. 
After calling attention to the "principles and policy" which he 
expected to carry out it was made very clear that he desired only 
such advisers as would "cordially co-operate" in effecting his 
purposes. Each member would be expected to give his time and 
ability in promoting the success of the present administration; 
whenever he should feel that he could no longer do so, he would 
be expected to retire. Should these restrictions prove acceptable, 
the person addressed was invited to become a member of the 
cabinet. The following is a copy of this interesting document: 
Sir: 

The principles and policy which will be observed and maintained dur- 
ing my administration, are embodied in the Resolutions adopted by the 
Democratic National Convention of Delegates, assembled at Baltimore in 
May last, and in my Inaugural address this day delivered to my Fellow 
Citizens. — 

In making up my Cabinet I desire to select gentlemen who agree with 
me in opinion, and who will cordially co-operate with me in carrying out 
these principles and policy. 

In my official action I will myself take no part, — between gentlemen 
of the Democratic party, who may become aspirants or candidates — to 
succeed me in the Presidential office, and shall desire that no member of 
my Cabinet shall do so. Individual preferences it is not expected or 
desired to limit or restrain. — It is official interference by the dispensation 
of public patronage or otherwise that I desire to guard against. — Should 
any member, of my Cabinet become a candidate or an aspirant to the 
Presidency or Vice Presidency, of the United States, — it will be expected 
upon the happening of such an event, that he will retire from the Cabinet. — 

I disapprove the practice which has sometimes prevailed of Cabinet 
officers absenting themselves for long periods of time from the seat of 
Government, and leaving the management of their Departments to Chief 
Clerks — or less responsible persons. — I expect myself to remain constantly 
at Washington — unless it may be an occasional necessary absence,— and 
then for a short time, — It is by conforming to this rule, — that the 
President and his Cabinet can have any assurances that abuses will be 



326 JAMES K. POLK 

prevented — and that the subordinate executive officers connected with them 
respectively, — will faithfully perform their duty. — 

If Sir: you concur with me in these opinions and views, I shall be 
pleased to have your assistance as a member of my Cabinet; and now 
tender you the office of and invite you to take charge of the 

Department. — 

I shall be pleased to receive your answer at your earliest convenience. 
I am with great respect 

Your Ob 't S 'v 't." 

To every item of the program outlined in this letter the Presi- 
dent rigidly adhered. He had "his own way" despite the in- 
credulity of Gideon Welles. Catron's above-quoted remark, and 
not the opinion expressed by "Welles, is a true statement of Polk's 
position as chief executive. Even Welles at a later date, although 
he continued to underrate the President's ability, was forced to 
admit that "he had courage and determination and shrank from 
no labor or responsibility."^* Claiborne has called Polk a "polit- 
ical martinet" :^^ he was likewise something of an executive mar- 
tinet, but no member of his cabinet except Buchanan seems to 
have questioned his right to dictate the administrative policy of 
the government. Quite frequently the Secretary of State tried 
to substitute his own policies for those of the President, but in- 
variably he was forced to submit to the will of his superior. On 
several occasions Polk was on the point of dismissing him from 
the cabinet for violating his pledge to put aside Presidential 
aspirations. 

On questions of importance the President sought freely the 
advice of his cabinet, members of Congress and private individ- 
uals ; very often the advice given led to modifications in matters 
of detail, but, except in very rare instances, the main essentials 
of his policies were carried into effect as originally planned by 



13 On the back is written: " Eough Draft of Letter. To be revised 
corrected. Jan. 15, 1845" (Poll' Papers). The revised copy which was 
sent to Buchanan is printed in his Works, VI, 110. 

1^ MS "Review of Pol. Hist, of U. S. etc.," Welles Papers. 

15 Claiborne, op. cit., 228. 



ADMINISTRATION AND PATRONAGE 327 

himself. His habit of considering carefully the problems in- 
volved before they were presented for discussion left little of 
importance for his advisers to suggest. He felt keenly the indi- 
vidual responsibility of his office ; it followed, therefore, that his 
own, and not the opinions of others, should dictate the policies 
to be pursued. 

The President yielded his couvietioiis neither easily nor for petty reasons. 
Polities influenced him. But he seldom forgot principles even though he 
had to sacrifice the friendship and influence of men as powerful as Senator 
Benton of Missouri and to some extent the assistance of Buchanan. i6 

Polk was not indulging in idle flourish when he told pros- 
pective cabinet members that he would "remain constantly at 
Washington, ' ' for during his entire term he was absent from the 
capital not more than six weeks." Being a strict Sabbatarian he 
abstained from Sunday labor except in cases of absolute necessity. 
The other six days of each week were devoted to unremitting 
toil, and frequently his labors extended far into the night. Near 
the middle of his official term he noted in his diary : 

It is two years ago this day since I left my residence at Columbia, 
Tennessee, to enter on my duties as President of the U. S. Since that 
time I have performed great labour and incurred vast responsibilities. 
In truth, though I occupy a very high position, I am the hardest working 
man in this country. 

A few weeks later he wrote : 

This afternoon I took a ride on horseback. It is the first time I have 
mounted a horse for over six months. I have an excellent saddle-horse, 
and have been much in the habit of taking exercise on horseback all my 
life, but have been so incessantly engaged in the onerous and responsible 
duties of my office for many months past that I have had no time to take 
such exercise.18 



16 Learned, op. cit., 124. 

IT Ibid., 120. 

18 Polk, Diary, II, 360, 456. A year and a half later his story is the 
same: "Since my return early in July, 1847, from my Northern tour, I 
have not been more than two or three miles from my office, and during 
the whole period (13 months) my labours, responsibilities, and anxieties 
have been very great" {ibid., IV, 85-86). 



328 JAMES K. POLE 

The office of President is never a sinecure, yet why, it may 
be asked, did Polk find it necessary to expend his energies more 
lavishly than other chief executives. The answer is that he felt 
under obligation to make himself familiar with all branches of 
executive government. He alone must bear the responsibility 
for efficient administration, consequently he alone must direct the 
affairs of the various departments. Supervision on so vast a 
scale meant a sacrifice of time and energy, but he had the satis- 
faction of believing that he had not sacrificed them in vain. We 
are not left in doubt regarding his feeling of self-reliance, for 
on September 23, 1848, he observed: 

I have not had my full Cabinet together in council since the adjourn- 
ment of Congress on the 14th of August last. I have conducted the 
Government without their aid. Indeed, I have become so familiar with 
the duties and workings of the Government, not only upon general prin- 
ciples, but in most of its intimate details, that I find but little difficulty 
in doing this. I have made myself acquainted with the duties of the 
subordinate officers, and have probably given more attention to details 
than any of my predecessors. It is only occasi[on]ally that a great 
measure or a new ciuestion arises, upon which I desire the aid and advice 
of my Cabinet. At each meeting of the Cabinet I learn from each member 
what is being done in his particular Department, and especially if any 
question of doubt or difficulty has arisen. I have never called for any 
written opinions from my Cabinet, preferring to take their opinions, 
after discussion, in Cabinet & in the presence of each other. In this way 
harmony of opinion is more likely to exist.^o 

Still another passage from his diary may be cited as indicative 
of his industry and of solicitude lest some duty might go unper- 
formed : 

No President who performs his duty faithfully and conscientiously can 
have any leisure. If he entrusts the details and small matters to subordi- 
nates constant errors will occur. I prefer to supervise the whole operations 
of the Government myself rather than entrust the public business to 
subordinates and this makes my duties very great.-'' 

Although the excerpts just quoted were written during the 
last year of his administration, Polk's painstaking supervision 



'•••Polk, Diary, IV, 130-131. 
20 Ibid., 261. 



ADMINISTEATION AND PAT EON AGE 329 

of the "whole operations" of the government began as soon as 
he had entered upon the duties of his office. His searching ex- 
amination of all documents presented for his signature and his 
ability to detect errors caused considerable newspaper comment.-^ 
His thorough knowledge of affairs enabled him to win a wager 
from the astute Buchanan in an argument concerning proper 
diplomatic usage.-- 

The introduction of systematic methods in the handling of 
department affairs added greatly to the efficiency of the adminis- 
tration. On questions of policy Polk preferred oral discussions 
to written opinions from his cabinet, but each member was re- 
quired to report regularly on all matters relating to his depart- 
ment. In a circular dated April 11, 1845, he asked the head of 
each department to furnish him with a monthly report concern- 
ing the work of the various bureaus and clerks under his juris- 
diction. The tendency of bureau chiefs to favor large expendi- 
tures made it necessary for each cabinet officer to ' ' give vigilant 
attention" to all estimates, and to pare them down whenever 
possible.-^ Such reports, supplemented by discussions at regular 
meetings of the cabinet, enabled the President to understand 
thoroughly the operations of all departments. 

As a rule the cabinet met regularly on Tuesdays and Satur- 
days of each week, and there were frequent special meetings on 
other days. Frequency of meeting afforded ample opportunity 
for the consideration of administrative policies. Apparently the 
President never attempted to interfere with a free expression of 
opinions, yet by adroitly directing the discussions he was able to 



21 For example: "The President is devoted to his official tasks. He 
signs nothing without the strictest examination, and has frequently, to 
the confusion of clerks, detected serious errors in the papers sent for his 
signature" (New York Evening Post, May 3, 1845; quoted by the Wash- 
ington Union, May 8). 

-- Polk, Diary, IIT, 97-99. The bet was made in a jesting mood and 
the President declined to accept his basket of champagne. "I record this 
incident, ' ' said he, ' ' for the purpose of showing how necessary it is for 
me to give my vigilant attention even to the forms & details of my [sub- 
ordinates'] duties." 

23 Polk, Diary, I, 48, and i)assim. 



330 JAMES K. POLK 

"have his own way" without causing offense. That his method 
of dealing with his cabinet resulted in both harmony and unity 
of purpose is corroborated by the testimony of Buchanan, the 
most discordant member. "However various our views might 
have been and often were upon any particular subject when 
entering the cabinet council," he wrote, in advising Pierce to 
follow Polk's example, "after mutual consultation and free dis- 
cussion we never failed to agree at last, except on a few questions, 
and on these the world never knew that we had differed. ' ' More 
surprising, perhaps, is his praise of the President for having 
personally directed diplomatic relations. "Mr. Polk," said he, 
' ' was a wise man, and after deliberation he had determined that 
all important questions with foreign nations should be settled in 
Washington, under his own immediate supervision."-'' Another 
proof of the President's ability to gain and to retain the good 
will of his cabinet is contained in a letter written by Bancroft 
in 1887 after he had made an exhaustive examination of the 
Polk Papers: 

His character shines out in them just as the man he was, prudent, far- 
sighted, bold, excelling any democrat of his day iu undeviatingly correct 
exposition of democratic principles; and, in short, as I think, judging of 
him as I knew him, and judging of liim by the results of his administration, 
one of the very foremost of our public men and one of the very best and 
most honest and most successful Presidents the country ever had.25 

In a letter written during the following year Bancroft again 
sounded the praises of his former chief and gave the reasons for 
the success of his administration : 

His administration, viewed from the standpoint of results, was perhaps 
the greatest in our national historj^, certainly one of the greatest. He 
succeeded because he insisted on being its centre, and in overruling and 
guiding all his secretaries to act so as to produce unity and harmony. 
Those who study his administration will acknowledge how sincere and 
successful were his efforts, as did those who were contemporary with hini.26 



24 Curtis, Life of James Buclianan, II, 72, 76. 

25 Bancroft to J. Geo. Harris, Aug. 30, 1887 (Howe, Life and Letters 
of George Bancroft, I, 294). 

26 Bancroft to J. G. Wilson, March 8, 1888 (Wilson, The Presidents of 
the United States, 230). 



ADMINISTRATION AND PATRONAGE 331 

"With a deep sense of personal integrity and a desire to avoid 
everything which might impair his absohite independence, Polk 
declined to accept presents of more than nominal value. Shortly 
after his inauguration Thomas Lloyd sent him a valuable saddle- 
horse, but he promptly gave orders that it should be returned to 
the donor. Another admirer who sent a consignment of w^ne 
and other delicacies for the President's table was instructed to 
send a bill or to take the articles away. It soon became known 
that he would accept nothing of greater value than a book or a 
cane. The same rule applied to presents for Mrs. Polk.-' The 
same scrupulous regard for propriety is shown in his refusal to 
invest in government securities a certain sum of money belong- 
ing to his nephew and ward, Marshall T. Polk.-^ His public 
policies were denounced in unmeasured terms, and his political 
honesty was frequently impugned, but even his enemies credited 
him wnth personal integrity and purity of character. His own 
personal affairs were characterized by simplicity and frugality. 
This fact has already been noted in the care with which he 
guarded against exorbitant charges at the time of his inaugu- 
ration.-" On the other hand, his generosity is shown by loans 
and gifts to friends whenever he believed the recipients to be 
deserving."" The improvident beggar was unceremoniously dis- 
missed, for Polk had no sympathy for the man who believes that 
the world owes him a living. 

One of the first purely political questions which required the 
new President's attention was the establishment of a newspaper 
which would serve as the "organ" of the administration. We 



27 Letters among PoJk Papers; also, Nelson, Memorials of Sarah Chil- 
dress Poll; 89. 

2s Polk, Diary, III, 15-17. 

29 See above, p. 293, note 28. He was, according to a remark in the 
Diary, his "own barbour" {Diary, III, 9). 

30 For example, when the news came that Colonel Yell had fallen in the 
battle of Biiena Vista the President wrote: "His eldest son, and perhaps 
his only son, is now at College at Georgeto^\^l, and as my impression is that 
Col. Yell died poor, I vnll in that event educate the boy, and shall take 
great interest in him" (Diary, II, 451-452). 



332 JAMES K. POLK 

have seen that the subject had already been discussed, but noth- 
ing definite had been accomplished when Polk entered upon the 
duties of his office. The refusal of Ritchie to leave Richmond 
determined the President to procure, if possible, the services of 
Donelson, for in no case would he consent to make Blair the 
administration editor. On March 17 he told Jackson in a "con- 
fidential" letter that 

There is at present no paper here which sustains my administration 
for its own sake. The Globe it is manifest does not look to the success 
or the glory of my administration so much as it does to the interests and 
views of certain prominent men of the party who are looking to succeed 
me in 1848. The arrangement which above all others I prefer would be 
that, the owners of the Globe would agree to place it in the hands of a 
new Editor, — still retaining the proprietorship of the paper if they choose. 
You may rely upon it, that without such an arrangement, the Democratic 
party who elected me cannot be kept united three months. If Maj'' 
Donelson would take charge of the Editorial Department — all the sections 
of the party would be at once reunited and satisfied. 

Donelson and Ritchie, he said, were the only ones whom he would 
permit to edit his government organ. ^^ 

Within the next two weeks the President "had full and free 
conversation with Mr. Blair and in good feeling frankly told 
him, that it was impossible for the whole party ever to be united 
in support of the administration whilst the Globe was regarded 
as the official organ," and that he must have a new paper.' In 
sending this information to Donelson on March 28 Polk said that 
within the last forty-eight hours the whole matter had "been 
brought almost to a head." Ritchie had been in Washington 
and Blair had agreed to sell the Glohe and retire, leaving Ritchie 
and Donelson to take charge as joint editors. Blair had made 
but one stipulation, that the arrangement should be delayed until 
he could consult Van Buren and Jackson; "he says positively 
that if Gen^ Jackson assents, he will at once sell and retire." 
After repeating the reasons, already given to Jackson, why he 



31 Polk to Jackson, March 17, 1845, Jackson Papers. 



ADMINISTRATION AND PATHONAGE 333 

could not employ the Globe and expressing the hope that the ar- 
rangement then pending might be effected, he added that "if it 
should fail I am still deeply convinced that it will be indispens- 
able to have a new paper and I have so informed 3Ir. Blair. "^- 

After some further negotiation Blair and Rives consented to 
dispose of the Globe and retire. The purchasers were Thomas 
Ritchie, of the Richmond Enquirer, and John P. Heiss, of Ten- 
nessee, formerly editor of the Nashville Union. A new paper 
called the Washington Undon succeeded the Globe with Ritchie 
as its chief editor and Heiss as its business manager. The daily 
edition of the new "Polk organ" made its debut on JNIay 1, 1845, 
and a semi-weekly followed four days later. Among the note- 
worthy features of the initial numbers were a eulogy on the late 
editors of the Globe, and the first installment of "Mrs. Caudle's 
Curtain Lectures," copied from the London Punch. The humor 
of the lectures may have been the more apparent to ingenuous 
readers. 

General Jackson was quite as unsuccessful in his attempt to 
make Major William B. Lewis the "ferret" of the Polk admin- 
istration as in his effort to have Blair retained as editor of the 
"organ." Lewis had for some time held the office of second 
auditor of the treasury, and, as he was considered to be a still 
more treacherous politician than Blair, the new President sum- 
marily dismissed him. In a letter to Polk, Lewis stated that he 
had learned from a private source that 

you have intimated that my removal from office was rendered necessary, 
because the position I occupied was dangerous to the Government, in as 
much as it would enable me to impart information to a foreign power to 
the disadvantage of my own country. 

He hoped that the repoi't was unfounded but desired to know 
whether Polk had made such a remark. As the President made 
no reply to this or to other letters on the same subject, Lewis 



32 Polk to Donelson, March 28, 1845, " Polk-Donelson Letters." 



33-4 JAMES K. POLK 

left for his home in Tennessee and published the correspondence 
in a Nashville paper. ^^ Polk's reasons for declining to make 
explanations are given in a letter to a friend in Tennessee : 

As to Maj. Lewis I shall of course enter into no controversy with him. 
What he desires most is to make himself conspicuous by such a contro- 
versy. His course since his removal from office proves his unworthiness 
of which I had full & ample proof before I dismissed him. . . . [Had 
Jackson known the reasons he would have approved. ]3i 

The enforced retirement of Blair and the dismissal of Lewis 
have been given special notice because many have cited them as 
evidence to convict Polk of ingratitude and disloyalty to General 
Jackson — the man to whom, it was said, he owed his own political 
advancement. There is little consistency in some of the criticisms 
relating to this matter. The man whom the critics denounced 
for being bold enough to ignore the wishes of "Old Hickory" 
was, by the same men, said to be weak and temporizing. Such 
critics commended Jackson for discarding his old friend Van 
Buren on account of the Texan question ; but they condemned 
Polk for dismissing his own detractors and obstacles to party 
success because these detractors happened to be friends of the 
General. ■■'■'' Jackson himself, when replying to Lewis's complaints, 
pointed out that the President had the right to fill offices with 
men in whom he, and not others, had contidence.^'^ 

Although General Jackson was undoubtedly disappointed be- 
cause his two most intimate friends had been dismissed, their 
removal does not seem to have impaired his friendship for the 
President or his desire for the success of the administration. 
The last letter which the General ever penned was written to 



33 The originals are among the Folk Papers. Printed copies may 
be found in Niles' Beg., LXVIII, 277. 

34 Polk to A. O. P. Nicholson, July 28, 1845, Polk Papers. In a letter 
to Polk, July 19, J. Geo. Harris expressed the belief that both Blair and 
Lewis had plotted against Polk. 

35 Claiborne, for example, reflects these contrary opinions of Polk. See 
Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman, I, 228-229. 

30 Jackson to Lewis, April 10, 1845 (Niles' Beg., LXVIII, 277). 



ADMINISTEATION AND PAT EON AGE 335 

Polk on June 6, 1845. It expressed not only personal friendship 
for the President, but warned him that certain rumored acts of 
Secretary Walker and land speculators might ' ' blow you & your 
administration sky high." The letter was characteristic of the 
writer and exhibited his well-known traits — solicitude for his 
friend and protege, a wish to supervise public affairs, and a 
patriotic desire to serve his country, even though his methods 
were not always of the best. "Here, my son," he said, as he 
handed it to Andrew Jackson Jr., "read this letter, I want you 
to be a witness to the fact that I have warned the government 
against the disaster with which it is threatened — and have done 
my duty." The letter was mislaid under some papers and not 
found until October and it was feared it had been stolen. The 
high value set upon it by the President, as well as his feeling 
toward the writer, is stated in a letter in which Polk asked that 
a search be made to recover it : 

I shall prize the letter as above all price as being the last ever written 
by the greatest man of the age in which he lived — a man whose confidence 
and friendship I was so happy as to have enjoyed from my youth to the 
latest.3T 

On the question of ousting Whigs from office in order to 
make room for Democrats, Polk 's own views accorded with those 
of his party,^^ and when making appointments, except a few 
military positions, political orthodoxy was a sine qua non. De- 
spite the importunities of Buchanan, he refused to appoint John 



37 Jackson to Polk, June 6; J. Geo. Harris to Polk, June 28; Polk to 
Nicholson, June 28, 1845, Polh Papers. Andrew Jackson, Jr., approved 
what the President had done and when writing, on October 10, to explain 
how Jackson's last letter had been mislaid said: "Our old friend Majr 
Lewis has completely killed himself here & I expect else where by his 
imprudent publications — he is now very sick of it, and well he may be ' ' 
(Pollc Papers). 

3s In 1846 an officer who had been notified that he would be removed 
protested that, although he had once been a Federalist, he had been a 
Democrat for many years. "Although not the only reason for making 
the change proper," the President observed, "I have no doubt he is a 
Whig in all his feelings, and that his patronage is bestowed exclusively 
on members of that party, as far as he thinks he can do so with safety 
to himself" {Diary, II, 113-114). 



336 JAMES E. POLK 

M. Read to a place on the Supreme Bench, because that distin- 
guished jurist had once been a Federalist. His remarks in this 
connection on the perduranee of original ideas showed his political 
sagacity, for Read later deserted the party and became a Re- 
publican : 

Mr. -Eead, I learned, was until within 10 or 12 years ago a leading 
Federalist, and a Eepresentative of that party in the Legislature. Al- 
though he has since that time acted with the Democratic party, I have no 
confidence in the orthodoxy of his political opinions or constitutional 
doctrines, and was therefore unwilling to appoint him to a station for life, 
where he would almost certainly [have] relapsed into his old Federal 
Doctrines & been latitudinarian in his doctrines. I have never known an 
instance of a Federalist who had after arriving at the age of 30 professed 
to change his opinions, who was to be relied on in his constitutional opin- 
ions. All of them who have been appointed to the Supreme Court Bench, 
after having secured a place for life became very soon broadly Federal 
and latitudinarian in all their decisions involving questions of Constitu- 
tional power. Gen'l Jackson had been most unfortunate in his appoint- 
ments to that Bench in this respect. I resolved to appoint no man who 
was not an original Democrat & strict constructionist, and who would be 
less likely to relapse into the Broad Federal doctrines of Judge Marshall 
& Judge Story.39 

Even Benton's son-in-law, William Carey Jones, was denied an 
office because he had once edited a Federalist paper in New 
Orleans. Like Jackson, Polk seemed to take it for granted that 
honesty, except in very rare eases, was not to be found among 
the Whigs, and his naive remarks about the exceptions which he 
discovered are very amusing. Senator Mangrum, for example, 
"though a Whig, is a gentleman, and fair & manly in his oppo- 
sition to my administration. ' ' Senator Crittenden, also, ' ' tliough 
differing with me in politics is an honorable gentleman."""' He 
does not, liowever, seem to have found a Whig honorable enough 
to hold an appointive office. Still, though he declined to place 
Whigs in appointive offices, he did not, on the other hand, dis- 
miss them for partisan considerations merely. In his diary he 



39 Polk, Diary, I, 137-138. 

40 Ibid., Ill, 381, II, 349. 



ADMIN I ST BAT ION AND PATRONAGE 337 

has noted the gratitude of those whom he had retained in office, 
despite their political opinions : 

Many Whigs whom I retained in office were among those who called. 
Though many removals & new appointments to fill vacancies have been 
made by me, my administration has not been proseriptive, and the Whigs 
who were faithful & good officers, whom I have retained in their places, 
seem to appreciate my liberality towards them and many of them have 
called to express their gratitude & to take leave of me.*i 

The independence displayed in dropping Blair and Lewis was 
characteristic of the policy which Polk endeavored to employ in 
all matters of patronage. He was soon to discover, however, 
that the dispenser of offices is by no means a free agent, and 
that "political considerations" must be taken into account. 

Although many at the time alleged that the President had 
made preelection pledges to the Tyler and Calhoun factions, 
there is now no reason for doubting Polk 's oft-repeated assertions 
that he was "under no pledges or commitments"*- to any of the 
political cliques. Even so, their wishes could not be wholly dis- 
regarded with impunity. Hostile elements within the party had 
united for the purpose of winning the election, and each was ready 
to claim its share of the ' ' spoils. ' ' Having no assured ' ' adminis- 
tration majority" in Congress, the success of his own program 
must depend upon his ability to enlist the support of several 
discordant factions. His effort to deal fairly with all of them 
resulted in general criticism, for each laid claim to all important 
offices and resented all favors accorded to its rivals. To have 
allied himself with any one of these factions would have resulted 
in disaster ; the refusal to do so was attributed to timidity and a 
temporizing disposition. 

It has been noted in the preceding chapter that there were 
three rather well-defined groups within the Democratic party. 
The first comprised the followers of Van Buren and Benton ; the 



41 Polk, Diary, March 2, 1849, IV, 360. 

42 For example, Polk to Cave Johnson, Dec. 21, 1844, ' ' Polk-Johnson 
Letters. ' ' 



338 JAMES K. POLE 

second, the adherents of Calhoun; and the third, that element 
in the South and "West which accepted the leadership of "Walker 
and Cass/^ Until the appearance of Van Buren's anti-Texas 
letter nothing had occurred to disturb the harmony which long 
existed between the Van Burenites and Jackson's followers in 
Tennessee, consequently Polk had been identitied with the first 
group even though his claim to the Vice-Presidency had met with 
no cordial response. 

Due, no doubt, to this affiliation and to a desire to assuage 
the disappointment caused by the dropping of Van Buren by the 
Baltimore convention, Polk turned first to New York when mak- 
ing up his list of cabinet appointments. Wright, as we have 
already seen, was invited to take charge of the Treasury Depart- 
ment ; and when this invitation was declined, Butler, on the advice 
of Van Buren, was tendered the War portfolio. Rebuffed a 
second time, Polk ceased his efforts to placate the Van Burenites, 
and appointed their rival, Marcy, to be Secretary of War. For 
the sake of harmony within the party he had done all that any 
self-respecting man in his position could have been expected to 
do, and if the friends of the ex-President did not receive their 
proper share of the ' ' loaves and fishes, ' ' the blame rested entirely 
upon their own shoulders. The President's offer, a few months 
later, to send Van Buren as minister to England was likewise 
declined, and the attitude of the ex-President and his adherents 
continued to be one either of sullen reserve or of secret opposition 
to the administration. When Polk reached New York on his north- 
ern tour in July, 1847, Van Buren sent him a verbal invitation 
to call. Believing the invitation to be a mere "formal courtesy" 
impelled by public opinion, the President promptly declined to 
accept it. "The truth is," is the comment in his diary, "Mr. 
Van Buren became offended with me at the beginning of my ad- 
ministration because I chose to exercise my own judgment in the 



43 With characteristic pungency J. Q. Adams divided Democracy into 
two parts: "Southern Democracy,' which is slavery, and Western Democ- 
racy, which is knavery" {Memoirs, XII, 11). 



ADMINISTEATION AND PATRONAGE 339 

selection of my own Cabinet, and would not be controlled by him 
and suffer him to select it for me. ' '** 

Although the President could not consent to retain Calhoun 
in his cabinet, he was prepared at the outset to deal fairly with 
that wing of the party. The British mission was offered first to 
Calhoun himself, and after his refusal, to his friends, Elmore 
and Pickins. But this faction, like the Van Burenites, declined 
to accept anything because their chief had not been permitted to 
control the administration. 

The Treasury Department with the patronage incident to the 
office was assigned to "Walker as a clear concession to the South 
and West. The selection of Greer, a friend of Dallas, for the 
Supreme Bench was likewise a recognition of the claims of this 
wing of the party. Apparently Cass did not seek an appointive 
office, but preferred to remain in the Senate. 

When selecting federal officers the President did not, of course, 
overlook his own personal friends. First of all, Cave Johnson 
was made Postmaster General, and Donelson, after being consid- 
ered as possible editor of the Union, was, on his return from 
Texas, sent as minister to Berlin. J. George Harris, whose vitri- 
olic pen and exasperating "buzzard" had made the Nashville 
Union so effective a party journal, was made purser in the navy. 
The loyal but dissolute Laughlin was appointed to be recorder 
of the general land office as a reward for his services as editor 
of the Nashville Union and for his support of Polk in the Balti- 
more convention. The President's old friend and former law 



4-t Polk, Diary, Til, 74. Polk had received information from many 
sources concerning the hostility of the Albany regency. For example, 
Buchanan, who visited Albany in the fall of 1846, reported that, while 
Governor Wright himself was friendly, Cambreleng and others avoided 
him. A month later George Bancroft, who had always been a warm friend 
of Van Buren, after a similar visit informed Polk that New York poli- 
ticians were hostile to the administration and that Van Buren evinced 
no desire to renew friendly relations with the President. Although 
Bancroft had originally suggested the tender to Van Buren of the British 
mission, he now advised that no further attempt be made to placate the 
ex-President (Buchanan to Polk, Sept. 5, 1846; Bancroft to Polk, Oct. 4, 
1846, Polk Papers. Van Buren 's correspondents freely criticized the 
President, Van Buren Papers, passim). 



340 JAMES K. POLE 

partner, Gideon Pillow, who claimed to be mainly responsible for 
Polk's nomination at Baltimore, was, when the war broke out, 
made a brigadier-general of volunteers. Even John 0. Bradford, 
whom a Whig bishop had excommunicated for editing the Nash- 
ville Union, was now rewarded by a pursership in the navy. 
Most questionable of all, however, in point of propriety, was the 
appointment of the President's own brother, William H. Polk, 
to be charge d 'affaires at Naples. 

Having pointed out that the President, in an effort to promote 
harmony, assigned to the several factions some of the most de- 
sirable appointive positions, and tliat friendship rather than merit 
dictated the selection of certain minor officials, we may now con- 
sider his general policy in dealing with the public patronage. 
The patronage incident to the office of chief executive is a source 
of great power, and for this reason the popular belief seems to 
be that it is also a source of great pleasure. The corollary is 
doubtful in any case and certainly is erroneous when applied to 
Polk, for his administration had not proceeded far before he 
came to regard patronage and office-seekers as a veritable night- 
mare. 

Polk was a man of very positive ideas, and one of those ideas 
was that public office is an opportunity for public service. Al- 
though in the finesse of practical politics he was no more scrupu- 
lous than his fellows, he never regarded any position held by 
himself as a sinecure and he believed that offices should not be 
so regarded by others. The keynote of his policy was foreshad- 
owed in the circular letter, already quoted, that was sent" to 
prospective members of his cabinet. He would aid no aspirant 
for the Presidential nomination in 1848 and he would not permit 
his subordinates to use their offices for such a purpose ; his and 
their energies must be devoted to the "principles and policy" 
of the existing administration. Determined to devote his whole 
time to the public service, he required that cabinet members should 
do likewise ; intrusting of important business to chief clerks was 
not to be tolerated. 



ADMIN I ST EAT ION AND PATRONAGE 3-il 

In theory, therefore, the President believed office to be an 
opportunity for present service and not a reward for acts already 
performed. And if we except the few instances already noted 
where appointments were made either for personal reasons or in 
an effort to promote harmony it may be said that Polk, at the 
beginning of his administration, sincerely endeavored to carry 
his theory into practice. The more important appointments re- 
ceived his own personal attention, and, in order that he might 
conserve his time for affairs of state, the selection of minor offi- 
cials was turned over to his cabinet.^^ The Union, soon after its 
establishment, repelled in an editorial assertions made by poli- 
ticians that Polk would have to dispense patronage in accordance 
with the wishes of the various candidates for the Presidency. On 
the contrary, said the editor, the President, in making his ap- 
pointments, will take no thought of whether the person is a Van 
Buren man, a Calhoun man, a Cass man or a Buchanan man. His 
tliought will be simply : " Is the man honest and capable ? ' ' Two 
months later the following editorial appeared : 

Mr. Polk has avowed and acted, and will continue to act, upon the 
settled determination not to permit the course of his administration to 
interfere with, or influence, the selection of a candidate of the democratic 
party to succeed him. That important duty he will leave to be performed 
by the people, unbiased and uninfluenced by his oflScial action. Can any 
portion of the democracy object to this course ?4g 



45 Commenting on this policy, Niles' Eegister said: " The course adbpted 
by President Polk, on taking hold of the helm of state, in relation to 
the importunities for ofiice which had grown out of an erroneous course 
admitted by some of his immediate predecessors, seems to have given 
satisfaction to every body except those who were in full cry for office. 
We allude to his having announced semi-officially that personal attend- 
ance at the seat of government, and personal importunities for ofiice 
would operate against the applicant; — that the papers designed to urge 
claims for appointment, must be submitted in the first place to the presid- 
ing officer of the department to which the office belonged, and must be 
by him deliberated upon and presented in due form, together with those 
of all other applicants for the same office, by the chief of the department 
to the president, for his deliberate judgment — with the whole subject 
before him. 

This announcement occasioned a general scatterfication. Washington 
city immediately lost a large proportion of its transient crowd. It is 
to be hoped the position will be adhered to in its genuine spirit, and with 
due decision" (Niles' Beg., LXVIII, 51, March 29, 1845). 

46 Washington Union, May 13, July 14, 1845. 



342 JAMES K. POLK 

Despite the soundness of the President's position, it was al- 
ready apparent that not only "any portion" but everjj portion 
of the party was displeased. A few days before the appearance 
of the latter editorial he had told Silas Wright that dispensing 
of patronage was his greatest source of annoyance. Concerning 
the general policy of the administration, said he, there seems to 
be no complaint, but much dissatisfaction about offices; "I sin- 
cerely wish I had no office to bestow."*' Could he have seen 
contemporary private correspondence his wish undoubtedly would 
have been still more emphatic. For example, old line Democrats 
complained because room had not been made for them by the 
ousting of all "Federalists," and because Polk and Walker were 
too busy to see their fellow-citizens. One of them in reporting 
to Van Buren this sad state of affairs remarked that one ' ' never 
had to call twice" to obtain an interview with either Jackson or 
Van Buren.** Enraged because he had not fared so well as certain 
other Tennesseans, Andrew Johnson pronounced Polk's appoint- 
ments to be the "most dmmiahle" ever made by any President," 
and this fact he attributed to duplicity and the want of moral 
courage. Nevertheless, it required greater courage to resist im- 
portunities than to gratify them, and dissatisfaction from so 
many sources is but evidence that an attempt was being made to 
divorce patronage from factional politics, even though that at- 
tempt was destined to prove unsuccessful. 

We are not left in doubt concerning the President's own 
opinions on the subject of patronage, for in making daily entries 
in his diary he seldom neglected to express his loathing for the 



47 Polk to Wright, July 8, 1845, Folk Papers. 

48 John P. Shcldou to Vcau Buren, Oct. 30, 1845, Van Buren Papers. 

49 "Take Polk's appointments all and all and they are the most 
damnable set that were ever made by any president since the government 
Avas organized, out of Tennessee as well as in it. He has a set of inter- 
ested parasites about him who flatter him till he does not know himself. 
He seems to be acting on the principle of hanging one old friend for 

the purpose of making two new ones" (Johnson to '? [someone in 

Tennessee], July 22, 1846, Johnson Papers). 



ADMINISTRATION AND PATRONAGE 343 

office-seeker. He had the utmost contempt for those whose 
"patriotism" consisted solely of a willingness to draw a salary 
from the government ; he regarded them not merely as an in- 
cubus but as a serious public menace. The personal boredom 
caused by listening to their tales became almost intolerable, but 
Polk was even more exasperated because they prevented him 
from devoting his time to important governmental affairs. 

At the beginning of his administration Polk tried to follow 
the program announced in the Union of making his appointments 
on the basis of honesty and merit. He attempted also, as we 
have seen, to conserve his own time by delegating to his cabinet 
the lesser appointments. But for "practical" reasons he was 
constrained to modify this salutary program. In the first place 
his predecessors had made themselves accessible to the public and 
it was difficult for any President, particularly a Democratic 
President, suddenly to reverse the precedent. In the second 
place he had several important measures which could be carried 
into effect only by the cooperation of Congress, and he soon dis- 
covered that such cooperation could not be procured by ignoring 
the claim of members to their "share" of the patronage. Re- 
gardless of his own wishes, therefore, he was forced to give audi- 
ence to individual office-seekers, and to make many appointments 
on the recommendation of members of Congress. In order to 
give a complete history of his patronage tribulations it would be 
necessary to reproduce his entire diary; some selected passages 
may serve to illustrate the annoyance experienced not only by 
Polk but by every chief executive. 

Once the horde had been admitted to his presence the Presi- 
dent, being a very courteous man, found it difficult to get rid of 
them. A few months' experience, however, taught him that "the 
only way to treat them is to be decided & stern. ' ' In February, 
1846, Washington was infested with an unusually large number 
of persons "who are so patriotic as to desire to serve their country 



344 JAMES E. POLE 

by getting into fat offices."^" On the anniversary of his inaug- 
uration he wrote in his diary : 

I am ready to exclaim will the pressure for office never cease! It is 
one year to-day since I entered on the duties of my office, and still the 
pressure for office has not abated. I most sincerely wish that I had no 
offices to bestow. If I had not it would add much to the happiness and 
comfort of my position. As it is, I have no offices to bestow without 
turning out better men than a large majority of those who seek tlieir 
places.51 

The inconvenience of possessing a courteous disposition is illus- 
trated by an entry made on June 4, 1846 : 

When there are no vacancies it is exceedingly distressing to be com- 
pelled to hear an office [seeker] for an hour tell his story and set forth his 
merits and claims. It is a great and useless consumption of my time, and 
yet I do not see how I am to avoid it without being rude or insulting, 
which it is not in my nature to be.52 

There were times, however, when politeness ceased to be a 
virtue, especially after the same individual had called repeatedly 
"on the patriotic business of seeking office." After a trying 
experience with "old customers," he observed on August 17, 
1846: 

I concluded that it was useless to be annoyed by them any longer, and 
I was more than usually stern and sunmiary with them. I said no! this 
morning with a free will and a good grace. The truth is that the persons 
who called to-day, with but few exceptions, were a set of loafers without 
merit. They had been frequently here before, and I find as long as I treat 
them civilly I shall never get clear of them. 53 

If, as the Whigs would have it, Polk needlessly precipitated 
the war with Mexico, he suffered ample punishment in the form 
of renewed scramble for office. Congressmen now not only sought 
places for their constituents, but many of them desired military 
positions for themselves. For the sake of harmony the President 



50 Polk, Diary, I, 158 (Jan. 9, 1846) ; ibid., 255. 

51 Ibid., 261. 

52 Ibid., 446-447. 

53 Polk, Diary, II, 85. See also ibid., 105-106. 



ADMINISTEATION AND PAT BON AGE 345 

was ready to suffer much inconvenience, but when it came to a 
matter of principle he was unyielding. The Diary for June 22, 
1846, notes that 

The passion for office among members of Congress is very great, if 
not absolutely disreputable, and greatly embarrasses the operations of the 
Government. They create offices by their own votes and then seek to fill 
them themselves. I shall refuse to appoint them, though it be at the 
almost certain hazard of incurring their displeasure. I shall do so because 
their appointment would be most corrupting in its tendency. I am aware 
that by refusing their applications I may reduce my administration to a 
minority in both Houses of Congress, but if such be the result I shall have 
the high satisfaction of having discharged my duty in resisting the selfish- 
ness of members of Congress, who are willing to abandon their duty to 
their constituents and provide places for themselves. I will not counte- 
nance such selfishness, but will do my duty, and rely on the country for 
an honest support of my administration. 

By December 16, 1846, the unscrupulous methods resorted to 
by members of Congress in their efforts to procure offices for their 
clients had become so appalling that Polk began ' ' to distrust the 
disinterestedness and honesty of all mankind. ' ' Complaints and 
disaffection over petty offices gave him more trouble than did 
great national policies. "There is," he confided to his diary, 
"more selfishness and less principle among members of Congress, 
as well as others, than I had any conception [of] before I be- 
came President of the U. S."^* Every day added new evidence 
of congressional depravity, and he was ' ' disgusted with the trick- 
ery and treachery" exhibited in recommendations for office.^^ 
The way in which patronage had become a menace to both polit- 
ical parties and to the country is set forth in the entry for Janu- 
ary 7, 1847 : 

The passion for office and the number of unworthy persons who seek 
to live on the public is increasing beyond former example, and I now 
predict that no President of the U. S. of either party will ever again be 
re-elected. The reason is that the patronage of the Government will 
destroy the popularity of any President, however well he may administer 



'^i Ibid., 278-279. 
55 Hid., 296. 



346 JAMES K. POLK 

the Government. The office seekers have become so numerous that they 
hold the balance of power betvi'^een the two great parties of the country. 
In every appointment wliieh the President makes lie disappoints half a 
dozen or more applicants and their friends, who actuated by selfish and 
sordid motives, will prefer any other candidate in the next election, while 
the person appointed attributes the appointment to his own superior merit 
and does not even feel obliged by it. The number of office seekers has 
become so large that they probably hold the balance of power between 
the two great parties in the country, and if disappointed in getting i>lace 
under one administration they will readily unite themselves with the 
party and candidate of the opposite politics, so as to increase their chances 
for place. Another great difficulty in making appointments which the 
President encounters is that he cannot tell upon what recommendations 
to rely. Members of Congress and men of high station in the country sign 
papers of recommendation, either from interested personal motives or with- 
out meaning what they say, and thus the President is often imposed on, 
and induced to make bad appointments. When he does so the whole 
responsibility falls on himself, while those who have signed papers of 
recommendation and misled him, take special care never to avow the 
agency they have had in the matter, or to assume any part of the respon- 
sibility. I have had some remarkable instances of this during my admin- 
istration. One or two of them I think worthy to be recalled as illustrations 
of many others. In the recess of Congress shortly after the commencement 
of my administration I made an appointment upon the letter of recom- 
mendation of a senator. I sent the nomination to the Senate at the last 
session & it was rejected, and, as I learned, at the instance of the same 
Senator who had made the recommendation. A few days afterwards the 
Senator called to recommend another person for the same office. I said to 
him, well, you rejected the man I nominated; O yes, he replied, he was 
without character & wholly unqualified. I then asked him if he knew upon 
whose recommendation I had appointed him, to which he replied that he 
did not. I then handed him his own letter & told him that that was the 
recommendation upon which I had appointed hiin. He appeared confused 
and replied, Well, we are obliged to recommend our constituents when they 
apply to us. The Senator was Mr. Ateheson of Missouri, and the person 
appointed & rejected was Mr. Hedges as Surveyor of the port of St. Louis.^e 

A week after the above had been written the begging for office 
had become "not only disgusting, but almost beyond endurance." 

5«7/;(d., 313-315. Polk crossed out the last sentence, but undoubtedly 
Atchison was the Senator in question. Members of Congress frequently 
signed enthusiastic recommendations for applicants and then sent private 
letters which requested Polk to pay no heed to the recommendation. The 
applicant of course blamed Polk when the appointment was not made. 
See ibid., 278, note. 



ADMINISTRATION ANV PATRONAGE 347 

"I keep my temper," wrote the President, "or rather suppress 
the indignation which I feel at the sordid and selfish views of 
the people who continually annoy me about place." The rule 
which he had adopted under which no member of Congress was 
to be appointed to office, except diplomatic and high military 
positions, had already caused twenty disappointed applicants to 
oppose the measures of the administration ; nevertheless he was 
determined to persist in applying the rule, regardless of conse- 
quences. "If God grants me length of days and health," he 
wrote in desperation, "I will, after the expiration of my term, 
give a history of the selfish and corrupt considerations which 
influence the course of public men, as a legacy to posterity. I 
shall never be profited by it, but those who come after me may 
be. "^' More than a year later he again expressed his determi- 
nation to write an expose of office-seeking,^^ and it is very prob- 
able that he would have done so had his death not occurred a few 
months after his retirement. It would have been an interesting 
volume, for he possessed botli the data and the disposition to do 
the subject full justice. 

The phrenologist who examined Polk in 1839 stated, among 
other things, that "when he suffers, he suffers most intently." 
No one who has followed the President's almost daily denunci- 
ations of place-hunters will be inclined to deny the truth of this 
statement. "I was doomed this morning," is the diary entry for 
February 18, 1847, "to pass through another pressure of impor- 
tunate office seekers. I am ready to exclaim God deliver me from 
dispensing the patronage of the Government. ""'^ His suffering 
was made the more intense by his efforts to conceal it. His habit 



57 Polk, Diarii, II, 328-330. 

s^i Polk, Diary, III, 419. "If a kind Providence permits me length of 
days and health, I will, after I retire from the Presidential office, write 
the secret and hitherto unknown history of the Government in this 
respect. It requires great patience & self command to repress the loath- 
ing I feel towards a hungry crowd of unworthy office-hunters who often 
crowd my office." 

59 Polk, Diary, II, 382. 



348 JAMES K. POLK 

of reticence and a desire to preserve his dignity led him, for the 
most part, to endure the agony in silence ; to his diary alone did 
he communicate his real opinions. "It is enough," he wrote on 
one occasion, "to exhaust the patience and destroy the good 
temper of any man on earth, to bear the daily boring which I have 
to endure. I keep, however, in a good humor as far as it is pos- 
sible to do so."*''^ It was this same passive exterior which led 
many to believe that he did not have positive opinions on other 
subjects. 

The severest of weather was no deterrent to the procession of 
the office-seeking "patriots," for "neither ice nor fire" could 
stop them. Polk "pushed them off and fought them with both 
hands like a man fighting fire," but "it has all been in vain.""^ 
He felt the need of "one of Colt's revolving pistols" to enable 
him to clear the office so that he might attend to his public duties.®- 
Most disgusting of all were those who, on hearing a report of an 
officer's illness, rushed to the President with an application for 
the sick man's position, "if he should die." Nearly all of them 
were ' ' mere loafers who are too lazy to work and wish to be sup- 
ported by the public" — in a word, "the most contemptible race 
on earth. "''^ So far as members of Congress were concerned, 
Senator Breeze, of Illinois, enjoyed the distinction of being the 
champion pest. "He has," said the President, "no sooner pro- 
cured an appointment than he sets to work to procure another, ' ' 
and his recommendations were governed by his political interests 
and not by the public good.*** 

Although Polk fully realized at the time of his inauguration 
that he was entering upon four years of incessant toil, he un- 
doubtedly, like all who have not held the office, believed the Presi- 
dency to be a position of dignity as well as power. The political 
intrigues and factional jealousies with which he was beset soon 



eo Polk, Diaru, III, 250. C3 Polk, Diary, III, 331, IV, 79. 

fii Polk, Diary, II, 360-361, 383. 64 Polk, Diary, II, 426. 

G2 Polk, Diary, IV, 246. 



ADMINISTEATION AND PATEONAGE 3-49 

divested the office of much of its glamour ; the political necessity 
of enduring the importunities of the office-seeking horde made it 
even contemptible. On this subject we may quote his own words : 

The office of President is generally esteemed a very high dignified posi- 
tion, but really I think the public -would not so regard it if they could look in 
occasionally and observe the kind of people by -whom I am often annoyed. 
I cannot seclude myself but must be accessible to my fellow-citizens, and 
this gives an opportunity to all classes and descriptions of people to obtrude 
themselves upon me about matters in which the public has not the slightest 
interest. There is no class of our population by whom I am annoyed so 
much, or for whom I entertain a more sovereign contempt, than for the pro- 
fessional office-seekers who have besieged me ever since I have been in the 
Presidential office.65 

Scarcely less obnoxious than the office-seeker was the casual 
visitor who had no business to transact but who nevertheless 
wasted the President's valuable time. Even though he begrudged 
the time spent in pointless conversation he realized that a refusal 
to meet callers would cause adverse criticism and weaken his 
administration. ''I feel," said he, "that I am compelled to yield 
to it, and to deprive myself of the ordinary rest, in order to attend 
to the indispensable duties which devolve upon me.""® 

Ceremonious notifications of royal births and deaths added 
their share of irritation to the busy and democratic President. 
"I confess," he noted on one occasion, "the practice of announc- 
ing officially the birth of Foreign Princes to the President of the 
United States, has always appeared to me to be supremely ridicu- 
lous."®" "When his attention was called by Buchanan to a grave 



65 Polk, Pianj, IV, 160-161 (Oct. 19, 1848). 

66 Polk, Diary, II, 280-281. 

67 Polk, Diary, I, 237. When not too much absorbed in affairs of state, 
he sometimes saw the funny side as well. E.g. ' ' These ceremonies seem 
to be regarded as of Great importance by the Ministers of the Foreign 
Monarchies, though to me they are amusing & ridiculous" (ibid., II, 215— 
216). The solemn notification of the death in the royal family of Russia 
struck him as being so ridiculous that he could "scarcely preserve his 
gravity." "I simply remarked [to the Russian minister] that such 
occurrences would take place, and at once entered into familiar con- 
versation" (ibid., 374). 



350 JAMES K. POLK 

communication from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs re- 
lating to a dispute between American and French consuls over 
their claims to precedence, Polk related with approval a story 
of Jefferson's "pell mell" etiquette, and told Buchanan that ''I 
was not a man of ceremonies, that he and Mr. Guizot might settle 
the dispute between the consuls in any way they pleased. "''- 

Although Polk was not, as is generally believed, devoid of all 
sense of humor, the austerity of his bearing when President of the 
United States very naturally gave rise to this belief. His habitual 
gravity was caused in part by ill health, but still more by the 
weight of responsibilities. Official cares so filled his mind that 
no room was left for amusement. This fact is well illustrated 
by an incident which he has noted in his diary. One day a 
magician gave an exhibition before a select company at the execu- 
tive mansion and the President was persuaded by Bancroft and 
Mrs. Catron to attend. The rest of the company derived much 
enjoyment from the entertainment, but Polk felt that his time 
had been unprofitably spent. "I was thinking," he wrote, 
"more about the Oregon & other public questions which bear on 
my mind that [than] the tricks of the juggler, and perhaps on 
that account the majority of the company might think my opin- 
ions entitled to but little weight." He could not, like Lincoln, 
find relaxation in a homely anecdote or in a chapter from some 
humorous writer. Official cares were constantly on his mind and 
he had no time for anuisements. 

The cares of office added much to the gravity of the Presi- 
dent's naturally serious disposition. Indeed, he had become, as 
Claiborne haS said, "grave almost to sadness."*"* While he will- 
ingly spent his energies in the public service, he longed for the 
day to arrive when he might relinquish the helm of state ; it 
needed no one-term pledge to prevent him from standing for 
reelection. ' ' I have now, ' ' he wrote on his fifty-second birthday. 



fis Polk, Diarii, II, 175. 

69 Claiborne, Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman, I, 228. 



ADMINISTEATION AND PATRONAGE 351 

"passed through two-thirds of my Presidential term, & most 
heartily wish the remaining third was over, for I am sincerely 
desirous to have the enjoyment of retirement in private life."'" 
Polk 's success as an executive and as a constructive statesman 
will, we believe, be made manifest in the chapters which follow. 
The topics to be considered cover the fields of war, diplomacy, 
finance, industrial development, and constitutional law. In all 
of these fields, the President formulated his own policies and, in 
the main, succeeded in putting them in operation. Soon after 
his inauguration he announced to George Bancroft that the ' ' four 
great measures" of his administration would be: reduction of 
the tariff, establishment of an independent treasury, settlement 
of the Oregon question, and the acquisition of California.^^ He 
carried out this program in spite of vigorous opposition. And 
if we except the coercion of Mexico, upon which there is still a 
difference of opinion, it is the verdict of history that his policies 
were both praiseworthy and sound. 



70 Polk, Diary, III, 210. 

71 Sehouler, Hisiory of the United States, IV, 498. 



CHAPTER XVI 

COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION 

As we have noted in a preceding chapter, the joint resohition 
adopted by Congress on February 28, 1845, authorized the annex- 
ation of Texas by either of two methods. Under the first — the 
House resolution — Congress consented to admit Texas as a state 
as soon as the government and people of that republic had agreed 
to annexation and had conformed to certain requirements 
specified in the resolution. The second method — the so-called 
Benton plan — provided : 

That if the President of the United States shall in his judgment and 
discretion deem it most advisable, instead of proceeding to submit the fore- 
going resolution to the Republic of Texas, as an overture on the part of the 
United States for admission, to negotiate with that Republic. 

Three days before Polk's inauguration Tyler, as we have 
seen, approved the joint resolution and selected the first method 
— the one specified in the House resolution. On March 3 Presi- 
dent Tyler dispatched a messenger with instructions to Donelson, 
the American charge d' affaires, who was residing temporarily 
in New Orleans. 

The action taken by Tyler did not, of course, effect the annex- 
ation of the lone-star republic. There was a possibility,^ at 
least, that the new President might recall the messenger and 
select the Benton alternative of negotiating with Texas. Besides, 
annexation in any case was contingent on the acceptance of the 
proposed terms by the government and people of the Texan 
republic. 



1 See p. 318 and note 96. 



COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION 353 

When Calhoun called upon Polk to inform him that Tyler 
had decided to select the House resolution, the President-elect 
declined, as we have seen, to express an opinion. And, if we 
except the seemingly incredible statements made by Tappan and 
Blair, he did not reveal his opinions concerning the method of 
annexation up to the time of his inauguration. He says in his 
diary- that his mind was not fully made up as to the choice 
of method until he met his cabinet on March 10, 1845 ; he then 
decided to select the House resolution, or in other words, to 
acquiesce in the choice made by Tyler. Additional evidence 
that he arrived at no decision until he had consulted the cabinet 
is contained in a private letter written to Donelson on the seventh 
of March. He said : 

A despatch was transmitted to you by the late administration on the 3rd 
Ins. In tAvo or three days another will be forwarded to you on the same 
subject by a special messenger. But five members of my Cabinet have been 
confirmed by the Senate; the remaining members I hope will be confirmed 
at the next meeting of the Senate. I write now to say that I desire you, not 
to take any definite action in pursuance of the instructions given in the 
despatch of the 3rd Inst, until after you receive the one which will be for- 
warded in two or three days, and by which the instructions will probably 
be modified. I write you this informal note for the reason that Mr. Buchanan 
the Secretary of State has not entered the duties of his office, and because 
I desire to have the Cabinet complete before definite action is had on my 
part.3 

Just what the President meant by saying that Tyler's instruc- 
tions would probably be modified we can only conjecture. Pos- 
sihlij he may have been contemplating a reversal of Tyler's 
action, although his statement does not seem to warrant such an 
inference. More likely he was thinking of the reasoning con- 
tained in the instructions sent by his predecessor, for this, as 
we shall see, was criticized in the official dispatch which soon 
followed. 



2 Polk, Diary, IV, 44. 

3 Polk to Donelson, March 7, 1845, ' ' Polk-Donelson Letters. ' ' The 
endorsement on the letter reads: "The President March 7. Reed, from 
Mr. Pickett on the 19th at New Orleans." 



354 JAMES E. POLK 

As soon as the decision to proceed under the House resolution 
had heen reached Buchanan, by the President's order, delivered 
to Almonte, the Mexican minister, an answer to the protest 
against annexation which that official had addressed to Calhoun. 
In his letter Almonte characterized annexation as "an act of 
aggression the most unjust which can be found recorded in the 
annals of modern history — namely, that of despoiling a friendly 
nation like Mexico, of a considerable portion of her territory." 
After asserting that Mexico would exert all of her power in 
recovering her province of Texas, he concluded by demanding 
his passports. In reply Buchanan informed Almonte that while 
President Polk desired to continue friendly relations with Mexico, 
annexation was "irrevocably decided" so far as the United 
States was concerned, and that it was too late to raise the 
question of Texan independence.* 

On the same day, March 10, Polk sent out another messenger. 
Governor Archibald Yell, with new instructions for Donelson. 
The instructions from both Presidents reached the charge d' 
affaires at New Orleans on March 24, and he set out immediately 
for Texas.^ 

In the new instructions, Buchanan informed Donelson that 
Polk did not concur with Tyler in the belief that procedure under 
the Benton alternative would necessitate the conclusion of a 
treaty which must be ratified by the Senate, "yet he is sensible 
that many of the sincere friends of Texas may entertain this 
opinion." Should this prove to be the case, dissension and delay 
must be the inevitable result. From all points of view, said 
Buchanan, the House resolution was to be preferred, therefore 
he urged Texas to accept it without modification and to trust to 
sister states for desired adjustments. He desired especially that 
the public lands of Texas should be transferred to the United 

4 Almonte to Calhoun, March 6; Buchanan to Almonte, March 10, 1845 
(Buchanan, Works, VI, 118-120). 

r. Donelson to Buchanan, March 24, 1845 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 
sess., 45, 46). 



COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION 355 

States so that the federal government might extend its laws 
over the Indian tribes.*' 

Donelson reached Galveston on March 27 only to find that a 
British vessel had arrived there a short time before and that the 
British and French ministers had gone to Washington, Texas, 
to confer with the government of that republic. As it was 
rumored that these diplomats carried with them the promise of 
Mexico's recognition of Texan independence and an offer from 
England of a favorable commercial treaty, Donelson ''put off 
in a hurry after them." When reporting this information to 
Polk, Yell said that should General Houston espouse the cause 
of annexation. President Jones would also support it. Yell had 
conversed with many Texan leaders, including Memuean Hunt. 
They talked, he said, of getting the people to demand that con- 
gress should be called for the purpose of considering annexation.' 

Not all of the leaders, however, were pleased with the terms of 
annexation offered by the United States. Donelson did not be- 
lieve that the people would acquiesce in annexation unless the 
proposition were presented to them by their own government, 
and he thought that President Jones was not in favor of the 
measure. He was not encouraged by the apparent attitude at 
the capital when he first reached there, but within a month he 
was able to report that he considered the question as settled, so 
far as Texas was concerned.^ 

The people proved to be in favor of annexation, and the 
leaders could not ignore their wishes f nevertheless, the Texan 
government could not afford to disregard the wishes of General 
Houston, and he, at first, assumed a hostile attitude. On his 
arrival, Donelson found the Texan government disposed to offer 
objections to the American terms of annexation, and he had 



c Buchanan to Donelson, March 10, 1845, ibid., 35-38. 
7 Yell to Polk, Galveston, March 26, 1845, Polk Papers. 
s Donelson to Buchanan, April 1, 3, May 6, 1845 (Sen. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 
1 sess., 47, 51, 56). 

9 Smith, Annexation of Texas, 434-435. 



356 JAMES E. POLK 

reason to believe that, in no small degree, this attitude was due 
to the hostility of Houston. The ex-President was sojourning at 
some distance from the seat of government. Donelson paid him 
a visit in the hope that he might overcome his objections to 
immediate annexation. 

In a letter to Donelson, Houston had said that in the House 
resolution ''the terms are dictated and conditions absolute." 
Believing that Texas should have something to say about the 
terms of union, he therefore preferred the Benton alternative 
of negotiation. The proposed method, in his opinion, left too 
many things uncertain. He opposed, especially, the cession of 
Texan property to the United States and tlie ambiguous char- 
acter of the northwestern boundary.^° Donelson reminded 
Houston that the specifications in the House resolution regarding 
property, debts, and public lands, were substantially those which 
had been suggested by Houston himself only a few months before, 
still the ex-President gave no intimation that he would withdraw 
his opposition. ^^ 

However sincere Houston's objections may have been, forces 
were at work which were likely to modify them. Donelson had 
brought to Houston a letter from General Jackson which praised 
the work he had already done and assumed that he would aid in 
its completion.^- The immediate effect of this letter was not 
apparent, but Houston, like Benton, always wished to stand well 
with "the chief." In addition, he could never quite overcome 
a lingering desire to be once more under the folds of ' ' old Glory. 
Then, too, the Washington Glohe and other newspapers intimated 
that he might be chosen President of the United States in the 



10 Houston to Donelson, April 9, 1845 (Tex. State Hist. Assn. Quar 
Oct., 1897, 79 ff). Donelson to Buchanan, April 12, 1845 (Sen. Doc. I, 
29 Cong., 1 sess., 52). 

11 Donelson to Calhoun, April 24, 1845 (Sep. Am. Hist. Assn., 1899, 
II, 1029). Houston's memorandum of suggestions is given m Jones, 
EepuUic of Texas, 414-415. 

12 Jackson to Houston, March 12, 1845 (Yoakum, History of Texas, 
II, 441). See also, Duff Green to Calhoun, Dec. 8, 1844 (Eep. Am. Hist. 
Assn., 1899, II, 1007). 



COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION 357 

event of annexation.^^ For the present, however, Houston was 
obdurate, and Donelson returned to the seat of government to 
continue the struggle with President Jones and his cabinet. 

Although Jones was noncommittal and spoke of offers from 
Mexico, already there were indications that popular pressure 
would be brought to bear upon the government/* Some, it is 
said, even threatened to lynch Jones if he should attempt to 
prevent annexation/^ 

On the first of April Donelson transmitted the proposals of 
his government to Allen, the Texan Secretary of State, and with 
them a letter explaining why the House resolution had been 
selected. President Jones complained about the terms offered 
in the resolution, but on April 15 he issued a proclamation sum- 
moning the Texan congress to convene on the sixteenth of June.^^ 

As public opinion in favor of annexation rose to a high pitch, 
Houston 's attitude experienced a noticeable change, and early in 
May he set out for the Hermitage to visit General Jackson. After 
conversing with him at Galveston, Yell reported to Polk that the 
ex-President was now friendly and not the least opposed to annex- 
ation — that ''lie is now safe." He is, said Yell, the "Power 
behind the Throne, greater than the Throne itself." Donelson, 
in Yell's opinion, deserved much credit for the "heroic work" 
he had been doing ; his relationship to the * ' old hero ' ' had greatly 
assisted him in dealing with the Texans.^^ Whatever the reason 
may have been, Houston's conversion to annexation seems to have 
been complete, and late in May Jackson wrote with enthusiasm 
that "Texas comes into the union with a united voice, -and Genl 



13 Smith, Annexation of Texas, 439. 

14 Letters to Jones from Underwood, Norton, Lubbock, Ashbel Smith, 
et al. (Jones, BepuMic of Texas, 442, 444, 446-449). Jones's endorsements 
on these letters claim that instead of being opposed to annexation, he 
was ' ' its chief author.' ' This may be doubted. 

15 Smith, op. oit., 441. 

16 Donelson to Allen, March 31; same to Buchanan, April 12; Procla- 
mation of April 15, 1845 (Sen. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 48, 52, 54). 

IT Yell to Polk, May 5, 1845, Polk Papers. 



358 JAMES E. POLK 

Houston, as I know, puts his shoulders to the wheels to roll it in 
speedily. I knew British gold could not buy Sam Houston all 
safe & Donelson will have the honor of this important Deed."^^ 

Houston's conversion did not settle the matter. Another 
difficulty now presented itself. The House resolution required 
that a convention should be assembled in Texas for the purpose 
of framing a new state government, but the Texan constitution 
had, of course, made no provision for such proceeding. Presi- 
dent Jones could block annexation by declining to exercise extra- 
legal authority, and for a time it was feared that he might do 
so. On May 5, however, Jones issued another proclamation. 
Admitting his want of authority, he nevertheless recommended 
that delegates be chosen to meet at Austin on July 4 for the 
purpose of considering the olfer made by the United States.^" 

Allen now pointed out to Donelson that acceptance of the 
American proposal of annexation would very likely result in an 
invasion from Mexico. He therefore requested that an American 
army should be brought to Texas so that it might be ready to 
repel such an invasion.^"^ Donelson submitted Allen's request 
to his government ; but Polk and Buchanan had already antici- 
pated the wishes of Texas, and a promise of protection had 
been forwarded to Donelson. Buchanan was instructed by the 
President to say that as soon as Texas shall have accepted the 
American proposal, "he will then conceive it to be both his 
right and his duty to employ the army in defending that State 
against the attacks of any foreign power." A force of three 



IS Jacksou to Polk, May 26, 1845, ibid. Smith thinks it likely that 
Houston was influenced to some extent by the belief that the United 
States might seize Texas as it had seized West Florida (Smith, oj). cit., 
443). 

19 Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 63-64. 

20 President Jones maintained later that Donelson, by a "trick," had 
induced Allen to make the request for troops. This may be a misrepre- 
sentation, vet it is interesting to note that Polk and Buchanan made 
an offer of troops before they had received Allen's request (Jones, 
Bepublic of Texas, 53, 457-458). As to misrepresentation, see Smith, 
Annexation, 445, note 21. 



COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION 359 

thousand men, he said, woukl mimediately be placed on the 
border, prepared to enter Texas and to act without a moment's 
delay.'^ 

Shortly after this promise to protect Texas had been sent 
to Donelson a significant article appeared in the Washington 
Undon. It may not, of course, have been inspired by the Presi- 
dent ; but the coupling of the American claims against Mexico 
and the desire for California with the question of annexing Texas 
accords so well with Polk's previously announced policy that 
one is tempted to assume that Ritchie voiced faithfully the views 
of the administration. Polk and his cabinet, said the article, are 
fully capable of handling the Texas and Oregon questions. It 
is uncertain what course Mexico will pursue, but 

Her true interest will be found in peace. Let the great measure of 
annexation be accomplished, and with it the questions of boundary and of 
claims. But if she madly rushes on to the alternative of war, who shall 
pretend to set bounds to the consequences? 

We infinitely prefer the friendly settlement of the great question now 
pending. It will secure the peace and welfare of the Mexican nation. It 
can now be done, and it should now be accomplished. For who can arrest 
the torrent that will pour onward to the West? The road to California will 
open to us. Who will stay the march of our western people? Our northern 
brethren also are looking towards that inviting region with much more 
interest than those of the South. They, too, Avill raise the cry of "West- 
ward, ho ! " However strongly many of them may now oppose annexation, 
yet let California be thrown, open to their ambition and the torrent even of 
their population will roll on westwardly to the Pacific.22 

The preliminary treaty between Texas and Mexico, which 
had been arranged by Captain Charles Elliot, the British charge, 
was signed by the executive officers of the former country on the 
twenty-ninth of March. Under pretext of making a visit to South 
Carolina, Elliot had, in April, set out for the Mexican capital.-" 
His artifice, for the time being, was successful. 



21 Donelson to Buchanan, May 6; Buchanan to Donelson, May 23 
(Se7i. Ex. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess.,'40, 56, 69, ff.). 

22 Vmon, June 2, 1845. 

23 " I shall go out in the ' Electra, ' ' ' Elliot wrote to President Jones 
on April 5, ' ' hut change ships out of sight of land, and go down in the 



360 JAMES K. POLE 

Having sent (May 6) to Buchanan the letter in which he 
stated that Texas desired military protection, Donelson left for 
New Orleans — partly to get news of conditions in Mexico, and 
partly to keep track of Elliot. At New Orleans he heard it 
rumored that a British fleet was coming to aid Mexico. He 
notified Buchanan immediately and urged that the United States 
should take steps to protect Texas. "Of course," said he, "if 
war should be declared against us, Texas will be its theatre, and 
the earlier we are in possession of the commanding points on the 
Rio Grande the sooner we shall be able to bring it to a close. "^^ 

"While at Iberville, Donelson read in a New Orleans paper that 
Captain Elliot had induced Mexico to recognize the independence 
of Texas if she would agree to remain a separate nation. He 
returned immediately to Texas. Before starting, however, he dis- 
patched another letter to Secretary Buchanan in which he 
prophesied that 

Texas will be sure to call the proposal recognizing her independence as 
nothing but a ruse on the part of the British government, by which it is 
hoped that the people of Texas will be led to reject annexation; and the 
effect will be, still greater unanimity in favor of the United States, and 
Against all interference on the part of Great Britain in a question tndu 
American. 

He believed that the United States should be prepared for "an 
immediate blow upon Mexico" in ease that country should 
declare war, and that ' ' Texas will be as ready as we are to defend 
the 'star spangled banner,' and denounce British dictation."-^ 
On his arrival at Galveston, Donelson learned that Elliot was 
about to leave for Washington, Texas, for the purpose of sub- 
mitting to the Texan government the plan of recognition to which 
Mexico had consented. The two men discussed the plan freely, 



' Eurydice. ' By this means I shall be reported as gone to ' Charleston ' 
in the 'Eleetra,' and so hope to arrive unobserved" (Jones, BepuhJic of 
Texas. 443). The preliminary treaty is printed on pp. 47.3-475 of the 
same volume. 

2* Donelson to Buchanan, May 11, 184.5 {Sen. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 5G). 

25 Donelson to Buclmnan, May 22, 1845 (ibid., 58-59). 



COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION 361 

and Donelson was disgusted by the hypocrisy displayed in the 
representation that the overture for an agreement had come 
from Texas. "Stripped of diplomatic phrase," he wrote, "this 
recognition is nothing more nor less than a contrivance of Great 
Britain to defeat the measure of annexation, or involve Mexico 
in a war with the United States." Since Mexico was reported 
to be concentrating troops on the Rio Grande ' ' where Texas has, 
as yet, established no posts, ' ' Texas would probably send a force 
to remove these intruders and Captain Stockton would be ready 
to cooperate after the acceptance of annexation. In "addition 
to the suggestions before made on this subject, I would remark 
that the route for the infantry or artillery in our service which 
may be thought requisite on the Rio Grande, should be by water 
and not by land." Two days later he wrote again to the Secretary 
of State. He had just received Buchanan's letter of May 23 
which promised protection, but it did not cover the whole ground. 
If Mexico should invade Texas to the Nueces or farther before 
the convention has had an opportunity to accept the American 
proposal, "are the United States," he asked, "to stand still and 
see the country thus invaded, without interposing protection ? ' '-® 
In the same mail with Donelson 's dispatches went a letter 
from Charles A. Wickliffe, Polk's confidential agent in Texas. 
It informed the President that Captain Elliot was boldly assert- 
ing that annexation would be followed immediately by a declara- 
tion of war by Mexico. Mexico, said Elliot, would declare war 
instantly ; the United States would blockade the Mexican ports ; 
but Great Britain would not submit to this, and, consequently, 
there would be war for twenty years. Nevertheless, said the 
agent, Elliot was fully aware that a majority of the Texans were 
in favor of annexation. Wickliffe urged that any attempt on the 
part of Mexico to invade Texas while negotiations for annexation 
were pending should be repelled with vigor by the United 
States.-^ 



26 Donelson to Buchanan, June 2, 4, 1845, ihid., 64-66. 

27 Wickliffe to Polk, June 4, 1845, Folic Papers. 



362 JAMES E. POLK 

The letter just received from Buchanan authorized Donelson 
to guarantee protection after the American proposal had been 
accepted, and on June 11, he gave this qualified promise to the 
Texan Secretary of State. Elliot's bluster thoroughly aroused 
his indignation, and in his letter to Allen he said that 

if Texas caunot be allowed to enjoy the blessings of peace and independence, 
as one of the sov^ereign members of the American Union, Avithout asking per- 
mission of Mexico or of the monarchies of Europe, the fact is worth volumes 
of argument in explaining the duty of those who are struggling to maintain 
a system of government founded on the will and controlled by the authority 
of the people.28 

The tone of this letter had a reassuring effect upon the Texans 
and lessened the hazard of an exercise of independent judgment. 
The letters which Donelson and Wickliffe had written on the 
second and fourth of June procured prompt action on the part 
of their government. These communications reached Washing- 
ton on the evening of June 14, and on the following day Polk 
wrote an interesting and important letter to Donelson. The 
threatened invasion, said the President, 

increases our solicitude concerning the final action by the Congress and 
Convention of Texas upon our proposition of annexation. In view of the 
facts disclosed by you, not only as regards the approach of an invading 
Mexican army — but of the open intermeddling of the British Charge d' 
affaires with the question of annexation, I have lost no time in causing the 
most prompt & energetic measures to be adopted here. I am resolved to 
defend and protect Texas, as far as I possess the power to do so. 

This statement makes it clear that Polk did not doubt the 
genuineness of the British menace, and that he was prepared 
to meet it at all hazards. He informed Donelson that General 
Besancon, the bearer of this letter, would be dispatched that 
night with instructions and that another messenger would be 
sent at the same time to Fort Jessup, bearing orders for the 
troops to march at once to the mouth of the Sabine. These 



2s Donelson to Allen, June 11, 1845 {Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 
71). 



COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION 363 

troops were to act as Donelson might direct, under his instruc- 
tions from the Department of State. The charge was told that the 
steamer Spencer had been ordered to leave New York to report 
to him at Galveston, and that an additional naval force would 
be sent immediately to the Gulf of Mexico. Polk urged that the 
Texan convention should, on the day of meeting, pass a general 
resolution accepting the offer made by the United States. ' ' The 
moment they do this, ' ' said the President, 

I shall regard Texas as a part of the Union ; all questions of Constitutional 
power to defend & protect her by driving an invading Mexican Army out 
of her Territory will be at an end and our land and naval forces will be 
under orders to do so. 

The convention could then proceed with its deliberations in 
safety, without fear of Mexican invasion or of "British intrigue" 
. . . . "The assent of the Convention is all we want." The 
question of employing the army and navy of the United States 
to repel a Mexican invasion during the interval between the 
acceptance of annexation by the Texan congress and the meeting 
of the convention, Polk left to the discretion of Donelson. He 
expressed the hope that there might be no necessity for exercis- 
ing such discretion, nevertheless, should anything occur which 
was calculated to overawe or interfere with the peaceful delibera- 
tions of the convention — 

then in my judgment the public necessity for our interposition will be such 
that we should not stand quietly by & permit an invading foreign enemy to 
occupy or devastate any portion of Texan Territory. Of course I would 
maintain the Texan title to the extent which she claims it to be & not permit 
an invading enemy to occupy a foot of the soil East of the Eio Grande.-^ 

The troops stationed at Fort Jessup could not, as the letter 
pointed out, reach Texas in time to afford immediate protection 
to the convention which would assemble on July 4 ; nevertheless, 
as a definite statement of Polk's plans and purposes, this letter 



29 Polk to Donelson, June 15, 1845, "Polk-Donelson Letters." Also, 
a copy in Polk Papers. 



364 JAMES K. POLK 

is extremely interesting. Writing to Donelson on the same day, 
Buchanan said that Captain Elliot, by obtaining Mexico's con- 
sent to annexation, had "deprived that power of the only 
miserable pretext which it had for a war against the United 
States. "=^° 

The troops to be sent from Fort Jessup were commanded by 
General Zachary Taylor. By a confidential dispatch dated May 
28, Marcy had given instructions for the general's guidance, 
should annexation be accepted by Texas. Taylor sent a messenger 
to consult with Donelson concerning the necessity of sending 
troops into Texas and to investigate the resources for their sub- 
sistence. Donelson reported to him that all branches of the 
existing Texan government had assented to annexation, and that 
the convention would do so on the fourth of July. If any re- 
liance, said he, is to be placed upon the threats made by Mexico 
and the advice which it may be presumed will be given to her 
by the British and French governments, "an invasion of Texas 
may be confidently anticipated " ; at all events, the General would 
be justified in moving to the western frontier in order to give the 
protection authorized by President Polk. He advised Taylor to 
transfer the troops from New Orleans directly to Corpus Christi, 
which is a healthy place and convenient for supplies, "and is 
the most western point now occupied by Texas." In the same 
letter Donelson remarked that the "occupation of the country 
between the Nueces and Rio Grande, you are aware, is a disputed 
question. Texas holds Corpus Christi; Mexico, Santiago, near 
the mouth of the Rio Grande. "^^ 

Von Hoist has made much of the phrases just quoted. Isolat- 
ing them from their context and giving to them an erroneous, or 
at least an ambiguous, translation, he has used them to sub- 
stantiate his assertion that Donelson, in this letter which was 
forwarded by Taylor to Washington, "emphasized the fact that 



:^<> Bvichanan to Donelson, June 15, 1845 (Buchanan, Worlcs, VI, 174). 
31 Tavlor to Adj. Gen., June 18; Donelson to Taylor, June 28, 1845 
(H. Ex/ Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 800, 805). 



COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION 365 

it was an open question to whom the land between the Nueees 
and the Kio Grande belonged."^" His purpose is to show that 
Polk provoked a war by claiming unjustly a strip of land the 
ownership of which even his own subordinates had questioned. 
Whatever may have provoked the war, Donelson's letter conveys 
no such meaning. As a matter of fact his chief emphasis was 
placed on the healthful conditions at the places designated and 
his desire to avoid taking "an offensive attitude in regard to 
Mexico, without further orders from the government of the 
United States." Taylor was advised to limit his activities to 
the defense of Texas unless attacked, in which case he was to 
drive the Mexicans beyond the Rio Grande. Donelson spoke of 
occupation, not of ownership ; but even if he had meant the latter, 
it is clear enough that it was not a "disputed question" so far 
as he was concerned. The paragraph which contained these 
phrases was followed by another which said that ' ' the threatened 
invasion of Texas, however, is founded upon the assumption that 
Texas has no territory independent of Mexico." Von Hoist 
found it convenient to omit this paragraph, for it did not har- 
monize with the thesis which he had set out to prove."^ Donel- 
son's views on the subject had already been expressed very 
clearly in his letters of May 11 and June 2, above quoted, in 
which he advised an early occupation of posts on the Rio Grande. 
In this same connection, von Hoist represents Taylor to have 
spoken of San Antonio as being situated on the western boundary 
("redete gar von San Antonio als an der westlichen Grenze ge- 
legen") ; whereas the General simply spoke of the immediate 
occupation of "the western frontier (italics mine) of Texas, 



32 von Hoist, History of the United States, German ed., II, 72, Eng. 
trans., Ill, 90. 

33 His remark concerning- Polk 's suppression of facts might well be 
applied to his own writings: "That his silence about them was deliber- 
ately desigiied is made clearer than day by the false coloring by means 
of which he manages, without exciting distrust by bold misrepresenta- 
tions, to give to things which supported his assertion a weight which they 
did not remotely deserve" {ibid., Eng. trans., Ill, 89). 



366 JAMES E. POLK 

from the coast to San Antonio, and ultimately further north. "^* 
On the same page we are told that the Texan Secretary of War 
asked Taylor to protect Austin, on the Colorado "da es an der 
Grenze ist, " which the translators have made to read "because 
it is on the boundary." But the Secretary had written that 

The town of Austin where the convention will assemble, and the most of the 
archives of our government are now deposited, being on the frontier, and 
exposed to Indian depredations and Mexican invasion, would require pro- 
tection, as would also San Antonio de Bexar and Corpus Cliristi.35 

In justice to von Hoist it may be said that Grenze is the Ger- 
man equivalent of 'boundary, and that he may have been ignorant 
of the distinction drawn by Americans between the words 
boundary and frontier; and yet, it seems incredible that he could 
have so misunderstood the letters as a whole as not to have known 
that the American officials were speaking of a general region, 
and were not attempting to fix a boundary line. That von Hoist 
himself meant boundary when he used the term Grenze is shown 
by the context, and his translators in converting his writings 
into English have invariably written boundary instead of fron- 
tier, which had been used in the original documents. Were it 
not for the fact that this writer's version of Polk's policy has 
influenced both writers and teachers of history, it would hardly 
be worth while to dwell on his misuse of official documents. 

Donelson's belief that Captain Elliot and his government 
were striving to prevent annexation was by no means unfounded. 
Great Britain was not willing to extend her interference to the 
point of risking a war with the United States, but she was deter- 
mined to apply every possible pressure that stopped short of 
this limit which she had set for her activities."*' However, the 



3i Ibid., Ger. ed., II, 72. Taylor to Adj. Gen., July 8, 1845 (H. Ex. 
Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 802). 

35 von Hoist, op. cit., Ger. ed., II, 72, Eng. trans.. Ill, 90. Cook to 
Taylor, June 27, 1845 (H. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 804). 

36 E. D. Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, chap. ix. It 
has been considered unnecessary, in a biography of Polk, to discuss in 
detail the acts and the motives of England, France, and Mexico, except 
in their bearing on Polk 's policy. The part played by England is well 
presented in the volume by Professor Adams just cited. 



COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION 367 

officious meddling of Captain Elliot and the Mexican threats of 
invasion caused anxiety in Texas, and fear of the latter led the 
government to solicit the protection of the United States. By 
instructing Taylor to send dragoons to San Antonio and infantry 
to Corpus Christi, Donnelson had inspired the people with a 
feeling of safety, even though Taylor could not reach tliese 
points before the meeting of the convention.^' 

The preliminary treaty which Elliot had arranged between 
Texas and Mexico^^ provided for the suspension of hostilities 
until the people of Texas had either accepted or rejected the 
terms of the agreement. Accordingly, on June 4, President Jones 
issued his proclamaation declaring a truce. The general effect 
of this proclamation and of the mystery and secrecy employed 
by Elliot in bringing the two governments together^'' led the 
people still more to distrust both men, and, consequently, aided 
the cause of annexation. Donelson handled the question most 
skilfully and did much to solidify the sentiment in favor of 
joining the United States. On the other hand, he very sensibly 
refrained from doing anything which might antagonize the Texan 
officials who were still trying to maintain a neutral position.*° 
Then, too, the apparent insincerity of Mexico added strength to 
the annexationists. As soon as President Jones had proclaimed 
a truce, Bankhead, the British minister in Mexico, pressed that 
government to issue a similar proclamation. Instead of comply- 
ing, Cuevas, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, made dire threats 
of war on Texas. *^ Even those in the lone-star republic who 
were inclined to oppose annexation could no longer contend that 
Mexico would peacefully concede independence. 



37 Allen to Donelson, June 26; Donelson to Allen, June 30, 1845 (Sen. 
Ex. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 92, 94). Smith, Annexation of Texas, 451. 

3sFor a copy of this document see Adams, op. cit., 210-211, or Jones, 
Hepublic of Texas, 473-475. 

39 Elliot was later reproved by the British Foreign Secretary for the 
secrecy of his proceedings because they ' ' laid Great Britain open to the 
charge of intriguing in Texas" (Aberdeen to Elliot, July 3, 1845; cited 
by Adams, op. oit., 220). 

■"' Smith, Annexation of Texas, 452-454. 

41 Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 221-222. 



i 



368 JAMES K. POLE 

On June 16 the Texan congress assembled, and President 
Jones submitted the American joint resolution ; two days later 
he placed before this body the terms of the conditional recogni- 
tion of independence which Elliot had negotiated with Mexico. 
On the congress now devolved the duty of choosing between the 
two proposals ; but as Mexico was already threatening war, there 
was little probability that any arrangement made wdtli that 
country would be selected. "Without loss of time the congress 
by a unanimous vote agreed to accept the offer made by the 
United States, and by a similar vote it rejected the proposed 
treaty with Mexico.^ - 

As the time for the meeting of the popular convention 
approached, it appeared that there might be greater difficulty 
in winning the approval of that body. In several respects the 
terms offered by the United States were unacceptable to the 
Texans. The American joint resolution had not specified a 
definite boundary, and there were uncertainties regarding public 
lands, Indian policy, and. other details. Some suggested, also, 
that before it had entered the Union the republic ought to be 
divided into several states, in order to increase its political 
importance.**^ On the other hand, Donelson had been instructed 
by his government to urge upon Texas the wisdom of accepting 
the proposed terms without modification, and before the meeting 
of the convention he had spared no effort in shaping public 
opinion to sanction such a course. In this connection he pointed 
out that many of the unsatisfactory matters could be adjusted 
after annexation, while haggling over terms would result in 
discord and delay. 



42 Donelson to Buchanan, June 23. 1845 {Sen. Ex. Doc. 7, 29 Cong., 1 
sess., 83). 

■i^ Smith, Annexation of Texas, 456-457. General Houston, as we have 
noted, had had misgivings regarding the boundary question, and although 
he had left the scene of action Polk deemed it worth while to reassure 
him on the subject. ' ' You may have no apprehensions, ' ' wrote the 
President, "in regard to your boundary. Texas once a part of the 
Union & we will maintain all your rights of territory & will not suffer 
them to be sacrificed" (Polk to Houston (copy), June 6, 1845, Polk 
Papers). 



COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION 369 

An interesting account of the part played hy Donelson and 
of the attitude of the Texan officials is given in a letter written 
to Buchanan from Washington, Texas, by John G. Tod. Tod 
had evidently just arrived in Texas from Washington (D. C), 
and his letter is in the form of a daily journal of events from 
July 1 to July 11, 1845.** Donelson, according to Tod, had no 
doubt whatever that annexation would be consummated, and he 
could not understand why officials in Washington were so excited 
about the question. " 'There has,' said he, 'never been any 
difficulty about it at all. President Jones has always been open 
and candid upon this subject and there was no room to appre- 
hend trouble and difficulty if it is not created by the management 
of the matter in Washington.' "*^ Under date of July 2, Tod 
recorded that Jones, Allen, and Raymond*" had called on Donel- 
son. "The President and the latter laughed and joked a good 
deal about the excitement on the Potomac." After this meeting 
Tod had a long conversation with Jones and told him that Polk 
and his cabinet had become suspicious because Ashbel Smith, 
on his way to England, had passed right by Washington without 
calling on the President. With a remark that he was not 
responsible for Smith's acts, Jones proceeded to say that there 
never had been any doubt of or opposition to annexation. With 
apparent contradiction, however. Tod reported Jones to have 
said that "Major Donelson had conducted the affair very ably, 
and if it had not been for his prudence and good management, 
the last Congress would have involved the measure with much 
greater obstacles and probably defeated it." After predicting 
that there would be no war if the United States would "only 
keep quiet and cool," Jones said that there were two very 



44 Buchanan Papers. Tod was a Texas army captain and served aa 
bearer of dispatches. Later, he was employed by Polk as special 
messenger to carry to President Jones a copy of the joint resolution of 
Congress which admitted Texas into the Union (Polk, Diary, I, 148). 

45 This was "vvi-itten on July 1. Evidently Donelson 's opinion of Jones 
had undergone a change. 

46 Eecently the Texan charge at Washington. 



370 JAMES K. POLK 

unaccountable things connected with annexation: first, that the 
United States should feel an}- uneasiness, when the government 
as well as every man, woman, and child in Texas desired annex- 
ation ; and second, that Elliot should have entertained any hope 
that the offer of independence or anything else would prevent 
Texas from joining the United States. He had, he said, told 
Elliot that he would lay his offer before the congress and the 
convention, but that he did not doubt that Texas would be 
annexed. " 'His object in obtaining the offer which he did from 
Mexico, was to strengthen the cause of Annexation, and place 
us on higher grounds with the world. It was truly a great 
advantage to our cause, that it disarmed Mexico entirely in the 
estimation of other Nations, and ]\Iexico was fully aware of 
it.' "*' Jones's statement that no attempt had been made to 
deceive Elliot accords with the reports which the British diplo- 
mat made to his own government.** Houston, also, testified that 
President Jones had not been guilty of double dealing and denied 
that European governments had been intriguing in Texas.*^ 
This denial does not, of course, mean that the ministers of Eng- 
land and France had not done all in their power to prevent 
annexation; but whether or not their activities amounted to 
mtrigue depends upon the definition of the tenn. "At no time, 
in no manner, ' ' said Ashbel Smith long afterwards, 

did the British government attempt to exercise or even hint the remotest 
wish to exercise any political influence in the affairs of Texas, or to possess 
any advantage, obtain any facility, enjoy any privilege that was not equally 
and as fully accorded to every other power in amity with Texas.so 

On the day preceding that set for the assembling of the 
convention, some of the delegates, at an informal meeting, 

47 Under date of July 9, Tod said that the people of Texas were sur- 
prised because articles " in American newspapers — even the Washington 
■Unio7i — expressed doubts that Texans sincerely desired annexation. 

48 Adams, British Interests, etc., 216. 

49 J. Geo. Harris to Polk, June 12, 1845, Poll: Papers. Harris had just 
seen Houston in Nashville. 

50 Smith, Eeminiscoices of the Texas EcpuhJie. 38. 



COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION 371 

drafted an ordinance expressing assent to the American joint 
resolution. Thus prepared, the convention, whicli formalh' 
organized on July 4, promptly voted to enter the Union, and 
b}' another vote agreed to wear crape for a month in memory 
of General Jackson. On the tenth, Allen, the Secretary of State, 
notified Elliot of the action taken by both the congress and the 
convention. Wlien doing so, he pointed out that "these mani- 
festations hardlj^ admit of a doubt that the incorporation of 
Texas with the Federal Union is destined to an early consum- 
mation."^^ By the end of August the convention had finished 
drafting a constitution for the new state, and the second Monday 
in October was fixed as the day on which this constitution as 
well as the question of accepting the American offer of annex- 
ation should be submitted to a vote of the people. By Novem- 
ber 10 President Jones was able to announce that the, people had 
approved both annexation and the state constitution. ^- 

Since both the goveriuiient and the people of Texas had 
accepted the American offer, nothing remained to consummate 
annexation except formal admission into the Union by the Con- 
gress 'of the United States. When, therefore. Congress met in 
December, 1845, Polk announced that Texas had agreed to annex- 
ation and had submitted her new state constitution. Since this 
had been done, "the public faith of both parties is solemnly 
pledged to the compact of their union," and "strong reasons 
exist" why the new state should be admitted without delay.^' 

On December 10 Douglas reported from the House Committee 
on Territories a joint resolution which declared Texas to be a 



51 Allen to Elliot, July 10, 1845 (Texas Diplomatic Correspondence, III, 
120). No further action was taken by Great Britain or her representatives, 
and Mexico was made clearly to understand that England would not support 
her in the event of trouble Avith the United States (Adams, op. oit., 224—225). 

53 Smith, Annexation of Texas, 459-460. As late as September, W. D. 
Lee presented credentials as charge d' affaires from the government of 
Texas, but Polk declined to recognize him in that capacity. Instead, he 
instructed Buchanan to deal with Lee as the agent of a state (Polk, Diary, 
I, 17-20). 

53 Richardson, Messages, IV, 386, 



372 JAMES K. POLK 

member of the Union on an equal footing with the original states. 
Although this resolution met with vigorous opposition, it was 
adopted eventually by a majority of nearly two-thirds. It was 
transmitted to the Senate where it encountered still further 
opposition, although there was small prospect that the dissenters 
would succeed in defeating it. Some of the Senators who had 
originall}' opposed annexation now agreed with the President 
that the national faith had been pledged, and the measure was 
adopted by a vote of thirtj^-'One to fourteen. Within a short time 
the laws of the Union were extended over the new state, and 
the Republic of Texas ceased to exist. One important question, 
how^ever, remained to be answered : What will Mexico do about it? 



CHAPTEE XVII 

PRELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 

Under the promises made by President Polk, Texas, after the 
action taken by her convention on July 4, was entitled to the 
protection of the American army and navy. The query was 
raised at the time — and pressed vigorously by the Whigs after- 
wards — as to what constituted Texas and, consequently, what 
the United States was bound to protect. The joint resolution 
of the American Congress which Texas had just accepted had 
specified no definite boundary, but had consented to annexation 
"subject to the adjustment by this government of all questions 
of boundary that may arise with other governments." By an 
act passed on December 19, 1836, however, the Texan congress 
had declared th« -Rio Grande to be her boundary, although her 
territory as a department of Mexico had extended only to the 
Nueces ; and early in his administration Polk expressed his 
detei-mination to maintain the claim set up by Texas. Mexico 
herself made such a position easier by claiming all of Texas and 
by making no discrimination, at this time at least, between the 
land lying west of the Nueces and the rest of Texas. As above 
noted, however, Donelson did not believe that it would be either 
wise or necessary to provoke a war with Mexico by at once 
expelling the Mexican settlers on the east bank of the Rio 
Grande, or by stationing the military forces beyond the actual 
settlements made by Texas. But at the same time he made it 
clear that he did not intend by such a policy to abandon the 
claim to the Rio Grande as the boundary. On July 11, after his 
instruction to protect Texas had been made obligatory by the 



374 JAMES K. FOLK 

acceptance of annexation by the convention, he again reverted 
to the wisdom of such a policy. He told Buchanan that in his 
correspondence with Texas he had avoided any discussion of the 
boundary between Texas and Mexico, because the joint resolution 
had left the question open, and the preliminary treaty of recog- 
nition arranged by Elliot had left the question in the same state. 
Jones, in his trace proclamation, had in effect agreed to leave 
matters as they were — with Texas in possession of part of this 
territory, and Mexico in possession of another part. "What 
the Executive of Texas," wrote Donelson, "had determined not 
to fight for, but to settle by negotiation, to say the least of it, 
could as well be left to the United States on the same conditions. 
He added, however, that although he had not deemed it expedient 
to discuss the boundary question, 

I have been far from advocating that the claim of Texas to the Rio 
Grande ought not to be maintained. This was not the question. It was 
whether, under the circumstances, we should take a position to make war 
for this claim, in the face of an acknowledgment on the part of this gov- 
ernment that it could be settled by negotiation. 

In other words, he did not believe that the promise to protect 
Texas made it incumbent upon the United States to expel im- 
mediately all Mexicans from the territory. What the United 
States would decide to do on her own account was of course 
another matter. Far from questioning the validity of the claim 
to the Rio Grande as the boundary, Donelson, in the same letter, 
suggested the grounds upon which this claim might be based. 
They were the revolutionary rights of Texas, the agreement made 
by Texas with Santa Anna in 1836, rights under the Louisiana 
Purchase, and the capacity of Texas to maintain her claim by 
force. The last, he said, Mexico herself had admitted but a short 
time ago when she agreed to recognize the independence of 
Texas.^ 



1 Donelson to Buchanan, July 11, 1845 {Sen. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 
101-103.) 



PEELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 375 

In his letters to Donelson and Houston, Polk had made it 
clear that he would insist upon the Rio Grande as the boundary 
of Texas. The method by which he proposed to deal wdth the 
boundary question may be deduced from the instructions sent 
to the military and naval forces of the United States. It was 
in effect the same as that proposed by Donelson. On June 15, 
George Bancroft, temporarilj- in charge of the "War Department, 
informed Taylor that the Texan convention would, in all prob- 
abilit}', accept annexation on July 4, and that Texas would then 
be a part of the United States. Taylor was ordered to move his 
troops to the western frontier of Texas, with the Rio Grande as 
his ultimate destination. On Jul}^ 8, Taylor was informed by 
Marcy that Mexico had some military posts on the east side of 
the Rio Grande, and that these were not to be molested "unless 
an actual state of war should exist. ' ' Similar instructions were 
sent to Commodore Conner on July 11, and in these Bancroft 
stated still more explicitly the policy of the administration. As 
soon as the Texan convention had approved annexation, Conner 
was to protect Texas like any other part of the United States, 
but it was the President's desire to avoid aggression and blood- 
shed. 

That you may precisely understand what is meant by the aggression 
you are instructed to avoid, I will add, that while the annexation of Texas 
extends our boundary to the Del Norte, the President reserves the vindica- 
tion of our boundary, if possible, to methods of peace. 

For this reason, the IMexicans already on the east side of the 
river were not to be molested while peace continued. Positions 
were to be selected with regard to the health of the officers 
and men, and in "such a manner as will be most likely to dis- 
incline Mexico to acts of hostility. ' ' Should Mexico declare war, 
Conner was to dislodge all Mexican troops stationed east of the 
mouth of the Rio Grande, and "if your force is sufficient, [you] 
will take the castle of San Juan d'Ulla, it being the determina- 
tion of the President to preserve peace, if possible ; and, if war 



376 JAMES K. POLE 

comes, to recover peace by adopting the most prompt and ener- 
getic measures. ' '- A few daj'S later the Washington Union said 
that it would be "difficult to estimate" the importance of Polk's 
energetic policy in deterring Mexico from hostile movements, 
and in giving confidence to the Texans.^ On the other hand, 
the National Intelligencer asserted tliat Polk had, in order to 
induce Texas to accept annexation, made promises which 
exceeded his authority under the joint resolution.* 

A private letter written by Polk late in July to a friend in 
Teimessee indicates that the demonstrations, at this time, of 
the military and naval forces on the Texas frontier were intended 
purely for defensive purposes. After speaking of the Texan 
convention and of sending the American forces to protect the 
new state, he said : "I do not however anticipate that Mexico 
will be mad enough to declare war. I think she would have done 
so but for the appearance of a strong naval force in the Gulf 
and our army moving in the direction of her frontier on land. "^ 
The fact that Polk saw such beneficial results from sending the 
troops toward the Mexican border doubtless explains why Marcy, 
two days later, wrote to Taylor that the President wished him 
to station a part of his army, at least, west of the Nueces.*^ His 



2 Bancroft to Conner, July 11, 1845 (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 
232-23.3. The "methods of peace" which the President wished to employ 
meant, no doubt, the vigorous pressing of American claims. 

a '"It was most fortunate that President Polk, and our minister, Mr. 
Donelson, were known in Texas to have held, during their whole lives the 
most intimate relations with the sage and patriot of the Hermitage, who 
had manifested so much solicitude for the re-union of Texas with the 
parent country, ' ' and they knew that ' ' Young Hickory ' ' would repel 
any interference {Union, July 14, 1845). 

* But, it added, "why should any thing else be expected than that the 
Executive should pay just as little regard to the Joint Resolution as 
did they who passed it to the Constitution of the United States" (Xat. 
Intell, July 19, 1845). 

5 Polk to A. O. P. Nicholson, July 28, 1845, PoJl Papers. 

6 Taylor is still ordered to avoid aggressive measures toward Mexico 
as long as peace exists. "The Rio Grande is claimed to be the boundary 
between the two countries, and up to this boundary you are to extend 
your protection, only excepting any posts on the eastern side thereof, 
which are in the actual occupancy of Mexican settlements over which 



PSELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAB 377 

object seems to have been to prevent a hostile act on the part 
of Mexico by showing her at once that the United States would 
protect Texas to the Rio Grande at all hazards; but at the same 
time, he wished to avoid acts that might unnecessarily precipitate 
a war. 

On August 6, Taylor was notified by the Adjutant General 
that although war might not take place he was authorized to 
call upon Texas for additional troops. Such troops were to be 
"received into the service of the United States when actually 
required in the field to repel invasion, actual or menaced, and 
not before."' 

On the day after this order was issued, but apparently with- 
out knowledge of it, the National Intelligencer expressed a fear 
that the President was about to make war upon Mexico. It 
admitted that necessity might justify Polk in defending Texas, 
but 

the President is quite indefensible, if, in exceeding the measure of the 
necessity, he keep not strictly on the defensive and within the settled limits 
of the land, whose proper population merely, and not its territorial preten- 
sions, it is now necessary to defend. But it is apparent that Texas claimed, 
and we fear it is equally apparent that the Executive has granted, the occu- 
pation of everything up to the Rio Grande ; which occupation is nothing 
short (as everybody knows) of an invasion of Mexico. It is offensive war, 
and not the necessary defense of Texas. And should it prove, as we think 
it will, that the President has gone this additional length, then the President 
will be MAKING "WAR, in the full sense of the word, on his own authority and 
beyond all plea of need, and even without any thought of asking legislative 
leave. 8 

This is a succinct statement of the "disputed territory" argu- 
ment which was arrayed against the President by the Wliigs 



the Republic of Texas did not exercise jurisdiction at the period of annex- 
ation or shortly before that event. It is expected that, in selecting the 
establishment for your troops, you will approach as near the boundary 
line, the Rio Grande, as prudence will dictate. With this view, the Presi- 
dent desires that your position, for a part of your forces at least, should 
be west of the river Nueces" (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 82-83). 

7 Ibid., 8.3-84. 

s Nat. InteJL, Aug. 7, 184-5. 



378 JAMES K. POLE 

throughout the war period, and which has found its way into 
many histories and textbooks. The truth of the Wliig assertion 
will be discussed later in this chapter ; at this point it is sufficient 
to note that Americans, not jMexicans, first raised the cry of 
"disputed territory" as applied to the land lying between the 
Nueces and the Rio Grande. Mexico, at this time, laid no greater 
claim to this land than to the rest of Texas. In her eyes, the 
crossing of the Sabine was an invasion of Mexico and an act of 
war. To the assertions made by the National InteUigenccr the 
Vnion answered that "Texas assumed by law" all territory- to 
the Rio del Norte, including Santa Fe, to which the National 
Int6lligmiccr retorted that their fears as to the President's 
position were now fully admitted. In reply to the charge made 
that going to the Rio Grande would be an offensive and not a 
defensive act, the Vnion, a few days later, cited a letter written 
by Robert J. Walker which "proves" that Texas as a part of 
the Louisiana Purchase had extended to the Rio Grande. It 
cited also a speech made by Walker in the Senate wherein he 
had quoted the organic law of Texas which essayed to tix the 
boundary line. Just how Walker's letters and speeches could 
prove anything it is not easy to see, but the JJmon accepted them 
as proof and from it argued that Polk was bound to enforce the 
law to the Rio Grande." The President was far more disturbed 
by the annoyances of dispensing patronage than by the criticisms 
of the Whigs, and the success of annexation convinced him more 
than ever of the wisdom of the method that had been selected." 
The officials in Washington were rather in the dark regarding 
the plans and purposes of Mexico, yet on August 23, Marcy 
informed Taylor that there "is reason to believe" that Mexico 
is preparing to invade Texas. Upon what this belief was based 

^Nat. InteU., Aug. 9. Union, Aug. 11, 1845. For a discussion of the 
Spanish boundaries of Texas, see Garrison, Westward Extension-, chap. vii. 

10 Polk to Senator Haywood, Aug. 9, 184.5, Fo]k Papers. He expressed 
the opinion that Texas would have been lost to the Union had the Benton 
alternative been selected. 



PSELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAB 379 

the letter does not state, but it was probably based on information 
given to the Department of State by Baron Gerolt, the Prussian 
minister at Washington. In a conversation with George Ban- 
croft, Gerolt said that he had received authentic infonnation 
from Mexico, under date of June 28, to the effect that Mexico 
was making preparations to invade Texas. Gerolt 's informant 
stated that General Arista with three thousand men, chiefly 
cavalry, had been ordered to move toward the Del Norte, while 
Paredes, the commander-in-chief, and General Felisola, were 
ready to follow with a force of ten thousand men. Gerolt him- 
self believed that the United States must expect protracted guer- 
rilla warfare. Bancroft at once addressed a letter to Buchanan 
imparting the above information. Buchanan was away at the 
time, but Mason, who was acting in his stead, showed the letter 
to the President. Polk accepted the information as reliable. He 
thought it likely that the Mexicans would cross the Rio Grande, 
for the American forces already on the ground would be unable 
to prevent it. He took steps immediately to send additional 
forces to Texas, and in a letter to Buchanan he urged the Secre- 
tary of State to return as soon as possible to take up his duties, 
and especially, to hasten the settlement of the Oregon question." 
Tajdor was authorized by Marcy to accept volunteers from 
certain designated states, and, "should Mexico declare war, or 
commence hostilities by crossing the Rio Grande with a consider- 
able force," he was to lose no time in letting these states know 
the number of troops needed.^- This order was followed a week 
later by another which was more aggressive in tone. Marcy 
complained of lack of information regarding the activities of 



11 Bancroft to Buchanan, Aug. 7; Polk to Buchanan, Aug. 7, 1845 
(Buchanan, Works, 223-224). Copy of the latter in Polk Papers. Buchanan 
did not share the President 's apprehensions caused by Gerolt 's information 
and views. In reply to Polk 's letter he stated his belief that the American 
forces on the Rio Grande should be strengthened, but that the movement 
of the Mexican troops was mainly a demonstration to insure Herrera's 
election (Buchanan to Polk, Aug. 11, 1845, Polk Papers). 

12 Marcy to Taylor, Aug. 23, 1845 (H. Ex. Doe. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 
84-85). 



380 JAMES K. POLK 

Mexico and urged Taylor to write frequently to the War Depart- 
ment. "You have been advised," said Marey, 

that the assembling of a large Mexican army on the borders of Texas, and 
crossing the Eio Grande with a cousiilerable force, will be regarded by the 
Executive here as an invasion of the United States, and the commencement 
of hostilities. An attempt to cross that river with such a force will also be 
considered in the same light. 

In case of war, "either declared or made manifest by hostile 
acts," Taylor's main object was to be the protection of Texas, 
but in pursuit of this object he was authorized to cross the Rio 
Grande and take Matamoras and other places.^^ Polk at this 
time considered the propriety of convening Congress in the event 
of a declaration of war or an invasion of Texas by Mexico, but 
Senator Bagby, of Alabama, and perhaps others, advised against 
such a course.^* The new order to Taylor was decided upon at 
a cabinet meeting held on the twenty-ninth of August.^^ It did 
not, however, result from any sudden panic in administration 
circles,^*' and Polk has been condemned for holding that even 
an attempt to cross the river would be an act of war. He 
has been condemned also for asserting that the crossing of that 
river by a Mexican army would be "an invasion of the United 
States."^' But if it be conceded that Texas extended to the 
Rio Grande, then the ground taken in the new order was no more 
aggressive than that taken in the former. It was certainly the 
duty of the President to defend Texas, and if Texas did extend 
to the Rio Grande, an attempt to cross the river would indicate 
the disposition of Mexico to invade the United States quite as 
well as the actual crossing. Nations do not wait until a hostile 
fleet is within the three-mile jurisdiction limit before steps are 



13 Marcy to Taylor, Aug. 30, 1845, ibid., 88-89, 

"Polk, Diarij, I, 12-13. 

^•' Ibid., 8-10. 

K' The Adjutant General had written only three days before, August 26, 
that the country was filled with rumors of movements of Mexican troops, 
but that they were l^elieved to be exaggerated or untrue (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 
30 Cong., 1 sess., 87). 

1" E. g., von Hoist. History of the Uniied States (Eng. ed.). Ill, 98-103. 



PBELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAE 381 

taken to repel it. Why should they take greater chances when 
an invasion by land is threatened ? 

Whether the land on the east bank of the Rio Grande icas 
legally a part of the United States is open to more serious 
question. From the first, Polk had claimed it to be a part of ^ 
Texas and consequently of the United States. His right to do 
so involves points of constitutional law which the writer will 
not attempt to determine, although some phases of annexation 
may be recalled in order to indicate the questions upon which 
such a determination must be based. The joint resolution under 
which Texas had been annexed did not- specify any territorial 
limits, but left that matter "subject to the adjustment by this 
government of all questions of boundary that may arise with 
other governments." The Texan claim to the Rio Grande rested 
mainly on the agreement made with Santa Anna after his defeat 
at San Jacinto in which he agreed to withdraw beyond the Rio 
Grande,^® and on the act passed by the Texan Congress on Decem- 
ber 19, 1836, which had declared that river to be the boundary 
of the republic. Wliatever claim these transactions may have 
established passed, of course, to the United States. Without 
attempting to determine the effect of these events on the legal 
right of Texas to all land east of the Rio Grande, it may be noted 
that Santa Anna made his agreement under duress and perhaps 
without authority ; and it is by no means certain that Texas could 
lawfully enlarge her territory by an ordinary legislative enact- 
ment. The United States government claimed, also, that Texas 
as a part of the Louisiana Purchase had extended to the Rio 
Grande ; but, as Abraham Lincoln exclaimed in Congress, "what, 
under heaven, had that to do with the present boundary between 
us and Mexico ? ' '^^ All claim to this region had been transferred 
to Spain by the Florida treaty of 1819. Congress, when passing 
the joint resolution, had left the boundary for future settlement ; 



18 This agreement is printed in Niles' Eegister. L, 336. 

19 Lincoln, Works (Tandy ed.), I, 322. 



382 JAMES K. POLK 

and both Texas and Mexico, in the project of a treaty had, in 

March, 1845, agreed to settle the question by negotiation. By 

declaring all land east of the Rio Grande to be a part of the 

United States Polk may, indeed, have exceeded his authority, 

but it does not follow necessarily from this, so long as Texas 

asserted ownership, that the President was under no obligation 

to prevent a hostile army from entering the territory until the 

question of title could be determined. General Jackson and his 

loyal adherents had always held that the United States could 

never be adequately protected until it extended to the Rio 

Grande, and Polk had promised the Texans to maintain this 

boundary'. Apparently the President attached more importance 

to these considerations than to an analysis of his constitutional 

powers. 

Various letters written by General Taylor after his arrival 

in Texas in July, 1845, informed the Adjutant General of iinnors 

that Mexico was preparing to invade Texas. As time passed, 

however, he came to regard these rumors as groundless, and by 

September he reported that reliable agents had ascertained that 

the Mexican government was not mobilizing its forces on the 

border. Taylor believed that the assembling of the American 

army along the Nueces had had a deterrent effect upon the 

jMexicans, but in October he advised a forward movement to the 

Rio Grande. "It is with great deference," he wrote to the 

Adjutant General, 

that I make auy suggestions on topics Avhich may become matter of delicate 
negotiation; but if our government, in settling the question of boundary, 
makes the line of the Eio Grande an ultimatum, I cannot doubt that the 
settlement will be greatly facilitated and hastened by our taking possession 
at once of one or two points on or quite near that river. Our strength and 
state of preparation should be displayed in a manner not to be mistaken. 

As Mexico liad not yet either declared war or committed any 
overt act of hostilit}-, he did not feel authorized to take this step 
without further orders from the War Department.-'^ In a letter 



-'0 Taylor to Jones, Oct. 4, 1845 (H. Ex. Doe. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 108). 



PEELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 383 

dated October 16 Marcy suggested to Taj-lor the expediency of 
putting his arm}' into winter huts, but in this as in other 
military matters the general was given wide discretion. By 
the first of November Taylor had received this letter, and on 
the fifth a letter from Commodore Conner informed him that 
W. S. Parrott had set out for "Washington bearing a message that 
Mexico was willing to negotiate the questions in dispute between 
the two countries. Taylor deemed it unnecessary to build winter 
huts for his troops, but, with negotiations about to begin, he 
did not believe himself authorized to move to the Rio Grande. 
He nevertheless urged the occupation of posts on the boundary 
line at the earliest possible date.-^ Parrott was Polk's confiden- 
tial agent in Mexico. He had been selected for this position 
soon after Almonte, the Mexican minister at Washington, had 
demanded his passports, and, on April 3, 1845, had taken passage 
on the same steamer that carried Almonte from New York to 
Mexico. He had at one time practiced dentistry in Mexico, 
and, later, had engaged in business there. He held a much 
inflated claim against the Mexican government, but of this Polk 
was probabh' not aware.^- His selection was due no doubt to 
his knowledge of the Spanish language, for otherwise he was 
ill fitted for such a mission. Parrott 's instructions bore the date 
of March 28, 1845, and at that time the President seems to have 
believed an immediate declaration of war by Mexico to be highly 
probable. On his arrival at Vera Cruz, if he should find that 
Mexico had actually commenced open hostilities against the 
United States, Parrott was to return immediately. In that 
case the administration was determined to "act promptly and 
vigorously in maintaining the rights and honor of the country. ' ' 
Should hostilities not have begun, the main object of his mission 
was to ascertain whether Mexico would renew diplomatic rela- 
tions, and to do everything that could discreetly be done to 

21 Marcy to Taylor, Oct. 16; Conner to Taylor, Oct. 24; Taylor to 
Jones, Nov. 7, 18-io {ibid., 89, 111, 112). 

22Eeeves, American Diplaviacy under Tyler and FoR, 268-269. 



384 JAMES E. POLE 

bring- this about. He was to get in touch with the high officials, 
if possible, and to let them know that, while Texas under no 
circumstances could be abandoned, the United States was pre- 
pared to settle other questions " in a liberal and friendly spirit. ' ' 
He was not to disclose his official character until it had been 
clearly ascertained that Mexico was ready to renew diplomatic 
relations, but the nature of his mission was soon discovered by 
the Mexican government.-^ The "liberal and friendly spirit" 
included, no doubt, the purchase of California and New Mexico, 
although there seems to be no direct evidence that plans for such 
a purchase had been definitely formulated at this early date. In 
his correspondence with Buchanan, however, Parrott emphasized 
the danger of the seizure of Upper California by Great Britain. 
He did not believe that Mexico would go to war with the United 
States on account of Texas, but he nevertheless recommended a 
chastisement of that country. On August 26, he reported that 
Herrera and his new cabinet would not go to war, and that there 
was a desire, even publicly manifested, to receive a "commis- 
sioner" from the United States. He believed that an "Envoy 
possessing suitable qualifications for this Court might with com- 
parative ease settle over a hrcakfast the most important national 
question."-* Parrott 's dispatch and others sent by John Black, 
United States consul at Mexico, and by F. M. Dimond, United 
States consul at Vera Cruz, of similar import, were discussed 
at a cabinet meeting held on September 16. It should be noted 
that Parrott used both terms, commissioner and envoy, for it 
is possible that this may have misled President Polk as to the 
desire of the Mexican g-overnment. At any rate Polk chose to 
regard Parrott 's statement as assurance that ]\Iexico would 
receive a "minister," and he determined at once to send an 
official of that character. It would be interesting to know 



23 Buchanan to Parrott, March 28, 1845 (Buchanan Works, VI, 132- 
134) ; Reeves, op. cit., 269-270. 

24 Parrott to Buchanan, Aug. 26, 1845; quoted by Reeves, op. cit., 271. 



PRELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAE 385 

whether Polk had really been misled by Parrott's letter or 
whether he deliberately determined to send a regular minister 
regardless of the wishes of Mexico, for the nature of the creden- 
tials given to the American diplomat was later given by Mexico 
as the reason for declining to receive him. At the cabinet meet- 
ing just mentioned, it was decided that the mission should be 
offered to John Slidell, of New Orleans. The President recorded 
in his diary that one great object of the mission would be 

to adjust a pennauent boundary between Mexico and the U. States, and 
in doing this the Minister would be instructed to purchase for a pecuniary 
consideration Upper California and New Mexico. He [the President] said 
that a better boundary would be the Del Norte from its mouth to the Passo 
[El Paso], in latitude 32° North, and thence West to the Pacific Ocean, 
Mexico ceding to th6 U. S. all the country East and North of these lines. 

He believed that such a boundary might be procured for fifteen 
or twent}^ millions of dollars, but he was willing to pay as high 
as forty millions.-^ Here is an explicit statement of Polk's deter- 
mination to purchase California, if possible. He probably had 
this method in mind when, shortly after his inauguration, he 
declared to Bancroft-® that one of the great measures of his 
administration would be the acquisition of that country. 

News of recent threats of war by the Mexican government, 
published in the New Orleans papers, led Polk to believe that 
Parrott had been mistaken, and he decided that it would be 
inexpedient to send Slidell until the facts could be ascertained. 
However, he wrote a confidential letter to Slidell asking him 
to accept the appointment and to be ready to leave for Mexico 
on a day's notice.-^ 

About a month later the President sent for Benton, and 
sought his advice concerning both Oregon and California, 
although there had been no intercourse between the two men 
since the Missouri Senator had so bitterh^ denounced the rejection 



25 Polk, Diary, I, 33-35. 27 Polk, Diary, 1, 35-36. 

26 See page 351. 



386 JAMES K. POLE 

of Van Buren by the Baltimore Convention. He told Benton 
that he thong-ht of reasserting- the Monroe doctrine against the 
planting of any foreign colony on the North American continent. 
His immediate object was to forestall any contemplated British 
colony in California. Benton approved such a course, generally, 
but doubted that the doctrine could be applied to the Frazer 
River valley in which the British had made discoveries and 
settlements.-* Polk's anxiety about California had been in- 
creased by a dispatch received from Thomas 0. Larkin, Ameri- 
can consul at Monterey, California, which bore the date of 
July 10, 1845.-^ This dispatch stated that the agent of the 
Hudson's Bay Company had formerly furnished the Calif ornians 
with arms and money to enable them to expel the Mexicans 
from that country, but that now Great Britain was instigating 
a Mexican invasion of California. He stated, also, that England 
maintained a vice-consul and France a consul in California, 
although they apparently transacted no commercial business. It 
was inferred from this that the two governments had designs 
on that province. 

While he awaited developments in Mexico before sending 
instructions and a commission to Slidell, and influenced probably 
by the news received from the consul at Monterey, the President 
caused Buchanan to write a letter to Larkin, under date of 
October 17, 1845. Larkin was already consul at Monterey, and 
he was now, in addition, made a confidential agent in California. 
Polk's desire for California and the method by which he hoped 
to acquire it are made very clear in this letter. It is made 
equally clear that whether or not he should be able to acquire 
it for the United States, he was determined to resist its transfer 
to either Great Britain or France. "The future destiny" of 
California, wrote Buchanan, "is a subject of anxious solicitude 
for the Government and people of the United States." For tliis 



'slbid., 70-71. 

29 Mentioned in Buchanan's letter to Larkin, Oet. 17, 1845, infra. 



PBELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAB 387 

reason the President "could not view with indifference the 
transfer of California to Great Britain or any other Power. The 
system of colonization by foreign Monarchies on the North 
American continent must and will be resisted by the United 
States." Larkin was told that "this Government had no am- 
bitious aspirations to gratify and no desire to extend our federal 
system over more territory than we already possess, unless bj' 
the free and spontaneous wish of the independent people of 
adjoining territories." After reiterating that the United States 
would "vigorously interpose" to prevent California from becom- 
ing a British or a French colony, Buchanan continued : 

Whilst the President ■will make no effort and use no influence to induce 
California to become one of the free and independent States of this Union, 
yet if the people should desire to unite their destiny with ours, they would 
be received as brethren, whenever this can be done without affording Mexico 
just cause of complaint. Their true policy for the present in regard to this 
question, is to let events take their course, unless an attempt should be made 
to transfer them without their consent either to Great Britain or France. 
This they ought to resist by all the means in their power, as ruinous to their 
best interests and destructive of their freedom and independence. 

Larkin was asked to assure the Californians of the friendship 
of the United States and to ascertain their feelings toward 
this and other countries. He was instructed further to gather 
various statistics and to inform his government generally regard- 
ing affairs in California.^° Clearly Polk had hopes that the 
Texas program might be reenacted in California. Apparently, 
no conquest of this region was contemplated, unless, perhaps 
Great Britain or France should attempt to seize or colonize it. 
He was willing, of course, to purchase both California and New 
Mexico and thereby settle the whole question both peaceably and 
speedily. His constitutional authority to declare the so-called 
"disputed territor}-" to be a part of the United States has been 



30 Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845, brought to California by Com- 
modore Stockton (MS in Larlcin Papers, Bancroft Library, Univ. of Calif.) 
There is a printed copy in Buchanan, Worls, VI, 275-278. 



388 JAMES K. POLK 

seriously questioned; it ma}' be questioned, also, whether his 
promise to "receive as brethren" the Calif ornians was not a 
stretching of executive powers. 

The President appointed Lieutenant Archibald II. Gillespie, 
of the marine corps, confidential agent and assigned to him the 
duty of repairing to California to cooperate with Larkin. He 
was given a copy of the written instructions to Larkin, and was 
made the bearer of verbal instructions to both Larkin and Fre- 
mont. Just what these verbal instructions were no one has been 
able to ascertain with any degree of certainty. Buchanan 's letter 
to Larkin bore the date October 17, but Gillespie was still in 
Washington as late as October 30. On that date Polk recorded 
in his diary that he had just held a confidential conversation 
with Gillespie concerning his secret mission, and added that "his 
secret instructions & the letter to Mr. Larkin, — will explain the 
object of his mission. ' '■" The letter to Larkin tells its own story, 
but the "secret instructions" to Gillespie have been the subject 
of considerable speculation. The latter will be considered in 
connection with the operations of Fremont. 

The President did not confine his activities with respect to 
California to the sending of Gillespie with instructions for 
the consul at Monterey. While Buchanan was preparing these 
instructions, Bancroft, by the President's order, was inditing 
secret orders for Commodores Stockton and Sloat. These, too, 
were given the official date of October 17, 1845. 

Commodore John D. Sloat had been for some time in enm- 
mand of the naval forces on tlie Pacific, and as early as June 24 
Bancroft had sent him "secret and confidential" orders to seize 
San Francisco and blockade other ports, if he should "ascertain 
with certainty" that Mexico had declared war against the United 
States.=^" By the order of October 17 he was told that "in the 
event of actual hostilities" he was to dispose of his entire force 

31 Polk, Diary, I, 83-84. 

32 H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 231. 



PEELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAE 389 

"so as to carry out most effectually the objects specified in the 
instructions forwarded to you from the Department in view 
of such a contingency."^^ 

Commodore Robert F. Stockton w^as given command of the 
frigate Congress which had been equipped at Norfolk for duty 
in the Pacific. His sealed orders, which were not to be opened 
until he had passed beyond "the Capes of Virginia," directed 
him to proceed to the Sandwich Islands, and, eventually, to join 
the squadron of Commodore Sloat. To Stockton were intrusted 
the originals of the instructions to Sloat and Larkin, duplicates 
of which, as we have seen, were sent overland in care of Lieu- 
tenant Gillespie. 

On November 9, 1845, Parrott reached Washington bearing 
a note from the Mexican Secretary- of Foreign Affairs which 
expressed the willingness of his government to receive a com- 
missioner from the United States.^* Three days before Parrott 's 
letter arrived, however, Bancroft had received a dispatch from 
Commodore Conner which stated that Mexico was willing to 
negotiate, and the President had directed Buchanan immediately 
to prepare instructions for Slidell. Slidell's commission was 
signed on the tenth, and this with his instructions was conveyed 
to him by Lieutenant Lanier of the navy. Parrott was selected 
as his secretary of legation.^^ 

Slidell's instructions were an elaboration of the plans for 
territorial expansion which the President had laid before his 
cabinet on the sixteenth of September.^" To Larkin had been 
assigned the task of winning the good will of the Californians, 
and of letting them know that they would be welcomed into the 



33 See Eives, United States and Mexico, II, 168. 

34 Polk, Diary, I, 93. Polk says that Mexico agreed to receive a minister. 
This, however, is an error, for the Secretaiy clearly said a ' ' commissioner ' ' 
. . . "to settle the present dispute" (Peiia y Peiia to Black, Oct. 15, 1845, 
in H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 16). 

35 Polk, Diary, I, 91-94. 

36 See above, p. 385. 



39Q JAMES K. POLK 

Union should they see fit to declare their independence; to 
Slidell authority was given to adjust the boundary question, and 
to purchase New Mexico and California, if possible. Taken 
together these documents indicate the ardent desire of the Presi- 
dent to extend the United States to the Pacific, as well as the 
methods by which he hoped to accomplish his purpose. 

The instructions to Slidell first of all reiterated the substance 
of the Monroe Doctrine and insisted that the United States could 
not permit the establishment of European colonies in North 
America. He was instructed to notify Mexico that the United 
States had waited long and patiently for Mexico to pay the just 
claims of American citizens, but that "these claims must now 
speedily be adjusted in a satisfactory manner." It was well 
known, Buchanan pointed out, that Mexico could not pay in 
money, but "fortunately" the provision in the joint resolution 
of annexation relating to the adjustment of boundaries presented 
a means of satisfying these claims, ' ' in perfect consistency with 
the interests as well as the honor of both Republics." The means 
was the assumption of the claims by the government of the United 
States, and the cession of territory by Mexico as a compensation 
therefor. With this introduction Buchanan proceeded to discuss 
boundaries and the lands that might be claimed or purchased. 
The independence and the annexation of Texas must be considered 
as settled facts. The United States based her claim to the Rio 
Grande as the boundary of Texas on the act passed by the Texan 
Congress on December 19, 1836, and on the fact that that river 
had been the boundary of the Louisiana Purchase; although 
Buchanan himself admitted that all rights under the latter had 
been transferred to Spain in 1819 by the Florida treaty. He did 
not claim that New Mexico had belonged to Texas or had come 
with that republic into the possession of the United States. To 
"obviate the danger of future collisions," however, the Ameri- 
can government would, in exchange for it, assume all claims of 
her citizens against Mexico and pay in addition five millions of 



PBELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 391 

dollars. In case Mexico should be unwilling to cede any lands 
west of the Rio Grande, then the claims would be assumed but 
the five millions would not be paid. If either of these objects 
could be attained, Slidell was authorized to conclude a treaty 
with Mexico. 

Reeves, in his American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk, 
makes the over-confident assertion that 

Parrott's mission and Slidell 's instructions taken together prove two 
things: (1) that the Mexican War was not the result of the annexation of 
Texas, and (2) that the reopening of diplonaatie relations with Mexico was 
for the purpose of securing California by purchase. 37 

That one of the motives for seeking to reopen diplomatic relations 
was the desire to purchase California may be granted at once. 
But precisely how Parrott's mission and Slidell's instructions 
prove that the acquisition of this region was the main purpose 
of the administration, or that war did not result from the annex- 
ation of Texas the present writer is unable to see. Other evidence, 
which will be offered presently, indicates that Polk decided to 
wage war because Mexico had failed to satisfy the American 
claims ; but instead of proving that the IMexican war was waged 
"for the fulfillment of Polk's designs upon California,"^'' 
Slidell 's instructions indicate that the President, at the time 
these instructions were drafted, was ready to release Mexico from 
further obligation if she would cede only a part of New Mexico. 
Should he find it impossible to make better terms, Slidell was 
specificall}^ authorized to conclude a treaty by which the United 
States would assume all claims if Mexico in return would cede 
that part of New Mexico lying east of the Rio Grande. Had 
Slidell been able to conclude such a treaty, Polk would have 
been deprived of all means of bringing pressure to bear on 
Mexico, except unprovoked military conquest. To be sure, the 
President was eager to acquire California. Larkin had been 



37 Eeeves, 275. He is speaking here of Slidell 's original instructions. 

38 Ibid., 288. 



392 JAMES K. POLK 

instructed to assure the Californians that they would be wel- 
comed into the Union should they see fit to separate from Mexico, 
and now Slidell was instructed to purchase that territory, and 
was told that "money would be no object when compared with 
the value of the acquisition." He was told, also, that his mission 
was "one of the most delicate and important which lias ever 
been confided to a citizen of the United States," nevertheless 
there was not the slightest hint that the President had any inten- 
tion of resorting to force in the event that Mexico should refuse 
her consent to the sale. On the contrary, as above noted, Slidell 
. M^as to conclude a treaty which would assume all claims even 
though Mexico should confine her cession to territory on the east 
side of the Rio Grande. It would seem that, at this time, Polk's 
plan to acquire California was limited to purchase or to "mani- 
fest destiny" of the type that had succeeded so well in Texas. 
The outbreak of war was soon followed by the conquest of Cali- 
fornia, but this fact alone does not prove that the war "was 
waged for the purpose of conquest, for the fulfillment of Polk's 
designs upon California." Polk may have welcomed the war — 
possibly he may have provoked it — but his offer to cancel the 
claims for so small a tract of land seems to show that forcible 
conquest was not his intention at the time that Slidell was sent 
to Mexico. 

Slidell was sent to Mexico in the capacity of envoy extra- 
ordinary and minister plenipotentiary', not simply as a commis- 
sioner to settle disputes incident to the annexation of Texas. 
The reception of a minister would have the effect of fully restor- 
ing diplomatic relations and of paving the way for the discussion 
of all questions concerning which that minister might bear 
instructions— unpaid claims, for example. For this reason Mex- 
ico declined to receive Slidell. According to a statement made 
long afterwards by Bejamin E. Green,^^ secretary of legation 



30 The statement is dated Aug. 8, 1889 (Tyler, Letters and Times of the 
Tylers, III, 176). 



PEELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 393 

at Mexico in 1844, President Polk had been informed, before 
sending Slidell, that President Herrera would receive a commis- 
sioner, and that he was ready to settle all disputes and to cede 
New Mexico and California to the United States. He was told, 
on the other hand, according to the same statement, that the 
Herrera government doubted its abilit.y to sustain itself against 
the power of Santa Anna if it should receive an ordinary minister 
as though nothing had happened. If this be true, then Polk 
must have known that, in all probability, Slidell would not be 
received, and his sincerity in sending the envoy may be seriously 
questioned. But it seems incredible that the President would 
deliberately jeopardize the success of a mission which promised 
to procure everything he could desire, even California, simply 
to gratify a whim of sending to Mexico the particular kind of 
a diplomatic agent which she did not want. Some allowance 
should be made for the fact that Green's statement w^as made 
many years after the event and that he was the son of Duff 
Green, the champion of Calhoun and the uncompromising 
opponent of Polk.'*° 

On December 2, 1845, before the American envoy had reached 
his destination, Polk submitted to Congress his first annual 
message. In it he officially infonned that bod.y of the annexation 
of Texas, despite ' ' British and French interference " ; of the 
severance of diplomatic relations by Mexico; and of SlidelPs 
mission. While expressing a "sincere desire for a peaceful 
adjustment of all difficulties," the message hinted at drastic 
measures in the event that negotiations should fail : 



40 It is true, of course, that Polk had before him the letter of Pena y 
Pena, which agreed to receive a commissioner and said nothing about a 
minister. See p. 389, note 34. It is true, also, that Joel E. Poinsett 
wrote soon after war was declared that ' ' I took the liberty of remonstrat- 
ing to one in the confidence of the government that the Mexican govt 
would not and dared not receive our Minister Plenipotentiary but could and 
would receive a Commissioner and that any movement of our troops from the 
Nueces would lead to hostilities. The reply was not to be uneasy. The 
Mexicans Avould not cross the Rio Grande to attack our troops & Genl Taylor 
had orders to remain on this side of the river, that a war with Mexico 
depended altogether upon the state of our relations Avith England" (Poin- 
sett to Van Buren, May 26, 1846, Van Buren Papers). 



394 JAMES K. POLK 

The minister appointed has set out on his mission and is probably by this 
time near the Mexican capital. He has been instructed to bring the negotia- 
tion with which he is charged to a conclusion at the earliest practicable 
period, which it is expected will be in time to enable me to communicate 
the result to Congress during the present session. Until that result is 
knoAvn I forbear to recommend to Congress such ulterior measures of redress 
for the wrongs and injuries we have long borne as it Avould have been proper 
to make had no such negotiation been instituted. 

This passage indicates that, even at this early date, the President 
believed that the United States had ample ground for war and 
that he would not hesitate to recommend it if Slidell's mission 
should end in failure. 

Polk's reference to British and French interference in Texan 
affairs and his allusions to the Monroe Doctrine in connection 
with the Oregon question were not relished in British official 
circles. When reporting this fact to the President, McLane wrote 
tliat "a favorate scheme of the leading powers of Europe is to 
compose the Mexican troubles by giving her a settled monarchical 
form of Government, and supplying the monarch from one of 
their own families."" Doubtless McLane greatly exaggerated 
the desire for a Mexican monarchy, but his report harmonized 
so well with the suspicions already held by the administration 
that his opinions were probably accepted at face value. 

Slidell arrived at the Mexican capital on December 6, 1845. 
His secretary of legation, Parrott, soon followed, accompanied 



41 McLane to Polk, Jan. 17, 1846, Polk Papers. Before the receipt of 
the message in England, the British press had spoken in praise of Polk's 
success in acquiring Texas. For example, the morning Chronicle said : 
' ' That immense question, the annexation of Texas, which seemed so diificult 
to solve that it affrighted the boldest men and parties, has been achieved 
by Mr. Polk in a thrice. The activity of English envoys, tlie suppleness 
of the French, the efforts of the most able and most eloquent partisans at 
home, ail pointed at and making against annexation! All obstacles have 
been overcome. European interference has given color of reason to the act 
of annexation Avhieh it wanted before, since the measure was one which 
defeated and annulled European intervention. Then the great objection 
was that it would produce war. Annexation, however desirable, argued the 
Whigs, is not worth a drop of blood; but lo! it has not cost a drop of 
blood — the Mexicans are paralyzed." Quoted by the Washington Vnio7u 
Jan. 2, 1846. 



PRELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAE 395 

by Gillespie, who was on his way to California as bearer of dis- 
patches to Larkin and Fremont. Black, the American consul 
at Mexico, had met Slidell at Puebla and informed him that the 
Mexican govennnent was much perturbed by his early arrival, 
as he had not been expected until January. President Herrera 
seems to have feared that the arrival of the American envoy 
would be used by his enemies to undermine his power. There 
was foundation for this belief. Broadsides appeared warning 
the people that Slidell had come to acquire from the Herrera 
government not only Texas but New Mexico and the Californias, 
consequently to receive him would be treasonable. Peiia y Peiia, 
tlie Secretary of Foreign Affairs, promptly refused to receive 
Parrott as secretary of legation, because of his former activities 
in Mexico; but as to Slidell, he adopted a temporizing policy. 
His first objection, as already stated, was the early date of the 
envoy's arrival. After the receipt of Slidell 's credentials, the 
Secretary had a more tangible ground for objection. He pointed 
out to Black that Mexico had agreed to receive a commissioner 
to negotiate the Texas dispute, but that Slidell 's credentials 
represented him to be a minister resident. On this ground the 
Mexican government declined to receive the American diplomat. *- 
Slidell did not, however, regard this as a final rejection, for on 
December 31, Herrera was forced to relinquish the government 
of Mexico, and on January 2, 1846, General Paredes became 
President, ad interim. It now remained for Slidell to seek recog- 
nition from the new government, and he repaired to Jalapa to 
await developments. 

On January 28, 1846, after he had received Slidell's letter 
of December 17 which reported that the Mexican government 
had declined to receive him until it had given the matter further 
consideration, Buchanan wrote again to Slidell, approving his 



42 Black to Slidell, Dec. 15; Slidell to Buchanan, Dec. 17; Pena y 
Pefia to Slidell, Deo. 20, 1845 (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 23-27, 
28-30, 37). 



393 JAMES K. POLK 

conduct and giving him further directions. As it was morally 
certain, said Buchanan, that Paredes would gain control of the 
government, Slidell was directed to apply again for recognition. 
The President, he was told, desired to preserve peace, because 
both inclination and policy dictated this course. 

Should the Mexican Government, however, finally refuse to receive you, 
the cup of forbearance will then have been exhausted. Nothing can remain 
but to take the redress of the injuries to our citizens and the insults to our 
Government into our hands. In view of this serious alternative, every 
honorable effort should be made before a final rupture. 

Slidell was therefore to wait a reasonable time for Mexico to 
decide on his reception, unless he should discover that she was 
inclined to trifle with "this Government." The length of time 
and the evidence of trifling were left to the envoy's discretion 
to determine. It will be noted that the President regarded a 
refusal to receive Slidell and a failure to pay the claims imme- 
diately as ample grounds for taking redress into his own hands — 
in other words, for making war on Mexico. Protection of Texas 
from threatened invasion had nothing to do with the question 
then under discussion. To make still more clear the President's 
intentions, Slidell was told in another paragraph that in case 
Mexico should finally decline to receive him he was to demand 
his passports and return to the United States. "It will then 
become the dutj' of the President to submit the whole case to 
Congress and call upon the nation to assert its just rights and 
avenge its injured honor." Additional naval forces had been 
sent to the Mexican coast and "should war become inevitable, 
the President will be prepared to conduct it with vigor."" 

While Slidell was seeking an audience in Mexico an agent of 
Santa Anna (then in exile in Cuba) appeared in Washington 
and obtained an interview with President Polk. This agent was 
Colonel Alexander J. Atocha, a Spaniard by birth but a natural- 
ized citizen of the United States. As a friend of Santa Anna he 



43 Buchanan, Works, VI, 363-365. 



FBELVDE TO THE MEXICAN WAB 397 

had been arrested when that wily ruler's government was over- 
thrown, but on proving his American citizenship he was released 
and banished. He had called on Polk in June, 1845, for the 
purpose of urging the United States government to press certain 
claims which he held against Mexico. He had now returned from 
a visit to Santa Anna in Havana, prepared to la}^ before Polk 
the views of the ex-dictator. In his diary under date of Febru- 
ary 13, 1846, Polk stated that Atocha called on that day, and 
the substance of the conversation was recorded. Atocha repre- 
sented Santa Anna to be in constant communication with the 
Mexican leaders. 

He said that Santa Anna approved the revolution headed by Paredes and 
that Santa Anna was in favour of a Treaty with the U. S., and that in 
adjusting a boundary between the two countries the Del Norte should be 
the Western Texas line, and the Colorado of the West down through the 
Bay of San Francisco to the Sea should be the Mexican line on the North, 
and that Mexico should cede all East and North of these natural boundaries 
to tlie U. S. for a pecuniarj' consideration, and mentioned tliirty millions 
of Dollars as the sum. 

This amount, Santa Anna believed, would pay the most pressing 
debts of Mexico and support the army until conditions had 
improved. 

Col. Atocha said that Santa Anna was surprised tliat the U. S. Naval 
force had been withdra-svn from Vera Cruz last fall, and that Gen '1 Taylor 's 
arihy was kept at Corpus Christi instead of being stationed on the Del 
Norte; and that the U. S. would never be able to treat with Mexico, with- 
out the presence of an imposing force by land and sea, and this. Col. Atocha 
added, was his own opinion. Col. Atocha did not say that he was sent by 
Santa Anna to hold this conversation with me ; but I think it probable he 
was so. 

Atocha requested that the conversation should be considered 
confidential, and said that he had more to communicate.^* 

Polk was evidently much interested in the views expressed 
by Atocha, and at a regular cabinet meeting held on the fol- 
lowing day he related to the members the substance of the 



44 Polk, Dianj. I, 222-225. 



398 JAMES K. POLK 

conversation. The idea of sending- a confidential agent to confer 
with Santa Anna was mentioned. Walker was inclined to favor 
such a course, but Buchanan was decidedly opposed to it. The 
President said that altlioug-h he did not propose to send such an 
agent, if one should be sent, C. P. Van Ness, former minister to 
Spain, would be the best man that could be selected.'*^ Atocha 
called again to see the President on the sixteenth of Febiiiary. 
After discussing relations with Mexico for nearly an hour the con- 
versation was adjourned until afternoon when it was continued 
for more than an hour. Atocha repeated what he had said on 
Februarj^ 13. Polk told him that Mexico must satisfy the claims 
of American citizens and that if her government had any propo- 
sition to make, such as he had suggested, the United States would 
consider it after it had been made. Atocha then pointed out 
that no government of Mexico would dare to make such an offer 
and that it "must appear to be forced to agree to such a propo- 
sition." It was the opinion of Atocha himself and of Santa 
Anna that 

our [United States] army should be marched at once from Corpus Ohristi 
to the Del Norte, and a strong Naval force assembled at Vera Cruz, that 
Mr. Slidell, the U. S. Minister, should withdraw from Jalappa, and go on 
board one of our ships of War at Vera Cruz, and in that position should 
demand the payment of [the] amount due our citizens ; that it Avas well 
known the Mexican Government was unable to pay in money, and that when 
they saw a strong force ready to strike on their coasts and border, they 
would, he had no doubt, feel their danger and agree to the boundary sug- 
gested. He said that Paredes, Almonte, & Gen'l Santa Anna were all 
willing for such an arrangement, but that they dare not make it until it 
was made apparent to the Archbishop of Mexico & the people generally 
that it was necessary to save their country from a war with the U. States. 
He said the last words which Gen '1 Santa Anna said to him wlien he was 
leaving Havanna a month ago was, "when you see the President, tell him 
to take strong measures, and such a Treaty can be made & I will sustain it. ' ' 

Atocha said that ^Mexico owed half a million dollars to the 
archbishop, and that he could be reconciled by assurance that 
he would be paid as soon as Mexico had obtained the money from 



45 Ibid., 226. 



PEELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAS 399 

the United States. He reported Santa Anna as having said that 
he could be in Mexico in April or May, and would probably 
"go into power again," but that he and Paredes must have 
money to sustain themselves. AVith half a million in hand, they 
could make the treaty and retain control until the balance had 
been paid. Arista, he said, was friendly to the United States 
and in favor of ceding the northern departments to that country 
— in fact, he was anxious to do so, as he owned a large plantation 
near Monterey. Atocha intimated an intention to return to 
Havana and seemed desirous of getting Polk's views to carry 
to Santa Anna, but the President remained silent. Polk thought 
him to be a man of talents, but one who could not be trusted; 
"I therefore heard all he said but communicated nothing to 
him."*" We may well believe the President's statement that 
he listened attentively but offered no hint of his own intentions, 
for this habit was one of his best known characteristics. Although 
he believed Atocha to be a person who could not be relied upon, 
events which followed make it evident that he looked with favor 
upon the suggestions which had been offered. Some of them 
were followed, as we shall soon have occasion to note, in the 
new instructions given to Slidell and in the request made to 
Congress for money to be used in conducting negotiations. 

That Polk was influenced by Atocha 's suggestions there can 
be no doubt, and that his first impulse was to follow these sug- 
gestions very closely is made evident by the discussion which took 
place in the cabinet meeting on the following day, Februa)"y 17. 
In giving an account of this meeting Polk says in his diary that, 
after relating the conversation held with Atocha, 

I expressed the opinion that it wouki be necessary to take strong measures 
towards Mexico before our difficulties with that Government could be settled; 
and I proposed that in addition to Mr. Slidell 's present instructions, he 
should be further instructed to demand an early decision of the Mexican 
Government, whether they would receive him as Minister or not; and, if 
they receiveil him, whether they would without unnecessary delay pay the 

■i>i Ibid., 228-230. 



400 JAMES E. POLE 

amount due to American claimants; and tliat if that Government refused 
to do one or both, that he should leave the country, but instead of return- 
ing immediately to the U. States as he had beeen instructed to do, he 
should go on board one of our Vessels of War at Vera Cruz, and there remain 
until he had further instructions from his Government. 

I stated that in that event I would send a strong message to Congress 
calling on that body to authorize me to cause another demand to be made 
by Mr. Slidell, from on board the vessel of war, on the Mexican Government 
to pay our demands, and if this was refused by Mexico, to confer authority 
on the Executive to take redress into our hands by aggressive measures. 

Walker, Marcy, and Bancroft favored the plan suggested by the 
President. Johnson was inclined to hold a different opinion, but 
was willing to acquiesce. Buchanan objected, because — as Polk 
thought — he was peeved over certain appointments and because 
he could not control the administration. However, it was decided 
that Buchanan should prepare new instructions for Slidell, in 
accordance with the wishes of the President. But within an hour 
after the meeting had adjourned Buchanan, who was in no 
amiable mood, sent to the President by messenger a draft of 
instructions, commencing with ' ' I am directed by President ' ' etc. 
He requested Polk to make corrections in pencil and return it 
in time for the mail. Polk w^as dissatisfied with the draft and 
replied that he would attend to it on the following day. Buchanan 
immediately sent the messenger back with a note stating his 
reasons for dissenting from the decision of the President. On 
receiving no reply Buchanan sent another note on the same 
subject, but again he received no response. Polk did not see 
Buchanan on the following day, but decided, cm account of the 
Secretary's hostility, to postpone instructing Slidell for the 
present."*' 

The Mexican question was allowed to slumber for about three 
weeks, and during that time Oregon claimed the attention of 
both the President and Congress. On March 9 dispatches from 



47 Ihid., 233-236, 238. Polk considered the conduct of liis Secretary to 
be decidedly reprehensible, and he closed the entry for the day with the 
remark : * * The draft of tlie despatch and the two notes, Numbered 1 & 2, 
I will preserve. ' ' 



PRELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 401 

Slidell, for which Polk liad been waiting, arrived, and were dis- 
cussed in cabinet meeting on the day follownng. The essential 
features of new instructions to Slidell were agreed upon, and 
Buchanan was directed to draft them.*^^ While the new instruc- 
tions, which bore the date of March 12, reflected in some degree 
the suggestions offered by Atocha, their tone was somewhat less 
bellicose than the declaration made by the President to his 
cabinet on February 17. The change was probably due to the 
opposition of Buchanan. Slidell was directed to make a formal 
demand to be received by the new government. Apparently the 
administration had slight hopes that Paredes would comply but 
Buchanan pointed out that the demand should be made in order 
to satisfy the American people that everything had been done 
to avoid the necessity of resorting to war. "On your return to 
the United States, energetic measures against Mexico would at 
once be recommended by the President, and these might fail to 
obtain the support of Congress, if it could be asserted that the 
existing Government had not refused to receive our Minister." 
Slidell was to make it known to Paredes ' ' in some discreet man- 
ner" that the United States was both able and willing to relieve 
him from pecuniary embarrassment the moment that a treaty 
had been signed and ratified by Mexico.*-' A rumor was afloat, 
said Buchanan, of a design of European powers to establish a 
monarchy in Mexico and to place Prince Henry of Spain on the 
throne. He thought that these rumors were probably idle specu- 
lations, but "should Great Britain and France attempt to place 
a Spanish or any other European Prince on the throne of 
Mexico, this would be resisted by all the power of the United 
States." Whether he should be received or not Slidell was 
advised to delay his return to the United States, for the Oregon 
question was rapidly approaching a crisis and his return might 
influence its settlement by creating public alarm. ^° Nothing 

48 Ibid., 282, 287. 

49 This is evidently an echo of the suggestion made by Atocha. 

50 Buchanan to Slidell, March 12, 18-16 (Buchanan, Worls, VI, 402-406). 



402 JAMES E. POLK 

was said about Slidell's repairing to a war vessel for the purpose 

of making another demand, as Atocha had advised and Polk had 

recommended to the cabinet. Apprehension concerning the 

Oregon question as well as the opposition of Buchanan may 

have been responsible for the President 's change of mind. 

Polk seems to have been confident that Slidell would be 

received by Paredes. At a cabinet meeting held on March 28, 

he expressed the belief that Slidell's dispatches indicated his 

reception to be probable. He apprehended that the greatest 

obstacle to the conclusion of a boundary treaty, such as Slidell 

had been instructed to procure, would be the want of authority 

to make a prompt payment of money at the time of signing it. 

Paredes was in great need of money to pay his troops and keep 

them loyal, and Polk was of opinion that if Slidell could be 

authorized to pay a half million or a million dollars as soon as 

the treaty had been signed, it "might induce him [Paredes] to 

make a Treaty, which he would not otherwise venture to make." 

Some of the cabinet members raised the question of how this 

money could be obtained from Congress without exposing to the 

public and to foreign nations the object in voting it. "That 

object," said the President, 

as may be seen from Mr. Slidell's instructions, would be in adjusting a 
boundary to procure a cession of New Mexico & California, & if possible all 
North of latitude 32° from the Passo [El Paso] on the Del Norte & West 
to the Pacific ocean; or if that precise boundary cannot be obtained, then 
the next best boundary which might be practicable so as at all events to 
include all the country East of the Del Norte and the Bay of San Francisco. 
For the boundary desired, see Mr. Slidell's instructions. 

The cabinet, except the Secretary of State, agreed. Buchanan 
thought the plan of asking for an advance appropriation to be 
impracticable. Polk called attention to the act passed in 1806 
to enable Jefferson to purchase the Floridas, and suggested that 
memliers of Congress might be consulted informalh' for the 
purpose of ascertaining the probability of obtaining the appro- 
priation. He had already broached the subject to Ingersoll, of 



PEELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 403 

Pennsylvania, and Cullom, of Tennessee. After the meeting' had 
adjourned Polk summoned Benton and asked his opinion con- 
cerning the feasibility of the plan. Benton concurred in the 
views of the President and promised his cooperation.^^ On ex- 
amining the laws Polk found another precedent for his proposed 
appropriation — the two millions voted in 1803 to enable Jefferson 
to purchase Louisiana. He conversed with Allen, chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and with Senator 
Cass. Both approved his plan. On the advice of Allen and 
Benton the President sent for Calhoun and asked his opinion on 
the proposed appropriation and on the purpose for which it was 
to be used. Calhoun was in favor of procuring a boundary 
which would include California, and said that he had contem- 
plated trying to procure such a boundary when he was Secretary 
of State. He did not, however, like the boundary suggested by 
the President. Neither did he approve the plan to ask for an 
appropriation, for fear it might interfere with the settlement of 
the Oregon question. ^- 

While the President was exerting his influence to obtain from 
Congress an appropriation to facilitate negotiations, a dispatch 
arrived, on April 6, from the American consul at Vera Cruz 
stating that Slidell would probably not be received. The dis- 
patch was read in cabinet meeting next day, and Polk recorded 
in his diary : 

I stated that in the event Mr. Slidell was not accredited, and returned to 
the U. S., my opinion was that I should make a communication to Congress 
recommending that Legislative measures be adopted, to take the remedy 
for the injuries and wrongs we had suffered into our own hands. 

On the evening of the seventh dispatches from Slidell arrived, 
informing the President that he had not been received and that 
he had demanded his passports.^^ 



51 Polk, Diary, I, 303, 305-308. 

52 Ibid., 309-313. 

53 Ibid., 319, 322. 



404 JAMES K. POLE 

On March 12, the day on which Buchanan penned his final 
instructions to Slidell, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Rela- 
tions notified the American envoy that he could not be received. 
He was told that the annexation of Texas had always been and 
was still regarded by Mexico as a casus hdli. In spite of this 
fact she had agreed to receive a commissioner to discuss this 
question, but the United States had sent instead a minister resi- 
dent. Should the United States persist in its present course the 
Mexican government would "call upon all her citizens to fulfill 
the sacred duty of defending their country," and if war should 
result, the entire blame would rest upon the United States. As 
soon as he received this letter Slidell asked for his passports, and 
they were sent to him by Castillo on the twenty-first of March. ^^ 
He had left, therefore, for the United States before the arrival 
of Buchanan's instructions of March 12. With one government 
maintaining that aggressive measures must follow the refusal to 
receive the American envoy, and the other asserting that an in- 
sistence upon his reception must be met by an appeal to arms, 
it will be seen that Slidell's mission played an important part in 
bringing about a collision between the two nations. To be sure, 
Mexico still regarded the annexation of Texas as a casus hcUi and 
Castillo did not expressly state that she was prepared to acquiesce 
in its incorporation into the American Union, but at least lie still 
intimated a willingness to negotiate on this limited question. 

On receipt of Slidell's dispatch which announced that he had 
been rejected and had demanded his passports, the President 
consulted Benton concerning "the steps proper to be taken and 
especially if the principal Powers of Europe should attempt to 
force a Foreign Prince on the throne of Mexico. ' ' He consulted 
Houston, of Texas, and Allen, of Ohio, also, and it was agreed that 
nothing should be done until it had been ascertained that pass- 
ports had actually been given to Slidell.'^'' About a week later 



54 Castillo V Lanzas to Slidell, March 12 and March 21; Slidell to 
CastUlo, March 17, 1846 (H. Ex. Doe. 60, 30 Cong'., 1 sess., 67-72, 79). 

55 Polk, Diary, I, 325-327. 



PRELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 405 

(April 18) the President told Calhoun that he "saw no alter- 
native but strong measures towards Mexico." Calhoun depre- 
cated war and expressed the opinion that if the Oregon question 
could be settled first there would be no difficulty in adjusting 
the difficulties with Mexico, for he believed that Great Britain 
desired to prevent a war between the United States and INIexico. 
Polk, on the contrary, believed that the British minister in Mex- 
ico had exerted his influence to prevent Slidell's reception. Cal- 
houn urged against sending a message to Congress on Mexican 
affairs until the Oregon question had been settled. ' ' I told him, ' ' 
said Polk, 

that I would delay a reasonable time, but that whatever the settlement 
of the Oregon question might be, I would feel it my duty to lay the 
Mexican question before Congress, with my opinion on the subject, in 
time for their action at the present Session.sc 

Three days later Polk told his cabinet that "our relations with 
Mexico could not be permitted to remain in statu quo" ; that he 
contemplated asking Congress to adopt strong measures, but 
thought it prudent to await news from England before taking 
this step. He did not have long to wait, for on the following 
day (April 22) a dispatch from McLane was received. McLane 
was of opinion that Great Britain would take no step on the 
Oregon question until the Senate had come to some decision on 
the bill to terminate joint occupation of Oregon. On the twenty- 
third, the conference committee of the two houses came to an 
agreement on the bill to give England the required twelve months ' 
notice ; and on the twenty-fifth, Polk informed his cabinet that 
he deemed it to be his duty to make a communication to Congress 
without delay. "I expressed my opinion," the President re- 
corded, 

that we must take redress for the injuries done us into our own hands, 
that we had attempted to conciliate Mexico in vain, and had forborne 
until forbearance was no longer either a virtue or patriotic . . . and that 
we should take a bold and firm course towards Mexico. 



56 Ibid., 337-338. 



406 JAMES K. POLK 

Buchanan, whose opinion was first requested, thought that the 
President should recommend a declaration of war, while the other 
members suggested that a message be prepared and submitted to 
them within the course of a week. After considerable discussion 
Buchanan was requested to collect materials and prepare the 
draft of a message for the President's consideration/'" While 
Buchanan was preparing "a succinct history" of wrongs on 
which to base a message to Congress the President once more 
consulted Benton. The Missouri Senator had not yet made up 
his mind, but he expressed a decided aversion to a war with 
Mexico, if it could be avoided. He advised delay until the 
Oregon question had been either settled or brought to a crisis. 
"I told him," said Polk, "we had ample cause of War, but that 
I was anxious to avoid it if it could be done honourably & con- 
sistently with the interests of our injured citizens." He would 
delay, he said, until the arrival of Slidell in Washington, but 
he could not permit Congress to adjourn without laying the 
subject before them.^'* 

It should be noted that up to this point the President dwelt 
entirely on the refusal to receive Slidell and the failure to adjust 
the claims of American citizens. These furnished, in his opinion, 
ample grounds for war. This fact is significant, for Mexico was 
in such dire financial straits that she could not pay the claims 
except by a cession of territory. In other words, the President 
was ready to wage war to procure a territorial compensation for 
V claims against Mexico. He does not, up to this time, mention 
any military aggressions on the part of ]\Iexico. But on May 5 
Polk received a dispatch from Taylor, dated April 15, stating 
that he had been ordered by Ampudia to fall back across the 
Nueces, and the President noted in his diary that "the probabil- 
ities are that hostilities might take place soon."'-' On May 8, 



'<- Ibid., 343, 344, 347, 354. 

58 Ibid., 375-376. 

59 Taylor to Adj. Gen., April 15, 1846 {H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 
138). Polk, Diani, I, 380. 



PBELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 407 

Slidell, who had just returned from IMexico, called on the Presi- 
dent and told him that there was only one course left — for the 
United States to take the redress of its injuries into its own hands. 
"In this I agreed with him," said Polk, "and told him it was 
only a matter of time when I would make a communication to 
Congress on the subject, and that I had made up my mind to do 
so very soon."*'° The cabinet met on the following day and the 
President informed them that, altliough no open act of aggression 
by the Mexican arm}^ had been reported, it was imminent that 
such would be committed. All agreed that if Taylor's forces 
should be molested the President ought to recommend a declar- 
ation of war. Polk then asked each member whether, in his 
opinion, a message should be sent to Congress on the following 
Tuesday,"^ and whether it should recommend a declaration of 
war. All answered in the affirmative except Bancroft, who, Jiow- 
ever, favored immediate war should Mexico commit any ho.stile 
act. It was agreed that a message should be prepared and con- 
sidered at the next meeting.*^- On that same evening a dispatch 
from Taylor arrived, giving an account of the killing of Amer- 
ican dragoons on the east bank of the Rio Grande. Polk sum- 
moned the cabinet to a special meeting, and it was agreed unani- 
mously that the President should lay the matter before Congress 
and urge prompt measures to enable the Executive to prosecute 
the war. At noon on Monday, May 11, the war mesasge was 
ready and on its way to the capitol. Mexico herself had removed 
the obstacle which had worried both Bancroft and Buchanan. 
In addition, she rendered the President a distinct service by 
enabling him to base his war message on more tangible grounds — 
grounds which all friends of the administration could endorse 
with enthusiasm, and those which the opponents, for patriotic 
reasons, found it difficult to assail. Before the message was sent 



60 Polk, Diary, I, 382. 

01 This was on Saturday, May 9. 

c2 Polk, Diary, I, 384-385. Buchanan said that he would feel better 
if Mexico had committed some hostile act, but as matters stood, there was 
ample cause for wax, so he gave his assent. 



408 JAMES K. POLE 

to Congress, Benton called, by appointment, and criticized some 
parts of it. He was, he said, in favor of defending our territory, 
but was not prepared to make aggressive war on Mexico. Al- 
though he had remained silent, he had not favored marching the 
army from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande, and he doubted 
that the territory of the United States extended west of tlie 
Nueces river. •'^ 

The departure of Slidell from Mexico ended all attempt to 
adjust the international dispute by negotiation. Both nations 
now agreed on one point at least — that arms alone could settle 
the controversy. But which nation was the aggressor? Which 
committed the first overt act of war ; and to what extent, if any, 
was the American occupation of that strip of territory lying 
between the Nueces and the Rio Grande the real cause of the war ? 
We have already seen that Polk was ready to recommend war 
because Mexico would not pay the American claims by a cession 
of territory. Let us now consider the effect of Taylor's march 
to the Rio Grande upon Mexico's decision to attack the enemy. 

As a department of Mexico Texas had extended to the Nueces 
only ; the land lying west of that river belonged to the department 
of Tamaulipas. Except Santa Anna's agreement of 1836 and 
the Elliot treaty of 1845, Mexico never recognized the independ- 
ence of Texas, much less the extension of her boundary. Texas 
of course claimed everything to the Rio Grande, but throughout 
her career as a republic the territory between the two rivers 
remained unoccupied by either country except that Mexico held 
a few posts on the east bank of the Rio Grande. The legitimate 
extent and boundaries of Texas, therefore, were not determined 
when that republic joined the American Union, and the joint 
resolution of annexation left them as vague as before. "What, 
then, is Texas?" was the embarrassing question asked by the 
Whigs, as soon as the administration took steps to protect the 
new state from invasion. Texas, they said, was bounded by the 
Nueces, not by the Rio Grande; and they denied the President's 



03 Ibid., 386-390. 



PRELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 409 

authority to send an army into the "disputed territory" between 
the two rivers.''* The occupation of this territory was later used 
by Mexico as an excuse for attacking the American army ; but 
at the time that diplomatic relations were severed, the question 
of boundary was not a definite issue. Almonte demanded his 
passports and left Washington soon after the joint resolution had 
passed, without waiting to see what boundary would be claimed. 
His conduct was approved by his government, and Mexico con- 
tinued to assert her determination to reconquer Texas — not sim- 
ply the "disputed territory," but all of it. There was no inti- 
mation of an intention on her part to acquiesce in the annexation 
of Texas until she agreed to receive a commissioner to negotiate 
that question, and she declined to receive Slidell because his 
credentials were unacceptable. 

Although Polk had, before annexation was completed, an- 
nounced his intention to claim the Rio Grande as the boundary 
of Texas, the western frontier was not occupied immediately. 
On July 30, 1845, Taylor was instructed to station part of his 
forces west of the Nueces, but it was not until January 13, 1846, 
that he was ordered to move his army to the east bank of the 
Rio Grande. On receipt of this order, early in February, Taylor 
at once made preparations to carry it into effect, and he reported 
that he did not anticipate that his advance would be resisted. 
Before leaving Corpus Christi, Taylor prepared and had trans- 
lated into Spanish an "order" which he caused to be circulated 
among the inhabitants dwelling along the Rio Grande. This 
order stated that the advance to the Rio Grande was not a hostile 
move, and that both the personal and the property rights of the 
inhabitants on either side of that river would be respected."^ 



61 On September 13, 1845, the National Intelligencer said that if the 
Army of Observation should be sent beyond the Nueces it would not be in 
Texas and not defending Texas. ' ' Is the disputed territory, then, a part 
of Texas? No. It "was not -within Texas, as a part of Mexico. It has not 
been since acquired by arms or treaty. ' ' 

65 Tavlor to Adj. Gen., Feb. 4 and Feb. 10, 1846 {H. Ex. Doc. 60. 30 
Cong., l' sess., 116-117). "Order No. 30," dated March 8, 1846 {ibid., 
119-120). 



410 JAMES K. POLK 

The march of Taylor toward the Rio Grande was undisputed 
by the Mexicans until he reached the Arroyo Colorado on JNIarch 
19. Here a party of cavalry was encountered, and their com- 
mander warned Taylor that he was under orders to fire on the 
Americans should they attempt to pass that river. The warning 
Avas unheeded by Taylor and the Mexicans retreated without 
interposing armed resistance, but during the parley one of the 
ofificers placed in Taylor's hands a bellicose proclamation which 
had been issued on March 18 by General Francisco Mejia. This 
document is of interest, not only as being the first specific chal- 
lenge to the advance of the American army, but because it draws 
a sharp distinction between Texas and land lying between the 
Nueces and Rio Grande. The ' ' degenerate sons of Washington, ' ' 
said Mejia, not satisfied with annexing Texas, were now advanc- 
ing to take possession of a large part of Tamaulipas. This they 
had begun ^'whilst endeavoring to lull us into security, by open- 
ing diplomatic relations." "The limits of Texas," he continued, 
' ' are certain and recognized ; never have they extended beyond 
the river Nueces ; notwithstanding which, the American army has 
crossed the line separating Tamaulipas from that department." 
Even though Mexico might acquiesce in the annexation of Texas, 

nevertheless the territory of Tamaulipas would still remain beyond the 
law of annexation, sanctioned bv the American Congress; because that 
law comprises independent Texas, the ground occupied by the rebellious 
colony, and in no wise includes other departments, in which the Mexican 
government has uuinter[r]uptedly exercised its legitimate authority. 

All Mexicans were therefore exhorted to defend their country.*"'^ 
While Taylor was on the march from the Arroyo Colorado to 
Point Isabel he was met by a civil deputation from Matamoras 
bearing a protest from the prefect of the northern district of 
Tamaulipas. It stated that Taylor's march was regarded as an 
invasion of Mexico, and the prefect pointed out that "nothing 
has been said officially by the cabinet of the Union to the Mexican 



66 Ibid., 125-129. 



PE ELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 411 

government, respecting the extension ot the limits of Texas to 
the left bank of the Rio Bravo." The citizens of the district, 
he said, would never consent to separate themselves from Mexico 
and join the United States.*'' To this protest Taylor paid no 
heed, but moved on to take a position opposite Matamoras. His 
batteries bore directly on the public square of that town, and 
"their object," reported Taylor, "cannot be mistaken by the 
enemy." A parley was held on the Mexican side of the river 
by General Worth and General Vega in which Worth demanded 
an interview with the American consul at Matamoras. The de- 
mand was refused, and Worth informed the Mexican commander 
that he regarded this refusal as a belligerent act. Worth stated 
also that Taylor would regard the crossing of the Rio Grande by 
Mexican forces as an act of war.«« On March 31, General Mejia 
addressed a note to Taylor stating that all Mexicans looked upon 
the occupation of the east bank of the Rio Grande as a " positive 
declaration of war on the Part of the United States." Taylor's 
march could not be viewed as pacific, "inasmuch as a question 
of limits is depending between our respective governments." It 
could not be so viewed, "because it is not easy to conceive the 
reason or justice of taking forcible possession of the very terri- 
tory in dispute, pending the negotiation. ""^ Had such a com- 
munication been addressed to President Polk he might have had 
difficulty in explaining the peaceful nature of the advance of the 
American army, but it was Taylor's duty to obey orders and not 
to justify his movements. He very wisely declined to assume the 
role of a diplomat. 

On April 11, General Ampudia arrived at Matamoras and 
took command of the Mexican forces. By ' ' explicit and definite 
orders of his [my] government," he at once summoned Taylor 



fi'Cardenes to Taylor, March 23, 1846' (ibid., 130-132). 
fis Taylor to A 
irch 28 (ibid., '. 

^'•>Ibid., 1204. 



68 Taylor to Acl.i. Gen., April 6, 1846; Minutes of the parley held on 
March 28 (ibid., 133-138). 



412 JAMES E. POLK 

to retire beyond the Nueces within twenty-four hours, there to 
remain until the limits of Texas should be determined by the two 
governments. "If you insist in remaining upon the soil of the 
department of Tamaulipas, " he was told, "it will clearly result 
that arms, and arms alone, must decide the question." Taylor 
replied on the same day that he would remain where he was, 
"leaving the responsibility with those who rashly commence hos- 
tilities." As a result of Ampudia's note, Taylor immediately 
ordered a blockade of the Rio Grande, which cut off supplies from 
Matamoras.'° On April 24, Arapudia was superseded by General 
Arista, who at once notified Taylor that Mexico could not submit 
to the indignities heaped upon her by the United States, and that 
hostilities had commenced. Taylor replied on the following day 
that he had carefully refrained from committing 

any act which could possibly be interpreted into hostility, until the per- 
emptory summons of General Ampudia to vacate my position within 
twenty-four hours, rendered it necessary to take some action, and I then 
chose a measure not in itself hostile, but a simple defensive precaution, 
viz: a blockade of the Eio Bravo.'i 

Although this definition of a blockade may have relieved the 
conscience of the man who made it, such a bottling-up of the 
opponent is usually regarded as an act of war. Ampudia pro- 
tested vigorously and demanded the free use of the river, but 
Taylor refused to raise the blockade "unless indeed you desire 
an armistice pending the settlement of the question between the 
two governments. "^- 

The Mexican President likewise considered Taylor's blockade 
to be an act of war. On April 23, Paredes issued a proclamation 
directing a "defensive war" to begin. After a recital of the 
injuries which, since 1836, the United States had inflicted upon 
the people of Mexico ; the sending of Slidell as minister resident 



70 Ampudia to Taylor, April 12; Taylor to Aminidia, April 12; Taylor 
to Adj. Gen., April 15, 1846 {ibid., 138-140). 
Ti Ibid., 1204-1206. 
72 Taylor to Ampudia, April 22, 1846 (ibid., 144-147). 



DELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 413 

at the very moment when the American troops were occupying 
Mexican territory ; and the blockade of the Rio Grande by war 
vessels : Paredes asserted that 

hostilities therefore have been begun by the United States of America, 
who have undertaken new conquests in the territory lying within the line 
of the Departments of Tamaulipas and Nueva Leon while the troops of 
the United States are threatening Monterey in Upper California. 

He had therefore directed the commanding general to "attack 
the army which is attacking us ; to answer with war the enemy 
who makes war upon us." Like Taylor, Paredes invented a defi- 
nition to suit his purposes, for he declared the proposed hostilities 
to be not a war against the government of the United States, but 
simply a defense of Mexican territory which had been invaded.'^ 
Arista, who assumed command of the Mexican forces on the 
day after Paredes had issued his proclamation, took immediate 
steps to cross the Rio Grande. General Torrejon, with all of the 
cavalry and a small body of infantry, was sent across the river 
above Matamoras, while the main body of infantry and artillery 
was to cross below Matamoras and cut Taylor off from his base 
of supplies at Point Isabel.'* On April 25, Torrejon encoun- 
tered a scouting party of sixty-three American dragoons, under 
Captain Thornton. An engagement followed in which sixteen 
Americans were killed or wounded and the remainder forced to 
surrender. The prisoners were taken to Matamoras and treated 
kindly by the Mexicans.'^ The long-threatened war with Mexico 



T3 " I solemnly announce that I do not decree war against the govern- 
ment of the United States of America, because it belongs to the august 
Congress of the nation, and not to the Executive, to decide definitely what 
reparation must be exacted for such injuries. But the defense of Mexican 
territory which the troops of the United States are invading is an urgent 
necessity, and my responsibility before the nation would be immense if I 
did not order the repulse of forces which are acting as enemies; and I 
have so ordered. From this day defensive war begins, and every point 
of our territory which may be invaded or attacked shall be defended by 
force" {Mexico a traves de los Siglos, IV, 559). Eives, The United States 
and Mexico, II, 141-142. 

"4 Eives, op. oit., 143. 

75 Taylor to Adj. Gen., April 26, 1846; Eeports of Captains Thornton 
and Hardee {ibid., 288, 290-292). 



414 JAMES K. POLK 

was at last a reality. The killing of Thornton's dragoons by the 
Mexican forces under T'orrejon was soon described by President 
Polk as an unprovoked act of war. In a message sent to Congress 
on May 11, 1846, the President asserted that 

after reiterated menaces, Mexico has passed the boundary of the United 
States, has invaded our territory, and shed American blood upon the 
American soil. She has proclaimed that hostilities have commenced, and 
that the two nations are now at war. 

As war exists, and, notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists 
by the act of Mexico herself, we are called upon by every consideration 
of duty and patriotism to vindicate with decision and honor, the rights, 
and the interests of our country. 

He therefore recommended prompt and energetic measures for 
bringing the war to a speedy and successful termination.''^ 

Whether or not Taylor's advance into the "disputed terri- 
tory" was the actual cause of Mexico's refusal to renew diplo- 
matic relations and of her determination to resort to arms, it at 
least served as an excuse for such a course on her part. Although 
she had from the first claimed the occupation of any part of Texas 
to be an invasion of Mexico and a casus belli, she had, on various 
occasions, intimated that she might acquiesce in the annexation 
of Texas and discuss its limits. It was not until Taylor had 
crossed the Nueces that she actually took steps to attack the 
American forces. Polk may or may not have acted within his 
rights in assuming the boundary claimed by Texas, but at least 
there was some justification in the contention of the "Whigs that 
he precipitated the war by ordering Taylor to the Rio Grande. 



76 Eichardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IV, 442-443. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

WAR IN NORTHERN MEXICO 

President Polk's war message was sent to Congress on i\Iay 
11, 1846. After a brief debate of two hours the House, by a vote 
of one hundred and seventy-four to fourteen, passed a bill which 
authorized the President to prosecute the war that exists "by the 
act of the Republic of Mexico."^ Garrett Davis, of Kentucky, 
denied the truth of the statement just quoted and asserted that : 
' ' It is our own President who began this war" by sending General 
Taylor beyond the Nueces river. In defense of the administra- 
tion, the Washington Union answered this contention by calling 
attention to the fact that Mexico had always claimed Texas to 
the Sabine, and that there was no reason for believing that her 
invading army would stop at the Nueces.- 

Greater opposition was encountered in the Senate, and for a 
time the President feared that Benton and Calhoun would join 
the Whigs and thereby defeat the House bill. However, after a 
day's debate, the Senate, having added a few amendments, passed 
the measure by a vote of forty-two to two. Benton voted for the 
bill and Calhoun, having opposed a declaration of war, declined 
to vote either way.^ Some of the members based their objections 



1 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 795. Polk, Diary, I, 392. 

2 ' ' No man has yet alleged, so far as we know, that a Mexican invasion 
of Texas, if permitted by us, wovJd have stopped at the Nueces; or Avould 
have thought of stopping there. . . . The claim of Mexico is, in terms, 
that she owns Texas up to the Sabine. She makes not the slightest differ- 
ence in any one of her state papers between her ownership up to the Nueces 
and her ownership up to the Sabine. In a great multitude of state papers 
of old date, and of most recent date, Mexico says that Texas — all Texas — 
is her soil. This claim to the ivhole of Texas is the claim on which she 
refused negotiation. On this claim, and none other, Almonte threw up 
his passports. On this claim Mr. Shannon was sent home" (Union, May 15, 
1846). 

3 Co7ig. Globe, loc. cit., 80-1. Polk, Diary, I, 39-i. 



ili] JAMES K. POLE 

on the lack of information as to what had happened on the Rio 
Grande ; others denounced the President for having invaded ter- 
ritory which did not belong to the United States. In general, 
the Van Burenites of both houses supported the administration 
with their votes, but in private their criticisms were quite as severe 
as those of the "Whigs. Although Cambreleng was not a member 
of Congress at the time, a letter which he wrote to the ex-Presi- 
dent well expresses the feelings of this faction. The letter is 
especially interesting, for when Polk occupied the Speaker's chair, 
Cambreleng was his most loyal supporter. Having pronounced 
Polk to be worse than John Tyler and invoked divine pardon for 
having aided in his election, Cambreleng said : 

With regard to Mexico, they make inquiry through a consul— Mexico 
proposes to receive a Commissioner to treat about Texas if we will with- 
draw our naval forces — then we send in hot haste, and most secretly, a 
Minister Plenipotentiary, at a moment too when a revolutionary movement 
was going on and when it was obvious, that our minister could do nothing 
whatever but help Paredes to overthrow Herera, which he did very effec- 
tively and returned home with his credentials. [Taylor marched across 
Tamaulipas and blockaded the Mexicans] as if he had instructions [to 
make war, and Mexico had no choice but to fight].* 

The bill which decreed war against Mexico was signed by the 
President on May 13, and General Scott was given command of 
the army for which it provided, although Polk did not consider 
him to be " in all respects suited ' ' for the position. 

At a cabinet meeting held on the same evening the President 
and his Secretary of State had a sharp disagreement concerning 
the scope and the objects of the war. Buchanan had brought to 
the meeting the draft of a dispatch which was to be sent to 
American ministers at foreign courts. Its purpose was to notify 
those governments of the declaration of war, and to announce 
the intentions of the American government. In his draft Bu- 
chanan disavowed any intention of dismembering Mexico, and 
of making conquests. He stated specifically that the war had 



4 Cambreleng to Van Buren, Washington, May l(i, 1846, Van Buren 
Tapers. 



TVAE IN NOmHEEN MEXICO 417 

not been undertaken "with a view to acquire either California 
or New Mexico or any other portion of Mexican territory. ' ' Polk 
' ' thought such a declaration to Foreign Governments unnecessary 
and improper," and believed the causes for war set forth in his 
message to be entirely adequate. He told his Secretary that while 
the United States had not gone to war for the purpose of conquest, 

yet it was clear that in making peace we would if practicable obtain 
California and such other portion of the Mexican territory as would be 
sufficient to indemnify our claimants on Mexico, and to defray the expenses 
of the war which that power by her long continued wrongs and injuries 
had forced us to wage. I told him it was well known that the Mexican 
Government had no other means of indemnifying us. 

Buchanan expressed the fear that Lord Aberdeen would demand 
from McLane, United States minister in London, a statement as 
to whether his government intended to acquire Mexican territory, 
especially California. Should a satisfactory answer be withheld, 
he feared that both England and France would join Mexico in 
the war against us. Polk replied that the present war did not 
concern any European power, a demand such as Buchanan had 
mentioned would be an insult, and ' ' if made I would not answer 
it, even if the consequence should be a war with all of them." 
He would give no pledges as to the terms on which he would ulti- 
mately make peace with Mexico. Buchanan insisted that if as- 
surances were not given we would surely have war with England, 
and probably with France, for neither would permit California 
to be annexed to the United States. "I told him," wrote the 
President, "that before I would make the pledge which he pro- 
posed, I would meet the war which either England or France 
or all the Powers of Christendom might wage, ' ' and that ' ' neither 
as a citizen nor as President would I permit or tolerate any inter- 
meddling of any European Power on this Continent. ' ' Although 
Buchanan still maintained that unless some pledge were given 
the Oregon question could not be adjusted and that England 
would declare war, the President was immovable and said that 
he would take the responsibility of a war rather than give a 



418 JAMES E. POLK 

pledge which would prevent him from "fairly and honourably" 
acquiring California. The other members of the cabinet sup- 
ported this position, and Polk w^as ' ' much astonished at the views 
expressed by Mr. Buchanan on the subject." The President him- 
self drafted a paragraph to be substituted for the one which 
Buchanan had submitted.^ 

Scarcely had the President reduced his Secretary of State to 
proper subordination when difficulties with his Whig generals 
presented themselves." He had planned first of all to seize the 
northern provinces of Mexico and to hold them until the enemy 
had been forced to make peace. Without hesitation Congress 
voted the necessary troops and supplies, but the question of se- 
lecting suitable commanders to lead the troops to victory caused 
the President no little anxiety and annoyance. As Scott was the 
ranking general, Polk tendered him the command and consulted 
him concerning military arrangements, but he regarded the gen- 
eral as "visionary" and his advice as of no great value." 

From the beginning of his administration Polk seems to have 
looked upon the conquest of Mexico as an easy matter. Like most 
civilian executives he did not fully appreciate the time required 
to equip an army for active service. On the other hand, General 
Scott took both himself and his position very seriously, and was 
desirous of making his descent upon Mexico as imposing as pos- 
sible. He was a competent officer, and doubtless his intentions 
were good, but his vanity and tactless utterances soon involved 
him in difficulties. 



5 Polk, Viary, I, 396-399. For the dispatch as finally sent to the 
American ministers abroad, see Buchanan, Works, VI, 48-i. 

6 Polk was told that not only Scott but General Wool and Adjutant 
General Jones were using their influence with members of Congress to 
prevent the passage of a bill to authorize the appointment of two new 
major generals and four brigadier generals (Polk, Diary, I, 418). 

T"l did not think that so many as 20,000 [the number which Scott 
had requested for immediate service] volunteers besides the regular army 
was necessary, but I did not express this opinion, not being willing to take 
the responsibility of anv failure of the campaign by refusing to grant to 
Gen'l Scott all he asked" (Polk, Dmri/, I, 400-401). 



WAR IN NOBTHEEN MEXICO 419 

"Without consulting the War Department, Scott announced 
that he probably would not be ready to set out for the seat of 
war until the first of September. Through the Secretary of War, 
the President notified him that unless he should proceed to the 
Rio Grande very soon he would be superseded by another com- 
mander. 

Polk undoubtedly bore a prejudice against the general from 
the beginning and may have been too impatient with his delay ; 
on the other hand, Scott's amazing indiscretions soon gave the 
President no alternative but to deprive him of his command. 
Not satisfied with telling applicants for military positions that 
these places had been created "to give Commissions or rather 
pay to western democrats," he responded to Marcy's notice that 
the President desired greater promptness, by returning a most 
insulting and vainglorious letter. Although Polk had verbally 
tendered Scott the command of the Mexican expedition, the gen- 
eral now complained because he had not received a written order 
assigning him to the command ; he had, nevertheless, been in- 
cessantly employed in making preliminary arrangements. "In 
the midst of these multitudinous and indispensable occupations, ' ' 
wrote the irate general, 

I have learned from you that much impatience is already felt, perhaps in 
high quarters, that I have not already put myself in route for the Eio 
Grande; and now, with fourteen hours a day of preliminary work remain- 
ing on my hands for many days, I find myself compelled to stop that 
necessary work to guard myself against, perhaps, utter condemnation in 
the quarters alluded to. I am too old a soldier, and have had too much 
special experience, not to feel the infinite importance of securing myself 
against danger, (ill will or pre-condemnation,) in my rear, before advancing 
upon the public enemy. 

He had no fear of the enemy ahead, but unless he could feel 
confident of support in Washington the selection of another com- 
mander was advised. For fear that Marcy and Polk might not 
have sufficient mental capacity to grasp his meaning, the general 
added: "My explicit meaning is, that I do not desire to place 



420 JAMES K. POLK 

myself in the most perilous of all positions — a fire upon my rear 
from Washington, and the fire in front from the Mexicans." So 
clear was his explanation that both men saw at once the injustice 
of placing the gallant and overworked general in such a danger- 
ous predicament. In a very able and dignified — but, at the same 
time, withering — letter, Marcy notified Scott that, instead of 
leading the Mexican expedition, he was to remain in Washington.* 
In itself Marcy 's letter was galling enough to the pompous gen- 
eral's pride, but, as if to add insult to injury, it was handed to 
him just "as he [I] sat down to a hasty plate of soup." In 
another letter he made a lame attempt to explain that his allu- 
sions to "high quarters" meant members of Congress instead of 
the President, but he could not refrain from sneering at Polk's 
"magnanimity" in not having him court-martialed.^ The effron- 
tery exhibited in his letters indicates that the general was still 
deluded by the campaign cry, "Who is James K. Polk?" Marcy 
enlightened him, for the time being at least. Indeed the Presi- 
dent felt himself to be fully competent to discharge the duties 
which the Constitution had assigned to the chief executive. To 
one of his many volunteer advisers he remarked that : " I hoped 
my friends in Congress and elsewhere would suffer me to conduct 
the war with Mexico as I thought proper, and not plan the cam- 
paign for me."^° 

As already noted, Polk did not anticipate great difficulty in 
defeating the Mexican armies. Apparently, he feared most of 
all the influence of the Mexican priests. He thought that de- 
signing persons in Mexico had led the priests to believe that the 



>^ After calling attention to tlie importance of the position to which 
Scott had been assigned by the President, Marcy said: "How could you, 
under these circumstances, arrest your labors of preparation, and suffer 
your energies to be crippled, for the pui-pose of indulging in illiberal im- 
putations against the man who has just bestowed upon you the highest 
mark of his confidence ? ' ' 

9 Polk, Diary, I, 395, 400, 413-415, 419-421. The correspondence is 
printed in Niles' Beg., LXX, 231-233. 

10 Polk, Diary, I, 427. 



WAR IN NORTHERN MEXICO 421 

United States had planned to pillage their churches and to over- 
throw their religion. So long as the priests harbored such fears 
they would do much to incite the people stubbornly to resist the 
advance of the American army. Being desirous of weakening 
the power of the Mexican government by winning the good will 
of the people, especially in the northern provinces, Polk attached 
great importance to disabusing the minds of the priests. ' ' If the 
Catholic Priests in Mexico, ' ' he told Benton, 

can be satisfied that their churches and religion would be secure the con- 
quests of the Northern Provinces of Mexico will be easy and the proba- 
bility is that the war would be of short duration; but if a contrary opinion 
prevails the resistance to our forces will be desperate. 

He therefore sought interviews with Bishop Hughes, of New 
York, and the Bishop of Missouri and asked them to select priests 
who might accompany the army as chaplains and assure the Mexi- 
can clergy that their fear of Americans was groundless. A proc- 
lamation in the Spanish language which promised religious free- 
dom and kind treatment was prepared and sent to General Taylor 
with instructions that it should be distributed among the inhabi- 
tants.^^ 

In planning the campaign against Mexico the President at- 
tached great importance to getting possession of California. As 
early as May 26 he proposed, and his cabinet unanimously agreed, 
that an "expedition be immediately fitted out against Upper 
California" if it should be found that the mounted regiments 
assembled at Independence, Missouri, could reach the Sacramento 
region before winter. On May 30 he again impressed upon the 
cabinet the importance of having military possession of California 
when the time for making peace should have arrived. "I de- 
clared," said he, "my purpose to be to acquire for the U. S. 
California, New Mexico, and perhaps some others of the Northern 



11 IMd., 408-411. For the proclamation see H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 
1 sess., 284-287. In it the Mexicans were told that their government was 
in the hands of "tyrants and usurpers," and that the United States was 
doing the people a real kindness by invading their country. 



422 JAMES K. POLE 

Provinces of Mexico whenever peace was made. ' ' Colonel Stephen 
W. Kearny, who had already been transferred from Fort Leaven- 
worth to Santa Fe for the purpose of affording protection to 
American traders, was now selected to lead the expedition to 
California. By a new commission which accompanied his in- 
structions he was made a brevet brigadier-general. A requisition 
was sent to the governor of Missouri for one thousand mounted 
men to supplement the force of dragoons under Kearny's com- 
mand. It was agreed that Kearny should be authorized to take 
into his service any American citizens whom he might find in 
California. He was to be given authority, also, to enlist a few 
hundred of the Mormons who were now on their way to California, 
^'with a view to conciliate them, attach them to our country, & 
prevent them from taking part against us." The President di- 
rected that arms and provisions should be sent immediately from 
New York to the Pacific for the use of Kearny's army.^- About 
two weeks later he consulted his cabinet on the propriety of send- 
ing from New York by sea a regiment of volunteers to join 
Kearny's forces in California. Benton, whose advice was sought 
by the President, favored sending such a regiment, but he be- 
lieved that the men should go as emigrants and be discharged in 
California at the end of their service. ^^ This policy was subse- 
quently adopted. 

Although Polk was interested primarily in the acquisition of 
California and New Mexico he desired to procure, if possible, a 
much larger area; and the amicable settlement of the Oregon 



12 Polk, Dinni, I. 429, 437-439, 443-444. On June 3, J. C. Little, a 
Mormon from Pet<^rsborough, N. H., called on Polk for the purpose of 
ascertaining the policy of the government towards tliis sect. He was told 
that they would be treated like any other American citizens and that they 
would be invited to enlist in the army. Polk did not mention the projected 
expedition under Kearny. Little offered to overtake the Mormons and to 
muster 500 of them into the United States army; but fearing that they 
might reach California before Kearny and not wishing that the province 
should be at the mercy of Mormon soldiers, the President declined the offer. 
He decided, also, that Kearny should not enlist any of that sect until after 
they had arrived in California (ibid., 445-446, 449-450). 

13 Ibid., 473, 481. 



WAB IX NOBTHEEN MEXICO 423 

question by the treaty signed on June 15 made interference by 
Great Britain less probable. The extent of territory which he 
wished to acquire is stated very definitely in his record of a 
cabinet meeting held on June 30, 1846. At this meeting an ani- 
mated discussion arose between Buchanan and Walker regarding 
the objects to be attained as a result of the war. Buchanan ex- 
pressed himself as being in favor of making the Rio Grande the 
boundary up to El Paso, in latitude about 32° ; from this point 
a line was to be drawn due west to the Pacific ocean. He op- 
posed the acquisition of any land south of 32° because the North 
would be unwilling to acquire a tract that was likely to become 
slaveholding territory. Walker held very different opinions. He 
proposed that the boundary should begin at the mouth of the 
Rio Grande, in latitude about 26°, and extend directly westward 
to the Pacific. The other members of the cabinet took no part 
in the discussion, but Polk agreed with Walker. "I remarked," 
wrote the President, 

that I preferred the 26° to any boundary North of it, but that if it was 
found that that boundary could not be obtained I was willing to take 32°, 
but that in any event we must obtain Upper California and New Mexico 
in any Treaty of Peace we would niake.i* 

At this point we may leave the President to develop his pro- 
gram of conquest while we consider a parenthetical episode which 
affected his policy of territorial expansion but which was not, 
apparently, a part of it. 

Long before General Kearny could reach California, John C. 
Fremont had, by his indiscretions, come into collision wdth the 
Mexican officials of that province, and the famous "Bear Flag" 
republic had been proclaimed. These events, however interesting 
in themselves, call for small space in a biography of Polk, for, 
so far as any known evidence exists, they formed no part of the 
President's California program and were in no degree inspired 
by him. The only possible link which might connect these events 

^*Ibid.. 495-496. 



424 JAMES K. POLK 

with the plans of the administration is the "secret instructions" 
carried by Gillespie, and Fremont had already resisted Mexican 
authority before the arrival of Gillespie in California. Thomas 
0. Larkin, American consul at Monterey, who doubtless was cog- 
nizant of all instructions brought by Gillespie, continued to use 
his influence for peace until after the "Bear Flag" insurrection. 
Another reason for believing that Fremont and his adherents 
acted without authority from Washington is the fact that the 
President, in all of his known instructions to naval and military 
officers, laid special stress on winning over the inhabitants by 
kind treatment. Fremont adopted the opposite course, and even 
went out of his way to antagonize them. 

During Tyler's administration Fremont had made two expe- 
ditions into the western country, and in the summer of 1845 had 
undertaken a third. Early in 1846 he reached California, and, 
after making brief stops at Sutter's Fort and San Francisco, he 
paid a visit to Larkin at Monterey. He explained to the Mexican 
authorities at Monterey that he was bound for Oregon on a scien- 
tific expedition, and his statement was accepted as satisfactory. 

Instead of proceeding to Oregon, Fremont, having gone as 
far north as San Jose, retraced his steps until he had reached a 
point not far from Monterey. The excuse for his return south- 
ward, long afterward given by Fremont himself/^ was the desire 
to find a seaside home for his mother ! 

His original entry into the province without passports was a 
violation of Mexican law, and when, contrary to agreement, he 
returned to the vicinity of Monterey, he was ordered by Jose 
Castro, the comandmite general, to retire from the department. 
After sending a verbal refusal to obey this order, Fremont re- 
paired to Gavilan Peak, erected a log fort, and hoisted the flag 
of the United States. Here he was warned by Larkin of the 
danger of such a proceeding, and, after much vain blustering, he 
set out for Sutter's Fort, which he reached late in ]\Iareh. 

ir, Fremont, Memoirs, I, 457. 



WAE IN NOFiTUEBN MEXICO 425 

Breaking camp on March 24, Fremont and his party pro- 
ceeded northward until they had reached Klamath Lake, where 
they were overtaken, on May 8, by messengers who announced 
that Lieutenant Gillespie was close behind bearing dispatches 
from the government of the United States. The dispatches turned 
out to be a letter of introduction from Buchanan, a letter from 
Senator Benton, and whatever verbal communications Gillespie 
may have conveyed. Despite Fremont's assertions that it was 
made known to him ' ' that to obtain possession of California was 
the chief object of the President," he has admitted that he learned 
nothing from Buchanan's letter and that Benton's epistle was 
equally harmless except when "read by the light of many con- 
versations and discussions with himself and others at Washing- 
ton."^" Concerning the verbal instructions related by Gillespie, 
we are told by Fremont himself that they "had for their prin- 
cipal objects to ascertain the disposition of the California people, 
to conciliate their feelings in favor of the United States. ' ' 

As Fremont 's subsequent relations with the Calif ornians were 
anything but conciliatory, and as he received no communications 
from Washington other than those just mentioned, and finally, 
as his belligerent attitude toward the California government w^as 
so out of harmony with Polk's general policy of conciliation, we 
must conclude that Fremont's later activities were undertaken 
without authority from the President. 

After Gillespie's arrival at his camp, Fremont returned to 
the Sacramento Valley in California. If further evidence were 
necessary to prove that the messenger had brought no orders to 
precipitate a revolution, it is furnished in letters written by both 
men under date of May 24, 1846. To Benton, Fremont wrote 



ir, "The letter from Senator Benton, while apparently of friendship and 
family details, contained passages and suggestions whieh, read in the light 
of many conversations and discussions with himself and others at Wash- 
ington, clearly indicated to me that I was required by the Government to 
find out any foreign schemes in relation to California and so far as might 
be in my power, to counteract them" {ihid., 489). 



426 JAMES E. POLK 

that ' ' I shall now proceed directly homewards, by the Colorado, 
but I cannot arrive at the frontier until late in September." 
"He now goes home from here [Peter Lassen's]," said Gillespie 
when speaking of Fremont in a letter to Larkin of the same 
date.^' 

While Fremont was encamped at the ' ' Buttes of Sacramento, ' ' 
General Castro at Santa Clara was collecting a body of troops 
for the purpose of going to Los Angeles to attack Governor Pio 
Pico, with whom he had had a disagreement. With this object 
in view he had sent a man named Francisco Arce to Sonoma to 
purchase mules for his troops. American settlers, having con- 
cluded that Castro was planning to attack them, reported the 
purchase, to Fremont. A party led by Ezekiel Merritt set out 
from Fremont's camp and, on June 10, captured and brought 
back the mules. On the following day Merritt set out for So- 
noma and captured the town on the fourteenth. After a lively 
debate California was declared an independent republic and the 
"bear flag" chosen as its emblem. Fremont did not participate 
personally in these acts, but they were performed with his knowl- 
edge and consent. 

Captain John B. Montgomery, commander of the United 
States ship Portsmouth in San Francisco Bay, declined to iden- 
tify himself with the "bear flag" episode. The revolutionists 
therefore received no assistance from the navy until the arrival 
of Commodore Sloat, on July 2, at the port of Monterey. While 
off the Mexican coast Sloat had heard of Taylor's victories and 
of the blockade of Vera Cruz, and, on June 7, had set out for 
Monterey. On July 7, Sloat, after five days of hesitation which 
was due probably to Larkin 's desire to win California by concil- 
iatory methods," caused the United States flag to be raised at 
Monterey. On the following day Montgomery, acting under 



17 Letter to Benton, Fremont, Memoirs, I, 499. Gillespie to Larkin, 
Larl-in Papers, Bancroft Library. 

IS Bancroft, California, V, 228, note 6. 



WAR IN NOETHEEN MEXICO 427 

orders from Sloat, took possession of the posts on San Francisco 
Bay. The party at Sonoma now abandoned their "bear flag" 
republic and hoisted the stars and stripes. 

After a circuitous voyage via the Sandwich Islands, Com- 
modore Stockton, on board the Congress, reached Monterey on 
the fourteenth of July. About two weeks later he succeeded 
Sloat as commander of the Pacific squadron. More arrogant than 
his predecessor, Stockton rejected peace overtures sent from Gov- 
ernor Pio Pico and General Jose Castro, then at Los Angeles, 
and demanded their unconditional surrender. Seeing that re- 
sistance was futile, these officials fled to Mexico, and Stockton, 
with the cooperation of Fremont and Gillespie, took possession 
of southern California. Having thus completed the "first con- 
quest" of California, Stockton, acting on his own responsibility, 
undertook to establish a government over the inhabitants.^^ 

In antagonizing the Californians and in attempting to estab- 
lish a civil government Stockton, as we have already noted, acted 
on his own responsibility, for nothing in instructions which had 
been received by himself or his predecessor authorized his arbi- 
trary procedure. Instructions prepared by Secretary Bancroft 
under the direction of the President — some prior and some sub- 
sequent to Stockton's arrival in California, but of course not 
received at the time — expressed very definitely the desires of the 
administration with respect to California. One addressed to Sloat 
on June 8, 1846, ordered him to "endeavor to establish the su- 
premacy of the American fiag without any strife with the people 
of California. ' ' If California should be inclined to separate from 
Mexico and establish ' ' a government of its own under the auspices 
of the American flag," he was to encourage such action, but no 
authority to make a conquest was given. The United States, 
said Bancroft, desired to make California a friend and not an 
enemy, "to hold possession of it, at least during the war; and 

19 Except where noted, tliis summary of tlie first conquest has been 
drawn principally from Eives, II, chap. 34, and Bancroft, California, V. 



428 JAMES K. POLK 

to hold that possession, if possible, with the consent of the inhabi- 
tants." On July 12 he stated explicitly why possession was so 
much desired by the administration. "The object of the United 
States, ' ' Sloat was told, 

has reference to ultimate peace with Mexico; and if, at that peace, the 
basis of the uti possidetis shall be established the government expects, 
through your forces, to be found in actual possession of Upper California. 

A month later, August 13, Bancroft stated that "if the treaty 
of peace shall be made on the basis of uti possidetis, it may leave 
California to the United States. " Possession at the date of peace 
negotiations, and not a revolution as had been effected by Fre- 
mont and Stockton, was all that the President had contemplated. 
To be sure, Bancroft, in his letter of July 12, spoke of the neces- 
sity of establishing some sort of civil government under the pro- 
tection of Sloat, and a copy of Kearny's instructions was in- 
closed ; but he urged that ' ' in selecting persons to hold office, due 
respect should be had to the wishes of the people of California, 
as well as to the actual possessors of authority in that province. ' "" 
Necessarily the officers in California did not know the contents 
of these letters, for two of them were written after they had taken 
possession of California ; still, the instructions show clearly that 
Stockton and Fremont did not, in the course they pursued, cor- 
rectly divine the wishes of the President. 

A discussion of the uprising of the Californians under Gen- 
eral Flores, the second conquest by the United States forces, and 
the establishment of a government by General Kearny, acting 
under instructions from President Polk, must be postponed while 
we follow the advance of the main army into Mexico. While the 
President was making plans for acquiring new territory, and 
while subordinates without his sanction were making conquests on 
the Pacific coast. General Taylor was winning battles for his 
government, and laurels for himself, on the banks of the Rio 
Grande. 

20 Instructions of Bancroft to Sloat, Stockton and Biddle, June 8, 
July 12 and Aug. 13, 1846 (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 237-241). 



WAB IN NORTHEEN MEXICO 429 

The first bloodshed, as we have seen, occurred on April 25 
when Captain Thornton's dragoons, after a loss of sixteen men, 
were surrounded and forced to surrender. As a result Taylor, 
by authority already vested in him by the President, called upon 
the governors of Texas and Louisiana for eight regiments of vol- 
unteers. Before these could be available, however, he was obliged 
to meet the invading Mexican army with his small force of regu- 
lars. First of all he constructed and garrisoned a fort opposite 
Matamoras and with his main army returned to his base of sup- 
plies at Point Isabel, which was threatened by Arista. 

After strengthening the position at Point Isabel, Taylor set 
out on his return to the fort opposite Matamoras, upon which an 
attack had been made and the commander, Major Brown, killed. 
On the way back to this fort, whicli now took the name of Fort 
Brown, Taylor, on May 8, met and defeated Arista at Palo Alto. 
At daybreak on the following morning the Mexican commander 
retreated to Resaca de la Palma, where Taylor overtook him in 
the afternoon and won another victory. The Mexican army was 
completely disorganized, and scattered groups, after a precipitate 
flight across the Rio Grande, reassembled at Matamoras. This 
place was abandoned without resistance as soon as Taylor began 
to cross the river on the eighteenth of May. "The battles of 
Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma," wrote General Grant long 
afterwards, "seemed to us engaged, as pretty important affairs; 
but we had only a faint conception of their magnitude until they 
were fought over in the North by the Press and the reports came 
back to us."-^ 

In these battles the Mexican forces outnumbered their adver- 
saries more than two to one, but the American army was better 
equipped and led by a more capable commander. Fearless and 
unassuming, Taylor enjoyed the confidence of his soldiers. They 
were always eager to respond to the call of "Old Rough and 
Ready."' Ever prepared to do his duty, Taylor had no tliirst 
for military glory. In a private letter written on the day after 

21 Grant, Personal Memoirs, I, 99-100. Grant "was then a lieutenant. 



430 JAMES K. POLK 

his occupation of Matamoras he said that "I heartily wish the 
war was at an end. ' '-- 

News of Taylor's victories reached Washington on ]\Iay 23, 
the day on which Polk read to his cabinet Scott's letter about 
being fired upon in front and rear. When he received this news 
the President made no comment in his diary, except to record 
the fact that the news had arrived, but three days later he sent 
a message to the Senate nominating Taylor as major-general by 
brevet.-^ On May 30, just one week after the receipt of Taylor's 
official dispatch, the new commission was ready and Marcy for- 
warded it to the general along with an assignment to the chief 
command. On the same day the President in a letter to Taylor 
praised the general's "gallant conduct and distinguished ser- 
vices," and stated that the "battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de 
la Palma rank among our most brilliant victories. ' '-* 

There is no reason for believing that, at the time of Taylor's 
promotion, Polk harbored other than the most kindly feelings 
toward the victorious general. The delay in preparing the cor- 
dial letter just quoted was due to the pressure of executive busi- 
ness such as planning the California expedition and reducing 
Scott and Gains-'' to proper subordination. Not knowing the 
reason why the President's expression of approval had been de- 
layed, Taylor felt slighted, and his distrust of the administration 
was aroused. "It is strange passing strange," he wrote to his 
son-in-law, "that I have heard nothing from Washing [ton] since 
my official report of the battles of the 8th & 9th reached there, 
which I have seen published in the National Intelligencer & 
Union." He hinted at politics in high quarters, and mentioned 
a rumor that members of Congress from the South and West had 
protested to the President against his being superseded by Scott. 

22 Taylor to his sou-in-law, Dr. R. C. Wood, May 19, 1846, Taylor 
Letters, 4. 

23 Polk, Diary, I, 422, 425, 428. Until this promotion Taylor had been 
a colonel in actual rank, but brigadier-general by brevet. 

24 fl-. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 282-283. 

25 Gains had, without authority, been enlisting troops for the Rio Grande 
campaign. 



WAS IN NORTHERN MEXICO 431 

He hoped that the report was untrue, for "I consider this com- 
mand properly liis, & I have no wish to prevent his exercis- 
ing it."'" 

When another week brought no word from Washington Taylor 
became convinced that the administration was more interested in 
playing politics than in defeating the Mexicans. Merit and long 
service, in his opinion, were disregarded at the national capital ; 
"the more one does the more they expect of him, and his services 
or standing is estimated by political considerations." He was 
"perfectly disgusted" with the inefficiency in Washington, for 
small boats and wagons could be brought "from Liverpool" in 
less time than it had taken the government to supply them. 
"Was I a prominent or ambitious aspirant for civil distinction 
or honors," he wrote, "I might very readily suppose there was 
an intention somewhere among the high functionaries to break 
me down ' ' ; and he feared that such would be the result of the 
government's policy, "whether from design or not." He re- 
garded as "ridiculous" a report which had just reached camp to 
the effect that Scott had declined to take command of the army 
for fear of injuring his Presidential prospects, and that a quarrel 
with Polk had resulted from his refusal. "They need have no 
apprehensions," he added, "of being interfered with by me for 
that high office, which I would decline if proffered & I could 
reach it without opposition. ' '-^ As late as August 4 he expressed 
the hope that Scott would be the Whig candidate in 1848, but 
he put away the crown from his own head with a far less resolute 
hand.-^ 



26 Taylor to R. C. Wood, June 12, 1846, Taylor Letters, 9-10. Scott 
had already notified Taylor that he [Scott] had been assigned to the com- 
mand, but would not go to Mexico immediately. 

27 Taylor to R. C. Wood, June 21, 1846, ihid., 12-14. When more definite 
news of Scott's quarrel with the President arrived, Taylor expressed regret, 
for it would keep him in Mexico "which I by no means desire" (Taylor 
to R. C. Wood, June 24). 

2s ' ' So far as I am concerned I Avish to have nothing to do with that 
higli office; & if I had, this is not the proper time to discuss the subject; 
let this Avar at any rate be first brought to a close" (Taylor to R. C. Wood, 
ibid., 35). 



432 JAMES E. POLK 

His attitude toward the administration was based on ground- 
less suspicions, for at this early date there was surely no desire 
to "break him down." Even the receipt of Marcy's letter which 
assigned him to the chief command and inclosed his new com- 
mission did not change his antipathy toward his superiors. The 
honor of his promotion, in his opinion, was more than overbal- 
anced by his assignment to command an expedition which "must 
be a failure owing to the ignorance of some in regard to some 
matters, & the imbecility of others, for all of which I shall be 
made the scape goat." He must have received Polk's laudatory 
letter in the same mail, but of this he made no mention. He 
pronounced Scott "crazy" because of his letters to Marcy, and 
he was certain that "Gen'l S. will never hear the last of a tire 
from his rear, or a hasty plate of soup."-" 

While in this mood, Taylor questioned the good faith of the 
government in its dealings with Mexico. He was confident that 
"our ambitious views of conquest & agrandisement at the ex- 
pense of a weak power will only be restrained & circumscribed 
by our inability to carry out our view." He did not rate that 
ability very high, for he predicted that if the Mexicans should 
hold out for six or eight months "we will be fully as anxious to 
make peace as they are. ' ' Three weeks later he hoped that peace 
negotiations would soon begin, but he feared that the United 
States would claim a vast amount of territory as a war indemnity 
and for ' ' real & pretended roberies committed on our counnerce ; 
which will no doubt be double & treble award to certain claimants 
over & above what they ever lost." No land grabbing act of the 
British government had been "more outrageous" than Polk's 
plan to take permanent possession of California.^" 



29 Taylor to E. 0. Wood, June 30 and July 7, 1846, ibid., 18-25. 

30 Taylor to E. C. Wood, July 14, Aug. 4, and Aug. 23, 1846, ibid., 28, 
37, 49. Undoubtedly Taylor's distrust was increased by letters from Whig 
friends in the United States. See letters from Scott and Crittenden, in 
Coleman, Life of John J. Cfittenden, 256, 278. 



WAR IN NOBTEEEN MEXICO 433 

Taylor had reason enough to complain of the want of trans- 
portation facilities, ^^ although the cause was to be sought, not in 
any desire to "break him down," but in the lack of preparation 
usually experienced at the outbreak of a war, and more especially 
in the ignorance of the Washington officials concerning every- 
thing in Mexico. 

The President and his cabinet knew little of the topography 
of the country, or of its seasons, fertility, and accessibility. Even 
the geography was something of a mystery. As a result, consid- 
erable confusion and frequent misunderstandings were only to 
be expected. For the necessary information the executive de- 
partments had to depend largely on the reports of General Taylor ; 
and the general, fearing that the main object of the administra- 
tion was to make a "scape goat" of him, did not feel free to offer 
advice or to act without explicit orders. 

In a letter addressed to Taylor on June 8, 1846, Marcy stated 
that nothing had been heard from him since his brief dispatch 
announcing the victories of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, 
but it was assumed that Matamoras had been occupied. He ex- 
pressed the hope that Taylor would get possession of all places 
on the Rio Grande as far up as Laredo, and that he would be 
able to capture Monterey. The measures to be pursued, however, 
were left to the general's "own discretion and judgment." The 
President very much desired, said Marcy, to have Taylor's "views 
and suggestions in relation to the fall campaign. ' ' Being desirous 
of prosecuting the war with vigor, the President wished to know 
whether, in the general's opinion, the present expedition should 
be conducted with a view of striking at the City of Mexico, or 
of operating in the northern provinces only. "Your views on 
this point," said Marcy, "will doubtless have an important influ- 
ence upon the determination of the government here." Informa- 
tion was requested, also, on overland transportation facilities and 



31 "I consider there is an entire break -down in the Qr M [quarter 
master's] department every where" (Taylor to E. C. Wood, June 21, 1846, 
ibid., 13). 



434 JAMES K. POLK 

on the probability of obtaining adequate provisions, and the gen- 
eral's opinion was asked concerning the number and character 
of troops to be employed. Four days later Scott impressed upon 
Taylor the importance of obtaining information regarding move- 
ments and designs of the enemy, and authorized him to pay 
^'employes" liberally for procuring such information. Kearny's 
expedition to New Mexico and California, said Scott, would neces- 
sarily be independent of Taylor's command, but that of General 
Wool against the city of Chihuahua would be under Taylor's 
general directions. The general was authorized to agree to an 
armistice with a view to peace negotiations, provided he was 
convinced of the enemy's good faith.^- 

In his reply to these letters, Taylor stated that he had little 
definite information to impart. He gave, however, his opinions 
regarding the probabilities of obtaining supplies in the interior. 
Should the inhabitants prove friendly, he thought that his army 
might obtain provisions sufficient to enable it to penetrate as 
far as Saltillo ; still, in his opinion, the army under his command 
should confine its operations to the northern provinces and 
should not attempt to reach the City of Mexico. He ' ' purposely" 
abstained ' ' from any reference to movements against Tampico or 
Vera Cruz. ' ' He complained that he was greatly embarrassed by 
the lack of transportation facilities and closed his letter with the 
remark that : 

I am waiting with the utmost impatience the arrival of steamboats 
suited to the navigation of this river to establish a depot at Camargo, and 
throw the troops gradually forward to that point.ss 

Although General Taylor may have been overcautious in offer- 
ing suggestions, he seems to have reported all the information in 
his possession. But officials in Washington, especially Quarter- 
master General Jesup, were inclined to excuse their own short- 
comings by pleading lack of information from Taylor, and the 



32 H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 323-327. 

33 Taylor to Adj. Gen., July 2, 1846, iUd., 329-332. 



WAE IN NOBTHEBN MEXICO 435 

President came to feel that the general did not possess the initia- 
tive and the vigor necessary for the command which had been 
intrusted to him. Polk admitted that he had no knowledge of 
military affairs, but he had ' ' a strong conviction ' ' that necessary 
equipments had been too long delayed. He told the quarter- 
master general that some of his subordinates had become gentle- 
men of leisure who "required to have a coal of fire put on their 
backs to make them move promptly." He feared, also, that 
Taylor was not the man for the general command: 

He is brave but does not seem to have resources or grasp of mind enough 
to conduct such a campaign. In his communications to the War Department 
he seems ready to obey orders, but appears to be unwilling to express any 
opinion or to take any responsibility on himself. Though he is in the country 
with means of knowledge which cannot be possessed at Washington, he makes 
no suggestion as to the plan of the campaign, but simply obeys orders and 
gives no information to aid the administration in directing his movement. 
He is, I have no doubt, a good subordinate officer, but from all the evidence 
before me I think him unfit for the chief command. Though this is so, I 
know of no one whom I can substitute in his place.s* 

These remarks greatly exaggerated Taylor's taciturnity, yet the 
President was sorely in need of information to aid him in direct- 
ing the campaign. When in October an expedition to Tampico 
and Vera Cruz was being considered, so little was known of the 
character of the coast that Polk found it necessary to send to 
Rhode Island for P. M. Dimond, former consul at Vera Cruz, 
' ' believing that from him reliable information could be obtained. ' ' 
Nearly a month later the quartermaster general just awoke to 
the fact that : ' ' Had we foreseen the nature of the Rio Del Norte, 
and built suitable steamboats several months ago, a million of 
dollars might have been saved by this time. ' '^^ 



34 Polk, Diary, II, 117-119. 

35 Ibid., 180, 196. Jesup to Marcy, Nov. 7, 1846 (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 
Cong., 1 sess., .564). So vigorously had Taylor complained of inefficiency 
in the quartermaster's department, in a letter dated September 1, that 
Jesup was sent to New Orleans so that he might personally supervise the 
equipping of Tavlor 's army (Corresp. of Taylor, Marcy and Jesup, in 
same Doc, 557 ff'). 



436 JAMES K. POLK 

Although the President was lacking in military experience, 
and although, according to his own testimony, he found it to be 
"impossible to give much attention to the details in conducting 
the war, ' ' his brain was most fertile when it came to concocting 
schemes for undermining the control of the Mexican government 
over its own citizens. Ample proof of this is furnished in a con- 
fidential letter sent to Taylor under date of July 9, 1846. The 
letter was signed by Marcy, but was drafted by Polk, with some 
assistance from Benton. The President approved Taylor's con- 
ciliatory conduct toward the Mexicans and urged him to continue 
friendly intercourse with the inhabitants. The general was 
instructed to 

take occasions to send officers to the headquarters of the enemy for military 
purposes, real or ostensible .... in which opportunity may be taken to 
speak of the war itself as only carried on to obtain justice, and that we had 
much rather procure that by negotiation than by fighting. 

Eacial and social discords, he was told, made it possible to induce 
a large portion of the people to wish success to invaders who had 
no desire to injure them : 

In all this field of division — in all these elements of social, political, 
personal, and local discord — there must be openings to reach the interests, 
passions, or principles of some of the parties, and thereby to conciliate their 
good will, and make them co-operate with us in bringing about an honorable 

and a speedy peace Policy and force are to be combined ; and 

the fruits of the former will be prized as highly as those of the latter. 

Another paragraph, which was penned by the President alone 
and which he considered to be the most important, was still more 
specific in outlining the policy of the administration : 

Availing yourself of divisions which you may find among the Mexican 
people .... it will be your policy to encourage the separate departments 
or States, and especially those which you may invade and occupy, to declare 
their independence of the central government of Mexico, and either to 
become our allies, or to assume, as it is understood Yucatan has done, a 
neutral attitude in the existing war between the United States and Mexico. 



WAB IN NORTHERN MEXICO 437 

After peace had been concluded such departments were to "decide 
for themselves their own form of government. " As to temporary 
governments Taylor was authorized to follow the course laid 
down in the instructions to Kearny, a copy of which was inclosed. 
He was informed that an expedition against Mexico City would 
probably be sent from Tampico or Vera Cruz, and not from the 
Rio Grande. Information was requested, and Taylor was in- 
structed to send his answer "directly to the President of the 
United States."^° Only two days before this Houston, of Texas, 
had introduced in the Senate a resolution which extended the 
thanks of Congress to Taylor for his victories on the Rio Grande, 
and requested the President to present the general with a gold 
medal "as a tribute to his good conduct, and generosity, to the 
vanquished. ' '^^ 

As usual, Buchanan was ready with a dash of cold water for 
the President's scheme of benevolent assimilation of Mexican 
territory. He was in favor of taking and holding California as 
far as Monterey but no farther. "He was opposed, too," said 
the President, "to giving the inhabitants of Tamaulipas or of any 
of the Provinces South of New Mexico any encouragement to 
annex themselves to the U. S." Both Walker and Polk preferred 
to extend the boundary farther south, and the President was 
sorry to find his Secretary of State "entertaining opinions so 
contracted & sectional."^® 

About the same time, members of Congress gave the President 
no little annoyance by introducing resolutions of inquiry con- 
cerning the purposes of the war and the manner of conducting it. 
On June 29 the Senate had passed a resolution, introduced by 
Johnson, of Maryland, which called on the President for all 



30 Marcy to Taylor, July 9, 1846 (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 
333-336). 'Polk, Diary, II, 16-17. "I will preserve the original draft for 
future reference," Polk recorded in his diary, "should it become proper. 
I do this because it is a document of more than ordinary importance. ' ' 

37 Cong. Glole, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 1064. 

38 Polk, Diary, II, 15-16. 



438 JAMES K. POLE 

correspondence incident to the raising of volunteer troops. Polk 
sent for Johnson, on Jiily 6, and by showing him the correspond- 
ence convinced him that it would be unwise to comply, for the 
projected conquest of California would be revealed, and this 
Avould "excite the jealousy of England and France, who might 
interfere to prevent the accomplishing of our objects."^** For 
the purpose of ascertaining why nothing had been done by Tay- 
lor's army since the occupation of Matamoras, Hannegan, on 
July 8, introduced a resolution which purposed to ask the Presi- 
dent for information concerning all orders sent to the general 
since the ninth of May. By his renewal of friendship with Benton 
the President had procured an able defender, and the Missouri 
Senator was successful in sending this resolution to the table by 
asserting that if an officer should furnish the information sought 
he would be court-martialed and shot.'*" 

In truth, the executive departments had little information to 
impart. On August 1, Taylor answered the letter of July 9, 
which Benton and Polk had so carefully prepared, by saying that 
he had little to add to his dispatch of July second. He still de- 
clined to venture an opinion on the practicability of an expedi- 
tion against Vera Cruz, for the "Department of War must be 
much better informed than I am on that point." He told the 
President that he would obey his order to seek friendly inter- 
course with Mexican generals, and to induce the people to declare 
their independence, but he stated very frankly that he did not 
anticipate much success.*^ 

President Polk's subterranean diplomacy was not confined to 
an attempt to undermine the loyalty of Mexican generals and 
people. Since his conversations with Atocha, he had never quite 
abandoned the hope of making use of Santa Anna, and he now 
decided to assist the ex-dictator in regaining power in Mexico. 



39 /bid., 13-14. 

40 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 1068. 

41 Taylor to Polk, Aug. 1, 1846 (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 
336-338). 



WAB IN NOETHEEN MEXICO 439 

On May 13, 1846, two days after the President had sent his war 
message to Congress, Secretary Bancroft instructed Commodore 
Conner to blockade the Gulf ports of Mexico. At the same time, 
he inclosed a ' ' private and confidential ' ' order which read : "If 
Santa Anna endeavors to enter the Mexican ports, you will allow 
him to pass freely. ' ' Atocha, it will be remembered, had told Polk 
that Santa Anna would probably return to Mexico in April or 
May, and that he was in favor of ceding territory to the United 
States. Apparently the President had this conversation in mind 
when he caused Bancroft to issue the order to Conner.^'- 

Early in June Polk decided to send a special messenger to 
Havana for the purpose of learning the plans of Santa Anna. 
The messenger selected was Alexander Slidell Mackenzie, a naval 
officer and a nephew of John Slidell, the minister whom Mexico 
had rejected. He was furnished with a letter from Buchanan 
to Campbell, the United States consul at Havana, a copy of Ban- 
croft's confidential order to Conner, and verbal instructions from 
the President. Mackenzie gave the purport of these instructions 
when reporting to Buchanan the result of his interview with 
Santa Anna.^^ He arrived in Havana on July 5 and, by Camp- 
bell, was introduced to Santa Anna. From Polk's verbal instruc- 
tions he had prepared a memorandum, and this he read to the 
ex-President of Mexico. In substance it stated that the United 
States had taken up arms to redress its grievances and was deter- 
mined to prosecute the war with vigor, but that the President was 
desirous of ending the conflict speedily if an honorable peace 
could be made. Believing Santa Anna to be able and willing to 
make such a peace, ' ' the President of the United States would see 
with pleasure his restoration to power in Mexico. ' ' It was made 
clear that Polk would insist on the Rio Grande as the boundary 
of Texas and that he must at least have enough of California to 



42 Ibid., 744. Polk, Diary, I, 229. 

43 Mackenzie to Buchanan, June [July] 7, 1846 (duplicate in Polk 
Papers). This letter is printed in full in Reeves, Diplomacy under Tyler 
and Polk, 299-307. 



440 JAMES K. POLK 

include the port of San Francisco. For the hitter concession he 
would pay liberally, and his present intention was to demand 
no indemnity for the expenses of the war. Although, according 
to Mackenzie's account, Santa Anna aserted that the Nueces was 
the real boundary of Texas, he finally agreed to make all neces- 
sary concessions rather than see Mexico delivered into the hands 
of a foreign prince or continue under the monarchistic govern- 
ment of Paredes. He even suggested plans under which Taylor 
could most easily defeat the Mexican armies, and advised the 
occupation of Tamjiico. Mackenzie considered these suggestions 
of such importance that he exceeded his instructions and carried 
them directly to General Taylor. He had an interview with 
Taylor late in July,** but it is not likely that the general was 
influenced by Santa Anna's recommendations. 

Mackenzie 's report of his interview with Santa Anna, accord- 
ing to a note appended by Buchanan, reached Washington on 
the third of August. The President did not mention the subject 
in his diary either at the time of sending the messenger or when 
the report was received. In January, 1848, however, after he 
and his cabinet had decided not to include this report with other 
documents submitted in response to a call from the House, the 
President recorded his version of the mission. In this account 
Polk stated that he had given Mackenzie no written instructions, 
and that he had sent "no message" to Santa Anna. In reducing 
the conversation with the President to writing and in reading it 
to Santa Anna, the messenger had acted wholly without authority. 
As to whether Mackenzie's memorandum correctly reported his 
conversation with Polk, the record in the diary is somewhat am- 
biguous. "It is fortunate," is the President's comment, "that 
what he puts into my mouth could do me no injury, if it was 
genuine & was published ; but it would exhibit me in a ridiculous 
attitude." For this reason, he decided to withhold it from the 
House. *^ 



44Meado, Life and Lettrrs, I, 116. 45 Polk, Dkirn, III, 290-292. 



WAR IN NORTHERN MEXICO 441 

The President was eager to settle all differences with Mexico by 
diplomacy instead of war, provided he could obtain the territory 
he most coveted. Without waiting to learn the results of Mac- 
kenzie's mission, he made one more attempt to make a satisfactory 
treaty with the government of Paredes. On Sunday, July 20, he 
sent for Benton and read to him a dispatch which had been pre- 
pared by Buchanan. It was addressed to the Mexican Minister of 
Foreign Relations. Benton approved the dispatch and advised 
that it should be sent. A week later a revised copy was forwarded 
to Commodore Conner with instructions that it should be de- 
livered to the Mexican government. The document stated that 
the President was no less anxiou^ to terminate the w^ar than he 
had been to avoid it in the beginning. To accomplish this pur- 
pose he was ready to send an envoy who w^ould be clothed with 
power to make "a peace just and honorable for both parties." 
Should Mexico prefer to negotiate in Washington, her envoy 
would be treated with kindness. "In the present communica- 
tion," said Buchanan, "it is deemed useless and might prove 
injurious, to discuss the causes of the existing war. ' '*" 

Having decided to seek a settlement with Mexico through 
diplomatic channels, Polk revived the plan of asking Congress for 
money to be used in negotiating a treaty. When discussing with 
Benton the dispatch just mentioned, the President expressed the 
belief that he could procure both California and New Mexico if 
Congress would furnish him with two million dollars which might 
be paid to Mexico as soon as a treaty had been signed. Benton 
favored such an appropriation and advised Polk to consult with 
members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The President 
sent for McDuffie, Cass, and other members of the committee. 
He cited the appropriation which had enabled Jefferson to pur- 
chase Louisiana and urged the expediency of making a similar 
appropriation now. Archer, the Whig member, agreed to take 



*G Buchanan to Min. of For. Eel., July 27, 1846; Buchanan to Conner, 
same date {Seiu Ex. Doc. 107, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 2-3). The former is also 
in Buchanan, WorTcs, VII, 40. 



442 JAMES E. POLK 

the matter up with Senators of his party. Having thus paved 
the way, Polk sent a confidential message to the Senate on August 
4, 1846, and along with it, a copy of the dispatch already for- 
warded to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations. Believing 
that ' ' the best mode of securing perpetual peace and good neigh- 
borhood between the two Republics" would be the acquision of 
Mexican territory, he asked for an advance appropriation of two 
million dollars as a means of facilitating such an acquisition."*" 
After the Senate had given its approval, the message was trans- 
mitted to the House so that a bill might be drafted. 

As soon as the message had been read in the House, McKay, 
of North Carolina, presented a bill which provided that two 
million dollars be appropriated "for the purpose of defraying 
any extraordinary expenses which may be incurred in the inter- 
course between the United States and foreign nations," said 
money to be applied under the direction of the President. While 
Polk's plans for acquiring California were not, of course, gen- 
erally known at the time, the Whigs at once charged that the 
money was to be used for this purpose, either by direct purchase 
or indirectly by bribing Mexican officials. The necessarily indefi- 
nite wording of the bill gave ample room for partisan interpre- 
tations. White, of New York, was the most uncompromising 
critic of the President. He asserted that Polk himself had, in his 
war message, furnished abundant evidence that this war had 
been "projected, planned, and provoked" long before Congress 
had been consulted in the matter. He intimated, also, that the 
purpose of the bill was to extend slaveholding territory, and he 
challenged any Democrat to propose an amendment which would 
exclude slavery from the territory to be acquired. During the 
evening session of the same day Wilmot accepted this challenge 
by offering his famous "proviso" that slavery should not be 
permitted in any teritory to be obtained from Mexico. 



47 Polk, Dkiry, II, 50-G6. Kichardson, Messages, IV, 456. 



WAR IN NOBTHEEN MEXICO 443 

The position taken by John Quincy Adams is interesting. A 
violent opponent of the administration on nearly every occasion, 
he had supported Polk's claim to 54° 40' as the Oregon boundary, 
and he now warmly advocated the appropriation of the two mil- 
lion dollars for which the President had asked. For the sake of 
clearness, he asked McKay to substitute "Mexico" for "foreign 
nations," but, despite his sympathy with Wilmot's amendment, 
he was ready to "vote for the bill in any form." He did not 
believe an anti-slavery amendment to be necessary, for the insti- 
tution had been abolished by Mexico and would not be reestab- 
lished.*^ Based on the past, this was sound argument, but he 
could not forsee what the future would bring forth. 

The McKay bill, supplemented by the Wilmot amendment, 
passed the House by a vote of eighty-seven to sixty-four. On the 
day following, the last of the session, it was considered by the 
Senate, but Davis, of Massachusetts, prevented a vote on the 
measure by holding the floor until the session had expired. 
Whether the Senate would have pased the bill as amended we are, 
of course, unable to say, but the President believed that it would 
have struck out Wilmot's "mischievous & foolish amendment" 
and that the House would have concurred. "What connection 
slavery had with making peace with Mexico," said he, "it is 
difficult to conceive. ' ' In order to preclude all doubt concerning 
his motives, he confided to his diary an explicit statement of his 
reasons for requesting the advance appropriation.*^ 



48 "There are no slaves in California — slavery is abolished there; and 
if we were to make peace, and in that peace to acquire California, there 
could be no law of slavery established there, unless it was made an article 
of the treaty itself. ' ' 

49 "My object in asking this appropriation has not been fully stated in 
this diary. It was this. Mexico is indebted to the U. S. in a large sum, 
which she is unable to pay. There is also a disputed question of boundary. 
The two countries are now engaged in War. When peace is made the only 
indemnity which the U. S. can have will be a cession of territory. The U. S. 
desires to acquire Upper California, Ncav Mexico, and perhaps some territoi-y 
South of these Provinces. For a suitable cession of territory we are willing 
to assure the del)ts to our own citizens & to pay an additional consideration. 
My information induces the belief that Mexico would be willing to settle the 



444 . JAMES K. FOLK 

The disappointment which resulted from the defeat of the 
appropriation bill was somewhat assuaged by news of the con- 
quest of California which reached Washington on the last day 
of August. The welcome information and a copy of Sloat's 
proclamation were brought by a messenger who had just come 
from Mexico City bearing dispatches for the British minister. 
The diplomat reported the news to Buchanan immediately, and 
the President noted in his diary : ' ' This important intelligence 
comes to us through no other channel. "^° The conquest, however, 
was of little immediate value, for Polk was soon to learn that 
Mexico had declined to accept his proi¥ered "honorable peace." 

Santa Anna, and not Paredes, dictated the answer to 
Buchanan 's letter of July 27 in which Mexico was invited to open 
peace negotiations. Relying on Polk's assurances that he would 
not be molested, Santa Anna left Havana on August 8, 1846, on 



difficulty in this manner. No Government, however, it is believed, is strong 
enough to maJve a treaty ceding territory and long maintain power unless 
they could receive, at the time of making the treaty, money enough to sup- 
port the army. Whatever party can keep the army in its support can hold 
the power. The present Government is without any regular revenue, & 
without a prompt payment as a part of the consideration would not ven- 
ture to make a Treaty. Having no doubt that I could effect an adjustment 
of the pending war if I had tlie command of $2,000,000, I felt it to be my 
duty to ask such an appropriation. This I did in the first instance by a 
confidential communication made to the Senate iu Executive Session on the 
4th Instant. The Senate on the 6th Inst, passed resolutions approving my 
views and declaring that it was proper to make the appropriation asked. 
The Resolution approving my vieAvs passed the Senate by a vote of ayes 43 
to nays 2, and the Resolution approving the appropriation by yeas 33 to 
nays 19 ( ... ). With a full knowledge of all this Senator Davis had 
recourse to the desperate resort of speaking against time, to defeat a 
measure which he liad been unable to defeat by his vote. Had the appro- 
priation been passed I am confident I should have made an honorable peace 
by which we should have acquired California, & such other territory as Ave 
desired, before the end of October. Should the war be now protracted, the 
responsibility Avill fall more heavily upon the head of Senator Davis than 
upon any other man, and he will deserA'e the execrations of the country. 
I desired when I made the comnumication to the Senate in Executive Ses- 
sion, to consult that body in secret Session, to the end that the appropriation, 
if approved, should have been passed quietly and without attracting public 
attention, or exciting the jealousy of the PoAvers of Europe; but contrary 
to mv Avishes great publicity has been given to it by Congress" {Dairy, II, 
75-78). 

^-oibid., 108. 



WAB IN NOBTHEBN MEXICO 445 

board the British ship Arab, and eight days later he hmded in 
Vera Cruz. With him came Ahnonte, former minister to the 
United States, and Rejon and Basadre who had been members of 
his cabinet at the time he was forced to leave Mexico. The way 
had been prepared for his return by pronouncement of the troops, 
and General Salas, the commander-in-chief, stood ready to do 
the bidding of the returned exile. 

On the day of his arrival, August 16, Santa Anna issued an 
address which was filled with specious promises and high sound- 
ing phrases.®^ If these were to be accepted at face value, the 
ex-dictator had returned a sincere patriot and a champion of the 
Constitution of 1824, ready to subject himself "entirely to the 
decisions of the constitutent assembly, the organ of the sovereign 
will of the nation. ' ' For a time, Salas continued to act as chief 
executive while Santa Anna, the general-in-chief, sojourned at 
a country residence. But the late exile selected the cabinet and 
controlled the affairs of the nation. 

By the last of August internal affairs were adjusted suffi- 
ciently to enable the new government to consider the offer made 
by the United States. In reply to Buchanan's note Rejon, the 
new Secretary of Foreign Relations, said that the general-in-chief 
could not but ' ' fix his attention strongly ' ' on the passage in that 
note which suggested the omission of all discussion concerning 
the causes of the war. He felt himself unable to negotiate on 
such terms; and besides, he was obliged to postpone a definite 
answer until the Mexican congress had met on the sixth of Decem- 
ber."- This aggravating snub was Polk's reward for helping to 
reinstate Santa Anna in Mexico. Before many months had passed 
he had still greater reasons for regretting that he had listened 
to the advice of Atocha. 

Rejon 's letter reached Washington on September 19 and was 
considered by the President as a virtual refusal to negotiate. He 



51 A copy in translation, E. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., m-ldsD. 

52 Rejon to Buchanan, Aug. 31, 1846 {H. Ex. Doc. 4, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 43.) 



446 JAMES E. POLK 

at once decided that the character of the war should be changed 
so that the Mexican people might be made to feel the conse- 
quences of their government's refusal to make peace. The con- 
ciliatory policy of paying liberally for supplies was now to be 
changed for one of forcible seizures. The President directed 
that the towns in Tamaulipas should be occupied and that a 
descent should be made upon the coast at Tampico. Contrary 
to his usual custom of refraining from all labor on the Sabbath, 
Polk held cabinet meetings on September 20 in order to hasten 
aggressive movements against the enemy. Colonel SteveiLson, 
who had been put in command of the New York regiment destined 
for service in California, was reprimanded by the President be- 
cause his departure had been so long delayed, and Polk "inti- 
mated plainly to Col. S. that if further delay occurred he [I] 
would cause the officers who produced it to be arrested & tried." 
During the next few days much energy was devoted to war and 
naval preparations. Major-General Patterson was selected to 
command the Tampico exjDedition, and Pillow and Shields were 
chosen as his assistants. Polk gave personal attention to the 
quartermaster's department so that there might be no delay. 
The failure of his diplomatic overtures and the lax conduct of 
subordinates put the President in a petulant mood. He charged 
Whig officials with indifference regarding military operations, 
while General Scott, instead of being an aide to the War Depart- 
ment, was a constant embarrassment. ' ' I will observe his course, 
wrote the President in his diary, "and if necessary will order 
him to some other post.'"'^ 

While making preparations for war, Polk still left the way 
open for negotiations with Mexico. Under his direction, Bu- 
chanan, on September 26, prepared and sent a reply to Rejon's 
note of August 31. He charged the Mexican government with 
having distorted the meaning of his former letter. He told 
Rejon that "the President will now await with patience and 



53 Polk, Diary, II, 143-151. 



WAE IN NOrxTHEBN MEXICO 447 

with hope the final decision of the Mexican Government." He 
informed the minister, however, that in the meantime the war 
would be prosecuted vigorously, and there was a veiled threat 
that Mexico would be required to pay the costs. Buchanan's 
original draft had stated explicitly that Mexico must indemnify 
the United States for the expenses of the war, but Polk and 
Marcy deemed it politic to reserve this blunt demand until nego- 
tiations had opened.^"* Commodore Conner was instructed to 
notify Slidell at New Orleans immediately in the event that the 
Mexican government should at any time show a disposition to 
negotiate. ^^ 

From the middle of May, when he occupied Matamoras, until 
the first of September, General Taylor spent the time in training 
and equipping an army for an advance upon Monterey. Due 
to General Gaines's unauthorized call for volunteers, Taylor was 
overwhelmed with troops, but the quartermaster had failed to 
furnish him with adequate supplies or means of transportation. 
Commenting on the impatience felt by people in the United States, 
and even by volunteer troops, because the army did not advance 
into Mexico, Lieutenant Meade said in a letter : 

These wise people forget that soldiers cannot march or fight unless they 
have something to eat, and when in a country totally devoid of resources, 
they must carry with them the means of sustaining physical nature, and in 
consequence must have the means of carrying their provisions and other 
supplies. 

He thought that Scott was right in not wishing to go immediately 
to the Rio Grande, there to idle away his time "waiting for 
wagons and pork"; but "unfortunately, he [Scott] chose to 
ascribe political reasons to what, I believe, was simply military 
ignorance on the part of Mr. Polk. ' '"*' 



54 Polk, Diary, II, 156-158. Buchanan to Min. of For. Eel., Sept. 26, 
1846 ( H. Ex. Doc. 4, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 44-45). 

55 Buchanan to Conner, Oct. 1, 1846 {WorTcs, VII, 90). 

56 Meade, Life and Letters, I, 101-111. "This, with his 'hasty plate 
of soup, ' ' ' continued Meade, ' ' has ruined him forever, for it is much 
better in this country for a man to commit a gross crime than to make 
himself ridiculous; the former he may get over, the latter, never." 



448 JAMES K. POLK 

By the last of August Taylor had collected his invading force 
at Camargo, and within a few days his army was advancing on 
Monterey. The march was tedious, and on arriving at that place 
he found it to be well fortified. The attack upon the city began 
on September 20, and on the twenty-fourth Ampudia, the Mexican 
commander, offered to evacuate the city if Taylor would permit 
the troops to retain their arms and other movable property. 
Taylor at first demanded ' ' a complete surrender of the town and 
garrison, the latter as prisoners of war" ; but he finally consented 
to allow the Mexicans to inarch out with all of their arms and 
accoutrements. He also agreed to a truce of eight weeks, or 
until further orders had been received from their respective gov- 
ernments.''^ The period of inactivity was destined to be longer 
than that agreed ujion in the truce, for the President soon deter- 
minted to modify his plan of reducing Mexico to submission. 

The special messenger whom Taylor had dispatched with a 
report of the battle of Monterey reached Washington on Sunday, 
October 11, and the President was much displeased because the 
general had agreed to the armistice.^* At a cabinet meeting held 
on the following day all agreed that the general had committed 
a "great error." After the meeting, Polk noted in his diary : 

But two reasons could have justified the terms granted to the enemy 
in the capitulation. The first is, if he believed that he could not capture 
them; & the 2nd. is, that Gen '1 Ampudia may have induced him to believe 
that in consequence of the recent change of rulers in Mexico that Govern- 
ment Avas disposed to make peace. If the first reason existed Gen'l Taylor 
has not stated it in his despatches, and we have no information to justify 



57 Taylor's reports {K. Ex. Doo. 4, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 83-102). A good 
account of this battle is given in Eives, United States and Mexico, II, 
chap. 37. 

58 " In agreeing to this armistice Gen '1 Taylor violated his express 
orders & I regret that I cannot approve his course. He had the enemy in 
his power & should have taken them • prisoners, depriving them of their 
arms, discharge them on their parole of honour, and preserved the advan- 
tage which he had obtained by pushing on without delay further into the 
country, if the force at his command justified it. . . . It was a great 
mistake in Gen'l Taylor to agree to an armistice. It Avill only enable the 
Mexican army to reorganize and recruit so as to make another stand ' ' 
{Dmru, II, 181). 



WAR IN NOBTHEBN MEXICO 449 

the existence of this reason, though it may have existed. If the second 
reason was the one upon which he acted, then Gen'l Ampudia has over- 
reached & deceived him The Cabinet were united in the opinion 

that if Gen '1 Taylor had captured the Mexican army, deprived them of their 
arms, and discharged them upon their parole of honour not to bear arms 
during the war or until they were regularly exchanged, that it would have 

probably ended the war with Mexico It was agreed unanimously 

that orders should be forthwith sent to Gen'l Taylor to terminate the 
armistice to which he had agreed, and to prosecute the war with energy 
and vigor.59 

Taylor's agreement had, in fact, placed his government in a 
most awkward position, but the difficulty was due more to the 
slow means of communication than to bad judgment on the part 
of the general or the administration. On receipt of Rejon's letter 
Polk decided immediately, as we have already noted, to strike a 
blow at both northern Tamaulipas and Tampico, and Marcy,"** 
on September 22, notified Taylor of the change in the President 's 
plans. General Patterson was at the same time ordered by the 
President to invade Tamaulipas. To be sure Taylor had no knowl- 
edge of this arrangement when he made the agreement with 
Ampudia, but his armistice, if permitted to remain in force, would 
paralyze in a great measure the aggressive movement which had 
been assigned to Patterson. 

The letter in which Marcy instructed Taylor to terminate the 
armistice was not so drastic as the comments in Polk's diary 
would lead one to expect. In fact, it contained no phrase that 
should have given offense to the victorious general. The Presi- 
dent, he said, regretted that "it was not deemed advisable to 
insist upon the terms which you had first proposed," but he 
added that the "circumstances which dictated doubtless jus- 
tified the change." After explaining the new plan of campaign 
and the necessity of beginning operations at once, he instructed 
Taylor to give the notice necessary for ending the truce.®^ 



59 Polk, Diary, II, 183-184. 

60 H. Ex. Boo. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 341-343. 

«i Marcy to Taylor, Oct. 13, 1846 {ihid., 355-357). 



450 JAMES K. POLK 

Although nothing in Marcy's communication coukl reasonably 
be construed as a reflection upon Taylor, the ever-suspicious 
general drew from it evidence of a conspiracy to discredit him 
and to deprive him of his command. While admitting that 
Marcy's letter praised him, he detected in it a very cold tone. 
He believed that the administration was hostile to him simply 
because his friends had been indiscreet enough to connect his 
name with the Presidency.*'" In his reply to the War Department, 
he stated that with his limited force he could not have prevented 
the escape of the enemy from Monterey, and that his equipment 
did not warrant the pursuit of Ampudia into a country devoid 
of supplies. He admitted that he had been influenced, also, by 
Ampudia 's statement that Santa Anna was in favor of making 
peace, and with a thrust at the President, he added : " It is not 
unknown to the government that I had the very best reason for 
believing the statement of General Ampudia to be true. ' '''^ This 
pointed reference to Polk's part in the reinstatement of Santa 
Anna must have been read at the White House with anything but 
pleasure, yet Taylor could not be blamed for believing that the 
President desired, most of all, a peaceable adjustment with Mex- 
ico. All of his instructions had emphasized this point. He was 
aware of Polk's overtures to Santa Anna and of his recent offer to 
the Paredes government. Since he had not received Marcy's in- 
structions of September 22 his agreement with Ampudia accorded 
very well with the policy of his government, so far as he knew 
it at the time. Still, he had no reason to complain because he 
had been instructed to end the truce, and the political motives 
which dictated these instructions existed only in his own very 
active imagination. The main difficulty, as already stated, was 
the slow means of communication which made it impossible for 
either the general or the administration to know the conditions 



62 Taylor to Wood, Nov. 10, 184(5, Taylor Letters, 67. 

63 Taylor to Adj. Gen., Nov. 8, 1846 (If. Ex. Doe. 60, 30 Cong., 1 
sess., 359-360). 



WAB IN NOETHEEN MEXICO ' 451 

which governed the actions of the other. Even before the armis- 
tice had been disapproved, Taylor felt abused because the Presi- 
dent had tried to facilitate the advance upon Tamaulipas by send- 
ing orders directly to General Patterson,*'* but in this case, also, 
Polk's action was governed by military rather than political 
considerations. 

Santa Anna's declaration in favor of restoring the constitu- 
tion of 1824 led President Polk to abandon the hope of inducing 
the northern provinces of Mexico to declare their independence 
of the central government. Since the main purpose of Taylor's 
advance into Nueva Leon and Coahuila, and that of Wool into 
Chihuahua, had been to effect this separation, the President 
decided that both of these expeditions, especially the latter, had 
now become "comparatively unimportant." Accordingly he sug- 
gested at a cabinet meeting that Taylor should be authorized to 
remain at Monterey, and, if he saw fit, to order Wool to the same 
place. He suggested, also, that the most effective means of bring- 
ing Mexico to terms would be an invasion from Vera Cruz. Marcy 
embodied these views in a letter to Taylor and his letter was care- 
fully discussed at a special cabinet meeting. In the meantime 
Marcy 's draft had been shown to Scott whereupon the general 
expressed a desire to command the Vera Cruz expedition, and 
recommended an army of twenty-five or thirty thousand men. 
But Polk had not forgotten Scott's indiscreet letters, conse- 
quently the request was not granted. After a discussion of more 
than two hours instructions were agreed upon and delivered to 
Eobert M. McLane who had been selected as special messenger. 
They covered the points already noted, and the choice between 
remaining at Monterey or advancing into the interior was left 
entirely to Taylor's discretion. He was informed that General 



64"! conceive that this mode of regulating details and ordering detach- 
ments direct from the Department of War is a violation of the integrity of 
the chief command in the field, pregnant with the worst of evils, and against 
which I deem it my duty respectfully but earnestly to protest" (Taylor 
to Adj. Gen., Oct. 15, 1846, ibid., 354). 



452 JAMES K. POLE 

Patterson would probably command the Vera Cruz expedition, 
and he was asked to send about two thousand of his regulars to 
this commander, if, in his judgment, they could be spared. On 
the other hand, he was forbidden to send them if, in his opinion, 
his own position would be endangered.*"^ 



65 Polk, Diary, II, 198-205. Marcy to Taylor, Oct. 22, 1846 (H. Ex. 
Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 363-367). 



CHAPTER XIX 

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 

For some time after instructing Taylor to remain at Mon- 
terey the President remained undecided as to what policy he 
would pursue. He had difficulty in making up his mind whether, 
after the capture of Vera Cruz, the army should simply hold the 
territory in possession and wait for Mexico to treat, or whether 
an advance to Mexico City should be undertaken. Before any 
decision had been reached. Colonel Richard B. Mason was sent 
to California via Panama, and instructed to command the troops 
in that region until the arrival of General Kearny.^ 

Financial as well as military considerations impeded the 
formation of a definite war policy. Department estimates caused 
so much apprehension concerning the cost of the war that the 
number of volunteers asked for by Marcy was cut down from 
25,000 to 10,000 men. No decision had been reached as to whether 
the government should simply preserve the status quo, or "pro- 
secute the war into the heart of Mexico." Buchanan advocated 
the former policy and, apparently, Polk did not wish to decide 
the question either way until he had consulted the Senator from 
Missouri. Benton called by appointment on the same evening 
(November 7) and expressed himself as strongly in favor of 
taking Vera Cruz and of following this up with a crushing move- 
ment against Mexico City. To confine the military operations 
simply to holding the territory then in possession would, in his 
opinion, prolong the war and ruin the Democratic party; for 
"ours were a go-ahead people and .... our only policy either 



1 This action resulted from Polk's want of confidence in Colonel 
Stevenson who had been sent round the Horn with the New York volunteers 
(Polk, Diary, II, 209, 215). 



454 JAMES K. POLK 

to obtain a peace or save ourselves was to press the war boldly." 
He believed that commissioners vested with authority to offer 
peace, "before a battle, during the battle, & after it Avas over," 
should accompany the army headquarters, and he offered to be 
one of the number. Three days later the Senator suggested that 
some man of "talents and resources" and of military training 
ought to be made lieutenant-general, and he modestly offered to 
accept the position if it should be created by Congress. After 
alluding to his original preference for Van Buren he declared 
that he was now ready to give Polk his unqualified support. To 
make his declaration more emphatic, he reminded the President 
that he [Benton] had quarreled with General Jackson and had 
subseqiiently defended him "in the gloomy period of the Bank 
panic."- The would-be commissioner continued to urge the 
necessity of an advance upon the Mexican capital, but the Presi- 
dent was reluctant to undertake such an expedition if it could 
be avoided. By November 17, however, Polk had decided to 
attack Vera Cruz, although he still "considered it to be an open 
question, to be determined according to circumstances hereafter, 
whether a column should be sent from Vera Cruz against the 
City of Mexico." If, by that time, Mexico should decline to make 
peace, he would be "decidedly in favour" of taking the capital 
city.^ 

The selection of a commander for the Vera Cruz expedition 
caused the President great anxiety. He would gladly have chosen 
Benton ; but the Missouri Senator would not accept a rank lower 
than that of lieutenant-general, and there was no reason for be- 
lieving that Congress would create such an office. Polk had lost 
faith in Taylor's ability as a commanding officer. He had also 
come to regard him as the partisan dupe of Bailie Peyton and 
George W. Kendall, "who were cunning & shrewd men of more 
talents than himself, and had controlled him for political pur- 
poses. " " His constant effort has been to throw the responsibility 



2 Polk, Diary, II, 221-223, 227-228. 3 ibid., 241. 



CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 455 

of any disaster which might happen on the administration. In 
this he had been most ungrateful for the kindness which he has 
received at my hands." These impressions had been derived, in 
part, from Taylor's dispatches. In addition, Polk's mind had 
been poisoned by adverse criticisms contained in private letters 
written to him by his friend and benefactor, General Pillow.'* 
Taylor had quite a different story to tell about responsibility. 
He told Crittenden in a letter that : 

When it was supposed I was in great peril from which, had I not suc- 
ceeded in extricating myself, the administration & its friends were prepared 
to throw the whole responsibility on me — [by sajang that he had no 
authority to take a position on the Eio Grande]. s 

For some time Polk 's aversion for Scott precluded all thought 
of assigning him to the chief command. Scott had, in Sep- 
tember, requested that he might be sent to Mexico, and at 
that time his request was denied.'' "When, however, a majority 
of the cabinet, at a meeting held on November 17, reluctantly 
came to the conclusion that Scott ought to be appointed in spite 
of his faults, Polk consented to "think further on the subject," 
although "after his very exceptional letter in May last nothing 
but stern necessity and sense of public duty could induce me to 
place him at the head of so important [an] expedition." Benton 
was consulted, and when he, too, advised that, under present 
circumstances, Scott should be appointed, the President at last 
felt ' ' constrained to assign him to this command. ' ' When notified 
of his appointment Scott was, according to Polk's account, so 
grateful ' ' that he almost shed tears. ' '^ If so, his gratitude proved 
to be ephemeral. 



ilbkl., 227, 229, 236, 241. Peyton, it will be recalled, had been one of 
Polk's most hated political opponents in Tennessee. At this time he was a 
member of General Worth 's staff. Kendall was editor of the New Orleans 
Picayune and accompanied Taylor's army in the capacity of war cor- 
respondent. 

5 Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 15, 1846, Crittenden Papers. 

6 Scott to Marcy, Sept. 12; Marcy to Scott, Sept. 14, 1846 {H. Ex. Boo. 
60, 30 Cong., 1 sessL, 372-373). 

7 Polk, Biary, II, 241-245. 



456 JAMES K. POLK 

Meanwhile the President was busily engaged in preparing his 
annual message to Congress. The original draft was shown to 
Benton, and the Senator suggested certain alterations. 

In his Thirty Years' View, Benton stated that the draft con- 
tained a ''recommendation to Congress to cease the active pro- 
secution of the war, to occupy the conquered part of the coun- 
try (....) with troops in forts and stations, and to pass an 
act establishing a temporary government in the occupied part ; 
and to retain the possession until the peace was made." He 
stated further that he persuaded the President to give up the 
"sedentary project." Apparently these statements grossly ex- 
aggerated the facts, for they agree neither with the President's 
general war policy, nor with his own description of his original 
drafts. His diary for December 1 reads : 

I had proposed in my draft to submit to Congress the propriety, at the 
same time that the war should be vigorously prosecuted [italics mine] to 
establish a line of boundary securing to the TJ. S. a sufficient territory to 
afford indemnity for the expenses of the war, and to our citizens who hold 
pecuniary demands against Mexico. I proposed, also, that a more perman- 
ent Government should be provided by Congress over the conquered provinces 
than the temporary Governments which had been established by our own 
Military and Naval commanders according to the laws of war. Col. Benton 
thought these passages should be omitted, and submitted to me in writing 
the reasons for this opinion. 

Whether wise or unwise, these recommendations certainly did 
not advise a "sedentary" policy. The fact that Walker, who 
wanted all of Mexico, preferred Polk's draft to that of Benton is 
another indication that the President had no intention of ter- 
minating "the active prosecution of the war." Although no sug- 
gestion to this effect seems to have been included in Polk's draft, 
certain modifications were made in order to please the Missouri 
Senator, for otherwise it was feared that he would oppose, and 
probably could defeat, everything which the President was about 
to recommend.® 



8 Benton, Thirty Years' View, II, 693. Polk, Diary, II, 258-260. 



CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 457 

On December 7, 1846, the twenty-ninth Congress began its 
second session and, on the next day, received the President's 
annual message. In it Polk repelled the charge made by some 
of his opponents that the war with Mexico was unjust and un- 
necessary. "A more effectual means," said he, "could not have 
been devised to encourage the enemy and protract the war than 
to advocate and adhere to their cause, and thus give them 'aid and 
comfort.' " The intended application of this quotation from the 
constitutional definition of treason could not be misunderstood, 
and Polk at once became the object of violent denunciation. In 
order to disprove the charges that had been made, he gave a 
history of events leading up to the war, laying emphasis on the 
fact that Mexico had violated two treaties in which she had 
agreed to pay American claimants damages awarded to them by 
a joint commission. The first of these treaties was negotiated in 
1839. The second, which postponed the dates of payment, de- 
clared upon its face, said the President, that " 'this new arrange- 
ment is entered into for the accommodation of Mexico.' " "Not- 
withstanding this new convention was entered into at the request 
of Mexico" and for the purpose of relieving her from embarrass- 
ment, the claimants have only received the interest due on the 
30th of April, 1843, and three of the twenty installments." 



9 In this connection a letter of Waddy Thompson, who negotiated these 
treaties, is of interest : "In the unquestionable vindication of the Mexican 
war by the President I see that much prominence is given to two points both 
of which I claim exclusive credit of as they were both not only without 
instructions but in violations of the orders of the state department. By the 
Treaty of 1839 the Mexican government had the option to pay the awards 
in cash or in Treasury notes. These latter were worth then not more than 
20 cents in the dollar and now are worth even less. But the whole debt 
could have been paid Avith less than one fifth of its nominal amount. The 
brevity of a letter will not allow me to state to you tlie various means by 
which I managed to close the eyes of Mexico to the advantages which they 
possessed. But I did so and on my o^vn respoiunhility made a provisional 
arrangement subject to tlie ratification of my government. It was approved 
with certain alterations. Mr. Webster sent me the draft of a Treaty. 
The preamble stated that this new arrangement was made at the instance 
and desire of the American claimants. I took the responsibility of chang- 
ing this and stated in my despatch accompanying the Treaty that if Mexico 
failed to comply Avith the terms of the Treaty it Avould g\\Q us a much 
stronger justification for inforcing payment than if it had been stated in 



458 JAMES K. POLK 

The President maintained that tlie United States had had 
ample grounds for war long before the Mexican army crossed 
the Rio Grande. He asserted, also, that hostilities had not been 
precipitated by Taylor's advance to the western frontier, for 
"Mexico herself had never placed the war which she has waged 
upon the ground that our army occupied the intermediate ter- 
ritory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande." After an 
elaborate argument which proved, to his own satisfaction at least, 
the Rio Grande to be the rightful boundary of Texas, he said 
that it would be "difficult to justify the Executive, whose duty 
it is to see that the laws be faithfully executed if .... he had 
assumed the responsibility of yielding up the territory west of the 
Nueces. ' ' 

One passage in the message relating to conquered territories 
was subsequently attacked in the Senate. Having urged a 
vigorous prosecution of the war the President went on to say that : 

In the Provinces of New Mexico and of the Californias little, if any, 
further resistance is apprehended from the inliabitants to the temporary 
governments which have thus, from the necessity of the case and according 
to the laws of war, been established. It may be proper to provide for tlie 
security of these important conquests by making adequate appropriation 
for the purpose of erecting fortifications and defraying the expenses neces- 
sary incident to the maintenance of our possession and authority over them. 



the Treaty that the change in the Treaty had been made at the instance of 
the claimants. I see that it is so regarded by the President in his message. ' ' 
Concerning article six of the treaty of 1843, which Polk had also men- 
tioned, Thompson said: "The sixth clause of the Treaty which provides 
for a new convention for claims not then adjusted was inserted by me not 
only without instructions, but it was disapproved by Mr. Webster but 
nevertheless retained" (Thompson to Buchanan, Dec. 13, 1846, Buchaiuin 
Papers). In this same letter, Thompson spoke of letters whicli he and 
Webster had written to Bocanegra, Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations, 
in 1842. These are printed in the appendix of his book, BccoUcctions of 
Mexico. There Thomi)son agrees that Webster had Avritten his letter before 
having seen his [Thompson's], but in the letter to Buchanan he accuses 
Webster of plagiarism: "Mr. Webster stole my reply to Mr. Bocanegra 's 
letter to him and to the diplomatic corps and published it as his own — in 
a letter to me. He says in his letter to me endorsing his reply to Mr. 
Bocanegra that he had not received mine when he wrote his. In this he 
lied. That is the word and no other word will express the idea. He had 
received it & stole it, and then lied about it. Telling a falsehood to conceal 
a larceny — a petty larceny if you please — of tliis I have the proof. ' ' But cf . 
Recollections, 284-304. 



CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 459 

As will be seen later, some members of Congress interpreted this 
as a recommendation to provide for permanent possession, before 
any treaty had been made. 

So far as it related to the war, the message concluded with a 
renewal of the request for an appropriation of two million dollars 
to be used at the discretion of the President for diplomatic pur- 
poses. The reasons which had induced him to ask for that amount 
at the preceding session, said he, "still exist," and he believed 
that it would have been granted then if a vote had been taken. ^° 

When the message came up for discussion in the Senate, "West- 
cott, of Florida, moved that the part relating to conquered terri- 
tories, above quoted, be referred to the Committee on Territories. 
Benton objected, and a discussion ensued as to whether the Presi- 
dent's recommendation had contemplated the establishment of 
permanent governments. Westcott contended that no other mean- 
ing could be drawn from it, while Benton insisted that it meant 
nothing of the kind. No decision was reached, for, on motion 
made by Crittenden, the question was sent to the table.^^ 

In the House, Garrett Davis, of Kentucky, caused a heated 
debate by introducing a resolution which requested the President 
to submit for examination all orders to military and naval officers 
relating to the establishment of civil governments in the con- 
quered provinces. He had in mind, of course, the governments 
set up in New Mexico and California by General Kearny and 
Commodore Stockton, and he wished to know whether the acts of 
those officers had been authorized by the President ; if so, he 
demanded to know "by what imperial or regal authority his 
majesty undertook to act in the premises." If Polk, said Davis, 
had authorized the organization of civil governments in foreign 
provinces, he was guilty of usurpation ; and if the Santa Fe 
region was a part of Texas, as the message seemed to assert, then, 
the President had no right to set up a government over a portion 



10 Richardson, Messages, IV, 472-495. 

11 Co7ig. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 42-44. 



460 JAMES K. POLE 

of a sovereign state. Similar arguments were made by Schenck, 
of Ohio, and by other opponents of the administration. The 
defense of the President was led by Douglas, altho^igh many 
other Democrats rallied loyally to his support. After a week's 
debate, the resolution was passed on the fifteenth of December.^- 

The establishment of a government in California by Stockton 
and Fremont has already been discussed. A brief summary will 
indicate the objectionable features of Kearny's conquest of New 
Mexico which led the House to call upon the President for 
information. 

Leaving Fort Leavenworth late June, 1846, in command of a 

small force made up of United States dragoons and Missouri 

volunteers, Kearny reached Santa Fe on August 18 and, without 

resistance, took possession of the capital of New Mexico. Four 

days later a proclamation was issued in which Kearny announced 

that he would hold the department "as a part of the United 

States, and under the name of the 'territory of New Mexico.' " 

After promising a representative government at an early date, 

the proclamation added that 

The United States hereby absolves all persons residing within the boundaries 
of New Mexico from any further allegiance to the republic of Mexico, 
and hereby claims them as citizens of the United States. 

Before the end of September he had framed and put into opera- 
tion an elaborate civil government under the title of the ' ' Organic 
law for the territory of New Mexico. . . ."^^ 

Kearny's authority for thus assuming the role of lawgiver 
was based on the following confidential instructions sent to him 
by the Secretary of War on June 3, 1846: 

Should you conquer and take possession of New Mexico and Upper 
California, or considerable places in either, you will establish temporary 

civil governments therein You may assure tlie people of those 

provinces that it is the wish and design of the United States to provide 
for them a free government, Avith the least possible delay, similar to that 



12 ibid., 12-33. 

13 For the proclamation, "organic law," and other documents, see H. 



Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Oong., 1 sess., 169ff. 



CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 461 

which exists in our territories. They will then be called upon to exercise 
the rights of freemen in electing their own representatives to the terri- 
torial legislature. It is foreseen that what relates to the civil government 
will be a difficult part of your duty, and much must necessarily be left to 
your own discretion. i* 

The explicit directions given in this letter, supplemented as they 
were by wide discretionary powers, seem to give ample authority 
for the action taken by General Kearny. Furthermore, when 
Polk received the news, on October 2, that Kearnj^ had pro- 
claimed New Mexico to be ''a part of the United States," he 
noted in his diary that "Gen'l Kearny has thus far performed 
his duty well."^^ Whether, had no objections been raised, he 
would have given similar approval to the "organic law," we 
have no means of knowing. This document did not reach Wash- 
ington until November 23, and, according to their own state- 
ments, it was not examined by either Marcy or Polk until after 
information regarding it had been requested by the House.^"' 

Whatever he might have done with respect to Kearny's ter- 
ritorial governments had Congress interposed no objections, Polk 
now realized that part, at least, of Kearny's work could not be 
justified. At a cabinet meeting held on December 19, Buchanan 
expressed the opinion that the House resolution ought not to be 
answered, but the President decided to transmit the desired 
documents. In the evening he made the following comment : 

Among them was a document from Brigadier Gen'l Kearney, containing 
a form of Government over the conquered territory of New Mexico, which 
among other things declared that territory to be a part of the U. S. and 
provided for the election of a Delegate to the Congress of the U. S. In 
these and some other respects he exceeded the power of a military com- 
mander over a conquered territory. It was agreed that in my message to 
Congress I must disapprove this part of the Document, though, without 
censuring the Gen'l, who had misconceived the extent of his authority, 
but who had, no doubt, acted from patriotic motives. 



14 Marcy to Kearny, June 3, 1846 (ibid., 244). 

15 Polk, Diary, II, 169-170. 

i« Marcy 's report to the President, Dec. 21, 1846 (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 
Cong., 1 sess., 151). Polk's Message of Dec. 22, 1846. Nothing is said 
in the Diary about this document until the matter had been brought up in 
the House. 



462 JAMES K. POLK 

A message to this effect, with an additional statement that ' ' such 
excess has resulted in no practical injury," was sent to the House 
a few days later. And yet, not two months before this, the Presi- 
dent had expressed satisfaction because Kearny had proclaimed 
New Mexico to be a part of the United States !^' 

While awaiting information respecting territorial govern- 
ments, the House engaged in an acrimonious debate on the Presi- 
dent 's annual message and the causes of the war. Polk was 
assailed for having stated in his message that his opponents had, 
by their attacks upon the administration, been giving "aid and 
comfort" to the enemy. In turn, he was charged with having 
given ' ' aid and comfort ' ' to Santa Anna, the most powerful and 
unscrupulous of the enemies. Whigs averred that the President 
had wantonly plunged the country into a war of aggression in 
order to show the world ' ' who James K. Polk was. ' ' Even those 
who had voted for the declaration of war now asserted that the 
executive was conducting "an unconstitutional war." Most 
abusive of all was Gentry, of Tennessee. Polk, he said, was a 
"petty usurper" who "had come into power without the will 
of the people of these States, and almost without the wish or 
knowledge even of his own party ' ' ; and his message was ' ' nothing 
but a low demagogical attempt to deceive the nation — to tell just 
enough of the truth to cause the people to believe a lie." On 
the other hand the President was ably defended by his Demo- 
cratic supporters^* who maintained, not only that his message 
had given a true history of relations with Mexico, but that Polk's 
remark about giving ' ' aid and comfort ' ' to the enemy had been 
amply vindicated by utterances which were being made on the 
floor of the House. The receipt of the special message, accom- 
panied by the orders issued to military and naval officers, pro- 
duced no change in the character of the discussion. The Whigs 



17 Polk, Biarii, II, 170, 281-282. Richardson, Messages, IV, 506-507. 

18 In defending tlie President, Bayly, of Virginia, arraigned the argu- 
ments and the attitude of Garret Davis in sueh scathing terms that a chal- 
lenge followed. The arrest of Bavly bv the municipal authorities prevented 
a duel (Polk, Dmry, II, 297). 



CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 463 

still continued to fulminate against the ''President's war," and 
to characterize the establishment of civil governments in the con- 
quered provinces as an unwarranted assumption of unconstitu- 
tional powers. 

The man thus portrayed as a usurper whose imperial ambi- 
tions neither Congress nor the Constitution had been able to check 
believed himself to be hampered by want of adequate authority. 
Upon his shoulders rested the responsibility of military victory, 
yet the officers at his disposal were, in his opinion, disloyal to 
the administration and interested solely in their own political 
advancement. However erroneous this opinion may have been, 
there is no reason for doubting that Polk believed both Scott and 
Taylor to be incompetent and unreliable. Having arrived at the 
conclusion that Taylor was a "narrow minded, bigotted partisan" 
who had been ' ' made giddy with the idea of the Presidency, ' ' the 
chief executive felt the need of a commander more in sympathy 
with the administration. He had selected Scott to lead the attack 
on Vera Cruz, not because he had great confidence in the gen- 
eral's ability or his loyalty, but for the reason that Scott was the 
only man in the army "who by his rank could command Tay- 
Jqj. "19 rpj^g admixture of war and politics had created a dilemma 
from which the President saw but one avenue of escape, namely, 
to follow the advice of Benton, and ask Congress to authorize the 
appointment of a lieutenant-general. 

Before Scott had had time to reach the seat of war Polk began 
to sound members of Congress for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether a bill to create such an office could be passed. He even 
sent for Calhoun and asked his assistance, explaining that Benton 
would be appointed should Congress see fit to create the position. 
Calhoun, however, was "decidedly opposed to having such an 
officer,"-" and Polk's best friends doubted that Congress could 



19 Polk, Diary, II, 249, 277. 

20 Ibid., 282. Calhoun believed that the President was governed by 
political motives — by a desire to deal a blow at Taylor and Scott (Calhoun 
to Duff Green, April 17, 1847, Rep. Am. Hist. Assn., 1899, II, 727). 



464 JAMES K. POLK 

be induced to take favorable action. Indeed, the President him- 
self did not believe that the necessary law could be procured, but 
Benton urged him to make the recommendation, "and if Con- 
gress rejected it the responsibility would be theirs." Influenced 
partly by his own desire to have a Democratic commander and 
partly by the dread of Benton's opposition, Polk drafted a 
message on Christmas day in which he asked Congress for 
authority to appoint a lieutenant-general.-^ 

Although a bill for creating the coveted office was tabled by 
the Senate on January 15, the President by his action succeeded 
in retaining, for a time at least, the good will of the Missouri 
Senator. This in itself was of no small importance, for the de- 
fection of Calhoun and his coterie of adherents had converted 
the normal Democratic majority into a minority, and Benton 
wielded a far greater influence than did Calhoun. On the day 
that the Senate tabled the bill, Polk noted in his diary : 

With a large nominal majority in both Houses, I am practically in a 
minority. The several cliques & sections of the Democratic party are mani- 
festly more engaged in managing for their respective favourites in the next 
Presidential election, than they are in supporting the Government in pros- 
ecuting the war, or carrying out any of its great measures. The only 
corrective is in the hands of the people. I will do my duty to the country 
and rejoice that with my own voluntary free will & consent I am not to be 
a candidate. This determination is irrevocable.22 

He was greatly discouraged because Congress delayed legislation 
on war measures which he had recommended, among them pro- 
vision for ten additional regiments of regular troops. ' ' Instead, 
said he, "of acting upon the great measures of the country, they 
are spending day after day and week after week in a worse than 
useless discussion about slavery. ' '^^ His discomfort was increased 



21 "I found Col. B. fixed upon this point,." said the Diary. " If I do 
not propose it, it is manifest from my interview with him that both he 
and his friends will be greatly dissatisfied" (Polk, Diary, II, 275, 286, 293). 
The message was sent to Congress on December 29. 

221-bid., 328. 

2s Ibid., 334. He referred to the debate on King's slavery- restriction 
resolution introduced in the House on Jan. 4, 1847. 



CAMPAIGN AGAINST TEE CITY OF MEXICO 465 

by cabinet opposition to the advance upon the Mexican capital 
and to the acquisition of any territory except New Mexico and 
California, although the members believed that other northern 
provinces should be encouraged to declare their independence. 
Even Walker, who up to this time had advocated expansion on a 
large scale, now gave his approval to a restrictive policy. Donel- 
son, also, from his post at Berlin, entered a protest against unre- 
stricted expansion. Since war had come, he believed the Rio 
Grande boundary to be necessary and Upper California to be 
desirable ; but he was decidedly averse to holding central Mexico. 
Even California, in his opinion, was not indispensable, for it 
would eventually become an independent nation any way. He 
hoped that Polk would not listen to those who desired to incor- 
porate Mexico into the Union.-* 

On January 13, 1847, when the President was downcast be- 
cause of obstacles which impeded a vigorous prosecution of the 
war, a harbinger of peace appeared in the person of Colonel 
Atocha. He came not as an avowed agent of Santa Anna, but 
as one who professed to have intimate, though unofficial, knowl- 
edge of the plans and purposes of his crafty patron. He showed 
to Benton personal letters received from Santa Anna, Almonte, 
and Rejon, all of which expressed a desire for peace with the 
United States. With Atocha 's permission, Benton showed the 
letters to Polk and Buchanan. All agreed that he had been sent 
by Santa Anna as a confidential agent charged with the duty of 
ascertaining the terms on which Polk would make peace. When 
asked about the terms which would be agreeable to Santa Anna, 
Atocha said that Mexico would consent to the Rio Grande as 
the boundary of Texas, but "reserving a space of territory be- 
tween that River & the Nueces as a barrior between the two 

■ ^I'Tbid., 301. Donelson to Buchanan, Dec. 22, 1846 (rec'd Jan. 27, '47), 
Buchanan Papers. In a letter written two weeks later, he said that 
Europeans did not like Polk's message and were opposed to his war policy. 
They feared, he said, that Mexico, when defeated, would desire admission 
into the Union and would be admitted (Donelson to Buchanan, Jan. 8, 
1847, Buchanan Papers). 



466 JAMES K. POLK 

countries." He said, also, that Mexico would cede California for 
a consideration of fifteen or twenty million dollars, but on the 
subject of New Mexico he seemed to have no authority to speak. 
He advised that commissioners should meet in Havana and that, 
pending negotiations, the blockade at Vera Cruz should be raised. 
As a concession to Mexican pride, he urged that the invitation 
to negotiate should come from the United States. 

For several days the President held consultations with Benton 
and with members of the cabinet. Although willing to open peace 
negotiations, he rejected some of the suggestions which had been 
made by Atocha. New Mexico as well as California nnist be 
ceded to the United States, and the proposal to create a neutral 
zone between the Nueces and the Rio Grande must not be enter- 
tained. The blockade of Vera Cruz would not be raised until a 
treaty had been made, for if it were raised and no treaty resulted, 
the administration would be subjected to ridicule. At a cabinet 
meeting held on January 16 Buchanan was directed to prepare 
a letter to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations. In it the 
Mexican government was invited to appoint peace commissioners 
who were to meet similar representatives from the United States 
at either Havana or Jalapa. On seeing the letter, Atocha ob- 
jected to the passage which said that the war would be prosecuted 
vigorously until a treaty had been signed. On his suggestion, the 
President consented to vest the commissioners with authority, 
"in their discretion after meeting the Mexican commissioners," 
to raise the blockade and to suspend hostilities. The letter was 
so modified and delivered to Atocha, and Secretary Walker 
arranged to have a revenue cutter convey him from New Orleans 
to Vera Cruz. He was not regarded as an official bearer of dis- 
patches but as "an individual to whom a sealed letter was 
entrusted to be delivered."-^ 



25 Polk, Diani, ir, 323, 325-327, 331-334, 335-336, 339. The letter to 
the Mexican Minister is printed in Buchanan, Works, VII, 198-199, also in 
Sen. Ex. Bog. 1, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 3(5. 



CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 407 

Polk's desire for a diplomatic victory was strengthened by 
obstacles which seemed to preclude military success. Congress 
appeared to be more interested in practical politics than in 
"strengthening the Executive arm," and the President had no 
faith in either the competency or the loyalty of his commanders 
in the field. Coincident with Scott's arrival in New Orleans on 
his way to the seat of war the newspapers of that city published 
a full account of the administration's plan of campaign. No 
one except the general could have imparted the infonnation, 
and the President at once attributed this violation of secrecy to 
Scott's "inordinate vanity. "-° To cap the climax a New York 
newspaper published a letter, written by Taylor to Gaines, in 
which the administration was denounced and its military plans 
completely exposed.-' Apparently the "Whig generals" were 
determined to prevent the Mexican army from being taken by 
surprise. In his private letters, Taylor said that keeping him 
"in the dark" seemed to be the "great object" of the adminis- 
tration,-- and generosity may have led him to protect his Mexican 
adversaries from similar annoyance ! 

The President decided that the administration could be vindi- 
cated most effectively by the publication of all correspondence 
which had passed between Taylor and the War Department, and, 
evidently by his request, a resolution calling for these documents 
was introduced in the House by Thompson, of Mississippi.-^ 
Ashmun, of Massachusetts, offered an amendment which solicited 
information concerning the secret agent who had been sent to 
confer with Santa Anna at Havana. This amendment and the 



2e Ihid., 327-328. "I have no doubt," Polk wrote a few weeks later, 
"the Mexican Government and Military commanders are as well apprised 
of the secret instructions which were given to Gen'l Scott when he left 
Washington as he is himself. His vanity is such that he could not keep 
the most important secrets of the Government which were given to him ' ' 
{ibid., 393-394). 

27 Ibid., 393-394. 

28 Taylor to Wood, Jan. 26, 1847, Taylor Letters, 82. 

29 Polk, Diarij, II, 362. Cong. Globe, 22 Cong., 2 sess., 296. Taylor 
was reminded by Marcy (Jan. 27) that his offense had made him liable to 
dismissal (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess, 391). 



468 JAMES K. POLK 

appointment of the returned exile to the position of "lieutenant 
general for Mexico" gave an opportunity for a new assault upon 
tlie President, although the speakers were unable to add many 
items to the catalog of iniquities which they had been compiling 
since the opening of the session. 

The Thompson resolution was passed by the House and the 
correspondence was published, yet Congress seemed unwilling to 
cooperate with the President by enacting the laws which he had 
recommended. "I am in the unenviable position," he wrote on 
February 5, "of being held responsible for the conduct of the 
Mexican War, when I have no support either from Congress or 
from the two officers (Scott & Taylor) highest in command in 
the field. How long this state of things will continue I cannot 
forsee." For this state of affairs he blamed factious members 
of his own party who were more interested in the next Presi- 
dential election than in the welfare of the country. Said he : 

In truth faction rules the hour, while principles & patriotism is for- 
gotten. While the Democratic party are thus distracted and divided and 
are playing this foolish and suicidal game, the Federal Party are united 
and never fail to unite vs^ith the minority of the Democratic party, or any 
faction of it who may break off from the body of their party, and thus 
postpone and defeat all my measures.so 

This statement was verified within the next few days when Cal- 
houn and his friends united with Wliigs in temporarily blocking 
the passage of a bill for raising ten additional regiments of 
troops. As a result Polk now regarded Calhoun as the "most 
mischievous man in the Senate," and he attributed the South 
Carolinian's hostility to the fact that he had not been retained 
in the cabinet.^^ Senator Turney, a friend of the President, 
charged Calhoun with impeding necessary legislation by depriv- 
ing his party of a majority in the Senate. He proclaimed this 
fact to the people so that they might "place the responsibility 
exactly in the proper quarter."^- However, the rejection of the 



30 Polk, Diary, II, 368. 

31 Ibid., 371-372. 32 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 395. 



CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 469 

ten-regiment bill, as reported from the conference committee, 
proved not to be final ; after a reconsideration, it was passed by 
the Senate on the tenth of February. Congress had already 
authorized the emission of twenty-three million dollars in treas- 
ury notes, for war purposes. The satisfaction which Polk ex- 
perienced as a result of this new turn of events was counter- 
balanced by his disgust because members of Congress demanded 
for their personal friends all offices which had been created by 
the military bill. ''Take the day altogether," he wrote on Feb- 
ruary 15, ''I am sure I have never been so wearied and annoyed 
in my life."^^ 

When the Senate voted, in the first instance, to reject the ten- 
regiment bill, the Washington Unian characterized this action as 
' ' Another Mexican Victory ' ' : 

If Santa Anna, Ampudia, or any other Mexican general could snatch 
from our soldiers a corresponding victory, we should place them upon the 
same elevation where their compatriots, friends, and fellow-soldiers in the 
Senate of the United States now stand. 

By a resolution passed on February 13 the editors, Ritchie and 
Heiss, were denied admission to the floor of the Senate— an action 
concerning which the President wrote : 

It is a second Duane case, & strikes a blow at the liberty of the press. 
The foul deed was perpetrated by the votes of the undivided Federal 
Senators, and Senators Calhoun & Butler of S. C. & Yulee & Wescott of 
Florida.34 

On March 3, 1847, the twenty-ninth Congress ended its labors. 
Although Polk's opponents had filled pages of the Congressional 
Globe in charging him with miscellaneous crimes and misde- 
meanors, he had nevertheless been provided with men and money 
so that he might continue his "unholy war" against Mexico. 
The bill for granting him three million dollars to be used in 
negotiating a peace was also enacted into law, but not until the 
"Wilmot proviso," which sought to exclude slavery from all 
territory to be acquired, had been rejected by both houses. 

33 Polk, Diary, II, 380. 

34 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., S92, 417. Polk, Biarij, II, 378. 



470 JAMES K. POLK 

During the last evening of the session, while the President 
was at the capitol for the purpose of signing bills, an incident 
occurred which tested not only his patience but his courage as 
well. Among the bills wdiich were expected to pass was one 
authorizing the appointment of two major-generals and three 
brigadier-generals. His original intention had been to ignore 
New York, when filling these positions, for he knew that he could 
not satisfy both Democratic factions in that state — one led by 
Marcy and the other by Senator Dix, the close friend of Van 
Buren. However, Marcy insisted that one of the lesser positions 
should be given to his friend. General Clark, while Dix emphati- 
cally opposed the appointment. As a compromise, Polk decided 
to appoint Enos D. Hopping, who, although affiliated with the 
Marcy faction, had been recommended for a colonelcy by both 
wings of the party. Although both Marcy and Senator Dickenson 
threatened to resign if CUark were not appointed, Polk defied 
their attempt to "bully" him, and appointed Hopping as soon 
as the bill had been signed. "I had become perfectly indiffer- 
ent," was his comment, "wdiether Mr. Dickinson and Mr. Marcy 
resigned or not. I knew^ that neither of them could be sustained 
in such a course for such a cause. "^° 

Among the appointments made and confirmed during the clos- 
ing hours of the session was that of Bentou as major-general. 
He had solicited the appointment, and had, at the time, attached 
no conditions to his acceptance, but it soon developed that he 
had no intention of serving unless the President would assign him 
to the chief command of the army and invest him with ' ' plenary 
Diplomatic powers to conclude a Treaty of peace." The cabinet 
objected to clothing Benton with diplomatic powers, and, besides, 
Polk himself had planned to send Buchanan as commissioner, 
should Mexico consent to negotiate. He would gladly have put 
Benton at the head of the army if he could have done so witliout 
recalling the four major-generals already in the field. According 



35 Polk, Diaru, II, 399-405 



CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 471 

to his own statement, he would ''have no hesitation" so far 
as Scott and Taylor were concerned, but he thought it would 
be unjust to recall Butler and Patterson. When informed of the 
President 's decision, Benton declined to accept the appointment.^'' 

Polk was ready to go a long way to avoid offending the Mis- 
souri Senator, for Benton was the only man in public life for 
whom he seemed to harbor a feeling of awe.^' He was influenced 
still more, however, by his aversion for the Whig generals and 
by his desire to transfer the chief command to a member of his 
own party. At the time that Benton was appointed, Polk was 
especially hostile to General Scott on account of alleged discrimi- 
nation against Democratic officers. ^^ 

Since the congressional batteries had ceased their "fire upon 
his rear, ' ' the President could devote more attention to the enemy 
across the Rio Grande. After consultation with Benton and the 
cabinet he decided to raise the blockade of the Mexican ports and 
to substitute a tariff, the proceeds of which were to be used for 
war purposes. He took steps to hasten the recruiting and equip- 
ping of the new regiments which Congress had voted, and to 
eliminate the "extravagance & stupidity" of the quartermaster's 
department. ^^ 



z<->Ihid., 406-413. 

37 But there were limits to his concessions. It was about this time 
that he refused to appoint Benton's son-in-law (Jones) to office, because 
he ' ' was a short time ago the editor of a Federal paper in New Orleans ' ' 
(ibid., 455). 

38 He had, said the President, "arbitrarily & without cause" degraded 
Colonel Harney, of Tennessee. " Gen '1 Taylor had acted with the same 
proscriptive spirit, not only towards Col. Harney, bvit other gallant 
Democratic officers. ' ' Against the advice of his cabinet, Polk directed 
that Harney should be restored: "I told the Secretary of War that if 
he was unwilling to write the letter ... I would do it myself. ... I 
am resolved that Col. Harney shall not be sacrificed to propitiate the 
personal or political malice of Gen'l Scott" (ibid., 384-386). 

39 ' ' The truth is, ' ' he wrote, ' ' that the old army officers have become 
so in the habit of enjoying their ease, sitting in parlours and on carpeted 
floors, that most of them have no energy, and are content to jog on in a 
regular routine without knowing whether they are taking care of the public 
interest or not" (ibid., 431). 



472 JAMES K. POLK 

While the President's mind was thus engrossed with details 
concerning military contracts and pack-mules, Atocha returned 
to Washington, on March 20, bearing Mexico 's reply to his offer 
to negotiate a peace. "The question of Texas," said the Minister 
of Foreign Relations, "was a cover to ulterior designs, which 
now stand disclosed" ; nevertheless his government would "accede 
cheerfully" to the invitation to appoint commissioners, but such 
appointment would not be made "unless the raising of the block- 
ade of our ports and the complete evacuation of the territory of 
the Republic by the invading forces shall be previously accepted 
as a preliminary condition. "^° 

For the present this communication put an end to all hope 
of a peaceable adjustment, for Polk at once declared the condi- 
tions to be "wholly inadmissible," leaving no alternative but a 
"crushing movement" against Mexico. Buchanan interposed ob- 
jections to an advance upon the Mexican capital, but 

I [Polk] replied that I differed with him in opinion, & that I would 
not. only march to the City of Mexico, but that I would pursue Santa 
Anna's army wherever it was, and capture or destroy it. I expressed the 
opinion that if I had a proper commander of the army, who would lay 
aside the technical rules of war to be found in books, which required a 
long train of baggage wagons; one who would go light & move rapidly, 
I had no doubt Santa Anna & his whole army could be destroyeil or 
captured in a short time. 

On the same evening rumors reached Washington that Taylor's 
army was in great danger, consequently the President Avas still 
•more determined to deal Santa Anna a speedy and crushing 
blow." 

It is necessary at this point to turn aside from the adminis- 
trative side of the war in order to give a brief sketch of the 
military operations of Kearny in California, and of Scott in his 
campaign from Vera Cruz to Mexico City. 



40Monasterio to Buchanan, Feb. 22, 1847 {Sen,. Ex. Doc. 1, 30 Cong., 
1 sess., 37-38). Also, Buchanan. Works. VII, 223-224. 
41 Polk, Diary, II, 432-434. 



CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 473 

On September 25, 1846, having put his "organic law" in 
operation in New Mexico, Kearny, with a force of three hundred 
dragoons, set out for California. At Socorro, on October 6, he 
met the scout. Kit Carson, who was on his way to Washington 
with dispatches from Stockton and Fremont announcing the con- 
quest of California and the subjugation of its inhabitants.^- As 
this news seemed to indicate that no further trouble was to be 
expected, Kearny sent back two hundred of his dragoons, and 
retained but one hundred as a personal escort. He forwarded 
the dispatches by another messenger, and Carson (much against 
his will) was required to guide the way to California. 

Reaching the junction of the Colorado and Gila rivers on 
November 23, Kearny's army intercepted a messenger bearing 
mail from California to Sonora, and from the letters examined, 
Kearny received his first intelligence of the uprising of the Cali- 
fornians under General Flores." On December 2 he reached 
Warner's rancho, the most eastern settlement in California. Here 
he was visited by an Englishman named Stokes, who volunteered 
to carry a letter to Commodore Stockton, at San Diego. On 
receipt of this letter (December 3) Stockton sent a small force 
of thirty-nine men, under Captain Gillespie, to cooperate with 
Kearny. At San Pascual, on December 6, Kearny's army fought 
a battle with a Mexican force under Captain Andres Pico. A 
greater number of Americans than Mexicans were killed, but as 
Pico retreated, leaving Kearny in possession of the field, it was 
called a victory.** As soon as the troops had recovered suffi- 
ciently, Kearny proceeded on his way to the coast. At several 



■12 Porter, General Stephen W. Kearny and the Conquest of California, 
11. This interesting pamphlet is a strong defense of Kearny's conduct 
in California. 

43 Emory, Notes of a Military Beconnoissance ; H. Ex. Doc. 41, 30 Oong., 
1 sess., 96. This document gives a detailed account of Kearny's march 
from Ft. Leavenworth to San Diego. 

44 Bancroft, Hist, of California, V, 341 ff. See also Porter, op. cit., who 
criticizes Bancroft and defends Kearny. 



474 JAMES K. POLK 

points Pico harassed his little army ; but on the evening of De- 
cember 10 he was met by a body of marines sent by Stockton, and 
two days later he reached San Diego in safety.*^ 

Kearny's instructions, as we have seen, authorized him to 
take possession of California and to establish a temporary civil 
government. All orders relating to that country which were 
issued by the War Department clearly indicated that the Presi- 
dent desired Kearny to have the chief command as soon as he 
had reached California. Despite this fact Stockton, who had 
constituted himself ' ' commander-in-chief and governor, ' ' declined 
to surrender the command, even after Kearny had exhibited his 
instructions, and until the arrival of other land forces, the general 
was not in a position to assert his rights. He declined to accept 
a subordinate command under Stockton, yet in the "second con- 
quest" of California, which soon followed his arrival, he loyally 
cooperated with the commodore. 

When Kearny reached San Diego he found the country, ex- 
cept a few of the seaports, in possession of the Flores revolution- 
ists, whose headquarters were at Los Angeles. It had already 
been planned that Fremont should attack Los Angeles from the 
north. After consulting with Kearny, Stockton decided to move 
north from San Diego for the purpose of striking Los Angeles 
from the south. Having made the necessary preparations the 
army left San Diego on December 29 under the nominal com- 
mand of Stockton, although Kearny seems actually to have di- 
rected the operations. An engagement occurred on January 8 at 
San Gabriel River, and another on the following day near Los 
Angeles. Flores and Pico now abandoned that city ; the former 
fled to Mexico, while the latter moved northward and surrendered 
to Fremont on favorable terms. Although Stockton and Kearny 
were displeased with Fremont's assumption of authority in grant- 
ing these terms to the enemy, they decided to avoid further 



■i-' Emory, Notes, etc., 112-113. 



CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 475 

trouble by ratifying the agreement.**'' The ' ' second conquest ' ' of 
California was now complete, and no further resistance was 
offered to the authority of the United States. 

Stockton and Fremont, still ignoring General Kearny 'sauthor- 
ity, proceeded once more to set up a civil government. Kearny re- 
turned to San Diego, and soon after repaired to Monterey, where 
he found Commodore Shubrick, the successor of Stockton. Shu- 
brick promptly recognized Kearny's authority, and the general 
took steps to organize a civil government. Monterey was made 
the capital city and on March 1, 1847, Kearny assumed the office 
of governor. Having put the government in operation, he turned 
it over to Colonel Richard B. Mason, on May 31, and set out for 
Washington. By his order, Fremont accompanied him, under 
separate escort, and at Fort Leavenworth the pathfinder was 
put under arrest and ordered to report to the adjutant-general 
in Washington.'*' Both arrived at the capital city about the 
middle of September and laid their respective complaints before 
the Government. President Polk w^as very favorably impressed 
with Kearny. He regarded the general as ''a good officer & an 
intelligent gentleman" and one who had "performed valuable 
and important services in his late expedition to New Mexico & 
California. ' '*® 

After Kearny had filed charges against Fremont, Polk dis- 
cussed with the cabinet the propriety of constituting a court of 
inquiry instead of a court-martial. The latter tribunal was se- 
lected. Benton and his son-in-law, William Carey Jones, en- 
deavored to have the scope of investigation broadened so that 
Fremont might bring counter charges against his opponents, but 
Polk would grant no favors even though he expected that his 
refusal would subject him to the wrath of the whole Benton 



46 Porter, o/>. cit., 25-29. 

47 Bancroft, Hist, of Cal., V, 451-452. Porter, op. cit., 32-33. 

48 Polk, Diary, III, 168, 175. 



476 JAMES K. POLK 

clan.*^ Fremont was convicted and sentenced to dismissal from 
the army. The President approved the sentence of the court, 
except on the charge of mutiny, but remitted the penalty and 
ordered Fremont to report for duty. The pathfinder, however, 
declined to accept this clemency, and sent in his resignation. As 
the President had anticipated, approval of the court's verdict 
caused an immediate break with Benton. All intercourse be- 
tween the two men ceased as soon as Polk's decision was an- 
nounced. About a year later a member of the Blair family told 
Secretary ]\Iason that Benton was about to publish one of Polk's 
letters which would injure him in the eyes of the public. Unter- 
rified by the threat, the President noted in his diary : 

I told Judge Mason that lie had no such letter. I do not know what 
this means. I am, however, at the defiance of both Blair & Benton. The 
former has proved himself to be unprincipled and the latter, I fear, is no 
better. From the day I approved the sentence of the Court martial in 
Col. Fremont's case, Col. Benton, for no other cause than that I dared to 
do my duty, has been exceedingly hostile to me. He has not called on me, 
nor have I spoken to him for more than twelve months. [Also, February 
10, 1849.] There is every indication now that he [Benton] will join the 
Whigs in the support of Gen '1 Taylor, at all events until he can get ofilces 
for his three sons-indaw. If I had failed to do my duty in Col. Fremont's 
case, and given an ofiiee which he sought for his Whig son-in-law (Jones) 
he would never have quarreled with me. His course towards me and my 
administration for more than a year past has been selfish and wholly 
unprincipled.50 

It was mainly on Benton 's recommendation tliat Kearny had 
been selected to lead the expedition to California, yet, after the 



43" I have always been upon good terms "'ith Col. Benton," Polk noted 
in his diary, ' ' but he is a man of violent passions and I should not be sur- 
prised if he became my enemy because all his wishes in reference to his 
family" are not gratified. . .". "I am resolved that Col. Fremont shall 
be tried as all other ofiiccrs are tried. I will grant him no favours or 
privileges which I would not grant to any other officer, even though I should 
incur liis displeasure & that of his friends by refusing to do so" {ihid., 
177, 198, 204). See also page 203 where John Eandolph Benton, the 
Senator's son, threatened Polk for declining to give him an office. 

•"'O Polk, Diary, IV, 227, 330. For Benton's account of the court-martial, 
see his Thirty Years' View, II, 715-719. 



CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 477 

court-martial, the Senator embraced every opportunity to deal 
a blow at his former friend. When, in August, 1848, Polk nomi- 
nated Kearny to be brevet major-general, Benton declared that 
he would "speak out the balance of the Session, and defeat all 
public measures before Congress, rather than suffer the vote on 
Gen'l Kearny's nomination to be taken." In fulfillment of this 
threat he harangued the Senate for thirteen days with execration 
of Kearny and laudation of Fremont, at the end of which he an- 
nounced that he would "break off," although he had not finished 
a third of what he had intended to say.'^^ His effort failed to 
produce the desired result, for Kearny's appointment was con- 
firmed and he repaired to Mexico for service under Scott. 

As already noted, Scott was chosen to supersede Taylor after 
Congress refused to create the position of lieutenant-general. He 
received notice of his appointment on November 18, 1846, and 
within a few days he was on his way to Mexico. From New York 
lie sent an effusive letter to Taylor — praising that general's gal- 
lantry and achievements but notifying him that he would be 
deprived of a large part of his army. He realized that his action 
would be ' ' infinitely painful ' ' to Taylor, but he relied upon the 
general's "patriotism to submit to the temporarj^ sacrifice with 
cheerfulness."'^' According to the plans of operation decidgf 
upon in Washington before Scott's departure,! Taylor's duties 
were to be confined to holding the territory already conquered, 
yet, as will soon appear, Scott greatly misjudged the cheerfulness 
with which Taylor would leave himself exposed to attacks of the 
enemy. 

On November 12, nearly two weeks befoi-e Scott had written 
from New York, Taylor informed the War Department that he 



51 "I mean to sliow, " he said, "that this brevet nomination of Gen- 
eral Kearny ought to be rejected; tliat the affair of San Pasqual was a 
disastrous defeat, through his mismanagement; that his conduct in New 
Mexico was unfortunate, and in California criminal ; and that infamy, not 
honor, settles upon his name" (Polk, Diary, IV, 59. Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 
1 sess., App., 977-1040). 

52 Scott to Taylor, Nov. 25, 1846 {H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 373). 



478 JAMES E. POLK 

was about to press forward into the enemy's country. As late 
as January 7, 1847, he was only ''unofficially advised" of Scott's 
presence in Mexico. By that time he had driven the ]\Iexicans 
from Saltillo, Parras, and Victoria, while Commodore Perry had 
captured the port of Tampico.'^^ 

Although Scott arrived in New Orleans on December 19, it 
was not until the middle of January that his several communi- 
cations reached Taylor, and that the victorious general learned 
that he was to be deprived of a large part of his army. With his 
usual indiscretion, Scott had not only disclosed his plans to the 
newspapers while at New Orleans, but when giving orders to his 
subordinates, he intimated that Taylor was purposely keeping 
at a distance so that he might avoid the orders of his superior. 
In a letter written to Scott, Taylor indignantly repelled this 
insinuation and complained of being left to face an enemy twenty 
thousand strong with only a thousand regulars and a few vol- 
unteers. "I cannot," he wrote, 

misunderstauil the object of the arrangements indicated in your letters. 
I feel that I have lost the confidence of the government, or it would not 
have suffered me to remain, up to this time, ignorant of its intentions, with 
so vitally affecting interests committed to my charge. 

He felt "personally mortified and outraged" by such treatment, 
yet he promised to obey the orders of his government so long as 
he remained in Mexico. Soon after this, in a letter to the ad- 
jutant-general, he gave vent to his resentment because he had not 
been notified by special messenger of the government's determi- 
nation to supersede him. He had been assigned to the command 
by the President, and had he "chosen to be punctilious," he 
would have declined to part with his troops without direct orders 
from the same authority. However, he had decided not to follow 
this course, and his only regret was that the ' ' President did not 
think proper ... to relieve me from a position where I can no 
longer serve the country with that assurance of confidence and 



53 Letters of Taylor to Adj. Gen. (ihid., 374-3J 



CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 479 

support so indispensable to success." He requested that this 
letter might be submitted to the President.^* By this time 
Taylor was thinking of serving the country in another capacity. 
Nearly two months earlier he had decided to accept the nomi- 
nation for the Presidency, should it be tendered to him."'^ 

Scott's answer to Taylor's letter was conciliatory in tone. 
He passed over the caustic remarks which it contained by ex- 
pressing a ' ' wish to forget them. ' ' After explaining that condi- 
tions had made it necessary to deal directly with Taylor's subor- 
dinates without previously consulting him, he asked the general 
to abandon Saltillo and to make no detachments, except for 
reconnoissance beyond Monterey.^® 

A few days after Scott had sent this letter, and before it had 
reached its destination, Taylor received word that a reconnoi- 
tering party which he had sent out on the road to San Luis Potosi 
had been captured. He considered this disaster to be a direct 
result of the "intrigue" of Marcy and Scott to discredit him, 
and he resolved to fight Santa Anna, ' ' be the consequences what 
they may. "^^ His determination to hold Saltillo at all hazards 
was not altered by the receipt of Scott's letter asking him to 
withdraw to Monterey. It reached him while he was at Agua 
Nueva, eighteen miles beyond Saltillo, and he notified Scott that 
he would remain there unless "positively ordered to fall back 
by the government at Washington. "^^ In a private letter he 
alluded to the correspondence with Scott and said that "he & 
myself now understand each other perfectly, & there can for the 
future be none other than official intercourse between us." His 



54 Taylor to Scott, Jan. 15; Taylor to Adj. Gen., Jan. 27, 1847 {ibid., 
863, 1101). 

55 Taylor to Wood, Dec. 10, 1846, Taylor Letters, 76. 

56 Scott to Taylor, Jan. 26, 1847 (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 864). 

57 < ' We now begin to see the fruits of the arrangements recently made 
in Washington, by an intrigue of Marcy, Scott & Worth to take from me 
nearly the whole of the regular forces under my command, while in the 
immediate front of the enemy if not in their presence" (Taylor to Wood, 
Jan. 30, 1847, Taylor Letters, 84). 

58 Taylor to Scott, Feb. 7, 1847 (fl". Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 1162). 



480 JAMES E. POLK 

enemies, in his opinion, believed that he wouki leave Mexico in 
disgust and that they might use such action to his disadvantage, 
"but in this I shall disappoint them."^'' 

The main Mexican army, commanded by Santa Anna, was 
stationed at San Luis Potosi. Taylor's perversity in refusing to 
take Scott's advice about falling back to Monterey left his army 
in danger of being annihilated by a greatly superior force. How- 
ever, he took a gambler's chance and w^on the battle of Buena 
Vista. He had planned originally to meet the enemy at Agua 
Nueva, but, on Santa Anna's approach, he fell back to Buena 
Vista, within seven miles of Saltillo. The battle opened on the 
afternoon of February 22 and lasted until dark on the following 
day, when Santa Anna retreated toward San Luis with his thor- 
oughly demoralized army. According to his own report, Taylor 's 
force numbered 4500 men, while Santa Aima commanded 20,000."° 

Taylor's first reward for defeating the enemy at Buer.a Vista 
was the receipt of a reprimand from the President and the Secre- 
tary of War. Marcy's letter, dated January 27, rebuked him for 
having, in his letter to Gaines, criticized the administration and 
exposed the plans of campaign. Ignoring his own indiscretion 
which had called forth the rebuke, Taylor was now "satisfied," 
according to his own statement, that "Scott, Marcy & Co. have 
been more anxious to break me down" than to defeat Santa 
Anna. Marcy had supposed him to be powerless since his troops 
had been taken away, and consequently afraid to defend himself ; 
"but he will find himself somewhat mistaken, & I have no doubt 
when he gets my reply to his abusive & contemptable letter, he 
will regret the course he has pursued." Believing Marcy to be 
"entirely incompetent," he thought that friends of soldiers who 
had fallen at Buena Vista should hold meetings and memorialize 
the President to remove him and to recall Scott to Washington.*^^ 



59 Taylor to Wood, Feb. 9, 1847, Taylor Letters, 85, 87. 
CO Taylor to Scott, March 1, 1847 (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 
1168). 

«i Taylor to Wood, March 20, 1847, Taylor Letters, 90-91. 



CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 481 

Two weeks later he received a letter from Marcy*^- which ex- 
pressed the President's "high appreciation" of his "distin- 
guished services," but this did not in the least remove his dis- 
trust of the administration. It will be seen, however, that the 
distrust on both sides resulted for the most part from misunder- 
standings due to the slow means of communication. 

Although General Scott, as we have seen, arrived at New 
Orleans on December 19, 1846, it took until the middle of Feb- 
ruary to assemble troops and make other preparations for his 
attack upon Vera Cruz. On February 15 he set out from the 
Brazos de Santiago, and, after stopping at Tampico and Lobos 
Island, his fleet of transports appeared off the coral island of 
Vera Cruz harbor on the fifth of March. Not knowing that Santa 
Anna had gone to attack Taylor, Scott expected that his landing 
M-ould be vigorously opposed ; but instead, he was able to land 
his troops on the sandy beach in front of the city without resist- 
ance from the enemy. For about four days American land bat- 
teries and the warships of Commodore Conner kept up a con- 
tinuous bombardment, and on March 29 the Mexican commander 
offered to capitulate. Scott took possession of both the city of 
Vera Cruz and the castle of San Juan de Ulua.*'=' 

After the battle of Buena Vista, Santa Anna set out for 
Mexico City, where he took the oath of office as President and 
adjusted a revolt of the clerical party.''* Leaving the govern- 
ment in charge of a substitute President, he left the city on April 
2, 1847, and prepared to meet Scott at the pass of Cerro Gordo, 
about twenty miles east of Jalapa. He occupied a position very 
difficult to approach, but in the battle of Cerro Gordo, which 
occurred on the seventeenth and eighteenth, the forces of General 
Scott won a comparatively easy victory. Within a few days 
Jalapa and Perote were occupied without resistance, and on the 

62Marcy to Taylor, April 3, 1847 (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 
1133). 

63 Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 216-230. 

64 See Rives, United States and Mexico, II, 391 ff. 



482 JAMES K. POLK 

fifteenth Worth took possession of Puebla. While Scott was at 
Jalapa, Trist arrived on the scene bearing a commission to nego- 
tiate a treaty, but a discussion of the controversy which followed 
his arrival is reserved for another place. 

Late in May Scott left Jalapa and established his headquarters 
at Puebla. Here he remained for several weeks, impatiently 
awaiting reinforcements. ,iHis time, however, was fully, if not 
profitably, occupied in quarreling and making friends with Trist, 
in bombarding the War Department with complaints and denun- 
ciations, and in a futile attempt to procure a peace treaty by 
bribing the Mexican officials. 

During the same period Santa Anna was in Mexico City 
making preparations to defend the capital. By an act passed 
on April 20, two days after the battle of Cerro Gordo, the Mex- 
ican congress had authorized him to "adopt all necessary mea- 
sures to carry on the war, ' ' but had deprived him of the power 
of making peace except with the consent of the congress."-' While 
engaged in his military preparations he received Polk's offer to 
negotiate a treaty, which Trist had transmitted by the aid of the 
British minister. The action taken by Santa Anna and his con- 
gress will be discussed in the next chapter ; it may be said here, 
however, that nothing resulted at this time from Trist 's attempt 
to negotiate. After he had received for his own use ten thousand 
dollars from Scott's secret service fund, the Llexican President 
decided that the time for peace had not yet arrived. 

While encamped at Puebla, Scott's army had been augmented 
by troops which had arrived during the sunuuer. The health of 
his soldiers was much improved, and they had been made efficient 
by constant drill. By the seventh of August, nearly four months 
after the battle of Cerro Gordo, all of the reinforcements had 
arrived and the army began its march on the City of Mexico. 
The first engagement occurred at Contreras, where on the nine- 
teenth and twentieth of August Scott's army won a signal victory 

65 Ihid., 434. 



» 



CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 483 

♦ 

over its adversaries.^f On the following day the Mexicans were 
again defeated, and this time thoroughly demoralized, in the 
battle of Churubusco. It is quite probable that if Scott had 
chosen to pursue the enemy he could have entered the capital and 
ended the war.^^ 

Scott, however, did not follow up the advantage gained at 
Churubusco. Instead, he agreed to an armistice in order to 
afford an opportunity for Trist to enter into negotiations with 
commissioners appointed by Santa Anna. In his report to the 
Secretary of War he admitted that he might have occupied the 
capital "with but little additional loss," but Trist and himself 
had "been admonished by the best friends of peace — intelligent 
neutrals and some American residents — against precipitation." 
This admonition and the fear that by ' ' driving away the govern- 
ment" peace would be delayed were the reasons assigned for 
consenting to an armistice.*'^ The "intelligent neutrals" were 
members of the British legation, and their opinions seem to have 
carried more weight than did the wishes of his own government. 
As will appear in the next chapter, Santa Anna's commissioners 
declined to accept the terms offered by Trist, and the .armistice • 
resulted simply in giving the Mexican army a chance to re- 
cuperate. 

The commissioners held their last meeting on September 6, 
and on the same day Scott addressed a note to Santa Anna. In 
it he stated that the armistice had been violated and that it would 
be terminated at noon on the following day, unless by that time 
he should receive "complete satisfaction" for the offenses which 
had been committed. Santa Anna's reply was anything but 
satisfactory, for he not only contradicted Scott's assertions but, 



66 In reporting this battle to the Secretary of War, Scott wrote: "I 
doubt whether a more brilliant or decisive victory ... is to be found on 
record" {Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 308). 

67 Ripley, War ivith Mexico, II, 283. Ripley served on General Pillow's 
staff. 

68 Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 314. 



I 



484 JAMES K. POLK 

in tiii-ii, charged the American commander witli violating the 
principles of civilized warfare.'''' Such an exchange of courtesies 
meant, of course, that hostilities would be renewed. 

Unofficial news of Scott's victories and subsequent armistice 
reached Washington on the fourteenth of September. As the 
President li^ad recentl}^ decided to force a peace by ordering Scott 
to prosecute the war relentlessly and to defray his expenses by 
levying contributions, he was not well pleased when he learned 
of the truce. He noted in his diary : 

Judging at this distance, I would think he should have improved his 
victories by pressing the Mexican Government to an immediate decision 
upon the terms of peace which Mr. Trist was authorized to offer to them, 
and if they refused these terms I think he should have taken immediate 
possession of the City, and levied contributions upon it for the support of 
his army. I fear the armistice was agreed to by the Mexican Commander 
only to gain time to re-organize his defeated army for further resistance. 'o 

On October 4, although he had already heard of the capture 
of Mexico City, the President decided to recall Trist. "Mexico," 
he wrote, ' ' nnist now first sue for peace, & when she does we will 
hear her propositions."" Apparently, he had little hope that 
the fall of the capital would induce the enemy to make peace, 
for two days later Marcy, under his instructions, sent to Scott 
new orders for continuing the war. He was told that reenforce- 
ments were on the way. It was hoped that they would enable 
him to "carry on further aggressive operations; to achieve new 
conquests ; to disperse the remaining army of the enemy in your 
vicinity, and prevent the organization of another." It was ex- 
pected that he would conduct operations in the most effective 
way to "induce the rulers and people of Mexico to desire and 
consent to such terms of peace as we have a right to ask and 
expect." One means of effecting this result was the levying of 



69 Scott to Santa Anna, Sept. 6; Santa Anna to Scott, Sept. 7, 1847 
(Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 346-.348). 

70 Polk, Blanj, III, 156, 170-172. 
-1 lUd.. 185-186. 



I 



I 



CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 485 

military contributions.'- These instructions did not reach Mexico 
City until the middle of November, and at that time Scott did 
not feel disposed to follow them. 

On September 8, the day following the termination of the 
armistice, Scott ordered Worth to make an attack on the Molino 
del Rey (king's mill), which was erroneously reported to be used 
as a cannon foundry." Worth succeeded in capturing the mill, 
but not without severe loss. A few days later General Pillow 
made a ' ' successful, but bloody ' ' attack upon the fortifications at 
Chapultepec.^* Scott's army now began its advance on the cap- 
ital city. Santa Anna offered further resistance at Belen and 
San Cosme, but, on the night of September 13, he evacuated the 
capital and withdrew to Guadalupe Hidalgo. 

Although defeated and driven from the capital, Santa Anna 
was not ready to lay down his arms. Being now thoroughly dis- 
credited, there was but one hope of maintaining his authority, 
namely, by achieving some unexpected military victory. He 
therefore determined to fall upon the small garrison which Scott 
had left to hold possession of Puebla. Having issued a decree 
in which he resigned the Presidency and assigned the duties of 
this office to Pena y Peiia and two associates, he set out for 
Puebla, where he arrived on the twenty-first of September. His 
attempt to overwhelm the garrison ended in failure, as did, also, 
an attempt to capture a force under General Joseph Lane which 
was on its way from Vera Cruz to Mexico City. While near 
Huamantla, Santa Anna received an order from Queretaro, dated 
October 7, which directed him to turn over his command to a 
subordinate and to appear before a court of inquiry. He com- 
plied with the first part of the order, but not with the second. 



72Marc.y to Scott, Oct. 6, 1847 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 
138-140). 

'i'3 Hitchcock, Fifti/ Years in Camp and Field, 296. 

"4 "In later years," was Grant's comment, "if not at the time, the 
battles of Molino del Rey and Chapultepec have seemed to me to have been 
wholly unnecessary" (Grant, Memoirs, I, 152-154). 



I 



483 JAMES E. POLK 

After keeping under cover in Mexico until the following spring, 
he set out for Jamaica, there to await a favorable opportunity to 
regain his lost power. 

The order which came from Queretaro, and which depriv(^d 
Santa Anna of his command, was dictated by Peila y Peiia, who 
claimed the right to exercise the office of President, not by virtue 
of Santa Anna's decree, but by the constitution and the laws of 
the republic. We are not here interested in the validity of this 
claim. For our present purpose we are interested simply in the 
fact that Pefia's action removed Santa Anna from control and 
opened the way for a resumption of negotiations. These and 
earlier negotiations will be discussed in the following chapter. 



CHAPTER XX 

TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 

In January, 1847, as we have noted in the preceding chapter, 
President Polk, in response to overtures made by Atocha, invited 
the Mexican government to send commissioners to Havana or to 
Jalapa for the purpose of negotiating a treaty with diplomatic 
representatives of the United States. In March, Atocha, who 
had carried the invitation to Mexico, returned to Washington with 
the reply that Mexico would not consent to appoint commissioners 
unless the raising of the blockade and the evacuation of Mexican 
territory "shall be previously accepted as a preliminary con- 
dition." Polk at once pronounced such terms to be "wholly 
inadmissible" and decided to deal a crushing blow at Mexico City. 

Before Atocha had set out on his journey to Mexico, and while 
the personnel of the proposed commission was under discussion, 
Buchanan expressed a desire to be chosen as one of the number. 
"I told him," wrote the President, "it struck me favourably, 
but that if he went he must do so in his character of Secretary 
of State, & go alone & without being associated with others."^ 
When the conditons demanded by Mexico became known there 
was, of course, no immediate necessity for making an appoint- 
ment. 

The idea of creating a commission which might accompany 
the army and take advantage of the first opportunity to negotiate 
a peace appears to have originated in the fertile brain of Senator 
Benton. He suggested such a commission in December, 1846, 



1 " I told him, ' ' Polk continued, ' ' that would be due to his position, & 
that the administration, if he Avent alone, would be entitled to the whole 
credit of the arrangiement. It seemed to strike him favourably. Indeed 
I had no doubt he was highly delighted with the idea" (Polk, Diary, II, 
338). 



488 ' JAMES K. POLK 

when the President had under consideration the appointment of 
Benton to the position of lieutenant-general. His plan provided 
for three commissioners who were to accompany the main army 
and who were to be clothed with full diplomatic powers. Polk 
approved the suggestion and mentioned Slidell as one of the 
number. To this Benton interposed vigorous objections and, in 
turn, proposed the names of John J. Crittenden, Silas Wright, 
and himself. The President was willing to nominate any of the 
men named, but he did not wish to slight Slidell, who had already 
performed valuable services in Mexico. Benton would not yield 
his objections to Slidell 's appointment, and the matter was 
dropped.- The Senator's next attempt to procure a diplomatic 
appointment was his request, during the following IMarch, that 
the President should make him commander-in-chief of the army 
and invest him with power to negotiate a treaty.^ 

When, on March 20, 1847, Atocha returned to Washington 
bearing an unsatisfactory reply to the American offer, the Presi- 
dent announced to the cabinet his intention to "lay aside the 
technical rules of war to be found in books" and to crush Santa 
Anna at all hazards.* His belligerent mood, however, did not 
preclude a desire for peace at the earliest possible moment. 

Nothing occurred which led the President to believe that 
Mexico might of necessity be ready to accept his peace terms 
until April 10, when news of the fall of Vera Cruz reached Wash- 
ington. The effect of this news upon Polk's determination to 
appoint an ambulatory connnissioner and his reasons for selecting 
Nicholas P. Trist to fill the position are recorded in his own 
memorandum of a cabinet meeting held on that day : 

The subject of consideration today was the Mexican War. T had 
several times mentioned to Mr. Buchanan the importance of having- a 
commissioner vested with Plenipotentiary powers, who should attend the 
headquarters of the army ready to take advantage of circumstances as 
they might arise to negotiate for peace. 1 stated to the Cabinet to-day 



^Ihid., 262-270. "■ Ihul.. 412. 

* Ibid., 432. On this same day the mails brought the news of the battle 
of Buena Vista. 



TBEATT OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO ' 489 

that such was my opinion, and that I thought it more important since the 
news of the recent victories, and especially since the information received 
this morning of the fall of Vera Cruz & the Castle of San juan D'Ulloa. 
All the mendiers of the Cabinet present concurred in this opinion. The 
embarrassment in carrying it out consisted in the selection of a suitable 
commissioner or commissioners who would be satisfactory to the country. 
This was a great difficulty. Such is the jealousy of the different factions 
of the Democratic party in reference to the next Presidential Election 
towards each other that it is impossible to appoint any prominent man or 
men without giving extensive dissatisfaction to others, and thus jeopar- 
dizing the ratification of any Treaty they might make. In this also the 
Cabinet were agreed. I stated that I preferred that the Secretary of State 
should be the sole commissioner to negotiate the Treaty, & that I would 
have no hesitation in deputing him on that special service if the Mexican 
authorities had agreed to appoint commissioners on their part, but as they 
had refused to do this he could not attend the head-quarters of the army 
for an indefinite j^eriod of time and with no assurance whether the Mex- 
ican authorities would agree to negotiate. Mr. Buchanan expressed his 
entire concurrence in this view. He said he would be willing to go in 
person if there was any assurance that negotiations would be speedily 
opened, but under the circumstances & with our present information he 
could not, of course, think of going. Mr. Buchanan then suggested that 
Mr. N. P. Trist, the chief clerk of the Department of State, might be 
deputed secretly with Plenipotentiary powers to the head-quarters of the 
army, and that it might be made known that such a person was with the 
army ready to negotiate. Mr. Trist, he said, was an able man, perfectly 
familiar with the Spanish character and language, & might go with special 
as well as defined instructions/^ The suggestion struck me favourably. 
After much conversation on the subject it was unanimously agreed by the 
Cabinet that it would be proper to send Mr. Trist, and that he should take 
with him a Treaty drawn up by the Secretary of State approved by the 
Cabinet, which he should be authorized to tender to the Mexican Govern- 
ment, and to conclude [a treaty] with them if they would accept it; but 
that if they would not accept it, but would agree to appoint commis- 
sioners to negotiate, that Mr. Trist should in that event report the fact to 
his Government, when Mr. Buchanan could go out as the commissioner. 

After the entire cabinet had approved such a mission, Trist was 
sent for and the nature of the mission explained. He accepted 
the appointment. He and all others cognizant of the President 's 
diplomatic venture were pledged to profound secrecy.^ 



^ 



5 Ibid., 465-468. Of the necessity for secrecy Polk wTote: "To give 
publicity to such a movement before it was commenced, and to have the 
federal papers giving their own version of it, and, as their habit is, to have 



490 JAMES E. POLK 

Although Trist, as we have just noted, was selected on the 
recommendation of Buchanan, his past career and his qualifica- 
tions were not entirely unknown to the President. Hejiad studied 
law under Jefferson, whose granddaughter he had married, and 
after a brief term of service as clerk in the Treasury Department 
President Jackson had made him his private secretary. In 1833 
he was appointed consul at Havana by Jackson, and, after eight 
years of service in that capacity, he w^as recalled by Tyler because 
he had been charged by Great Britain with having aided the slave 
trade in CubaT) Similar charges had been made during Van 
Buren's administration, and even his brother-in-law, Thomas 
Jefferson Randolph, advised Van Buren to remove him unless 
they were disproved. "Mr. Trist is disinterested and honor- 
able," said Randolph, "his judgment I have never confided in; 
whatever his errors may have been they have been doubtless of 
his judgment, but indiscretions may be carried too far."*"' This 
characterization seems apposite to his entire career. Bad judg- 
ment and inordinate conceit were his besetting sins. 

Shortly after Polk's inauguration, Trist began to importune 
the new President for office and to enlist the influence of the 
Donelson family in his behalf.' Unsuccessful at first, he was, 
on August 28, 1845, given a commission as chief clerk in the 
Department of State. ^ 

In appointing Trist to conduct the negotiations with Mexico 
the President, as it turned out, made a most unfortunate selec- 
tion ; yet in passing judgment upon the President's act, the 



them by every means in their power thwarting the objects of the Govern- 
ment by discouraging the enemy to accede to the measure, would in all 
probability be to defeat it, hence the necessity of secrecy." Trist 's appoint- 
ment was not, of course, ratified by the Senate. 

6 Randolph to Van Buren, Dee. 16, 1839, Van- Burcn. Papers. 

7 Trist to Polk, March 14 and April 2, Trist Papers. Polk 's name 
does not appear on the latter, but it speaks of "your Inaugural." With 
customary indiscretion he lectured the President on the meaning of 
sovereignty. 

8 Buchanan to Trist on that date ' ' hereby appointing ' ' him to that 
position {Trist Papers). 



TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 491 

special task which was assigned to the commissioner should be 
taken into consideration. He was given a definite project of a 
treaty for submission to the Mexican government, with but little 
discretion to alter its terms. In case Mexico should prove un- 
willing to accept the essential parts of the project, but never- 
theless willing to negotiate, it was Polk's intention to appoint 
Buchanan or some other qualified person, or persons, to conduct 
the negotiations. A task so definitely limited did not require a 
diplomat of the first rank. 

Having decided to send Trist to Mexico, Polk directed Bu- 
chanan to prepare a project of a treaty and, also, a reply to the 
Mexican communication which had been brought back by Atocha. 

Buchanan's draft of a treaty was submitted and fully dis- 
cussed at a cabinet meeting held on the thirteenth of April. It 
fixed the boundary of Texas at the Eio Grande, and provided that 
New Mexico and both Upper and Lower California should be 
ceded to the United States. Another article stipulated that the 
United States should have the right of transit across the isthmus 
of Tehuantepec. In addition to the assumption of the claims of 
its citizens against Mexico, the United States was to pay the 
sum of fifteen million dollars. In the President's opinion, the 
sum named was too large, but, if necessary, he was willing to go 
as high as thirty millions. / The Secretary of State still opposed 
increasing the amount. Walker attached greater importance to 
the free passage across the isthmus than to the cession of both 
New Mexico and the Californias. If this could be procured he 
was willing to pay thirty millions, otherwise not. He wished it 
to be made a sine qua non. "To this," said Polk, "I objected 
& stated that it constituted no part of the object for which we 
had entered the War" — an indirect admission that he had en- 
tered the war to acquire territory. Finally, all agreed to accept 
the President's terms. Nothing was made a sine qua non except 
the acquisition of Upper California and New Mexico — the Rio 



492 JAMES K. FOLK 

Grande boundary being considered as already settled." The pro- 
ject in its final form provided for cession to the United States 
of both Californias and New Mexico, while the United States 
agreed to assume the claims and to pay fifteen million dollars ; but 
Trist's instructions stipulated the modifications which he might 
make. 

The instructions covered the points agreed upon at the cabinet 
meeting of April 13 (see note 9) and, in addition, authorized 
Trist to incorporate, if necessary, an article guaranteeing rights 
to the inhabitants similar to those stipulated in the treaty by 
which Louisiana had been acquired. Should such an article be 
included he was to insist upon a provision which would invali- 
date all recent land grants. Should he fail to make a treaty, he 
was authorized to arrange for a peace commission, provided that 
"a reasonable prospect shall exist" that Mexican commissioners 
would agree to the ultimata already specified by the United 
States. 

Under the same date (April 15) as the instructions to Trist, 
Buchanan prepared a letter to the Mexican Minister of Foreign 
Relations. It was a reply to the minister's note of February 22 
which Atocha had brought back and in which Santa Anna had 
declined to treat unless the blockade were raised and Mexican 
territory evacuated. It also informed the Mexican government 
of the purpose of Trist 's mission. In this letter Buchanan said 
that a demand such as Mexico had made was both unprecedented 
and unreasonable — that ''the war can never end whilst Mexico 
refuses even to hear the proposals" which the United States has 
always been ready to make. "The President," he continued, 



9 Polk, Diary, II, 468, 471-475. The maximum amounts to be paid were 
to be governed by the cessions procured — $.'^0,00(1, 000 for all desired; 
$2.5,000,000, without passage across the isthmus; $20,000,000 if only Upper 
California and New Mexico could be obtained. Trist was to reduce these 
amounts, if possible. Polk 's views on territorial expansion are expressed 
very clearly in his diary entry for January '}, 1847: "New Mexico and 
California is all that can ever probably be acquired by Treaty, and indeed 
all that I think it important to acquire" {ihid., 308). 



TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 493 

"will not again renew the offer to negotiate, at least until lie 
shall have reason to believe that it would be accepted by the 
Mexican Government."^" 

On April 16, 1847, Trist set out for Mexico bearing his in- 
structions and the project of a treaty and, also, Buchanan's letter 
to the Mexican minister. Marcy instructed Scott to deliver the 
last mentioned document to the Mexican commander with a 
request that it should be laid before the government.^ ^ The 
secrecy with which the President tried to envelop the missions- 
was of short duration. On April 21 he was chagrined by dis- 
covering in the New York Herald a letter wdiich gave a very 
accurate account of Trist 's mission and its purposes.^^ William 
S. Derrick, a Whig clerk in the State Department, who had as- 
sisted in copying the documents, at once became the object of 
suspicion, but the source of the leakage could not be ascertained. 

Arriving at Vera Cruz on May 6, 1847, Trist hastened to tell 
Buchanan "the results of his [my] reflections" since his depar- 
ture from Washington as well as his opinions on affairs in Mex- 
ico. ^^ With characteristic egotism he immediately assumed re- 
sponsibilities which were never intended for him. ' A military 
detachment, selected by himself, was sent on ahead as bearer to 
General Scott of Buchanan's letter to the Mexican government, 



10 Project and instructions, Sei}. Ex. Dog. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 81-89. 
Buchanan to Min. of For. Eel., April 1.5, 1847 {Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 30 Cong., 
1 sess., 38-40). All are printed in Buchanan, Works, VII, 267-279. Trist 's 
coninrission and a copy of his autliority from Walker lo draw on the U. S. 
treasury for .$3,000,000 (both dated April 1.5) are among Trist 's papers. 

11 Marcy to Scott, April 14, 1847 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 
118-119). 

12 On the day of Trist 's departure Polk wrote in his diary: "Had his 
mission and the object of it been proclaimed in advance at Wasliington 
I have no doubt there are persons in Washington, and among them Editors 
of the National InteUigencer, who would have been ready and willing to 
have despatched a courrier to Mexico to discourage the Government of that 
weak and distracted country from entering upon negotiations for peace ' ' 
(Diary, II, 479). 

^^ Ibid., 482-483. "I have not been more vexed or excited," noted the 
President, ' ' since I have been President than at this occurrence. ' ' 
14 Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 153-156. 



49i JAMES K. POLE 

the confidential instructions from Marcy, as well as a letter from 
Trist himself. His failure to deliver these documents directly 
was the main cause of the misunderstanding which followed. 

Marcy "s letter to Scott^^ explained that Trist had been in- 
vested with authority to arrange for a suspension of hostilities, 
and 

Slioulil he make known to you, in writing, that the contingency has 
occurred in consequence of which the President is willing that further 
military operations should cease, you will regard such notice as a direction 
from the President to suspend them until further orders from the depart- 
ment, unless continued or recommended by the enemy. 

In addition, Scott was informed that Trist bore a communication 
from Buchanan to the Minister of Foreign Relations, and he was 
instructed to "transmit tliat despatch to the commander of the 
Mexican forces, with a request that it may be laid before his 
government." 

The connnunication which Scott was thus ordered to trans- 
mit to the Mexican general had been sealed, but Trist carried a 
copy which the Washington officials expected him to show to 
Scott at the time of delivering the original. As already noted, 
however, Trist did not personally deliver the communication to 
General Scott. He forwarded it from Vera Cruz, without in- 
closing a copy ; besides, his own letter, which accompanied it, did 
not explain fully the nature of his mission. 

When the documents reached Scott at Jalapa on ]\Iay 7 other 
things besides the absence of Trist 's copy of Buchanan's letter, 
tended to make the general both suspicious and irritable. While 
at New Orleans he had learned of the President's attempt to 
make Benton a lieutenant-general, and, as a result, he regarded 
Polk as "an enemy more to be dreaded than Santa Anna and all 
his liosts."^'"' Although "very slightly" acquainted in Wash- 
ington, Trist and Scott had, according to the general's account, 



15 Dated April 14 (ibid., 118-119). 
I'i Scott, Autobiograj)hy, IT, 400, 403. 



TBEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 495 

developed "feelings of mutual dislike." Indeed, Scott foolishly 
thought that Trist's "well-known prejudice against him [me] 
had had much weight in his appointment." Then, too, the gen- 
eral had concluded from a conversation held in Washington that 
Polk had originally intended to invest him with diplomatic 
powers — a fact which made him all the more resent Trist's ap- 
pearance in Mexico." 

Nettled by what he considered to be encroachments upon his 
authority, and without waiting to learn all of the facts, Scott 
entered into an indiscreet and insolent correspondence with both 
Trist and Marcy. "I have just received your note of yester- 
day," he wrote to Trist, "accompanied by communications to 
me from the Secretary of War, and one (sealed!) from the De- 
partment of State to the minister of foreign affairs of the re- 
public of Mexico."- -After complaining that the army had been 
weakened by sending the detachment to carry the dispatches from 
Vera Cruz, and declining to "commit the honor" of his govern- 
ment by having any direct agency in "forwarding the sealed 
despatch you have sent me from the Secretary of State," the 
general indignantly continued: 

I see that the Secretary of War proposes to degrade me, by requiring 
that 1, the commander of this army, shall defer to you, the chief clerk of 
the Department of State, the question of continuing or discontinuing 
hostilities. 

I beg to say to him and to you, that here, in the heart of a hostile 
country, from which, after a few weeks, it would be impossible to with- 
draw this army without a loss, probably, of half its numbers .... this 
army must take military security for its own safety. Hence, the question 
of an armistice or no armistice is, most peculiarly, a military question, 
appertaining, of necessity, if not of universal right, in the absence of 
direct instructions, to the commander of the invading forces; consequently. 



1" Ibid., 57G. There is no reason for believing that Polk ever intended 
to give Scott such an appointment. The entries in his diary concerning 
possible commissioners do not mention Scott's name, and from the first, 
he had a very poor opinion of the General's discretion and judgment. Scott's 
own account admits that Polk merely left him "half at liberty to believe" 
that he might be associated wth Wright or some other eminent statesman, 
for "What could h.ave been more natural? "(!) 



496 JAMES K. POLK 

if 3'ou are not clothed with military rank over me, as well as with diplo- 
matic functions, I shall demand, under the peculiar circumstances, that, 
in your negotiations, if the enemy should entertain your overtures, you 
refer that question to me, and all the securities belonging to it.is ^ 

We need not wonder that Ti-ist was provoked by the tone of 
Scott's letter; still, there was no good reason why he should 
commit the folly of following the example set by his adversary. 
A little common sense on his part might, no doubt, have smoothed 
the ruffled feathers of the irate general. Common sense, how- 
ever, was a quality of which Trist seldom availed himself. In- 
stead of awaiting a personal interview, at which he might have 
shown his own instructions and a copy of Buchanan's "sealed" 
letter, thereby removing the general 's misapprehensions, he chose 
to answer Scott not only in writing but in language still more 
abusive than that used by the general himself. 

A man possessed of Trist 's peculiar characteristics very nat- 
urally preferred written replies to oral explanations. Quite as 
vain as Scott himself, proud of his rhetoric and insinuating in- 
vective, he was so facile a writer that he could cover folio pages 
more easily than most persons can write sentences. The fatigue 
experienced by any one who peruses his tedious and rambling 
discourses was equaled, apparently, by the pleasure which their 
author had in penning them. It would have been unreasonable, 
therefore, to expect him to forego the pleasure of writing, even 
though a commonplace interview might more effectively have 
answered the purpose for which he had been sent to Mexico. 

While camped at San Juan del Rio, on May 9, he began his 
reply, and installments were added whenever the army halted 
on its march to Jalapa. It was finished after that place had been 
reached and sent to Scott, along with another letter, on the 
twenty-first of May. 



18 Scott to Trist, May 7, 1847 (Sen. Dog. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 120-121). 
A copy of this letter, accompanied by a very crisp note, was sent to Marcy 
on the same day (ibid., 119). 



TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 497 

Some of his remarks were sensible and to the point. When 
he had sent liis brief note from Vera Cruz, he told Scott, he did 
not anticipate that a correspondence between them would arise, 
"or that any communication whatever would be made on your 
part until I should have the pleasure of congratulating you in 
person upon the brilliant success Avhich has attended your move- 
ments." He pointed out, also, that his instructions, which he 
had intended to show on his arrival, would have made clear to 
the general that hostilities were to be suspended only after the 
conclusion of a treaty, and not at the caprice of the chief clerk 
of the State Department. He reminded Scott that the order to 
transmit the diplomatic note to the Mexican commander had come 
directly from the President — an officer who surely had a right 
to issue it. Commodore Perry, he said, had not caviled at a 
similar order sent to him — due perhaps to the want of ' ' discern- 
ment" or to ''his not having equal reason for believing his own 
personal consequence to be so excessive. ' ' 

Having made clear to Scott that the purposes of the govern- 
ment had been misapprehended, Trist might well have rested his 
case. He chose, however, to show the general that these mis- 
apprehensions had resulted from Scott 's own density of intellect, 
jealousy and self-esteem. After stating that there had been no 
intention to interfere with the general's proper military func- 
tions, he continued: 

In a word, sir, the course determined upon by our government, respect- 
ing tHe~suspension of hostilities, is what any man of plain, unsophisticated 
common sense would take for granted that it must be; and it is not what 
your exuberant fancy and overcultivated imagination would make it..'] 

Marcy's letter, however, was rather ambiguous on this point,^^ 
whatever might have been taken for granted. In a sarcastic vein 
Trist accused Scott of being piqued because the President had 
not selected him to negotiate with Mexico. Admitting that 
Polk might not have been "duly sensible" of Scott's superior 



19 See above, p. 494. 



498 JAMES K. POLK 

qualifications for performing such a service, yet, he did not see 
that the blame should rest upon the one who had been selected 
to perform it. In any case, said he, it was the general's duty to 
obey orders from Washington, whether documents were sealed 
or unsealed. 

This reply to the "tirade against our government," as Trist 
called Scott's letter, Avas inclosed in another letter dated May 
20, 1847. After informing the general that more important 
business would "compel me to decline the honor of maintaining 
a correspondence with you," he ordered Scott to transmit 
Buchanan's note to its intended destination.-" Happy in the 
belief that he had "finished" the "greatest imbecile" that he had 
ever encountered, Trist thought, apparently, that liis fulmina- 
tions would be approved by the President.-^ 

On May 20 — the day before he had been finished by receiving 
Trist 's letters — Scott wrote from Jalapa an insolent letter to 
Secretary Marc3^ He had, of course, received Marcy's somewhat 
ambiguous instructions, but he had made no attempt to learn 
from Trist the real intentions of his government. In it he said : 

Mr. Trist arrived here on the 14th instant. He has not done nie the 
honor to call upon me. Possibly he has thought the compliment of a 
first visit was due to him! I learn that he is writing a reply to my 
answer to him dated the 7th instant. ... It is not probable that I shall 
find leisure to read his reply, much less to give a rejoinder. 



20 Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 159- 1(58. 

21 On May 15, while the letter to Scott Avas being prepared, he said in a 
letter to Mrs. Trist: "There is a most extraordinary state of things here 
between myself «& General Scott — decidedly the greatest imbecile (and rend- 
ered so by his utter selfishness & egregious vanity ) that I ever had any thing 
to do with: If I don't finish him I will give any body leave to say that 
all the time I have passed in study has been passed in vain. Show this to Mr. 
B[uchanau] Avho can show it to the President." His egotism and his desire 
for notoriety is still further exhibited in a letter written to Mrs. Trist on 
May 21. She was instructed to tell Buchanan that he had made his letter 
to Scott long "in order that he [Scott | should not have a hair's breadth of 
ground left to support him, and because I knew that this correspondence 
will nuike much noise & produce such excitement that what is said in my 
letter Avill be read by 100 persons to one who would read the same thing 
better said in editorials of the Union or any other paper. This is my 
conviction, & this is what supports me through the task. If I have not 
demoliffhcd him, then I give up" (Trisi Pdprr.f). 



TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 499 

It should be noted that when this was written Scott had received 
no communication from Trist except a brief announcement of 
his arrival at Vera Cruz. The fact that Trist subsequently proved 
himself to be quite as devoid of judgment as was Scott himself 
can be no excuse for the general 's attitude at this time. Besides, 
no matter what Trist 's qualifications may have been, he was, 
nevertheless, the diplomatic representative of the President, and 
it was no part of Scott's proper military functions to abuse or 
to ignore him. As superior in authority to both of them the 
President had a right to command their services. 

In another paragraph, Scott expressed resentment because 
Polk had thought of investing both Benton and Taylor with diplo- 
matic powers, while the same had been withheld from himself. 
It was quite natural, perhaps, that he should have felt hurt 
because of this discrimination, but surely he had no right to 
claim functions not purely military. 

His complaint regarding Marcy's instructions was based on 
more valid grounds, although he had wholly misinterpreted the 
wishes of the administration. "I understand your letter," he 
told Marcy, "as not only taking from me .... all voice or 
advice in agreeing to a truce with the enemy, but as an attempt 
to place me under the military command of Mr. Trist." After 
quoting a passage from the Secretary 's letter, he added : ' ' That 
is, I am required to respect the judgment of Mr. Trist here on 
passing events, purely military, as the judgment of the President, 
who is some two thousand miles off!" There was, he said, one 
other instance like it in American history — when Bancroft in 
1845 instructed Taylor to obey the orders of Donelson — and "I 
wrote to General Taylor, with the permission of both Mr. Ban- 
croft and yourself, to correct that blunder. ' ' He closed by stating 
that he would cheerfully obey direct orders of the President, but 
not those of the "chief clerk of the State Department.""- 



22 Scott to Marcy, May 20, 1847 {Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 
124-127). 



500 JAMES K. POLE 

Scott was neither "finished" nor "demolished" by Trist's 
rhetorical effusions, which were handed to him as he was about 
to leave Jalapa. On May 29, having reached Puebla, he acknowl- 
edged their receipt and informed their author that he had taken 
the precaution to have them opened in the presence of staff 
officers. Said he : 

My^ii rst impuls e was to return the farrago of insolence, conceit and 
arrogance to the author; but on reflection, I have determined to preserve 
the letters as a choice specimen of diplomatic literature and manners. 
The Jacobin convention of France never sent to one of its armies in the 
field a more amiable and accomplished instrument. If you were armed 
with an ambulatory guillotine, you would be the personification of Danton, 
Marat, and St. Just, all in one. '7 

After expressing gratitude to the President for not having de- 
graded him by associating him with Trist on a peace commission, 
Scott asked the diplomat to make his future communications 
purely official, for 

If you dare to use the style of orders or instructions again, or to 
indulge yourself in a single discourteous phrase, I shall throw back the 
communication with the contempt and scorn which you merit at my 
hands.23 

While the President was absent from Washington, attending 
Commencement exercises at the University of North Carolina, 
Marcy received and answered Scott's note of May 7, in which the 
general's first letter to Trist (same date) liad been inclosed. 
In a statesman-like manner — and a style in pleasing contrast 
with the extravagant language emploj^ed by the general and the 
diplomat — the Secretary of War pointed out that Scott's "dis- 
tressing apprehensions of being degraded ' ' had resulted entirely 
from his not having waited to ascertain the nature of Trist's 
mission. He had no doubt that "more reflection and better 
information" would remove the general's fears. Trist, said 
Marcy, had been instructed to submit all documents to Scott for 



23 Scott to Trist, May 29, 1847 (ihid., 172-173). Original in Trist Papers. 



TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 501 

examination; and had the general, instead of declining to see 
Trist, read the documents, he would have seen that nothing 
unusual had been asked of him.-* 

Apparently, the Washington officials believed that the teapot 
tempest raging at Jalapa would be quelled by the information 
contained in Marcy's letter, for Polk made no mention of the 
incident in his diary until the arrival, on June 12, of Scott's 
insulting letter of May 20th. This, of course, was written before 
Scott had received Marcy's letter; but it showed that the general 
had made no effort to ascertain the facts, although Trist had 
been at his camp for nearly a week. In another respect this com- 
munication was more offensive than the note of May 7, which 
had been received during the President's absence. That had 
been addressed to Trist and simply inclosed in a brief note to the 
Secretary of War ; the letter just received was addressed to Marcy 
himself, and, as noted above, was both impudent and defiant. 
Little wonder that Polk pronounced it "highly exceptionable in 
character." He wrote in his diary: 

It appears that Gen '1 Scott has taken offense because Mr. Trist was 
sent to his Head Quarters as a Commissioner invested with Diplomatic 
Powers & full authority to conclude a Treaty of peace. He desired to 
be invested with this power himself, and although Mr. Trist had been 
at his camp for six days at the date of his despatch, he states he had not 
seen him. It is clear from his despatch, as well as one of previous date 
enclosing a letter from Gen '1 Scott to Mr. Trist, that he would not co- 
operate with Mr. Trist in accomplishing the object of his mission, the 
conclusion of an honourable peace. His two last despatches are not only 
insubordinate, but insulting to Mr. Trist and the Government. I gave 
my views on the subject, in which the Cabinet unanimously concurred. 
In accordance with them I directed the Secretary of War to prepare a 
despatch to General Scott rebuking him for his insubordinate course, and 
repeating the order in a peremptory manner to him to carry the despatch 
borne to him by Mr. Trist addressed to the Mexican Government to that 
Government, and requiring an immediate answer, to be returned by the 
bearer of the despatch, whether he had obeyed or intended to obey the 
former order of the Secretary of War. He deseiwes for his conduct in 



24 Marcy to Scott, May 31, 1847 {Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 
121-124). 



502 JAMES K. POLK 

this matter to be removed from the commaml. I (•oii('lu(le[(l |, however, to 
delay acting on his conduct until his answer to the communication which 

I this day ordered to be addressed to him shall be received Gen '1 

Scott arrogates to himself the right to be the only proper channel through 
whom the U. S. Government can properly communicate with the Govern- 
ment of Mexico on any subject; which is an assumption wholly unwar- 
rantable & which I will not tolerate. The truth is that I have been com- 
pelled from the beginning to conduct the war against Mexico through the 
agency of two Gen 'Is highest in rank who have not only no sympathies 
with the Government, but are hostile to my administration. Both of 
them have assumed to control the Government. To this I will not submit 
& will as certainly remove Gen '1 Scott from the chief command, as she 
I he] shall refuse or delay to obey the order borne to him by Mr. Trist. 
My doubt is whether I shall delay to remove him until I can hear further 
from him. 25 

A few days later the President declared that should Scott 
persist in disobeying- orders he would have the general arrested 
and tried by court-martial. But his caution was stronger than 
his resentment. He took no step until he had consulted the 
cabinet, and although fearful that Scott's "arrogance & inord- 
inate vanity" might have jeopardized peace by causing delay, 
he decided to await further news from Mexico. INIarcy and 
Buchanan were instructed to inform the commander and tlie 
diplomat that their conduct had been highly displeasing to the 
President. Surely he had ample cause for being displeased, for 
seldom, if ever, has any President had to cope with such folly 
and such insolence on the part of his agents. 

Elated by the thought that he had "finished" General Scott, 
won the approval of the President, and achieved fame by news- 
paper commendation, Trist must have been shocked when in- 
formed by Buchanan that his orders to Scott were both super- 
fluous and unwarranted. He was told that when he had placed 
the communication to the Mexican government in the liands of 
Scott his ' ' whole duty respecting it was then performed ' ' ; and 
if the general did not obey orders he was answerable neither to 
the Department of State nor to the commissioner, but to the 



2.- Polk, Biani. III. 57-59. 



TBEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 



o03 



military branch of the government. He was directed by the 
President, said Buchanan, to avoid personal altercations, and to 
submit to Scott his instructions and the project of a treaty.^^- 

Marcy's letter to Scott once more expressed surprise that the 
general could have so misconceived his instructions. There had, 
said the Secretary, been no intention to put him under the com- 
mand of Trist in any particular. The President had ordered 
him [Scott] to transmit a document to the Mexican commander 
and 

he [Polk J is wliolly unable to conceive how you cau reconcile with duty and 
subordination the making of it a topic of remark, I may say of incidental 
reproof of your common superior, in an official communication to a sub- 
ordinate officer in another branch of the public service.27 

While Marcy was writing the above letter another note from 
Scott was on its way to Washington. Unlike its predecessor this 
note did not breathe defiance, but with childlike petulance the 
general asked to be recalled. He inclosed a copy of his rejoinder 
to Trist 's last epistle which, with his usual facility at phrase 
coining, he called a ''flank battery" planted against him amidst 
critical military operations. ' ' Considering, ' ' said he, ' ' the many 
cruel disappointments and mortifications I have been made to 
feel since I left Washington, or the total want of support and 
sympathy on the part of the War Department which I have so 
long experienced, I beg to be recalled. "=-' 

The President was absent on a tour of the northeastern states 
when Scott's letter reached Washington. After his return, this 
letter as well as a communication from Trist, dated June 3, was 
considered at a cabinet meeting held on the ninth of June. Polk 
had good reason for thinking that these dispatclies disclosed a 
"wretched state of things'" in Mexico. He writes: 

26 Buchanan to Trist, June 14, 1847 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 

27 Marcy to Scott, June 15, 1847 (ibid., 127-129). 
2s Scott to Marcy, June 4, 1847 (ibid.. 130-131). 



504 JAMES E. POLK 

Jje n'l Sco tt has written foolish & bitter letters to Mr. Trist & Mr. 
Trist has written as foolish a letter to him. Between them the orders 
of the Secretary of War & the Secretary of State have been disregarded; 
the danger has become imminent that because of the personal controversy 
between these self important personages, the golden moment for conclud- 
ing a j)eace with Mexico may have passed. Gen '1 Scott's last despatch 
to the Secretary of War is full of passion & vanity & is highly insub- 
ordinate. ]n view of the whole case & of the present critical condition 
of affairs in Mexico, I submitted to the Cabinet for their advice whether 
they should not both be recalled.Jj 

The cabinet agreed in condemning the conduct of both men, but 
it was not deemed expedient to recall them. Consenting to await 
further developments, the President directed Buchanan and 
Marcy to command their respective subordinates to ' ' cease their 
correspondence and personal controversy and to act in harmony, 
each in his respective sphere, in obeying the orders, and carrying 
out the views of the government." He suggested sending some 
one to act with Trist, and mentioned Pierre Soule in this con- 
nection ; but no appointment Avas made.-^ 

On July 14 Colonel Wilson set out for Mexico, bearing the 
new instructions which had been prepared by the two cabinet 
officers and revised by the President. In his letter to Trist, 
Buchanan once more emphasized the fact that so far as the com- 
munication to the Mexican government was concerned Trist w^as 
simply the bearer of the dispatch for delivery into the hands of 
General Scott. In all other respects his functions were purely 
diplomatic, and it was no part of his duty to discipline or super- 
vise the commander-in-chief. Having repeated the President's 
order to confine his activities to the diplomatic field, Buchanan 
authorized Trist to make certain modifications in the boundary 
which had been proposed in the original treaty project.^"' 

29 Polk, Diari/, III, 76-77. 

30 Buchanan to Trist. July 13, 3847 (rec'd by Trist on Sept. 6) {Sen. 
Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 113-117). Original in Trist Papers. In a 
private letter written to Trist on the same date Buchanan said : "I most 
deeply regret vour quarrel Avith General Scott. It has been made the text 
for mucirWhig abuse & misrepresentation. Still we must bear it as Ave 

Governor Marcy has written a powerful letter to General Scott by 



can 



TEEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 505 

Marcy's letter to Scott was a very clear-cut and admirable 
document. With commendable patience he again pointed out that 
m no way had the government given Scott cause for offense. He 
assured the general that anything done by Trist, except the mere 
delivery of the dispatch addressed to the Mexican government, 
had been wholly unwarranted. In answer to Scott's request to 
be recalled, Marcy, by the President 's order, denied the request 
and indignantly repelled the charges upon which it had been 
based. ^^ 

The new instructions did not reach their destination until 
September 6, and by that time there was no need of urging co- 
operation on the part of the commissioner and the commander- 
in-chief. They had become fast friends; indeed, before the 
instructions had been drafted they had already taken steps to 
negotiate a treaty. 

On April 20, 1847, soon after the battle of Cerro Gordo, the 
Mexican congress had passed a law by which Santa Anna had 
been deprived of the power to negotiate with the United States. 
Nevertheless, within ten days, overtures were made to General 
Scott, through the British minister, but nothing resulted from 

the messeuger ^vhich will bear you this. The President's apprehensions 
are great lest the misunderstandings may defeat or delay the conclusion of 
a ireaty. Stall he is well disposed to do you justice" {Trist Papers). 
In a letter dated June 3, 1847, Trist had inclosed a communication from 
f^ ,^°"^"\*^f^ P,"'«o^ regarding a boundary line. The main point of it was 
that the line should be modified so as to include El Paso within the United 
btates. irist recommended this alteration. See Doc. 52, 168-172. 

3i<'0f 'the many cruel disappointments and mortifications I (you) 
have iDcen made to feel since I (you) left Washington,' you have omitted to 
specify a single one, and whether they are real or imaginary is left in o-j-eat 
uncertainty The sending of Mr. Trist to Mexico as a commissioner of 
peace, and the suspicion you cherished that you had been degraded by his 
being clothed with military authority to interfere with your rightful com- 
n'lnvHfi.f."^ probaby prominent among these 'cruel disappointments and 
moi ifications.' The exposition which has been made of that case, shows 
the lamentable extent to which error may prevail in personal matted when 
pie.iudice and suspicion pre-occupy the mind. Should your other undis- 

tS ,<^™^V ''P^-?'-''*™^''*" ^""^^ mortifications' be of a like unsubstan- 
tiate^l character, as It is presumed they are, you may well conclude tliat they 
constitute no sufficient motive with the President to grant the induloeuce 
you ask" (Marcy to Scott, July 12, 1847; Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, loo clt) 



506 JAMES K. POLK 

them.^- Late in May Santa Anna abandoned Piiebla and re- 
paired to Mexico City Avhere lie resumed the Presidency and 
prepared to defend the capital. Scott reached Puebla on May 
28 where he remained several weeks awaiting reenforcements. 
Trist followed Scott to Pnebla and established himself at the 
headquarters of General Persifer F. Smith, but for some time 
there was no intercourse between him and the commander-in-chief. 

Scott, as we have seen, had refused to deliver Buchanan's 
dispatch to the Mexican government and, on June 6, Trist ad- 
dressed a note to Charles Bankhead, the British minister at 
Mexico City, asking if he would deliver Buchanan's note and 
make known verbally to the Mexican govei-nment that Trist had 
arrived at army headquarters.^" Bankhead immediately sent 
Edward Thornton, Secretary of Legation, to receive the dispatch 
and to consult with both Scott and Trist. Thornton, who reached 
Puebla on June 10, told Trist that Sefior Baranda, the Minister 
of Foreign Kelations, had frequently expressed a desire to dis- 
cover some way of opening negotiations witli the United States, 
but that he lacked the courage to avow it openly and had re- 
signed. The voting of three million dollars for diplomatic pur- 
poses by the United States Congress had, said Thornton, made 
a bad impression in Mexico, for many believed that the money 
was to be used in bribing certain Mexican officials.'^ Trist in- 
closed copies of his notes to Bankhead in a letter to Buchanan, 
dated June 13, in which he complained because Scott would give 
him no information concerning affairs in ]\Iexico.'^^ 

As soon as Thornton had returned to the capital Bankhead 
delivered Buchanan's dispatch (of April 15) to Domingo Ibarra 
who had recently succeeded Baranda as Minister of Foreign 



32 Eives, JJniidl States and Mexico, II, 432-435. 

33 Trist to Bankhead, June (i, 1847 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Coug., 1 sess.. 
181-183). Copy also in Trist Papers. 

34 Thornton 's report to Bankhead. quoted in Rives, United States and 
Mexico, II, 440-441. 

35 Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 178-181. 



TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO .-,07 

Relations. In a brief note, dated June 22, Ibarra informed 
Buchanan that the "decision on the affair" would rest with the 
Mexican congress.""^ Two days later Thornton arrived at Puebla 
with Ibarra's note, and notified both Scott and Trist that Saiita 
Anna had called a special session of the congress so that it might 
consider the question of peace negotiations. 

Since the Mexican government had thus taken a step in the 
direction of arranging for peace, the question of meeting possible 
overtures now presented itself to the American representatives. 
They were not as yet on speaking terms, and since Trist was the 
one who had been assigned the duty of conducting negotiations, 
he was forced to make the first move. Consequently, on June 25, 
the day after Thornton's return from Puebla, he addressed a 
note to General Scott. In it he stated that since the information 
given to himself and to Scott, by Thornton, seemed to indicate 
that Mexico was inclined to treat, he wished to notify the gen- 
eral that he was ready to negotiate a treaty. He inclosed a copy 
of his commission.^' Scott acknowledged the receipt of his note, 
and "this," wrote Trist to Buchanan, "constituted the com- 
mencement of our official intercourse with reference to the duties 
with which I am charged. "^^ It was not, how^ever, the beginning 
of their friendship. 

The next step in the ' ' official intercourse ' ' seems to have been 
a note written to Trist by General Worth, which stated that Don 
Emanuel Ibarra, a brother of the Minister of Foreign Relations, 
lived near by. He was, said Worth, an intelligent man, and in 
favor of peace. On the same day some one replied, stating that 
Trist wished to thank Worth for the information, but was too ill 



3" Ibarra to Buchanan, June 22, 1847 (Sen. Ex. Doc. U 30 Cong., 1 sess., 
40-41). 

37 Trist to Scott, June 25, 1847, Trisi Papers. This seems to be the 
only copy of the letter available. Kives (II, 442) says that no copy has 
been preserved. Trist inclosed a copy of this, as well as one of Scott 's 
reply to it, in his dispatch No. 8, July 7, 1847, but neither the dispatch 
nor the letters reached the Department of State (see H. Ex. Doo. 60, 30 
Cong., 1 sess., 830, and note). 

38 Trist to Buchanan, July 23, 1847 (H. Ex. Doc. GO, as cited above, 831). 



508 JAMES K. POLK 

to write."''' At the same time, Scott sent to Trist a letter written 
by Thornton which seems to contain the first suggestion about 
bribing Mexican officials. On July 3, Trist wrote to Thornton 
as follows: 

Your note to Mr. Hargous, in which you refer to the impossibility that 
I frankly told you existed to my adopting your suggestion upon a certain 
point, has been sent to me for perusal by Gen '1 Scott, who moreover offers 
at once to make every arrangement which may be necessary for imme- 
diately carrying that suggestion into the fullest effect, which circumstances 
may admit. 

This being the present state of the case, I shall, of course, be thankful 
for any information pertinent to the subject. If there be any person, 
who, in your opinion, could be safely intrusted with the whole affair, I 
should very gladly put it into his hands.4o 

Evidently the following cojiy of a letter is the one referred to, 
although the date appended is somewhat confusing : 

(Copy) 
My dear Sir: 

Mr. Trist does not seem to think there is the smallest possibility of 
making use of money in Mexico for what I mentioned to you; however 
I told him how he might do it por si acaso. Should it be in your way, 
pray use your influence with Gen '1 Scott to allow a reasonable time for 
taking the note into consideration before advancing. 

Yours very truly, 
L. Hargous Esq., 
&c &c &c 
Nemo the name of the writer of the above letter is omitted out of 
National delicacy. The writer was at the time on a vist to Mr. Trist, at 
Puebla— about June 24, 1847. 

Wiufield Scott, 

Puebla, July 19. 1847.*^ 

39 Worth to Trist, July 2, 1847; copy of unsigned letter to Worth of 
same date {Trist Papers). 

•JO Trist (the copy is unsigned, but is in Trist 's hand) to Thornton, 
July 3 1847, Trist Papers. A pencil note on the margin says that a copy 
was "'enclosed in mv No. 8" to Buchanan. No. 8, as already noted, 
did not reach its destination. Louis Hargous was an American merchant 
in Mexico City. 

41 On the side margin is written: "(the writer of this was Edw. 
Thornton)."' Since Trist mentioned what seems to be this note in his 
letter of July 3 to Thornton, apparently a copy (the above) was made 
for him on tlie date appended, i.e. on July 19. This is in the Trist Papers. 



TBEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 509 

Officially, both Scott and Trist had evinced a disposition to 
cooperate ; but, as yet, there was no indication that a personal 
reconciliation was near at hand. Nevertheless, a reconciliation 
came within a few days, and the incident which seems to have 
effected it was quite as trivial as was the cause of their bitter 
feelings toward each other. Scott's sensitive nature frequently 
led him to make dire threats, yet he was an extremely kind- 
hearted man, even when dealing with his adversaries. The fol- 
lowing brief note and the act of kindness mentioned in it, seems 
to have won Trist 's heart completely, and to have been the first 
step in the amicable adjustment of their differences : 

My dear Sir: 

Looking over my stores, I find a box of Guava marmalade which, perhaps, 
the physician may not consider improper to make part of the diet of your 
sick companion. 

Yrs very truly 

Winfield Scott, 
Genl. P. F. Smith, July 6, 1847.42 

&c &c &c 

The marmalade seems to have had an immediate effect upon 
Trist 's health and his disposition, for on the following day he 
told Buchanan in a letter that his health had improved and 
that 

With Gen '1 Scott 's reply to my letter, I received a message from him 
evincing so much good feeling that it afforded me the sincerest pleasure 
to meet it as I did, in a way which should at once preclude all constraint 
& embarrassment between us.*3 

Indeed, their mutual "good feeling" and admiration soon became 
so pronounced that they rated each other's judgment higher 
than that of their respective chiefs in the cabinet, or even the 
judgment and the authority of the President of the United States. 



42 The ' ' sick companion ' ' was Trist, who was staying at Smith 's 
headquarters. On the back of the note Trist wrote: "Brought to my 
bed side bv Genl Smith, and left there with the box of guava, as I lav 
ill at Puebla." 

43 Trist to Buchanan, July 7, 1847, Trist Papers. This is a copy of 
the dispatch ' ' No. 8 ' ' which never reached Washington. 



510 JAMES K. POLK 

The first fruit of the reconciliation between the two men was 
the consideration of bribing the Mexican government to consent to 
peace negotiations. It is evident from the above correspondence 
that Thornton had discussed the subject with Trist, but whether 
he or some one else named the definite amount of money asked 
by the Mexicans is not clear. Trist himself mentioned "specific 
information obtained from various sources, ' ' and Hitchcock wrote 
that English merchants in Mexico "say a peace can be had for a 
little money." In another place he said that "our agents in this 
business are Englishmen. "^^ It is probable that Thornton him- 
self gave Trist the information, and that he had received the 
demand for money from one close to the Mexican President. 

On July 15 Trist and Scott held a conference, and on the 
following day the former addressed a rambling letter to the 
latter, fully committing himself to the plan of paying a bribe. 
"We are both convinced," said he, "beyond a shadow of a doubt, 
that the only tvay in which the indefinite protraction of this war 
can possihUj he prevented . . . . is hy the secret expenditure of 
money at the city of Mexico." The amounts named as "neces- 
sary & sufficient" were ten thousand dollars in advance and one 
million dollars on the ratification of a treaty. He admitted that 
nothing of the kind had been contemplated by his government 
and that he had no authority to take such action, but this fact he 
deemed it his "duty to disregard." Concurring in Scott's view 
that a part of the war fund might be used most advantageously 
in buying peace — the real object of the war — he requested the 
general*^ to join with him in giving the requisite pledge that the 
money would be paid. Trist believed that such a pledge would 
"entirely supersede the necessity for the occupation of the 
capital. ' '''• 

44 Hitchcock, Fifty Years in Camp and Field, 26(>, 2(18. 

45 Scott was, of course, more eager than Trist to give the pledge. It 
had, however, been arranged beforehand that the request should come 
from Trist, as commissioner. See Hitchcock, op. eit., 267. 

4" Trist to Scott, July 16, 1847, Trist Papers, both the original draft 
and a "fair copy." 



TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 511 

Scott was already fully committed to the plan of purchasing 
a treaty, but in a transaction so irregular he naturally desired 
the approval of his generals, especially that of General Pillow 
who was a close personal and political friend of the President. 
On receipt of Trist's note, therefore, he called together his chief 
officers — including Pillow, Quitman, Twiggs, Shields, and Cad- 
walader — in order that he might "post them up" and win their 
approval. According to Colonel Hitchcock, who was present at 
the meeting, Pillow "fully and eloquently" supported the scheme 
after Scott had explained that it was customary to use money 
when dealing with such people as the Mexicans. Quitman ap- 
proved the "motives" which had inspired the plan, but was not 
in favor of paying bribe money. Twiggs "approved the whole 
scheme." Shields had misgivings, but was willing to leave the 
whole matter to Trist. Cadwalader expressed no opinion. ^'^ As 
a result of the conference Scott "very cheerfully" responded 
to Trist's letter on the following day. He said: 

I fully concur with you, with several of the general officers of this 
army & with many foreigners of high standing, here & at the capital, who 
have volunteered their opinions, that the occupation by the U. States' 
forces of twenty of the principal places in this Republic, in addition to 
those in our hands, would not, probably, in a year or more, force the 
Mexican authorities to sue for, or accept a peace on any terms honorable 
or just to our country — luithout the administration, or pledge in advance, 
of doucers to some of the principal authorities in this miserably governed 
country. "We have both learned, thro ' the most unquestionable channels, that 
this is invited & expected as an indispensable condition precedent to any 
negotiation. Indeed the minimums have been specifically indicated: — ten 
thousand dollars, in hand, to one high functionary, & a million (to be 
divided, probably among many) on the ratification of a definite treaty of 
peace. 

He had, he said, already sent the ten thousand dollars, and he 
agreed to unite with Trist, at the proper time, in giving a pledge 
to pay the million dollars. This amount was to be paid by means 
of a draft on the War Department under the head of "army 



47 Hitchcock, Fifty Years in Camp and Field, 266-268. Some of the men 
concerned later gave a very different version of their respective attitudes. 



512 JAMES K. POLK 

contingencies," and Trist was asked to send a note of explana- 
tion to the Secretary of War. Concerning the ethics of the con- 
temj^lated action, he wrote : 

In regard to the morality of the trausactiou in question, I have, like 
yourself, not the slightest doubt. "We have tempted the integrity of no one. 
The overtures we propose to meet, if corrupt, come from parties previously 
corrupted, & we only profit by that corruption to obtain an end (peace) 
highly advantageous to both the U. States & Mexico. Such transactions 
have always been considered allowable in war.-Js 

The Mexican congress, to which Santa Anna had referred 
Buchanan's note of April 15, declined to take any part in diplo- 
matic affairs. A committee of that body held that the Acta dc 
Reformas of May 18, 1847, had, by readopting the Constitution 
of 1824, rendered inoperative the law of April 20 which had 
deprived Santa Anna of his power to conduct negotiations. 
Although the congress might easily have solved the difficulty and 
prevented ambiguity by specifically repealing the law of April 
20, it laid the matter on the table without deciding the question 
of the President's authority.*^ 

It is probable that Santa Anna never intended to make peace, 
and that he made overtures merely for the purpose of procuring 
money from the American officials. But in view of the fact that 
he had been promised a much larger sum, on the conclusion of 
a treaty, it is more likely that his refusal to carry out his under- 
standing with Trist and Scott was due to the attitude of his 
congress. At any rate he gave this as an excuse. On July 24 
a note from Thornton reached the camp at Puebla. It stated 
that while Santa Anna was in favor of peace he could not induce 
his congress to repeal the resolutions which had made it treason 
for liim to negotiate with the United States. The American 
army must, said Thornton, advance on the capital, and it will be 
met by a flag of truce before Penon has been reached. ''So." 
wrote Hitchcock, who recorded in his diary the substance of 



48 Scott to Trist, July 17, 18-17, original, in Tri^t Papers. 

49 See Eives, United States and Mexico, II, 4:44—446. 



TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 513 

Thornton's letter, "the idea of peace is all knocked into a cocked 
hat/'^" As a result, doubtless, of Thornton's advice, Scott, ac- 
cording to a letter written by Hitchcock some months later, 
prepared a memorandum and sent a copy to Santa Anna. In it 
the Mexican President was informed that Scott was about to 
advance upon the capital, and that he would either "defeat the 
enemy in view of the city, ' ' should resistance be offered ; or he 
would halt and give the government an opportunity to make 
peace.^^ As it turned out, the program outlined in this memo- 
randum was quite closely followed, but apparently the general 
did not, at the time it was prepared, have much hope of a peace- 
able adjustment.^- 

Trist and Scott were now fast friends, and each expressed to 
his chief in the cabinet a desire that the acrimonious letters which 
both had sent to Washington might be suppressed. Trist now 
believed that the general 's whole conduct had been characterized 
by the "purest public spirit," while Scott now found the com- 
missioner to be "able, discreet, courteous, and amiable." At 
this time Scott had not received Marcy's most severe criticism 
of his conduct, but he resented the rebuke contained in the Sec- 
retary's letter of May 31st. Although he had this letter in his 
possession for nearly three weeks, he told Marcy that the reason 
"I do not here triumphantly vindicate myself is not from want 
of will, means, or ability, but iime."'^^ Neither he nor the com- 
missioner mentioned the fact that his time had been occupied in 



50 Hitchcock, Fifty Years in Camp and Field, 269. He states that "T" 
wrote the letter, which uncioubtedly means Thornton. 

51 Sen. Ex. Doc. 65, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 521-532. 

°- Under date of July 30 Hitchcock speaks in his diary of a dinner 
given by Pillow to the other generals and Trist. He adds: "Everything 
now shows that the Mexicans intended to carry on the war to the utmost 
of their ability, and the probability now is that our attempt to enter 
the capital will be met with most determined opposition" (Hitchcock, 
op. cit., 269). 

53 Trist to Buchanan. July 23 ; Scott to Marey, July 25, 1847 (H. Ex. 
Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 831, 1011-1012). In another insolent passage 
Scott said: "You will perceive that I am aware (as I have long been) 
of the dangers which hang over me at home; but I, too, am a citizen 
of the United States, and well know the obligations imposed under all 



514 JAMES K. POLK 

trying to purchase a treaty from Santa Anna, and before the 
news of that questionable transaction reached Washington many 
interesting events had occurred. 

The first division of the American army left Puebla on August 
7, 1847, followed on the next day by Trist and Scott, one bearing 
the olive branch, the other the sword.^* The latter was first to 
be used, for, not until the battles of Contreras and Churubusco 
had been fought was the jMexican President ready for the olive 
branch. On the evening of August 20, after his defeat at Churu- 
busco, he sought, through the British legation, to arrange for a 
suspension of hostilities. A deputation from the legation — in- 
cluding Thornton, the secretary, and Mackintosh, the consul- 
general — met Scott at San Augustin, "ostensibly to ask for a 
safe-guard for the English Minister and British subjects, but 
really to prepare the way for peace. "°^ 

Near midnight of the same day Pacheco, the ^Mexican ^Minister 
of Foreign Relations, called on Bankhead and asked him to use 
his influence in inducing Scott to save the city from being sacked. 
The British minister, according to his own account, would not 
interfere further than to transmit a letter from Pacheco to Trist. 
It was decided, however, that the letter should be addressed to 
Buchanan (as a reply to his note of the previous April) instead of 
Trist. Bankhead himself wrote to Trist. and expressed the hope 
that peace might be concluded at an early date. Both li'tters 
were sent to the commissioner.^" 

The note addressed to Buchanan stated that Santa Anna had 
continued the fight until the American army had reached the 



circumstances by an enliohtened patriotism." Due to negligence on the 
part of the messenger, this letter did not reach Washington until Decem- 
ber. 1848. 

5-1 From Ayotla Trist wrote: "It is, indeed, a nohJc army, full of con- 
fidence in itself, and full of confidence in its commander To 

appreciate the man, to liioiv him at all, one must see him in this sphere. ' ' 
To Buchanan, Aug. 14, 1847 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 187). 

•<^> Hitchcock, Fifti/ Years in Camp and Field, 280. 

50 Pacheco to Buchanan, Aug. 20, 1847 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 
sess., 189). Bankhead to Trist, same date, TriM Papers. For Bankhead 's 
rejiort to his government, see Rives, II, 496-497. 



TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 515 

gates of the capital, and that he had now resolved to hear the 
proposals which the American commissioner had been instructed 
to make. In doing so, said Pacheco, the President was acting 
under the powers conferred upon him by the constitution. This 
meant, of course, that Santa Anna was ready to ignore the law 
of April 20, which made it treason for him to negotiate with the 
United States. This law may, indeed, have been rendered void 
by the subsequent readoption of the constitution, but since the 
law in question had not been specifically repealed, some doubt 
remained as to the legality of any treaty he might make. 

On the morning of August 21, while Scott and Trist were 
on their way from San Angel to Tacubaya, they were met by a 
"fine carriage" containing General Mara y Villamil, bearer of 
the letters written by Pacheco and Bankhead to the American 
officials. Trist read the letters, and a conference was held.^' The 
letter addressed to Trist did not expressly ask for an armistice, 
but apparently Mara verbally made it known that such was the 
wish of the Mexican President. With more magnanimity than 
judgment Scott, instead of demanding that the request for a 
cessation of hostilities should come from the defeated commander, 
proposed an armistice in a note addressed to Santa Anna. The 
proposal was accepted, and two days later an armistice was ar- 
ranged. '^^ The agreement made at Puebla probabl,y was Scott's 
real reason for taking the initiative ; the reasons which he gave to 
the Secretary of War were a desire to leave Mexico "something 
on which to rest her pride," and the fear that a more drastic 
course would "scatter the elements of government" and make 
the negotiation of a treaty impossible.^'-' 

After some delay commissioners were appointed by Santa 
Anna, and with them Trist held his first meeting on August 27, 



57 Hitchcock, op. cit., 279. 

58 The correspondence and armistice are printed in Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 
30 Cong., 1 sess., 308-312. 

59 Scott to Marcy, Aug. 28, 1847 {Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 314). 



516 JAMES K. POLK 

1847."- He soon discovered that the powers of the Mexicans 
simply permitted them to receive his propositions for transmission 
to Santa Anna. He told them that he had been authorized to 
treat only with commissioners provided with full powers ; never- 
theless, he delivered to them a statement of the propositions 
which he was ready to make.*'^ 

As soon as the American project had been received, Pacheco 
drafted instructions to the commissioners and furnished them 
with full powers, but the instructions required them to make such 
extravagant demands that the commissioners immediately offered 
their resignations. As a result, Santa Anna, through Pacheco, 
authorized the commissioners to make such modifications as the 
' ' circumstances of the country may exact. ' '"" 

The Mexican diplomats met Trist on September 1, and for 
two days the questions at issue were discussed. The terms of 
settlement now suggested by the Mexicans were much like those 
mentioned by Atocha in the preceding January. He had spoken 
of the Rio Grande as a boundary, with a neutral strip on the 
American side ; they asked for the Nueces as a boundary, with 
all territory between that river and the Rio Grande as neutral 



'jc The Mexican commissioners were ex-President Herrera, Bernardo 
Couto, Ignacio Mara y Villamil, Miguel Atristain, and Jose Arroyo. 

«i Trist to Buchanan, Aug. 27, 1847 {Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 
191-192). On the morning of August 27 an attack made by a Mexican 
mob on American supply wagons threatened to prevent negotiations, but 
an apology temporarily smoothed over this difficulty. For details, see 
Rives, II, "510-511. 

G2 For the instructions (in translation) and the correspondence relat- 
ing to them, see Sen.. Ex. Doc. 52, as cited above, .330-335. By their 
instructions the commissioners were to demand: Mexico would relinquish 
Texas — not as a result of annexation, but of negotiation. Its boundary 
must be the Nueces, and the United States must pay for the land one 
half of the price fixed by Texas laws. All debt claims against Mexico 
must be cancelled, as "an equivalent for entering into negotiation ''(! ) 
and ten leagues on either side of the boundary was to be neutral terri- 
tory. Cession of New Mexico and California must be refused, but, as a 
last resort, a factory port at San Francisco might be granted to the 
United States. A passage over the Isthmus of Tehuantepec was to be 
refused. Duties on American goods brought into Mexico must be paid. 
The United States must restore Mexican forts to the condition in which 
they were found. Lastly, the commissioners were to insist on indemnity 
for all damages done by the American army. 



,/J 



TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 517 

ground in which no settlement might be made by either party. 
He had claimed no authority to discuss a cession of New Mexico ; 
they said that their instructions forbade a cession of this terri- 
tory. He had stated that Mexico was willing to cede Upper 
California for a money consideration ; they were ready to cede 
the upper part of this territory, but insisted that Mexico must 
retain all of Lower California and a land connection with it. 
They declined to grant a transit across the Isthmus of Tehuan- 
tepee. Trist offered to withdraw the claim for Lower California 
and the transit across the isthmus, if Mexico would cede Upper 
California and New Mexico for a money payment. He agreed, 
also, to submit the Nueces boundary question to his government 
for consideration; they, in turn, agreed to submit to their gov- 
ernment the terms which he had proposed.^^ Four days later, 
and before Trist had taken steps to refer the matter to President 
Polk, another meeting was held, and the Mexican commissioners 
presented a counter-project and an explanatory note. The ces- 
sion of New Mexico was refused, an offer to cede Upper Cali- 
fornia north of 37° was made, and it was suggested that England 
should be asked to guarantee the proposed treaty. Trist, of 
course, declined to accept these terms and, for the time being, 
negotiations were abandoned. This in itself automatically abro- 
gated the armistice, but General Scott chose to terminate it on 
the ground that its terms had been violated by the interference 
of Mexicans with American supply wagons.**^ 

At the very moment, almost, when Santa Anna was rejecting 
the project of a treaty offered by the United States, President 
Polk was announcing his intention to demand additional terri- 
tory from Mexico. On September 4 he told his cabinet that, 
unless the next dispatch from Trist should announce that a treaty 
had been signed, the commissioner ought to be instructed to 

abovei^l95-20i?.'''^''"''"' ^'^'*- ^' ^^*^' ""'"'^ inclosures (Doc. 52, as cited 

64 Commissioners to Trist, Sept. 6, 1847- Trist 's rpnlv ^m.t 7. Q^^f*. 
to Santa Anna, Sept. 6 {ibid., 37^380, 214-222, 346).^ ^' ^ ' ^" 



518 JAMES E. POLK 

demand more territory. Three days later he expressed himself 
as in favor of acquiring Tamaulipas. The question of modifying 
Trist's instructions was discussed, but when, on the ninth, a 
rumor reached Washington that the Mexican congress had been 
called for the puri)ose of considering the American proposals, 
Polk noted in his diary: "I sincerely hope that a Treaty of 
peace may have been concluded and signed. ' '"^ 

The mail of September 14 brought the President both en- 
couragement and disappointment. By it he learned of the vic- 
tories at Contreras and Churubusco, but, also, of the armistice 
which followed them. The same mail contained Trist's brief 
dispatch of August 29, in which the government was informed 
that negotiations had begun. Polk was not pleased with the 
armistice. He believed that Scott should have demanded an 
immediate decision on the terms offered by the United States, 
and in the event of their rejection by Mexico, he should have 
entered the capital and levied a contribution for the support of 
his army. "I fear," noted the President, "that the armistice 
was agreed to by the Mexican Commander only to re-organize 

his defeated army for further resistance I shall wait 

very anxiously for further information from the army." He 
waited until October 4, and, as no favorable news arrived, he 
decided that Trist should be recalled and that Scott should be 
directed to levy contributions on the enemy.''" 

Letters embodying these views were prepared by Buchanan 
and Marcy and forwarded to their respective representatives in 
Mexico. The Mexican counter-project Buchanan pronounced 
"a most extraordinary document," and the proposal of such 
terms "a mere mockery." The connnissioners must have known. 



65 Diary, III, 161, 164, 167. 

fiG"Mr. Trist is recalled," said he, "because his remaining longer 
with the army could not, probably, accomplish the objects of his mission, 
and because his remaining longer might, & probably would, impress the 
Mexican Government with the belief that the U. S. were so anxious for 
peace that they would ultimate[ly] conclude one upon the Mexican terms. 
Mexico must now first sue for peace, & when she does we will iiear her 
propositions" {ihid., 170-172, 185-186). 



TBEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 519 

he said, that the United States would never relinquish New 
Mexico, Upper California, or the territory between the Nueces 
and the Rio Grande. The assertion made by the Mexicans that 
Trist had agreed to refer to his government the surrender of the 
last mentioned territory was not believed in Washington. If, at 
the time of receiving Buchanan 's letter, a treaty had been signed, 
Trist was to bring it home with him ; otherwise he was to suspend 
all negotiations and return home "by the first safe opportunity." 
The letter to Scott instructed him to support his army by 
contributions levied on the enemy. Any proposals from Mexico 
to reopen negotiations were to be forwarded by him to the 
President.*'' 

Polk has been criticized for ordering the employment of 
measures which might destroy all organized government in 
Mexico, and for demanding that future peace offers must come 
from the enemy. His reason for adopting this policy, whether 
valid or not, was his belief that Mexico would never come to 
terms so long as she held the erroneous opinion that the govern- 
ment at Washington was over-anxious for peace, or too weak to 
continue hostilities."^ In a private letter the Secretary of State 
said that "the spirit of the Country is now thoroughly aroused 
& the war will be prosecuted with the utmost vigor. This is the 
character of the American people. They find that peace cannot 
be made with Mexico upon honorable terms & they are deter- 
mined to see it out. ' '^^ Owing to the fact that there was, for some 
time, no communication betw^een Vera Cruz and the interior, 

«" Marey to Scott, Oct. 6, 1847; Buchanan to Trist, same date (Sen. 
Ex. Doc. 52. 30 Cong., 1 sess., 91-93, 138-140). The original of the latter, 
as well as a duplicate and triplicate are in the Trist Papers. Some one 
(undoubtedly Trist) has underlined in red the part which says that the 
United States will never surrender Upper California or the land between 
the rivers Nueces and Eio Grande. The dates of receipt are noted. 

68 In the letter to Trist, just cited, Buchanan said: "They [the 
Mexicans] must attribute oiir liberality to fear, or thev must take 
courage from our supposed political divisions. Some such cause is neces- 
sary to account for their strange infatuation." For criticism of Polk's 
change of policy, see Rives, II, 523-525. 

69 Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 7, 1847, Trist Papers. 



520 JAMES K. POLK 

these letters did not reach Trist until November 16 and the same 
mail contained another dispatch from Buchanan, dated October 
25th. When this dispatch was written the Secretary of State 
had received the letter from Trist which submitted the Mexican 
proposal regarding a neutral territory between the Nueces and 
the Rio Grrande. The Secretary had, he said, been instructed by 
the President to say that he "could not for a single moment 
entertain the question of surrendering a j:)ortion of Texas." 
Surprise and regret were expressed because the commissioner 
had "gone so far beyond the carefully considered ultimatum" 
as to refer it to his government. "The President," he added, 
"has directed me to reiterate your recall." In a private note 
Buchanan said that he was "extremely sorry" to be obliged to 
write such a dispatch, but 

to propose to consult the Gov't whether they woukl abaudou that portion 
of the country where Mexico attacked our forces & on our right to whicli the 
Whigs have raised such an unfounded clamor, will be a fruitful cause of 
assault against us in the next Congress. I hope, however, there may never 
be a necessity for sending this dispatch to either House of Congress."" 

Notice of his recall and of the adoption of a more drastic 
military policy were destined to have small influence upon Trist 's 
diplomatic activities, for soon after the dispatches had arrived an 
opportunity was presented for reopening negotiations. He and 
General Scott were now boon comjianions,''^ and while setting a 
high value on their own combined judgment, each deemed an 
order from the President and his cabinet to be a nuisance which, 
in important cases, should be disregarded. If, therefore, the 
commissioner and the general believed that a treaty ought to be 
made, why should the President interfere ! 



70 Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 25, 1847, TriM Papers. Eec'd Nov. 16. 
The official dispatch is printed in Doe. 52, as cited above, 94-95. 

'1 On October 18 Trist wrote to his wife: "I am General Scott's friend 
for life. I know him thoroughUi : he is the soul of honor & probity, and 
full of the most sterling qualities of heart & head: affectionate, generous, 

forgiving, and a lover of justice Tell all my intimate friends of 

the entire revolution, from the conception I had formed of Gen S. ;// mil 
ignoraiwe of his character, to wliat I now Icikvw of him" (Trist Papers). 



TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 521 

After the interruption of negotiations and the renewal of 
hostilities Scott's army had won the battles of Moliuo del Key 
and Chapnltepee and had captured Mexico City. On September 
16 Santa Anna, then at Guadalupe, resigned the Presidency and 
directed that the office should be held by Pena y Pena, president 
of the supreme court, until the Mexican congress should other- 
wise direct. He then set out on an unsuccessful expedition 
against a small force of Americans stationed at Puebla. Pena 
assumed the office, not however by virtue of the retiring Presi- 
dent 's decree, but in accordance with the constitutional provision 
that the head of the supreme court should succeed to the Presi- 
dency in the event of a vacancy. After removing Santa Anna 
from his military command, the new President succeeded in estab- 
lishing a government— one of doubtful legality in certain re- 
spects — but one which prevented anarchy until the congress could 
provide another. On November 11 that body selected General 
Anaya to be President ad interim, and the new executive at once 
made Pena y Pena his Minister of Foreign Relations.^^ 

Nearly a month before he had received notice of his recall 
Trist had taken steps to renew peace negotiations. On October 
20, during the brief administration of President Peila y Pena, 
he sent a letter, through the British legation, to Luis de la Rosa, 
the then Minister of Foreign Relations. This letter was dated 
September 7, 1847, for the reason that it purported to be a reply 
to the commissioners with whom he had negotiated before the 
armistice had been terminated." Rosa notified Trist'* that 

T2 Technically, Peiia was not president of the court — that office being 
vacant — but as' senior member, he acted as president. Hence his right 
to assume the Presidency was somewhat doubtful. Trist to Buchanan, 
Jan. 26, 1848 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 281). For other details, 
see Eives, II, 584-589. 

73 Trist to Buchanan, Oct. 31, 1847 (copy in Trist Papers). Printed 
in part in Sen. Ex. Doo. 52, as above cited, 212-213. The part omitted 
tells of Thornton's endeavor to induce the Mexicans to negotiate. The 
letter to the conmiissioners may be found in Doo. 52, 214 ff. In a letter 
dated Oct. 25 Trist told Buchanan that there was a general desire on 
the part of both Mexicans and foreigners for the annexation of all 
of Mexico to the United States (copy in Trisi Papers). This part is 
omitted from the same letter printe<l in Doo. 52, 205-212. 

-iRosa to Trist, Oct. 31, 1847 (Doe. 52, as above cited, 227-228). 



522 JAMES E. POLK 

commissioners would be appointed, but this promise was not 
fulfilled until after Anaya had become President. 

On November 22 the new minister, Peiia, notified Trist that 
President Anaya had appointed peace commissioners. Two of 
the men selected, Bernardo Couto and Miguel Atristain, had 
been members of the commission which had declined, in Septem- 
ber, to accept the American project. The others were Manual 
Rincon and Gonzago Cuevas. The former declined to serve and 
his place was not filled. Peiia's note was transmitted to Thorn- 
ton, who accompanied it by a letter of his own. In this, Thornton 
stated that he had informed Peiia of Trist 's recall, and that the 
minister was "thunderstruck" and disappointed. Thornton ex- 
pressed the hope that Trist might go on with the negotiations, 
since the Mexican government had been induced to appoint com- 
missioners by the prospect of a speedy peace. Peace could be 
had now, he said, but delay might jeopardize the prospect of a 
peaceful settlement.'^ This argument seems eventually to have 
appealed with great force to Trist 's shallow intellect. He did 
not, however, immediately follow the advice offered, for, two 
days later, he formally notified Peiia of his recall and stated 
that any communications regarding peace should be handed to 
General Scott for transmission to Washington.'"' 

In thus declining, in the first instance, to proceed with the 
negotiations after he had received notice of his recall, Trist was 
not actuated by respect for superior authority ; he was influenced 
solely by the belief that any other course would be futile. On 
the same day that he formally notified Pefia of his recall he told 
Thornton in a letter that no dread of "the displeasure of those 
entrusted with the power of dispensing office" would deter him 



"Peua to Trist, Nov. 22, 1847; Thornton to Trist (formal letter of 
same date) (Doc. 52, as above cited, 98-09, 281). Thornton to Trist 
(confidential), same date, Trist Papers. Thornton's confidential letter 
was written at Pena's urgent request. See Thornton to Palmerston, 
Nov. 29, 1847, quoted by Eives, II, 595. 

78 Trist to Pefia, Nov. 24, 1847 (Doc. 52, as above cited, 99-100). Orig- 
inal, recalled by Trist, in Trist Papers. 



TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO .523 

from "disobeying positive & peremptory instructions,"^'^ if the 
President had not deprived him of "all shadow of authority to 
do anything whatever." However, when Peiia y Peiia argued 
that the offer made prior to the receipt of his recall had com- 
mitted his government, when the British diplomats urged prompt 
action, and when General Scott "encouraged him, nevertheless, 
to finish the good work he had begun ' ' and expressed the belief 
that such action would be "duly ratified at Washington," a man 
of small mental caliber and excessive vanity, like Trist, could 
hardly fail to be influenced.'^ 

Despite all this pressure he did not decide immediately to 
disregard his instructions. On Nevember 27 he drafted an- 
other dispatch to Buchanan. In it he petulantly resented the 
President's criticism of his course in offering to refer to Wash- 
ington the question relating to the boundary of Texas. After 
pointing out the futility of demanding that ]\Iexican peace pro- 
posals must be sent to Washington, he urged that a new com- 
mission should be chosen to negotiate with the one already ap- 
pointed by Mexico. He then expected to leave Mexico in about 
twelve days.'^^ That he had at this time no intention of making 
a treaty is made clear by a letter written to Mrs. Trist on the 
following day. "I have," said he, "bid adieu for ever to official 
life. This decision is irrevocable." She was asked to tell Bu- 
chanan, with kindest regards, that Trist would not resume his 
place in the State Department, for he [Buchanan] "will soon 



""But, he added, "not only am I divested entirely of the official char- 
acter which I lately held, and with it of all shadow of authority to do 
anything whatever; but I deem it certain, that, in the actual state of 
things at Washington, the cause of Peace could not fail to be seriously 
prejudiced, were I to pursue any other course than that of the most 
absolute & unqualified acquiescence in the Executive will, as announced 
to me. ' ' He will go to Washington, he says, and do what he can for 
peace: "In a word, the signing of a Treaty of Peace is reserved for 
another hand than mine" (Trist to Thornton, Nov. 24, 1847 [copy], 
Trist Papers). 

"8 Pena to Couto, Nov. 24, 1847, quoted by Eives II, 596. Scott, Auto- 
hiography, II, 576. 

79 Trist to Buchanan, Nov. 27, 1847 {Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 
228-230). Complete copy in Trist Papers. 



524 JAMES K. POLK 

see the impossibility of this, or my having anything to do with 
Mr. Polk." Apparently the last remark was induced by the 
belief that the President had been unduly influenced by General 
Pillow.«<^ 

We are not left in doubt concerning the date of Trist's de- 
cision to reopen negotiations, for, with characteristic egotism, 
he announced with loud trumpet the very hour on which he de- 
cided to play Caesar and cross the Rubicon. In a letter to his 
wife, he said : 

Procure the key to this cipher (. . .) and decipher the following, to be 
read to him [Buchanan] most secretly. This determination, I came to, 
this day, at 12 o'clock. It is altogether my own. 

Knou'ing it to be the very last chance, and impressed with the dreadful 
consequences to our country which cannot fail to attend the loss of that 
chance. [Here follows cipher which was interpretd to mean] I will make 
a treaty, if it can be done, on the basis of the Bravo, by 32°; giving 15 
millions besides the 3 millions cash. si 

In spite, however, of this precision as to the time of making 
his decision, Trist seems to have told the Mexican commissioners 
at least a day earlier that he probably would take the responsi- 
bility of disobeying his instructions.*- He had become obsessed 



so Say to Buchanan, he wrote, "that a baser villain, and dirtier 
scoundrel does not exist out of the Penitentiary, nor in it, than Genl 
Pillow. This is, not an opiiiioti, but a matter of fact, which will be proved 
to the world." He told Mrs. Trist that he expected to leave for the 
United States about December 6. Instead, he wrote his famous letter 
on that date. In a letter written to John A. Dix (copy in Trist Papers) 
on October 31 he had expressed his opinion of Polk's political generals. 
In it he urged Dix to beware of precipitancy in the confirmation of gen- 
erals, lest the Senate should become involved in ' * a deep, damning, 
irretrievable disgrace — which no earthly power, nor all earthly powers 
combined, can avert. ' ' 

*i Trist to Mrs. Trist, Dec. 4, 1847, Trist Papers. In a similar strain 
he told Edward Thornton that ' ' this letter will occasion you great sur- 
prise, but no greater than I should myself have experienced a few hours 
ago, had a seer, in whose prophetic powers I put faith, foretold to me 
that I was to write it" (Trist to Thornton, Dec. 4, 1847, Trist Papers). 
This letter with blanks for Thornton 's name is printed in Doc. 52, as 
cited above, 266-268. Thornton's reply, dated Dec. 11, is in the Trist 
Papers. He commends Trist's proposed action and feels certain that the 
United States "will highly applaud your decision." He, too, expressed 
the belief that peace could be had "note or never." 

82 Couto to I'ena, Dec. 3, 1847, quoted by Eives, II, 597. 



TBEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 525 

with the belief that "if the present opportunity be not seized 
at once, all chance for making a treaty at all will be lost for an 
indefinite period — probably forever" (letter to Thornton, just 
cited) ; and a desire for fame doubtless helped to reenforce this 
belief. 

Having decided to make a treaty, if possible, Trist informed 
Buchanan of the fact in a very extraordinary letter, the manu- 
script of which covered sixty-five large pages. It is not only 
prolix and extremely tiresome, but, in addition, is one of the most 
gratuitously insulting documents in our diplomatic annals. He 
assigned, as reasons for resuming negotiations in spite of his 
recall, a conviction that his government still desired peace; a 
belief that a treaty could be made then, but not later ; certainty 
that Mexico would not and could not consent to yield more than 
his instructions had demanded ; and the belief that his recall had 
been based on "a supposed state of things in this country entirely 
the reverse of that which actually exists." Had he limited him- 
self to these general statements the letter might not merit severe 
criticism, whatever might be thought of his assumption of author- 
ity. But Trist never knew when he had said enough ; his pen 
rambled on where his brain declined to follow. Consequently, 
each topic was amplified — but not illuminated — by a seemingly 
endless profusion of words. 

Under the first heading he gave a dissertation on the Presi- 
dent's responsibilities, and then proceeded to philosophize upon 
Polk's mental operations. Having reached the conclusion that 
the President must still desire peace, he pointed out that the 
executive indignation mentioned in Buchanan's recent letter was 
entirely wasted on a weak power like Mexico. Despite his cer- 
tainty that the President must still desire peace, he hinted very 
pointedly that Polk wished to convert a defensive war into one 
of conquest, and for such a wish he should be ashamed of himself. 
Later in the letter he again recurred to the subject of annexing 
all of Mexico. He believed ultimate absorption to be desirable ; 



526 JAMES K. POLK 

but a dissolution of the Union would be preferable to the calamity 
of immediate annexation.^" 

As if disregarding his instructions and questioning Polk's 
motives were not enough, Trist had the bad taste and the audacity 
to volunteer opinions which could have no other effect than to 
wound and to exasperate the President. Well knowing, of course, 
that the Washington Union reflected the President's views, he 
declared its criticism of Scott's armistice to be "balderdash," 
"stuff," and "nonsense," which no one outside of Washington, 
"however low in understanding," would believe. Again, a tact- 
ful subordinate would not have told the President that his close 
friend, General Pillow, was an "intriguer" of "incomprehensible 
baseness of character." Trist did this. He asserted, also, that 
because the President had relied on "supposition" and "private 
representations" from this intriguer, "everything was seen up- 
side down." Having referred to Pillow and Santa Anna as 
"twin phenomena" in "moral obliquity," he did not hesitate to 
speak of the former as "an individual who gives himself out as 
the maker of the President (by having procured his nomination 
at the Baltimore convention), and as the President's other self — 
a pretension which I have reason to believe but too well founded. 
Even the "justice" done the President in charitably excusing 
his shortcomings by attributing tliem to "a blind confidence" 
in Pillow did not help matters very much. It could not have 
given Polk extreme pleasure to read that "infallibility of judg- 
ment .... is not among the attributes of the President of the 
United States," or to be told that Scott's armistice, instead of 
being a blunder, had rescued the administration and the Demo- 
cratic party from a "perilous position."®* While reading his 



83 In this very letter Trist toLl Biulianan how easily annexation eouhl 
be accomplished; and. according to Lionel Davidson, agent of the Koth- 
schilds in Mexico, he had, late in November, been in favor of permanent 
occupation (Davidson to Thornton, Nov. 23, ]8-±7, Trist Papers). And 
yet he condemned Polk for his supposed desire to acquire the republic. 

S4 Trist to Buchanan, Dec. 6, 1817 {Sen. Ex. Doo. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 
231-266). Complete copy also in Trist Papers. 



TBEATY OF GUADALU P E H I DALGO 527 

tedious letters Qiie is tempted, at times, to give Trist credit for 
sincerity — to think that he really believed himself to be perform- 
ing deeds of heroism ; albeit such charity for his motives must be 
at the expense of his intelligence. On the other hand, certain 
letters written to his wife show a want of sincerity, and brand 
him as a man who craved notoriety. 

The American diplomat's decision to cut the Gordian knot in 
order to save both Mexico and his country from impending dis- 
aster did not result in an immediate reopening of negotiations. 
The Mexican officials who had been so anxious for him to remain 
now pleaded want of authority, and interposed various pretexts 
for delay. Since the impediments to formal discussions on the 
part of the diplomats were not removed until the latter part of 
December, we may turn our attention to Washington for the 
purpose of ascertaining the views of the administration. 

On Ocober 6, as we have seen, the President ordered Trist 's 
recall, not on account of the commissioner's misconduct, but 
because it was thought that he would be unable to make a treaty. 
When, however, Polk learned that the commissioner had agreed 
to consult his government regarding a neutral zone between the 
two rivers, he remarked that "Mr. Trist has managed the nego- 
tiation very bunglingly and with no ability."*"' The recall was 
repeated in still more emphatic terms. 

Having no reason, of course, for believing that Trist would 
disobey his instructions, Polk gave his attention to the war policy 
which he purposed to recommend when Congress should have 
assembled in December. It was necessary that his message should 
be drafted with extreme care because the control of the House 
had now passed to his opponents. At a cabinet meeting held 
on November 9, Buchanan, whose Presidential aspirations had 
revived, told Polk that his message must advise one of two courses 
— to designate the part of Mexico which the United States would 
hold as indemnity, or to occupy all of that country by a greatly 



S5 Polk, Diarii, III, 199. 



528 JAMES E. POLK 

increased miltiary force. He did not recommend either course, 
but the President thought that he favored the latter. As Bu- 
chanan had up to this time Mashed to confine the acquisition of 
territory within very narrow limits, Polk believed that the change 
w^as due to political considerations. Since there seemed to be some 
uncertainty as to the policy of the administration, the President 
read a paragraph which he intended to include in his message. 

My views as thus reduced to writing [said he] were iu substance that 
we would continue the prosecution of the war with an increased force, 
hold all the country we had conquered or might conquer, and levy contri- 
butions upon the enemy to support the war, until a just peace was ob- 
tained; that we must have indemnity iu territory, and that as a part 
indemnity the Californias & New Mexico should under no circumstances 
be restored to Mexico; but that they should henceforth be consiilered a 
part of the U. S., & permanent territorial Governments be established over 
them; and that if Mexico protracted the war, additional territory must be 
required as further indemnity.®*'' 

During the next two weeks the President revised what he had 
written, and, at his request, Buchanan drafted a paragraph 
which embodied the Secretary's opinions on a proper Mexican 
policy. Both drafts were presented for discussion at a cabinet 
meeting held on the twenty-third of November. Avowing a wish 
to take all of Mexico, Walker preferred Buchanan's draft, for 
he believed that its construction would make such acquisition 
possible. "I replied," wrote Polk, "that I was not prepared to 
go to that extent ; and furthermore that I did not desire that 
anything I said in the message should be so obscure as to give 
rise to doubt or discussions as to what my true meaning was. ' ''**' 
This remark indicates that Trist's fears regarding the President's 
change of policy were wholly unwarranted. 

On December 7 Polk submitted to Congress his third annual 
message. He told of Trist 's mission and of his failure to conclude 
a treaty. The commissioner had, he said, been instructed to de- 
mand a cession of territory as indemnity, for in no other way 
could Mexico satisfy the claims of the United States. 



80 /bid., 216-218. &■! Ibid., 229. 



TEEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 529 

The doctrine of no territory is the doctrine of no indemnity, and if 
sanctioned would be a public acknowledgment that our country was wrong 
and that the war declared by Congress with extraordinary unanimity was 
unjust and should be abandoned — an admission unfounded in fact and 
degrading to the national character. 

He recited the substance of Trist's instructions and urged the 
necessity of acquiring- New Mexico and the Calif ornias. The war 
had abrogated the treaties regarding claims, making it necessary 
for the United States to pay American claimants and to reim- 
burse itself by taking territory. California, he said, should be 
acquired in order to forestall the attempt by any other nation 
to infringe upon the Monroe Doctrine. He disagreed with those 
who advocated the policy of retiring to a fixed line and confining 
the war to defensive operations. Instead, he recommended the 
establishment of governments in New Mexico and California, and 
a vigorous prosecution of the war. Having outlined his policy, 
he added : "It has never been contemplated by me, as an object 
of the war, to make a permanent conquest of the Republic of 
Mexico or to annihilate her separate existence as an independent 
nation," but a peace "must bring with it indemnity for the past 
and security for the future. ' '**'^ 



88 Eichardson Messages, IV, 533-546. Walker still favored the absorp- 
tion of all of Mexico. A paragraph in the first draft of his financial 
report to Congress practically advocated such a policy, but on the Presi- 
dent's advice this paragraph was omitted (Polk, Diary, III, 2-11-2-1:2). 
Among the Tri^t Papers is an interesting letter written lay a young Mexi- 
can to his father. It was written in Washington and bears neither date 
nor signature, but an accompanying newspaper shows the writer to have 
been Carlos Landa, and a comparison with events mentioned in Polk's 
diary ghows that the letter was written in December, 1847. Landa visited 
the Secretary of the Treasury on December 13 and reported that ' ' Walker 
is entirely in favour of the annexation of the whole of Mexico to the 
United States; he told me so frankly & also spoke of the manner of 
governing it during the first years by a suitable form of government 
which should not be in opposition to the institutions of this countrv. " 
Eegarding Walker as the most important member, he concluded that 
Polk and the rest of the cabinet likcAvise desired annexation. He visited 
Van Buren, Corcoran, Calhoun, and other prominent politicians. He says 
that Walker w-as stricken with epilepsy on December 9; Polk in his 
diary for that day notes that Walker '"'had been taken suddenlv ill & 
had fallen down in the Treasury building." 



530 JAMES K. POLK 

The message was vehemently assailed in both houses of Con- 
gress. As in the preceding session, the history of the outbreak 
of the war was discussed in all its details. These recitals shed 
no new light on the subject, for already nearly every argument 
had been pressed into service to show that Polk had wantonly 
usurped authority so that he might rob a sister republic of her 
territory. On January 3, 1848, by a vote of eighty-five to eighty- 
one, the House formally declared that the war had been "unneces- 
. sarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of the 
United States." Among the new Whig members who had the 
pleasure of adding their votes to the denunciation of the Presi- 
dent was Abraham Lincoln. With that consummate skill in 
debate which was later to expose the sophistry of the "Little 
Giant," he averred that Polk had falsified the history of our 
difficulties with Mexico by telling a half truth. The statements 
in the message reminded him of instances he had known of a 
lawyer's "struggling for his client's neck in a desperate case, 
employing every artifice to' work round, befog, and cover up with 
many words some point arising in the case which he dare not 
admit and yet could not deny. ' '^^ 

Resolutions, too, there were in plenty. Dickinson presented 
one on December 14 which asserted that the "true policy" of the 
government required the annexation of contiguous territory. In 
the Senate, on the following day, Calhoun offered a counter reso- 
lution to the effect that a conquest of Mexico would be disastrous 
to the United States, and that ' ' no line of policy in further prose- 
cution of the war should be adopted." On the twenty-second, 
Lincoln made his debut as a legislator by calling upon the Presi- 
dent to designate the exact." spot" on which the war had begun, 
and for proof as to the ownership of that spot.'"' 



^s» Cong. GJobc, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 95, 155. The quotation is taken from 
Lincoln, Works (Tandy ed.), 337, whit'li differs sliglitly from that reiwrted 
in the Globe. 

'JO Cong. Globe, Joe. cit., 64. 



TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 531 

Three days after his message had been sent to Congress the 
President received a letter from General Pillow which told of 
the attempt made by Scott and Trist to procure a treaty by the 
use of bribe money. At a meeting held on December 11 he told 
the cabinet of the news he had received, and expressed "in the 
strongest terms" his condemnation of their conduct. Scott's 
immediate recall was discussed, but it was thought prudent to 
seek further definite information from Generals Shields and Quit- 
man, who were expected to arrive in Washington within a few 
days.'-'^ Although he must have known better,''^ Shields, when 
consulted, asserted that bribery had not been considered, and 
that the discussion had related simply to paying part of the 
money for the territory in advance of the ratification of the 
treaty. Polk did not accept this version of the matter, and re- 
solved that those implicated in the scheme must be punished, even 
though his friend Pillow might be one of the number. For the 
present, however, he was obliged to await further information 
concerning the "infamous transaction."^^ 

Before news of the bribery episode had reached Washington, 
Polk and his cabinet had discussed the feasibility of promising 
protection to the peace party in Mexico, if they would form a 
government and agree to make a treaty. Incensed on account of 
the bribery scandal and because Scott had arrested Pillow and 
Worth, the President, against the advice of members of the cabi- 
net, determined to recall both Scott and Trist. The question of 
their successors had now to be considered. Marcy and Walker 
felt that Taylor should be put in command of the army, but Polk 
fixed upon General W. 0. Butler. His intention to invest Butler 



91 Polk, Diary, III, 245-246. 

92 See Hitdicock, Fifty Years in camp and Field, 267-268. 

93 Polk, Diary, III, 25.3, 262-3, 340, 383-4. In a letter to Marcy, Scott 
stated that he had used secret service money simply "to purchase valu- 
able information" (H. Ex. Doo. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 1085) — a statement 
which Polk pronounced ' ' evasive, and leaves the irresistible inference 
that such a transaction took place and that it will not bear the light" 
(Diary, III, 346). Of course the transaction did take place. See above, 
pp. 510-512. 



532 JAMES K. POLK 

with diplomatic powers was opposed by Buchanan, who insisted 
that the commissioner should be a civilian. A choice was made 
unnecessary by the arrival of news that Trist had already re- 
opened negotiations.^* The President's belief that Taylor was 
wholly out of sympathy with himself and his administration was 
by no means erroneous. On one point only did the two men 
agree — they both distrusted and detested General Scott. "Be- 
tween ourselves," wrote Taylor to his son-in-law on hearing of 
the victories near Mexico City, 

Gen '1 Scott would stoop to anything however low & contemptable as any 
man in the nation, to obtain power or place, & be as arbitrary in using 
it when in possession; between him, Trist & the powers that be, old Harry 
may take the hindmost, they are all of a piece. 

When, about a month later, a false report of Polk 's death reached 
camp, the hero of Buena Vista remarked: "While I regret to 
hear of the death of any one, I would as soon have heard of his 
death if true, as that of any other individual in the whole 
Union. "''^ Perhaps his own brief term in the White House 
caused him to realize more clearly the perplexities which con- 
front the chief executive of the nation. 

On January 4, 1848, Polk was much surprised to read in a 
letter sent from Vera Cruz by Colonel Wilson that Trist was 
negotiating with the Mexican commissioners. 

Mr. Trist [was his comment] has acknowledged the receipt of his letter 
of recal[l], and he possesses no diplomatic powers. He is acting, no doubt, 
upon Gen'l Scott's advice. He has become a perfect tool of Scott. He is, 
[in] this measure, defying the authority of his Government. . . . He seems 
to have entered into all Scott 's hatred of the administration, and to be 
lending himself to all Scott 's evil purposes. He may, I fear, greatly 
embarrass the Government. 

Next day Mrs. Trist showed to Buchanan the letter of December 
4 in which her husband announced, in cipher, that he would 
make a treaty in accordance with his original instructions."'" 



94 Polk, Dmni, III, 251, 2(56, 280-281. 

95 Taylor to Wood, Sept. 27, Nov. 2, 1847, Tanlor Letters, 136, 148. 
9«Poik, Diary, III, 283, 286. For Trist 's cipher letter, see above, p. 524. 



TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 533 

Before the President had recovered from the amazement 
caused by Trist's open defiance of authority, his vexation was 
increased by a call from the House for a copy of Slidell's in- 
structions and for information regarding the return of Santa 
Anna and Paredes to Mexico. With the concurrence of the 
cabinet Polk decided to furnish the House with Conner's in- 
structions regarding- Santa Anna, but Slidell's instriictions and 
all relating to McKenzie's mission were withheld on the ground 
that their publication would be prejudicial to public interest.^'^ 

Truly the new year had brought anything but pleasure to the 
chief executive. One annoyance succeeded another in such rapid 
succession that his patience was taxed to the utmost. Three days 
after he had declined to give the House full information on dip- 
lomatic affairs, the mail brought Trist 's celebrated sixty-five page 
letter (of December 6) in which the President was told that the 
commissioner had decided to save the administration and the 
party from a "periloiLS position," and the country from dis- 
aster, by making a treaty with Mexico. No wonder that he pro- 
nounced this epistle to be the "most extraordinary document" 
he had ever read. 

His despatch is arrogant, impudent, and very insulting to his Govern- 
ment and even personally offensive to the President. He admits he is 
acting without authority and in violation of the positive order recalling 
him. It is manifest to me that he has become the tool of Gen '1 Scott and 
his menial instrument, and that the paper was written at Scott's instance 
and dictation. I have never in my life felt so indignant, and the whole 
Cabinet expressed themselves as I felt. I told Mr. Buchanan that the 
paper was so insulting and contemptably base that it require [d] no 
lengthy answer, but that it did require a short, but stern and decided 
rebuke, and directed him to prepare such a reply. I directed the Secre- 
tary of War to write at once to Maj 'r Gen '1 Butler, directing him, if Mr. 
Trist was still with the Head Quarters of the army, to order him off, and 
to inform the authorities of Me-xico that he had no authority to treat. 
If there was any legal provision for his punishment he ought to be severely 
handled. He has acted worse than any man in the public employ whom 



'J- Ihid., 287-291. Richardson, Messages, IV, 565-567. For McKenzie's 
mission, see p. 439. 



534 JAMES K. POLK 

I have ever known. His despatch proves that he is destitute of honour 
or principle, and that he has proved himself to be a very base man. I 
was deceived in him. I had little personal knowledge of him, but could 
not have believed [it] possible that any man would have acted so basely 
as he would have [has] done.^^ 

Preparation of letters to Trist aud Butler (who had super- 
seded Scott) was delayed for several days while Polk and the 
cabinet discussed the propriety of submitting Trist 's treaty to 
the Senate, if it should turn out that he liad already signed one. 
Some of the members urged that unless the President had deter- 
mined to reject such a treaty the suggested notice to the Mexican 
government might prove embarrassing. Polk was now unwilling 
to restrict his demands to those embodied in Trist 's instructions, 
and yet he declined to say that he would not accept a treaty made 
in accordance with those instructions. Consequently General 
Butler was told that if Trist had actually concluded a treaty he 
was to send it to Washington, where it would be disposed of as 
the President should deem best ; if none had been concluded, he 
■w\as to inform the Mexican government that the United States 
would not recognize a treaty made by the former commissioner.^'' 

Polk waited for additional information regarding his insub- 
ordinate diidomat. The Mexican mail arrived on February 7, 
but contained no dispatches from either Trist or Scott. It 
brought, however, a letter from the irrepressible Atocha, and as 
usual he was ready to engage in underground diplomacy. 
"Atocha is a great scoundrel," was the President's comment, 

and his letter contained the infamous suggestion that he should be fur- 
nished with money to bribe the Mexican Congress to induce them to ratify 
a Treaty of peace, though he does not state whether a Treaty had been 
signed by Mr. Trist or not. 



98 Polk, Diary, III, 300-301. 

99 7bic?., 313-317. Marcv to Butler, Jan. 26, 1848 {Sen. Ex. Doc. 52 
30 Cong., 1 ses9., 146). On February 2 the President, in response to a call, 
sent to the Senate correspondence relating to Trist 's negotiations with the 
Mexican commissioners at the time of Scott's armistice (Richardson, Mes- 
mges, IV, 569). 



TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 535 

He said that Trist claimed to possess a bribe fund, and Polk 
thought it likely that the commissioner was base enough to make 
such an assertion. Silence, in Polk's opinion, indicated a con- 
spiracy on the part of Trist and Scott, and he had little doubt 
that a treaty would be made: ''a few days more will, I trust, 
develop what they have been doing. ' '^""^ 

While he awaited developments, troubles nearer home fully 
occupied the time and taxed the patience of the overworked ex- 
ecutive. The hoards of office seekers multiplied. The Whigs, 
not satisfied with aiding the enemy by '^unpatriotic sentiments" 
and annoying resolutions, were now, in the President's opinion, 
insidiously attempting to produce a panic in the money market 
and thereby, if possible, to break down the Treasury, and thus 
compel the inglorious withdrawal of our army from Mexico." 
There were dissensions within the Democratic party among the 
supporters of rival aspirants for the Presidency, and Polk sus- 
pected Buchanan of using his position in the cabinet as a means 
of injuring General Cass. Members of the party urged the Presi- 
dent to cease reiterating his determination not to accept another 
nomination, for they said that he might be nominated regardless 
of his own wishes. ' ' To all of them, ' ' says the Diarij, ' ' I have 
given the same answer, & repeated my sincere desire to retire & 
my fixed purpose to do so." At this same time he was called 
upon to perform a duty which was personally disagreeable, and 
one which would bring additional opposition to his administra- 
tion. He approved the conviction of Colonel Fremont for dis- 
obedience to the orders of General Kearny, and, although the 
sentence of dismissal was remitted, he fully expected to incur the 
powerful opposition of Senator Benton. ^'^^ The suspense regard- 
ing Trist 's activities was broken on February 19 by the arrival 
of a messenger bearing the treaty of peace. Before discussing 

100 Polk, Diary, III, 328-330. 

101 7& /,(?., 319-322, 327. After the approval of the court's decisiou, 
Benton, as noted elsewhere, ceased speaking to the President. 



536 JAMES E. POLE 

its reception, however, we may turn our attention to the negoti- 
ations by which it had been concluded. 

As noted above, negotiations did not begin as soon as Trist 
had announced his intention to remain in Mexico. Pena y Peiia, 
the Minister of Foreign Relations, said that the appointment of 
commissioners must be confirmed by the senate and that the new 
congress would not meet until January. Both Edward Thornton 
and Percy W. Doyle, who had recently returned to his post as 
secretary of the British legation, urged the Mexican government 
to waive formalities, but, for a time, their arguments produced 
no effect. Although Trist held informal interviews with the com- 
missioners, not until late in December did Pena consent to take 
the responsibility of instructing the commissioners to treat with 
the American diplomat. Even then, in true Mexican fashion, 
he required them to ask for impossible concessi6ns; and before 
an agreement had been reached. President Anaya 's term of office 
had expired. As a quorum of the congress had not yet assembled, 
his successor could not be elected, therefore Peiia, as head of the 
supreme court, again assumed the office of President. Once 
more, also, Luis de la Rosa was made Minister of Foreign Re- 
lations. 

Negotiations were resumed, but the new government at first 
seemed less disposed than the old to make the necessary conces- 
sions. The commissioners sat in Mexico City, while the seat of 
government was at Queretaro, consequently much time was lost 
in transmitting messages between the two places. 

Before the change of government Trist had made it clear 
that the Rio Grande boundary and the inclusion of San Diego 
within Upper California would be insisted upon by the United 
States. He said, also, that his government would not pay Mexico 
more than fifteen million dollars. On assuming office Rosa ob- 
jected to the boundary mentioned by Trist, and insisted that the 
sum to be paid must be at least thirty millions. Doubtless he 
would have interposed obstacles indefinitely had it not been for 



TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 537 

threatened uprisings in some of the Mexican states, and had 
Scott not taken steps to renew military operations. When argu- 
ments had failed, Trist threatened to break off negotiations unless 
a treaty could be signed by the first of February, while Doyle 
urged both Rosa and the commissioners to avert the calamity of 
a renewal of hostilities. Such pressure could not be withstood. 
On January 31 a messenger left Queretaro for Mexico City bear- 
ing documents which authorized the commissioners to sign the 
treaty as agreed upon with Trist. Not until the afternoon of 
February 2 were all details arranged and copies in both languages 
completed. In accordance with the wishes of the Mexican com- 
missioners, the treaty was not signed in the capital where the 
meetings had been held. For affixing the signatures they re- 
paired to the near-by town of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and from that 
place the treaty took its name."- 

In the treaty the United States procured the things which 
had been made ultimata in Trist 's instructions. The Rio Grande 
was recognized as the boundary of Texas ; Upper California and 
New Mexico, but not Lower California, were ceded to the United 
States. In return, Mexico was to be paid fifteen million dollars; 
and in addition, the United States agreed to pay all liquidated 
claims of American citizens against Mexico, and to assume un- 
adjusted claims to the extent of three and a quarter million 
dollars. Mexico was specifically relieved from the payment of 
claims not covered by the treaty. The privilege of transit across 
the Isthmus of Tehauntepec, desired by the American govern- 
ment, was not granted. In a word, Trist contented himself with 
the minimum which the administration had, in April, 1847, 
authorized him to accept. As soon as the signatures had been 
affixed the treaty was borne to Washington by James D. Freanor, 
a war correspondent of the New Orleans Delta, better known 



102 For further details concerning the last stage of negotiations, see 
Eives, United States and Mexico, II, 602-613. Some of the Mexican pro- 
jects in the Trist Papers were, according to a note appended by Trist, 
translated by Thornton and the copies are in his handwriting. Evidently 
he was familiar with all of the proceedings. 



538 JAMES K. POLK 

by his pen name, ' ' Mustang. ' ' Trist had already asked Seott to 
disregard his positive orders and to "pledge his word" that he 
would suspend hostilities. ^°^ 

Freanor arrived in Washington on February 19, 1848, and 
Buchanan placed the treaty in the President's hands at nine 
o'clock of the same evening. As Trist had announced his inten- 
tion to resume negotiations, no surprise was expressed when the 
document arrived. After a hasty reading of the treaty, Polk 
confided to his diary : 

Mr. Trist was recalled in October last, but chose to remain in Mexico 
and continue the negotiations. The terms of the Treaty are within his 
instructions which he took out in April last, upon the important question 
of boundary and limits. There are many provisions in it which will re- 
quire more careful examination than a single reading will afford. Mr. 
Trist has acted very badly, as I have heretofore noted in this diary, but 
notwithstanding this, if on further examination the Treaty is one that can 
be accepted, it should not be rejected on account of his bad conduct.io* 

To this sensible attitude of not permitting personal pique to 
warp his judgment on matters of state the President steadily 
adhered. Although Trist 's arrogance and unwarranted insolence 
had greatly exasperated him, the simple fact of negotiating with- 
out instructions probably did not worry Polk very much. In 
April, 1847, while Trist 's instructions were being prepared, Bu- 
chanan received a letter from IVIoses Y. Beach, of the New York 
Sun, whom the President had appointed as secret agent in Mexico, 
and the agent intimated that he might make a treaty. He had 
not, of course, been clothed with diplomatic powers, yet after 
reading Beach 's letter Polk noted in his diary : 

It is clearly to be inferred from his letter that he will make a Treaty 
with them if he can. Should he do so, and it is a good one, I will waive 
his authority to make it, and submit it to the Senate for ratification. It 
will be a good joke if he should assume the authority and take the whole 
country by surprise & make a Treaty.io'' 



103 Trist to Scott, Jan. 28, 1848, Trist Papers. 

104 Polk, Diarif, III, 345. 

105 Polk, Diary, II, 477. Beach's commission is printed in Buchanan, 
Works, VII, 119. 



TREATY OF GUADALUPE BIBALGO 539 

Probably Trist may have heard the President make similar re- 
marks, and, if so, they may have had some influence on his own 
conduct in Mexico. However this may have been, Polk, in the 
present instance, failed to see the humorous side of the trans- 
action. 

So important did the President regard an early disposal of 
the treaty that he waived his scruples against Sunday labor and 
summoned the cabinet to a special meeting on the evening of the 
twentieth of February. Of this meeting we have two accounts, 
one in Polk's diary for the day, another by his nephew and 
private secretary, J. Knox Walker. After a general discussion 
Polk asked the opinion of each member concerning the advisa- 
bility of submitting the document to the Senate for ratification. 
All agreed that the tenth article relating to land grants in Texas 
should be stricken out. On the question of accepting the treaty, 
thus amended, the cabinet was divided — Buchanan and "Walker 
advised a rejection of the whole treaty, while Marcy, Mason, 
Johnson, and Clifford were in favor of accepting all but the tenth 
article. After Buchanan's opposition to extensive annexation 
his present attitude so nettled the President that he asked the 
pointed question: "Will you take the responsibility of its re- 
jection?" Buchanan's reply, that he would "take all the re- 
sponsibility which properly pertains to me as Sec'y of State 
giving such advice," led Polk to believe that the Secretary was 
playing polities at the expense of his chief. He reminded Bu- 
chanan that at the beginning of the war the Secretary had drafted 
instructions to American ministers at foreign courts which as- 
serted that the government had no intention of taking territory 
from Mexico — an assertion which the President had required him 
to omit. He reminded him, also, of his persistent opposition to 
the acquisition of any land except Upper California and New 
Mexico — now he objected to the treaty because it did not procure, 
a large enough area. Buchanan admitted this. He told the 
President that he might go further and mention his (Buchanan's) 



540 JAMES K. FOLK 

opposition to Scott 's march from Vera Cruz to Mexico City. But, 
he added, his advice was not taken, and "I am not now willing 
to acquire for indemnity what I would then have been very will- 
ing to take. The line of the Sierra Madre will give us ' indemnity 
for the past & security for the future.' " No agreement was 
reached at this meeting.^^'' 

Another meeting was held on the following day, and the 
President announced that he had decided to submit the treaty 
to the Senate for ratification, with a recommendation that the 
tenth article be stricken out. The reasons assigned for this de- 
cision are recorded in his diary : 

They were, briefly, that the treaty eouformed on the main question of 
limits & boundary to the instructions given to Mr. Trist in April last; and 
that though, if the treaty Avas now to be made, I should demand more 
territory, perhaps to make the Sierra Madra the line, yet it was doubtful 
whether this could be ever obtained by the consent of Mexico. I looked, 
too, to the consequences of its rejection. A majority of one branch of 
Congress is opposed to my administration ; they have falsely charged tliat 
the war was brought on and is continued by me \y\\\\ a view to the con- 
quest of Mexico; and if I were noAv to reject a Treaty made upon my oaati 
terms, as authorized in April last, with the unanimous approbation of the 
Cabinet, the probability is that Congress would not grant either men or 
money to prosecute the war. Should this be the result, the army now in 
Mexico would be constantly wasting and diminishing in numbers, and I 
might at last be compelled to withdraw them, and thus loose the two 
Provinces of New Mexico & Upper California, which were ceded to the 
U. S., by this Treaty. Should the opponents of my administration succeed 
in carrying the next Presidential election, the great probability is that 
the country would loose all the advantages secured by this Treaty. I 
adverted to the immense value of Upper California; and concluded by 
saying that if I were now to reject my own terms, as offered in April last, 
I did not see how it was possible for my administration to be sustained. lo'' 

On the next day, February 22, he sent the treaty to the Senate, 
accompanied by a message which recommended tliat all except 



106 Polk, Dmrxf, III, 34.3-346. Walker's account is in tlie Foil: Faprrs. 
In a note he says that he prepared it February 22, two days after tlie 
meeting. He does not say whether lie had been present at the meeting, 
but comment in Polk's Diary, III, 351, indicates tliat he had been. 

10- Polk, Dkini, III, 347-348. 



TEEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 541 

the tenth article should be ratified. With it he transmitted copies 
of the instructions given to both Slidell and Trist, which up to 
this time had been withheld. ^°'^ 

Truly, the President had been placed in an awkward position 
by his officious diplomat. The war had been unpopular even 
while Mexico had refused to treat, and Polk had good reasons 
for believing that he could not hope for means with which to 
continue it, if he should reject his own terms. During his entire 
career he had shown excellent judgment as to what was and what 
was not attainable, and besides, the treaty gave him all that he 
had set his heart upon. Tamaulipas or part of Sonora might be 
desirable, if it could be obtained without difficulty; but Polk 
was not the man to risk losing the objects which he had set out 
to procure, when the prospect of better terms was by no means 
certain. Despite all that his opponents might say it seems clear 
that the President never welcomed a war, and he neglected no 
opportunity which gave prospect of ending it. He was deter- 
mined to have Upper California and New Mexico at any cost, 
for these formed a part of his original program. His interest in 
further acquisition was never very great. Buchanan's sudden 
desire for more territory confirmed rather than altered Polk's 
decision, for he believed that the Secretary was inspired by purely 
selfish motives. 

He wished [wrote the President] to throw the whole responsibility on 
me of sending the Treaty to the Senate. If it was received well by the 
country, being a member of my administration, he would not be injured 
by it in his Presidential aspirations, for these govern all his opinions & 
acts lately; but if, on the other hand, it should not be received well, he 
could say, "I advised against it. "loo 

Doubtless Polk was justified in attributing to political motives 
Buchanan's recent change of front on the territorial question. 
At any rate he had lost faith in the Secretary's loyalty to the 



los Eichardson, Messages, IV, 573-574. 
109 Polk, Diary, III, 350. 



542 JAMES K. POLK 

administration. He had not concealed his resentment when dis- 
cussing the treaty, and a few days later he had occasion to speak 
still more pointedly. Buchanan told him that it was rumored in 
the streets that he was to be removed from the cabinet because 
a friend of his named Nugent, a correspondent for the New York 
Herald, had criticized the administration. Polk told him that 
the rumor was untrue, but that the vile effusions signed by 
Nugent had been attributed to the Secretary of State. He re- 
marked "in a stem manner" that Buchanan himself must judge 
of the propriety of having a member of the cabinet holding fa- 
miliar intercourse with an unprincipled person who ' ' was in daily 
habit of calumniating" the President. ' ' Their object, ' ' said Polk, 
"seems to be to abuse Gen'l Cass, Mr. Woodbury, and myself, 
and to praise Mr. Buchanan. The[y] falsely represent that I 
am intriguing to obtain the nomination for a re-election to the 
Presidency." He did not doubt that Buchanan had encouraged 
these attacks, for his own purposes; but he did not wish to act 
on suspicion alone. "If," said he, "I obtain any reliable proof 
that Mr. Buchanan has given countenance to Galvienses [Nugent] 
he shall not remain in the Cabinet. He denies that he has done 
so, and I am bound to believe him. ' ' When informed by Clifford 
that both Walker and Buchanan had spoken of resigning on 
account of the controversy over the treaty, he declared that he 
would follow his own course, regardless of consequences. Al- 
though surprised to hear that Walker had made such remarks, 
he was neither surprised nor perturbed by the hostility of the 
Secretary of State. "I expressed to Mr. Clifford," says the 
Diarij, "an indifference as to the course which Mr. Buchanan 
might think proper to pursue, but told him there was not the 
slightest danger of his resigning. ""- 

i^» Ibid.. 35.3-355, 359. Galvienses was Nugent 's pen name. _ "Mr. 
Buchanan's real trouble," was another comment in the Dwry, "is that 
he cannot use my administration and shape his [its] course according 
to his own ever "varying whims, in order to promote his aspirations to 
the Presidency. He cares not for the success or glory of my administra- 
tion further than he can make it subservient to his own political aspira- 
tions.' ' 



TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 543 

When he had received the treaty and submitted it to the 
Senate the President no doubt believed that he had received the 
last of Trist's abusive epistles. If so, he was greatly mistaken. 
Indeed, Freanor had brought two more along with the treaty, 
but by an oversight they had not been delivered to Polk until 
two days after that document had been sent to the Senate. The 
first bore the date of December 29, and the main point developed 
was that Polk's annual message had jeopardized peace negoti- 
ations by aiding the puros, the party which desired to annex all 
of Mexico to the United States. The particular part of the 
message criticized was that which suggested that necessity might 
force the United States to establish a government with which it 
could make a treaty. By preventing the modcrados, now in con- 
trol, from making peace, the puros hoped, by continuing hostil- 
ities, to force the United States to take all of Mexico, or at least 
to establish some form of protectorate over it. The second letter, 
of January 12, 1848, dealt with the difficulty of suspending hos- 
tilities, and was still more offensive than the other. At the time 
of Trist's recall, Polk had required the commander-in-chief to 
transmit all peace proposals to Washington ; at the same time, 
Scott was instructed to pursue the war with renewed vigor. Such 
an arrangement, said Trist, prevented any suspension of hostil- 
ities while peace proposals were under consideration — except by 
disobedience of orders — and was "a wanton sporting with the 
lives of men," a course wdiich, if followed, w'ould cause the 
whole civilized world to "burst forth with one universal cry of 
horror. "^^^ 

The arrogant character of these letters completely exhausted 
the patience of the President, and their author was characterized 
as "an impudent and unqualified scoundrel." Through Marcy, 
Polk instructed General Butler to prevent Trist from exercising 
any official authority in Mexico and to drive him away from the 
army headquarters. When Marcy hesitated to issue so drastic 



111 Trist to Buchanan {Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 274-280). 



544 JAMES K. POLK 

an order, the President not only dictated its terms but prepared 
a note for the files of the War Department to show that Polk 
himself had assumed the entire responsibility."- 

Had Polk received at this time another long letter written 
by Trist, he would, if possible, have been still more exasperated. 
It bears a date earlier than Freanor's departure for Washington, 
but apparently it was not sent until later. Besides giving a 
detailed account of the negotiations, Trist made some really sen- 
sible remarks concerning the obligation of the United States to 
protect its adventurous citizens who had engaged in hazardous 
enterprises in Mexico. As usual, however, he could not refrain 
from saying disagreeable things. In his discussion of the boun- 
dary he committed the unpardonable sin of asserting that the 
land between the Nueces and the Rio Grande was as much a part 
of Tamaulipas (and not of Texas) as the counties of Aecomac 
and Northampton were a part of Virginia."^ If so, the Presi- 
dent was justly entitled to the sobriquet ' ' Polk the mendacious, 
for his war message had been premised on a falsehood and hos- 
tilities had been wantonly provoked. 

Private letters written at this time show that Trist derived 
real pleasure from playing cufajit terrible. He had developed 
an inveterate hatred for both Polk and Buchanan, and he seemed 
to believe that he possessed information which, when disclosed, 
would make the throne totter. He presumed that the arrival 
of his treaty had caused a commotion, but it could have been 
"nothing to the uproar that is to come." 

Until I shall be ready to speak, [he eoiitiiiue<l with a solenuiity boni 
of conceit], let them remain in the doubt and the hopes, as to my future 
course, inspired by the falseness & baseness of their own ignoble hearts. 
Let them go on hoping that I am, or may be made, like themselves; capable 
of being bought, if not to active villany, at least to passive; to silence, if 
to nothing else. 



112 Polk, Diary, III, 357-358. Marcy to Butler, Feb. 25, 1848 (Sen. 
Ex. Doc. 52, as at)0ve cited, 148-150). 

11-1 Trist to Buchanan, Jan. 25, 1848 {Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 
290). 



TBEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 545 

These remarks are interesting as coming from one of the two 
men who alone had been guilty of buying others. The disclosures 
which he expected to cause the "uproar" were Polk's confiden- 
tial correspondence with Pillow, whom Trist, in his letter, was 
pleased to call a reptile. 

As to whether he was entitled to payment for the extra time 
put in since his recall, Trist 's mind was not quite clear; but he 
would accept nothing which might depend upon even the ' ' official 
decision" of the President. 

His official mind is too corrupt or too imbecile. Nothing proceeding 
from it — in the way of advantage, at least — shall touch me. 1 say the 
same of every man capable of retaining a seat in his cabinet during the 
last 3, 4 or o months. 

The court of inquiry selected to investigate the charges made 
against Pillow and other accused military officers was, in Trist 's 
opinion, a "pitiable device of the pitiable being in the Presi- 
dential chair." When notified by General Butler that he must 
leave Mexico, Trist once more paid his compliments to the Presi- 
dent and denied his authority to order a private citizen out of 
a foreign country. He was probably right in holding that 

I deem it my duty to deny the lawfulness of any requirement from the 
President of the United States, pretending to impose upon me the obli- 
gation, either to leave the BepuUio of Mexico or to return to the United 
States. I recognize no authority in that functionary competent to create 
any such obligation. The pretension to create it, & the use of the armed 
power confided to him, for the purpose of enforcing it, are, to my mind, 
alike usurpations; usurpations differing but slightly in the shades of 
euormity.ii^ 

The President, as we have seen, sent Trist 's treaty to the 
Senate on February 22, but on account of the illness and death 
of John Quincy Adams its consideration was delayed several days. 

114 Trist to Mrs. Trist, March 2, 1848; Trist to Butler, March 17 
1848, Trist Papers. In a letter dated March 18 he told Butler that he 
would not embarrass him by resisting the order. He had, on Februarv 1 
written to his wife that he would go to West Chester and keep a board- 
ing school. ' ' For my own part, I will live on bread & water before I 
ever again hold office of any kind. ' ' Also in Trist Papers. 



546 JAMES K. POLK 

Immediately, however, unofficial reports predicted that the treaty 
would i)robably be rejected. Cave Johnson shared this belief, 
and he told the President of a rumor that both Buchanan and 
Walker had been exerting their influence against ratification. 
Polk was still more perturbed by another "astounding" rumor — 
also reported by Johnson — which charged Walker with giving 
aid to the Presidential candidacy of General Taylor. "If I 
ascertain this to be true," was the comment in his diary, "it will 
be inconsistent with the success of my measures for Mr. Walker 
to remain in my Cabinet. I will require strong proof however 
before I can believe it to be true.""^ 

The Whigs and a small group of Democrats who had been 
devising means of compelling the President to end the war, now 
that a treaty had been made, did their utmost to cause its re- 
jection. The prospect for ratification was not encouraging. On 
February 28 Senator Sevier, chairman of the Committee of For- 
eign Affairs, reported to Polk that all of the committee except 
himself had resolved to recommend that the treaty should be 
rejected and that the President be advised to send to Mexico a 
new connnission, invested with power to make a new treaty. They 
did not, said Sevier, object to the treaty itself but to the fact 
that Trist had no authority to make it. The absurd suggestion 
offered by the committee did not appeal to Polk's practical mind : 

I told him [Sevier] I condemned the insubordination & insolent con- 
duct of Mr. Trist, but that the Treaty itself was the subject for consider- 
ation and not his conduct, and that if the provisions of the Treaty wore 
such as could be accepted, it would be worse than idle ceremony to sond 
out a grand commission to re-negotiate the same Treaty. I told him, also, 
that if the Senate advised me to send out such a commission, I hoped they 
would advise me also what they would accept. . . . Extremes sometimes 
meet. . . . They have done so in this instance. Mr. Webster is for no 
territory and Mr. Hannegan is for aU Mexico, and for opposite reasons 
both will oppose the Treaty. It is difficult, upon any rational principle, 
to assign a satisfactory reason for anything Col. Benton may do, especially 
in his present temper of mind, wholly engrossed as he seems to have been 
for some months past with the case of his son-in-law. Col. Fremont. 



115 Polk, Diary, III, 361, 



TBEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 547 

His suspicion that Walker and Buchanan would use their in- 
fluence against ratification seems to have been removed by their 
volunteering to urge Senators to vote against the plan for cre- 
ating a new commission."" 

While the President was conversing with Sevier, the Senate 
was passing resolutions which requested him to submit all corre- 
spondence that had passed between Trist and the State Depart- 
ment. Without consulting the cabinet, he decided to send it all, 
despite its exceptionable character. On the next day he was told 
that the fate of the treaty was extremely doubtful and that about 
a dozen Democrats would vote against it because of their desire 
for more territory. Not for this reason, but from personal mo- 
tives, Polk feared most of all the opposition of Benton : 

He has heretofore maintained that the true boundary of Texas was 
the Nueces instead of the Eio Grande, & he is apt to think that nothing 
is done properly that he is not consulted about. n" 

If some Democrats declined to uphold the administration by 
supporting the treaty, so, also, were certain Whigs unwilling to 
put ratification on a purely party basis. Polk was especially 
pleased when on March 1 he was told by the banker, W. W. 
Corcoran, that Joseph Gales, of the National Intelligencer, had re- 
fused to prepare an article against ratification, when requested 
to do so by Whig Senators. For several days after this the fate 
of the treaty hung in the balance, its chief opponents being 
Webster and Benton. Polk blamed the insurgent Democrats most 
of all, for as he said, "if the Democratic party were united in 
favour of the Treaty, I doubt whether a single Whig would vote 
against it." Both parties, in his opinion, were interested pri- 
marily in the approaching Presidential election, and he did not 
believe that Whigs would care to incur the odium of casting a 
strictly party vote."^ 

After much heated discussion and many calls upon the Presi- 
dent for information (among other things for "information in 



116 /bid., 363-367. ^i' Ihid., M7. us /bid., 368-371. 



548 JAMES K. POLK 

regard to any disposition or overtures on the part of any consid- 
erable portion of the Mexican people to be annexed to the U. 
States"), the Senate, by a vote of thirty-eight to fourteen, ratified 
the treaty on the tenth of March. The tenth article and the secret 
article relating to an extension of time for ratification were elim- 
inated as the President had recommended. Other modifications 
made by the Senate, on its own account, caused Polk to fear that 
Mexico might decline to ratify the treaty. He greatly appreci- 
ated the assistance given by Senator Mangum, of the Committee 
of Foreign Affrirs, who "thougli a Whig, is a gentlema«" — 
apparently a rare combination, in the President's opinion. ^^'^ 

As soon as there was any indication that the treaty would be 
ratified, Polk began to cast about for a suitable commissioner 
whom he might send to Mexico to urge its acceptance. He fixed 
upon Louis McLane, of Maryland, and when he declined to serve, 
Senator Sevier, of Arkansas, was appointed. Scarcely, however, 
had Sevier's appointment been ratified by the Senate when he 
was taken ill and, in order to save time, Attorney-General Clif- 
ford was chosen to be his associate. Clifford set out for Mexico 
at once, while Sevier's health was sufficiently improved within 
the next few days to enable him to follow his colleague. 

Ratification of the treaty by the Senate did not entirely relieve 
Polk's anxiety, for he feared that his opponents might yet defeat 
it by indirect methods. Evidence of a disposition to employ such 
methods was seen in a motion, offered in executive session on 
March 14, to remove the injunction of secrecy from the Senate 
proceedings. Its adoption would expose to the Mexicans the 



^''■^ Ibid., 369, 377, 381. When the records of the executive session 
were finally made public on May 31 it was discovered that several rather 
drastic resolutions had been offered. Webster, for example, moved that 
all discussion of the treaty be postponed and that the President be 
asked to appoint a new commission. Houston held that since Trist had 
no authority to negotiate, his treaty was "utterly void," and ought to 
be rejected. Both Houston and Jefferson Davis wanted more territory, 
while Baldwin, of Connecticut, tried to incorporate into the treaty a 
provision for excluding slavery from all territory to be acquired. The 
proceedings are printed in Sen. Ex. Doc\ 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 4 ff. 



TEEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 549 

confidential instructions which had been given to Slidell and 
Trist and, also, the division of opinion in the Senate. They 
might as a result be induced to reject the modified treaty in the 
hope of obtaining better terms. No action was taken on this 
resolution until the last of May, but in the meantime the New 
York Herald began to publish Polk's message which had accom- 
panied Trist 's treaty to the Senate and, also, Slidell's instructions 
and parts of the diplomatic correspondence. As Nugent, the 
Washington correspondent for that paper, was known to be on 
intimate terms with Buchanan, the Secretary of State at once 
became the object of suspicion. Polk was loth to believe that 
Buchanan could be guilty of such treachery ; still, he advised 
Senators to make a thorough investigation, and he was prepared 
to dismiss the Secretary if it should be found that he had in any 
way been connected with giving out the documents. When sum- 
moned before a Senate committee, Nugent refused to disclose the 
name of the person who had furnished him with copies of the 
documents, but he stated in writing that it was not Buchanan. 
Polk believed the Secretary of State to be both weak and self- 
seeking, yet he was very much gratified to have Buchanan "re- 
lieved from so injurious an imputation. ' '^-" 

Ratification of the treaty by the Senate did not terminate 
discussion on military affairs. It was not certain, of course, 
that Mexico would accept the alterations which had been made, 
consequently the administration forces urged that the pending 
ten-regiment bill should be enacted into law. Polk's whole war 
policy was assailed and defended, as before, while opposition 
members kept annoying the President with requests for addi- 
tional information. Among other items called for by the Senate 
was a copy of the letter which, in 1845, Gillespie had carried to 
Thomas 0. Larkin, United States consul at Monterey, California. 
Our chief interest in this resolution is that when commenting 
upon it in his diary Polk distinctly implied that Fremont had 



120 Polk, Diary, III, 396-409. 



550 JAMES E. POLE 

not been authoriz.ed to foment a revolution in California. He 
transmitted a copy of the letter to the Senate in executive session, 
so that if it were made public, and trouble should result, the 
responsibility would rest upon the Senate and not upon himself .^-^ 
Clifford arrived in Mexico City with the modified treaty on 
April 11, 1848, Sevier four days later. Under the President's 
supervision Buchanan had prepared instructions which were to 
guide them in their discussions with the Mexican officials. Among- 
other things they were to avoid diplomatic notes whenever pos- 
sible and to hold personal conferences, which would be more 
conducive to a speedy adjustment of differences of opinion. In 
a letter to the Minister of Foreign Relations, written at the same 
time. Buchanan explained in detail the changes which had been 
made by the Senate. While his letter was very friendly in tone, 
a pointed reference to the fact that ' ' four votes, taken from the 
majority, and added to the minority, would have defeated the 
treaty" was intended to impress upon the Mexican government 
the futility of asking for better terms. ^" 

During the period of more than two months between the 
signatui-e of the treaty and the arrival of Clifford and Sevier in 
Mexico the several factions in that country had had time to dis- 
cuss the question of making peace with the United States, al- 
though the details of the treaty were not known to the public. 
The puros, or radicals, being anxious for annexation to the United 
States, naturally were hostile to ratification. For an entirely 
different reason the propertied class looked forward with dismay 
to the withdrawal of the American army, because they feared 
that adequate protection of their property would be gone. Ac- 
cording to his own account, "certain leaders" desired Scott to 
proclaim himself dictator for six years, with the eventual purpose 
of joining the United States. The general ' ' ultimately declined 



121 Ibid., 395, 399. Richardson, Messages, IV, 57a 

122 Buchanan to Min. of For. Eel., March 18, 1848 (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 
30 Cong,. 1 sess., 67). 



TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 551 

the invitation. One of his reasons was that he had already sug- 
gested annexation and "President Polk's Government carefully 
withheld its wishes from him thereon. "^-^ 

The work of the American commissioners was delayed by the 
fact that the Mexican congress, which alone could ratify the 
treaty, had not convened at the time of their arrival. Although 
the members had been elected in March, not until the first week 
in May did a quorum assemble in Queretaro. The apparent 
reluctance of the Mexican government to meet the issue led Polk 
to believe that ratification "may be regarded as doubtful."^-* 

After meeting, however, the congress acted with unusual 
promptitude. President Peiia y Peiia in his message, although 
regretting that the treaty had been modified, nevertheless ad- 
vised its ratification. In addition, his ministers of war and 
finance showed by verbal reports that Mexico was too weak to 
continue hostilities if the treaty should be rejected. On May 19 
the chamber of deputies gave its assent and the Minister of 
Foreign Relations invited Clifford and Sevier to visit Queretaro 
and present their credentials to the President. They arrived on 
May 25, just after the senate had ratified the treaty. Ratifica- 
tions were exchanged on the thirtieth and the commissioners re- 
turned to Mexico City and arranged for the fulfillment of the 
financial obligations of the treaty. ^-^ 

"At 6 o'clock this morning," wrote Clifford on June 12, 

the flag of the United States was taken down from the national palace in 
this city and that of the Mexican republic was hoisted. The customary 
honors were paid to both, and the ceremony passed off in perfect quiet, 
although the great square was thronged.i^e 

With this formality the two years' war with Mexico had been 
brought to a successful termination. President Polk had not 



123 Scott, Autobiography, II, 581-582. Doyle to Palmerston, Feb. 13, 
1848, quoted by Eives, II, 643-644. 

124 Polk, Diary, III, 447. 

125 Sevier and Clifford to Buchanan, May 25 and 30, 1848 (H. Ex. Doc. 
60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 72-73). See also Eives, II, 651-653. 

126 H. Ex. Doe, 60, as cited above, 74. 



552 JAMES K. POLK 

only "conquered a peace," but in all essential details he had 
effected his program of national expansion. Determined from 
the beginning to add California and New Mexico to our national 
domain, he pursued this object with a dogged persistence which 
neither opposition nor denunciation could weaken. Whatever 
may be thought of liis motives or his methods, to him is due the 
credit (or censure, if you please) of extending to the Pacific the 
boundaries of the United States. 

The letter in which Sevier and Clifford had announced that 
the treaty had been ratified by the Mexican congress reached the 
President on the fifteenth of June. Comment in his diary is 
limited to a statement that the letter had been received, for he 
was ill at the time and his mind was occupied with the contem- 
plated purchase of Cuba. His pleasure at being relieved from 
the burdens of war may be judged by a remark made on the 
second anniversary of its beginning: "It is two years ago this 
day since War was declared by Congress against Mexico. They 
have been two years of unceasing labour and anxiety with me. ' '^"^ 
On July 4, just as the President had returned from the cere- 
monies connected with laying the corner stone of the Washington 
monument, a messenger arrived with the treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo. He at once directed Buchanan to prepare a procla- 
mation so that it might be signed on "the anniversary of Inde- 
pendence. ' ' His private secretaries were set to w^ork at copying 
a message which had already been prepared, and two days later 
this and the treaty were submitted to both houses of Congress. 
Among the documents sent with the treaty was a copy of the 
instructions given to Slidell in 1845. When the House had asked 
for these instructions earlier in the session, their request had 
been denied, but now, as the President noted, "the reasons for 
withholding them at that time no longer exist." 

As a true expansionist the President fully appreciated the 
importance of his achievements. ' ' The results of the war with 

127 Polk, Diani, III, 448, 492. 



TBEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 553 

Mexico," said his message, "have given the United States a 
national character which our country never before enjoyed." 
New Mexico and California "constitute of themselves a country 
large enough for a great empire, and their acquisition is second 
only in importance to that of Louisiana in 180.3. ' ' He saw, on the 
other hand, that evil as well as good might follow in the wake 
of the war, and he took advantage of the occasion to warn Con- 
gress against unwise legislation. In organizing governments for 
the new territories, he invoked a spirit of concession and concil- 
iation, so that sectional discords might be avoided and the Union 
be preserved. The army should be reduced to its ante-bellum 
footing, for "our standing army is to be found in the bosom of 
society." A true disciple of Jefferson, he urged that 

Upon the restoration of peace we should adopt the policy suited to a 
state of peace. In doing this the earliest practicable payment of the 
public debt should be a cardinal principle of action. Profiting by the ex- 
periences of the past, we should avoid the errors into which the country 
was betrayed shortly after the close of the war with Great Britain in 
1815. In a few years after that period a broad and latitudinous con- 
struction of the powers of the Federal Government unfortunately received 
but too much countenance. Though the country was burdened with a 
heavy public debt, large, and in some instances unnecessary and extrava- 
gant, expenditures were authorized by Congress. The consequence was 
that the payment of the debt was postponed for more than twenty years, 
and even then it was only accomplished by the stern will and unbending 
policy of President Jackson, who made its payment a leading measure of 
his Administration. 12S 

Some of Polk's friends, including Houston and Davis, of the 
Senate Committee on Military Affairs, did not share his views 
concerning a reduction of the army. Not satisfied with his recom- 
mendation, the House, also, asked him for additional informa- 
tion. On August 1 he submitted a report from the Secretary 
of "War, and along with it, a message saying that he had "seen 
no reason to change the opinion" expressed in the preceding 



128 Eichardson, Messages, IV, 587-593. The original draft of this 
message contained a paragraph on the "misnamed & exploded 'American 
system,' but bv the advice of the cabinet it was omitted (Polk, Diani, 
III, 496). 



554 JAMES K. POLK 

July. He was "decidedly opposed" to an increase in the army, 
and he attributed the anxiety for more adequate defense to self- 
seeking military men and extravagant Whigs. Concerning the 
latter he said in his diary : 

Some Whig members of Congress favour the measure because it is in 
harmony with their general policy. They favour, as a party, large ex- 
penditures, high tariffs, & Banks, and in addition to this they would be 
pleased to have a large increase of the standing army fastened on the 
country, which they would for political effect charge to be a consequence 
of the Mexican War.129 

The forebodings of the President regarding the sectional bit- 
terness which might result from attempts to establish govern- 
ments for the new territories were not without foundation. The 
Wilmot Proviso had not been forgotten, and already, indeed, the 
debate on the Oregon bill foreshadowed the breakers ahead. 
Renewed agitation of the slavery question resulted from the 
Mexican war, but was not a part of it; its consideration as a 
domestic question is reserved for another chapter. 



129 Eichardson, Messages, IV, 603. Polk, Biarii. IV, 48. 



I 



CHAPTEE XXI 

OREGON 

The treaty of peace which terminated the Revolution fixed the 
boundary between the United States and Canada east of the 
Mississippi River. By the purchase of Louisiana with its indefi- 
nite boundaries, in 1803, the United States acquired whatever 
claims France might have to territory lying west of the Missis- 
sippi; and by the Florida treaty of 1819 Spain ceded to the 
United States all her claims to territory lying west of Louisiana 
and north of the forty-sfecond parallel of north latitude. In 
general terms, all this was clear enough, but the difficult problem 
was : What, precisely, are the proper limits of these claims ? 

The British claim to the Pacific coast region was based mainly 
on the explorations made by Captain Cook in 1776 ; the interior 
of the Oregon region was claimed as a result of the discovery of 
the Frazer River valley by Alexander MacKenzie in 1793. In 
1789, however, the Spaniards, who laid claim to all of this region, 
sent out from Mexico an exploring expedition. At Nootka Sound 
they seized two British ships and nearly precipitated a war 
between the two countries. The matter was adjusted by a con- 
vention signed in 1790 which admitted the right of British sub- 
jects to establish trading posts for the purpose of carrying on 
commerce with the natives. The question which came to be dis- 
puted later was whether, in this convention, Spain had trans- 
ferred to England the ownership of the land, or simply the tem- 
porary use of it. Russia, also, had laid claim to this region, but 
by treaties— one with the United States in 1824, and another with 
England in 1825 — had relinquished everything south of 54° 40' 
north latitude. 



556 JAMES E. POLE 

In addition to claims derived from Spain and France, the 
United States based her title to Oregon upon discoveries and 
settlements made by her own citizens. In 1792, Captain Robert 
Gray, of Boston, had explored the Columbia River and named it 
after his ship ; and in 1811, John Jacob Astor had founded the 
trading post of Astoria. This place had been taken by the British 
during the War of 1812, but under the terms of the Treaty of 
Ghent it was restored in 1818. 

After 1825, when Russia limited her claims, the Oregon ques- 
tion was reduced to this : Does either Great Britain or the United 
States have a valid title to all of the territory west of the Rocky 
Mountains and included between 42°, the northern boundai-y of 
California, and 54° 40', the southern boundary of Alaska ; if not, 
how should it be divided? The United States claimed this region 
by right of discovery — both direct and acquired ; on similar 
grounds Great Britain claimed it, at least as far south as the 
Columbia River. 

Prior to Polk's administration several attempts had been 
made to establish a definite boundary line between the United 
States and Canada. In the treaty of 1818 the forty -ninth parallel 
was agreed upon as the boundary from the Lake of the "Woods 
to the Rocky Mountains. The country west of the mountains 
was left open to what was commonly called joint occupation ; that 
is, each nation might make use of it without prejudice to the 
claims of the other. In 1827 "joint occupation" was continued 
indefinitely, but either nation might terminate the agreement 
by giving twelve months' notice to the other. 

At an early date members of Congress began to take an inter- 
est in Oregon. In December, 1820, the House appointed a com- 
mittee and assigned it the duty of considering the propriety of 
taking possession of the territory. A month later the committee's 
report was submitted by Floyd, of Virginia. In substance it 
recommended that the government should take steps to safe- 
guard tlie interests of the United States on the Pacific coast. 



OFiEGON 557 

No action resulted from this recommendation, but two years 
later after England had (1821) extended her laws over the ter- 
ritory, another committee was appointed to consider the sub- 
ject. Their report was similar to that made in 1820, but again 
no action resulted. 

A bill to authorize the occupation of the Oregon River valley 
was introduced in the House in December, 1828. Its most active 
sponsor, Floyd, of Virginia, urged the necessity of extending 
over this region the laws of the United States, and of constructing 
military forts to insure the protection of Americans. Gurley, 
of Louisiana, proposed an amendment under which lands might 
be granted to colonists from the United States. Polk opposed 
both the bill and the amendment on the ground that they would 
violate the treaty of "joint occupation" with Great Britain. He 
pointed out that those who participated in the debate had "con- 
fined themselves to the expediency of the measure, and have had 
no reference to the present state of our negotiations in refer- 
ence to the preliminary question of title to the country. ' ' After 
quoting the terms of the treaty of 1818, he remarked that "The 
question is not now whether it was wise to make this treaty, but, 
having made it, what is its spirit and meaning?" Until the 
treaty has been abrogated, he said, it is the ' ' supreme law of the 
land," and it can not be abrogated until twelve months' notice 
has been given. He moved that the Committee of the "Whole 
be discharged from further consideration of the bill and that the 
subject be referred to the Committee on Territories. He moved 
further that this committee be instructed to report in favor of 
extending over the American citizens in that region the jurisdic- 
tion of the courts of Michigan Territory, and of providing for 
the exploration and survey of the Northwest coast. Neither this 
nor solutions offered by other members were accepted by the 
House. On January 9, 1829, Polk voted with the majority in 
rejecting the entire bill.^ 



-^Eeg. of Deb., 20 Cong., 2 sess., 125-153. Also, Abridg. of Deb., X, 
273-315. 



558 JAMES E. POLE 

In 1833 the Missionary Board of the Methodist church selected 
a number of missionaries and sent them forth to found a settle- 
ment in AVillamette Valley.- Two years later President Jackson 
sent William A. Slacum to investigate conditions in that region, 
and in December, 1837, Slacum 's favorable report was laid 
before Congress.^ On February 7, 1838, Linn, of Missouri, intro- 
duced in the Senate a bill to organize Oregon as a territory 
and to establish on the Columbia River both a port of entry and 
a custom house.'* As early as December 29, 1829, Linn had offered 
a resolution which purposed to give the twelve months' notice 
necessary for terminating the conventions of 1818 and 1827.^^ In 
both cases Congress declined to take any action, but interest in 
Oregon continued to increase. Every year added to the num- 
ber who exhorted Congress to do something for the protection of 
American citizens in that country. Great Britain, it was urged, 
had extended her laws throughout Oregon as early as 1821 ; why 
should the United States continue to disregard the rights of its 
citizens? 

The arrival in Washington of Lord Ashburton, in April, 1842, 
gave rise to the hope that the whole vexed question of boundary 
might be adjusted, for the northwest as well as the northeast 
boundary was included in the scope of the British diplomat's 
instructions." But, as Tyler informed Congress in his second 
annual message, "it became manifest at an early hour in the 
late negotiations" that any attempt to settle the Oregon ques- 
tion "would lead to a protracted discussion, which might cm- 
brace in its failure other more pressing matters."' 

Eager to succeed where others had failed, Tyler proposed a 
tripartite treaty whereby he hoped to settle not only the Oregon 
question, but, also, the diplomatic difficulties with Mexico which 



- Gray, Eistonj of Oret/on, 106 £f. * Cong. Globe, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 16S. 
3 Sen. Dor. 24, 25 Cong., 2 sess. s Abridg. of Deb.,XTV, 18. 
Aberdeen to H. S. Fox, Oct. 18, 1842 {Sen. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 
1.19). 

■ Richardson, Mes.mges, IV, 196. 



OBEGON 559 

had resulted from the revolt of Texas aud the non-payment by 
Mexico of American damage claims. He was willing to let Eng- 
land have Oregon down to the Columbia Eiver if she in turn 
would induce Mexico to recognize the independence of Texas 
and to make territorial concessions to the United States. Eng- 
land was to cancel certain claims against Mexico and to induce 
her to cede to the United States that part of California lying 
north of the thirty-sixth parallel, and as a compensation for this 
service the United States was to relinquish her claim to that 
part of Oregon lying north of the Columbia River. At the time 
that he formulated this plan, Tyler apparently had little doubt 
that England would readily agree, or that the combination which 
he had suggested would reconcile opposing interests in the United 
States. "Texas might not stand alone," he told Webster, "nor 
would the line proposed for Oregon. Texas would reconcile all 
to the line, while California would reconcile or pacify all to 
Oregon. "« Despite this hopeful language, however, he en- 
deavored, after he had retired from office, to represent this whole 
matter as a passing fancy to which little importance should be 
attached. "I never dreamed," he wrote, 

of ceding- this country [between 49° and the Columbia] unless for the s^reater 
equivalent of California Avhich I fancied G. Britain might be able to obtain 
for us through her influence in Mexico — and this was but a dream of policy 
which was never embodied. 9 

Nothing, of course, came of Tyler's ingenious scheme for 
killing so many birds with one stone. Ashburton expressed, un- 
officially, the belief that Great Britain would not oppose a ces- 
sion of territory by Mexico to the United States, but that she 
could take no part in the transaction. ^° While there was never 
any prospect that Tyler's plan would succeed, had it been 

8 Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, II, 260-261. See also Webster 
to Everett, Jan. 29, 1843 (Curtis, Life of Webster, II, 175). 

n Tyler to his son, Dec. 11, 1845, MS in Library of Congress. Also 
printed copy i-n Tyler, op. cit,. 447. 

loSchafer, "British Attitude toward the Oregon Question," Am. Hist. 
Bev., XVI, no. 2, p. 293. 



560 JAMES E. POLE 

accepted by the other governments concerned the Mexican war 
might possibly have been averted. Webster soon left the cabinet 
and the President turned his attention to the ainiexation of Texas. 
The Oregon question remained unsettled and became one of the 
leading issues of the campaign of 1844. 

A bill introduced in the Senate on December 19, 1842, by 
Linn, of Missouri, gave opportunity for debate on the Oregon 
question and prepared the way for the approaching Presidential 
campaign. Among other things the bill provided for the building 
of forts along the route to Oregon and at the mouth of the 
Columbia Eiver, and for the granting of land to American 
settlers. It can hardly be said that the discussion was sectional 
in character, although westerners were more insistent than others 
that the government should take some action. Webster attributed 
the agitation entirely to politics, ^^ but it is evident that many 
were sincerely interested in westward expansion. 

The chief opponents of Linn's bill were Senators Calhoun 
and McDuffie, of South Carolina. The former declared that the 
passage of the land-grant section would violate the treaty with 
Great Britain. Besides, he opposed the whole bill on the ground 
that precipitate action might result in the loss of the entire 
territory. England, he said, could transfer troops by sea in a 
very short time, while it would take months for our army to 
reach Oregon by overland routes. Consequently the sound policy 
for the United States to pursue was that of "wise and masterly 
inactivity." McDuffie was averse to the bill, not because he 
feared that its passage might result in the loss of Oregon, but 
because he regarded the territory as an incubus which ought to 
be discarded. He would not give ' ' a pinch of snuff for the whole 
territory, ' ' because it was totally unsuited as a home for civilized 
beings.'- Benton and Linn made strong arguments in favor of the 
bill, and refuted in detail the positions taken by the Senators from 



11 "Webster to Everett, Jan. 29, 1843, as cited above. 

12 Cong. Globe, 27 Cong., 3 sess., 198-200; idem, App., 138-141. Benton, 
Thirty Years' View, II, 471-472. 



OEEGON 561 

South Carolina. Sevier, of Arkansas, resisted an attempt to 
strike out the section for granting land to settlers, for he justly 
regarded this provision to be ' ' the very life and soul of the bill. ' '^^ 
After passing the Senate by a vote of twenty-four to twenty-two, 
the bill was sent to the House where it remained to the end of 
the session without being voted upon. 

The importance of the Linn bill can not be measured by its 
failure to reach a vote in the House, for it elicited a debate in 
Congress and an agitation in the press which focused the attention 
of the people on Oregon and made it an important campaign 
issue. Then, too, its introduction caused British statesmen to 
give the subject more serious attention. Palmerston went so far 
as to declare in the House of Commons that should the bill be 
passed and put in operation "it would be a declaration of war."^* 

Dissatisfied because "Webster had not procured, in the Ash- 
burton treaty, all that the United States had claimed on the 
Maine border, and fearful that Everett, in London, might, under 
Tyler's directions, compromise the Oregon question, opposition 
members took steps to prevent such action on the part of the 
executive. On December 28, 1843, Senator Allen, of Ohio, moved 
a call upon the President for the instructions given to our minister 
in London as well as the correspondence that had passed between 
the two governments. On January 8, 1844, Semple, of Illinois, 
moved that the President be requested to give the notice neces- 
sary for terminating the convention of 1827.^'^ It was soon ascer- 
tained that no negotiations were in progress in London and con- 
sequently Semple 's resolution was defeated, but the debate 
helped to agitate public opinion. Extremists objected to any 
negotiation whatever on the ground that it would be an admission 
that Great Britain might have some claim to the territory. 

Negotiations were soon renewed, however, but in Washing- 
ton instead of at the court of Saint James. The man selected 



13 Cong. Globe, 27 Cong., 3 sess., 1.53. 

1* Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, LXVII, 1217. 

15 Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 1 sess., 77, 116. 



562 JAMES K. POLK 

by Lord Aberdeen for the American mission was Richard 
Pakenham (later Sir Richard), and early in 1844 he arrived 
in Washington. If his official instructions were to be followed 
there was small prospect of an adjustment, for they required 
him to insist upon the Columbia River as the southern boundary 
of Oregon. It is evident, however, that Aberdeen himself did 
not expect the United States to accept this proposal, and that 
he was prepared to concede better terms if he could obtain the 
sanction of Parliament and of public sentiment in England. 
In a private letter dated March 4, 1844, Pakenham was in- 
structed to ' 

endeavor, without committing yourself or your gov't, to draw from the 
American negotiator a proposal to make the 49th degree of latitude the 
boundary, with the proviso that the ports to the south of that parallel to 
the. Columbia iuclusive, shall be free ports to G. Britain.ie 

The tone of this letter augured well for the future. 

Upshur's tragic death interrupted negotiations before they 
had fairly begun, and the task of discussing the Oregon boundary 
with Pakenham devolved upon John C. Calhoun to whom Tyler 
now intrusted the State Department. According to statements 
made later, Tyler and Calhoun were reluctant to resume nego- 
tiations, consequently the Secretary of State decided that the 
''true policy" was "to do notJiing to excite attention, and leave 
time to operate."^' Nevertheless both Calhoun and Pakenham 
presented and advocated the claims of their respective govern- 
ments — including an offer from Great Britain to submit the whole 
subject to arbitration — but as neither side would yield the essen- 
tial points, the Oregon question remained unsettled at the close 
of Tyler's administration. 

" Reannexation of Texas" and " reoecupation of Oregon" 
were twin planks in the platform adopted by the Democratic 



16 Quoted by Schafer, "The British Attitude toward the Oregon Ques- 
tion, 1815-1846," Am. Hist. Eev., XVI, 296 (Jan., 1911). 

17 Calhoun to Mason, May 30, 1845 (Beport Am. Hist. Assn., 1899, IT, 
660). Tyler to Calhoun, Oct. 7, 1845 (ibid., 1059). 



. OREGON 563 

conventiou of 18-44. Although the former was the main topic of 
discussion during the campaign, the party was nevertheless 
committed to the claim that "all of Oregon" was the property of 
the United States. The candidates accepted the platform without 
reservation, while the rank and file voiced their approval by 
lusty shouts of "54° 40' or fight." Did the platform and the 
campaign cry mean what they said, or were they intended simply 
to arouse enthusiasm and to win votes for the party ? In either 
case the victorious candidate was placed in an awkward position ; 
to accept less than "all of Oregon" would repudiate the party 
pledge, while insistence upon the demand made in the platform 
would almost certainly result in war with Great Britain. 

In his inaugural address President Polk bluntly asserted that 
"our title to the country of the Oregon is 'clear and unquestion- 
able!' " He did not say "all of Oregon," but left it to be in- 
ferred that this was what he meant. In addition, he recommended 
that the laws of the United States should be extended over the 
people who had established their homes in that distant region. 
If the propriety of his recommendations may be questioned,^^ 
the fault lay with the party which had framed the platform 
rather than with the President who was pledged to carry it out.^® . 

The new President's inaugural reached England late in 
March and his remarks on the American title to Oregon were 
by no means relished in London. In Parliament and in the press 
they elicited expressions of surprise and denunciation. Opposi- 
tion members were especially resentful. On the contrary, Lord 
Aberdeen was disposed to treat the matter lightly and to regard 
the address as a declamation rather than an official document.-" 



18 See Benton, Thirty Years' View, II, 649, and von Hoist, Hist, of the 
U. S., Ill, 159. 

• 19 It is interesting, however, to note that Polk reversed the position 
which he had taken in 1828. See above, p. 557. 

20 "I wish to observe that this speech is not an address made to Con- 
gress — it is a speech made to the public, the Congress not being sitting. 
Undoubtedly, no speech of such a nature could be made by the President 
of the United States without drawing towards it the most serious atten- 
tion. Nevertheless, it does not jjossess the importance of an official mes- 
sage, forming a part of legislative proceedings. ' ' 



564 JAMES K. POLK 

He believed that a peaceful settlement was still possible ; if not, 
he could only say that "we possess rights which, in our opinion, 
are clear and unquestionable ; and, by the blessing of God, and 
with your support, those rights we are fully prepared to main- 
tain." In the House of Commons, Sir Robert Peel expressed a 
desire for an amicable adjustment, but he severely criticized 
President Polk for referring to "other contingencies than a 
friendly termination" of pending negotiations.-^ The London 
Times held that the interests of both countries would be served 
best by a compromise adjustment like that which settled the dis- 
pute over the northeast boundary ; nevertheless it thought that 
Americans should be warned that their pretensions, if persisted 
in, must surely result in war. The editor was not disposed to 
aggravate "the very serious difficulties with which the indiscreet 
language of Mr. Polk has already surrounded the Oregon ques- 
tion," still, the extravagant claims of the President could never 
be admitted. -- 

During April and May the British newspapers discussed 
the diplomatic situation in all its bearings, and speculated as 
to what policy Polk really meant to pursue. Only one, the 
London Colonial Magazine, believed that a war with the United 
States would be "productive of good"; the others cared little 
about Oregon itself, but they resented the "blustering attitude" 
of the American President and people. For example, the Times, 
on May 9, said: 

As long as we saw in these grotesque exhibitions of national vanity 
nothing but the expedients of presidential candidates, or the squibs of elec- 
tioneering rivals, the foreign policy of the United States had nothing very 
serious or very formidable in its vacant thunders. But the election being 
over, and the new president installed by the voices of the democratic party 
for the next four years, foreign nations acquire something more tlian an 
indirect interest in his character and position. If President Polk intends 
to sustain the heroic line in Avhich he passed through his electioneering 
probation and entered upon his high office, he may rely on having before 



21 Hansard, ParJ. Deb., LXXIX, 121, 123, 199. 

22 London Times, April 5, 1845, quoted by Niles' Beg., LXVIII, 114-115. 



OREGON 565 

him a career of no ordinary toil, agitation, and peril. But if he purposes 
to subside into a positive business-like president, more like the foreman of 
a thriving business in the city than the champion of an empire, the sooner 
he descends from the high horse the better; and he would have done well 
to throw aside the embroidered vestments of the candidate before he deliv- 
ered the inaugural address of the president. Nobody supposes that in using 
the very exaggerated and unbecoming language in which Mr. Polk spoke of 
the American claims to Oregon, he intended deliberately to breathe defiance 
to the Queen of Great Britain, or to threaten the rights of Her Majesty's 
subjects with instant violence. He intended simply to flatter a delusion 
common in all democratic states, but especially amongst the democratic 
party in the United States, which forces the statesman whom they have 
chosen to govern their country to gratify their OAvn popular vanity by 
affecting a temerity and an overbearing recklessness towards foreign nations 
which, as individuals, neither the president, nor any of his vociferous sup- 
porters, can be supposed to feel. 

Rulers of democracies, said the London Standard, on May 15, 

are apt to be inclined to war for the purpose of increasing their 

power and their patronage. To this fact it attributed the claims 

set forth by President Polk, and therefore it did not believe that 

the people would support him, except verbally. Americans 

could not possibly gain anything by precipitating hostilities, 

"therefore we hold a war to be extremely improbable, if not an 

absolute imiDossibility, let Mr. Polk do all that he can." The 

Examiner (April 25) considered Oregon "really valueless to 

England and to America." It therefore congratulated Lord 

Aberdeen on his conciliatory attitude, and advocated arbitration 

or a partition of the territory.-^ 

The utterances of British statesmen greatly exasperated the 

"old hero" of the Hermitage who, in characteristic style, urged 

the President to combat British pretensions by a vigorous and 

uncompromising policy : 

Weak and debilitated as I am I could not resist endeavoring to wade 
through the debate in the English parliament — comments on your inaugural 
as it relates to oragon. This is the rattling of British drums to alarm us, 
and to give life to their friends in the United States, such as the Hartford 
convention men — the blue light federalists & abolitionists, and to prevent 



23 Extracts from these papers quoted in Niles' Reg., LXVIII, 236-239. 



566 JAMES K. FOLK 

if Britain can, the reannexation of Texas, by shadowing fortli war & 
rumors of war, to alarm the timid, & give strength to the traitors in our 
country against our best interests & growing prosperity. This bold avowal 
by peel & Eussell of perfect claim to oragon must be met as boldly, by our 
denial of their right, and confidence in our own — that we view^ it too plain 
a ease, of right, on our side to hesitate one moment upon the subject of 
extending our laws over it & populating with our people — permit me to 
remind you that during the canvass, I gave a thousand pledges for your 
cour[a]ge & firmness, both in war- & in p<?aee, to cany on the administration 
of our government. This subject is intended to try your energy— dash 
from your lips the council of the times on this question, base your acts 
upon the firm basis, of asking nothing but what is right & permitting 
nothing that is wrong — Avar is a blessing compared with national degreda- 
tion. The bold manner of peels & Eussells annunciation of the British 
right to oragogon, the time & manner require a firm rebuke by you in 
your annual message, and has opened a fair field to compare their claim 
to oragon with their right to the Territory claimed by Britain on our north 
East boundary, & which we Avere swindled out of, there being on file in 
archives of England the maps on Avhich was laid doAvn our boundaiy agree- 
able to the treaty of 1783, Avhich Lord BroAAinan said in eulogy of Lord 
Ashburton sheAved that England in her claim to that territory had not a 
leg of rigid to stand upon — Just so Avith oragon, & peel & Eussell both 
Avell know it — still now, a perfect right to oragon is claimed — make a note 
of this, & in your annual message expose England's perfidy to the Avhole 
civilized Avor[l]d. To prevent Avar Avith England a bold & undaunted 
front must be exposed. England Avith all her Boast dare not go to Avar. 
You Avill pardon these my friendly suggestions. The Whiggs haA-e held 
you forth to England as feeble & inenergetic, & Avould shrink at the threat 
of -^var — I am sure you Avill meet this with that energy & promptness that 
is due to yourself, & our national character.s* 

As will be seen presently, Polk did not, in the first instance 
at least, follow this fatherly advice. But ere the President had 
decided to renew the compromise offer which his predecessors 
had made. General Jackson had passed to a land where "peel & 
Rnssell" no longer disturbed his repose. Even if he had lived 
it is highly improbable that his views would have influenced the 
President's foreign policy. Polk was ever ready to pay homage 
to Jackson on matters of no vital importance. But when the 
occasion demanded independent action — as in the discarding of 

24 Jackson to Polk, May 2, 184.5, Poll' Papers. 



OSEGON 5G7 

Blair and Lewis — he did not hesitate to follow his own judgment, 
even at the risk of incurring the General 's displeasure. 

In the selection of a minister to represent the United States 
at London Polk was hampered by political considerations. How- 
ever, his embarrassment was somewhat lessened by the fact that 
negotiations were already pending in Washington and by the 
slight probability that they would be transferred to London. 
Since Calhoun had not been retained in the cabinet, many Demo- 
crats thought that he should be given the British mission ; even 
Jackson considered England to be the proper place for him, 
"there to combat -with my Lord Aberdeen the abolition ques- 
tion."-"^ But Calhoun made it known that he would not accept 
the position; so, also, did his friends, Pickens and Elmore, de- 
cline the appointment.--' Having failed in his overtures to the 
Calhoun wing of the party, the President, through Bancroft, 
sounded Van Buren on the subject. In reply Van Buren stated 
his belief that an ex-President should not accept a foreign mis- 
sion unless there was a crisis to meet. He did not believe a 
crisis to exist, but if the President thought otherwise, he would, 
of course, regard it as his duty to go.-' Levi Woodbury declined 
the appointment for "domestic reasons," and Louis McLane, of 
Baltimore, was finally chosen.-^ 

About the middle of May, while Bancroft was in correspond- 
ence with Van Buren and before any official communications had 
passed between Buchanan and Pakenham, the recently estab- 
lished Washington Umon announced what it believed to be Polk 's 
Oregon policy: 

Some say we want war — some that we "cannot be kicked into war." 
Several predict that there will be war. Now, without undertaking to say 
positively that there will be war, or that there will not be war, we venture 



25 Jackson to Polk, Dec. 16, 1844, ibid. 

26 After declining the mission himself Calhoun spoke favorably of 
Elmore, but he thought General Hamilton to be best qualified for the 
position (A. V. Brown (undated) to Polk, ibid.). 

-' Van Buren to Bancroft, May 12, 1845, ^an Buren Papers. 
2s Correspondence with Woodbury and McLane, Folic Papers. 



568 JAMES E. POLK 

to predict that it is not Mr. Polk 's wish to plunge his country into war, 
and still less to sacrifice her rights and her honor. He will never abandon 
either; and without meaning to bluster or to brave the British ministers, 
we undertake to say that this is the general and enthusiastic sentiment 
of the American nation. The President will carry out the wishes of the 
people. It will not be his fault if our differences about Oregon should 
terminate in hostilities; but it will be his fault, and a fault which we are sure 
he would never encounter, to sacrifice our ' ' clear and unquestionable claims ' ' 
and our sacred honor to any visionary danger, or to any apprehensions of 
danger. ' ' " Young Hickory, ' ' it added, will make good his title.20 

Although this article purported to give merely the views of the 
editor, Ritchie, no doubt it had the previous endorsement of the 
President. Apparently its purpose was to prepare the people 
for a compromise adjustment of the Oregon question, but, also, 
to inform the British minister that the administration would not 
be intimidated by the prospect of a war. 

When the Tyler administration declined to accept the terms 
offered by Great Britain, Pakenham, in a note dated September 
12, 1844, asked Calhoun to specify what arrangement he was 
"prepared to propose for an equitable adjustment of the ques- 
tion." Calhoun did not see fit to comply with this request, and 
four months after Polk 's inauguration no formal reply to Paken- 
ham 's note had been made. On July 12, 1845, however, in a 
communication to the minister, Buchanan set forth the American 
claims and offered to accept the forty-ninth parallel as a com- 
promise boundary. Whatever Polk's private reasons for thus 
suddenly reversing the policy announced in his inaugural may 
have been, his official reasons were set forth in a letter which 
Buchanan, on the same day, addressed to Louis McLane, the 
American minister in London. In it he said : 

The President, at a very early period of his administration, was called 
upon to decide whether he would break off or continue this negotiation. 
Placed in a responsible position, he first inquired whether the national 
honor required that he should abruptly terminate it by demanding the 
whole territory in dispute. War before dishonor is a maxim deeply engraven 
upon the hearts of the American People ; and this maxim ever shall regulate 

20 Union (semiweekly). May 12, 184-3. 



OREGON 569 

his conduct towards foreign nations. But it was impossible for him to 
conceive that there could be dishonor in pursuing the course Avhich had 
been adopted by Mr. Monroe, his patriot Eevolutionary predecessor, more 
than a quarter of a century ago, and had been either expressly sanctioned 
or acquiesced in by all succeeding admiuistrations.so 

In his note to Pakenham, Buchanan gave a comprehensive 
statement of the American claims to Oregon — both direct and 
indirect.-^^ "The title of the United States," he said, "to that 
portion of the Oregon territory between the valley of the 
Columbia and the Russian line in 54° 40' North Latitude, is 
recorded in the Florida Treaty, ' ' which transferred to the United 
States all of the claims of Spain. He refuted the claims which 
Great Britain based on the Nootka Sound convention, for, as he 
said, no title to land had been acquired by this convention. The 
valley of the Columbia, said he, belonged to the United States 
by virtue of the discoveries of Captain Gray, the explorations of 
Lewis and Clark, and the settlements made by Astor and oilier 
American citizens. 

"Such being the opinion of the President in regard to the 
title of the United States," Buchanan told Pakenham, "he would 
not have consented to yield any portion of the Oregon territory, 
had he not found himself embarrassed, if not committed, by the 
acts of his predecessors." But as they had uniformly proceeded 
upon "the principle of compromise," Polk felt constrained to 
do likewise. He had therefore instructed Buchanan again to 
propose that the Oregon country be divided by the forty-ninth 
parallel from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean, with 
free ports for Great Britain on the portion of Vancouver's Island 
lying south of that parallel. 



30 Buchanan to McLane, July 12. 1845 (Buchanan, Worls, VI, 190). 
He emphasized the fact that even General Jackson had been satisfied v\rith 
joint occupation. But he passed over the other important fact that none 
of Polk's predecessors had barred themselves from compromise by em- 
phatically claiming title to all of the territory. 

31 In a letter written to John G. Palfrey, June 24, 1848, Buchanan said 
that it was from Greenhow's Oregon and California "that my information 
as to the facts in support of our claim was principally derived" {Works, 
VIII, 106). 



570 JAMES K. POLK 

The line proposed will carry out the principle of continuity equally for 
both parties, by extending the limits both of ancient Louisiana and Canada 
to the Pacific along the same parallel of latitude which divide them east 
of the Rocky Mountains; and it will secure to each a sufficient number of 
commodious harbors on the northwest coast of America.32 

Pakenhaiii replied on the twenty-ninth of July. He con- 
troverted every argument which Buchanan had made, and in 
addition, he endeavored to j^lace the American Secretary of 
State in a somewhat awkward position. If, said he, Spain had 
had exclusive title to Oregon down to the Florida treaty of 1819, 
then Gray as well as Lewis and Clark had been interlopers on 
Spanish territory and their discoveries could not give the United 
States a valid title to the Columbia River valley. On what 
grounds, he asked, 

unless it be upon the principle which forms the foundation of the Nootka 
convention, could the United States have acquired a title to any part of the 
Oregon territory previously to the treaty of 1819, and independently of its 
provisions? 

The Nootka convention, he continued, was not the "main re- 
liance" of Great Britain in this discussion, but it barred the 
United States from acquiring "exclusive dominion'' from Spain 
by the Florida treaty. He argued at length to show that the 
Nootka convention was still in force, and that none of the Amer- 
ican explorations had given the United States exclusive title to 
any part of Oregon. Although he had not referred Buchanan's 
letter to his own government, Pakenham concluded his reply by 
declining the offer made by the President, and by expressing 
the hope that 

the American plenipotentiary will be prepared to offer some further pro- 
posal for the settlement of the Oregon question more consistent with fairness 
and equity, and with the reasonable expectations of the British government.33 

The Britisli minister's categorical rejection of Polk's offer 
came as a shock to the administration and aroused the fighting 



32 Buchanan to Pakenham, July 12, 1845 (Buchanan, Works, VI, 194 ff.). 

33 Pakenham to Buchanan, July 29, 1845 (ibid., 212-220). 



OREGON 571 

blood of the President. Regarding Pakenham's note as insolent, 
Polk decided to withdraw his offer of compromise and to reassert 
claim to the whole territory. In the belief that the relations 
with England had become critical in the extreme, he personally 
dictated the main features of the reply to the British minister. 
In order to prevent misunderstandings concerning his directions 
to Buchanan, or discussions in cabinet, he began keeping a diary 
in which the events of each day were recorded. This daily record 
is of great historical importance, for it not only gives informa- 
tion nowhere else available, but it displays the motives which 
inspired the President's policies — at least the motives which he 
desired posterity to accept as the key to his official acts.^* 

The diary opens on August 26, 1845, and the day's record 
is concerned principally with cabinet discussion of the Oregon 
question. As early as August 7, after the Prussian minister 
had informed Bancroft of a threatened invasion of Texas by 
Mexico, Polk urged Buchanan, who was on a visit to his home, 
to return to Washington as soon as possible. "I must confess," 
he said, after explaining the Mexican situation, "that the de- 
velopments which are taking place, as well as my daily reflec- 
tions, make it, in my opinion, more and more important that we 
should progress without delay in the Oregon negotiation."^^ 
By August 26, the date of the cabinet meeting just mentioned, 
the President had become impatient because of Buchanan 's delay 
in drafting a reply to Pakenham's note of July 29. He asked 
the Secretary when the reply would be ready for consideration 
by the cabinet; but, without waiting to learn what Buchanan 
had prepared, he proceeded to tell the cabinet "the settled deci- 
sion to which his mind had come." In his reply to Pakenham, 
Buchanan was directed to "assert and enforce our right to the 
whole of the Oregon territory from 42° to 54° 40' North Lati- 
tude." He was to state that the President had offered to agree 



3-i For his own version of his reasons for keeping a <liary, see Diary, H 
100-101. 

25 Polk to Buchanan, Aug. 7, 1845, Buchanan Pai^ers. 



572 JAMES K. POLE 

upon the forty-ninth parallel solely in deference to his prede- 
cessors and because of his desire to preserve peace between the 
two nations. Since the British minister had, wdthout referring 
the matter to his government, rejected the compromise "in 
language, to say the least of it, scarcely courteous or respectful" 
the offer was now to be withdrawn. "Let the argument of our 
title to the whole country be full," said the President, "let the 
proposition to compromise at latitude 49° be withdrawn, and 
then let the matter rest, unless the British Minister chose to 
continue the negotiation." 

Buchanan agreed with the President so far as the assertion 
of title and the withdrawal of the compromise offer were con- 
cerned, but he believed that a paragraph should be added to the 
effect that Polk would consider any proposition which Pakenham 
might submit. To such an implied invitation for further nego- 
tiation the President objected. "Let our proposition be abso- 
lutely withdrawn & then let the British Minister take his own 
course." With his usual timidity, Buchanan urged that should 
Polk 's views be carried out, war would result, but the President 
replied that "if we do have war it will not be our fault." 
Buchanan expressed the opinion that the answer to Pakenham 
ought to be postponed until it could be ascertained whether there 
would be a war with Mexico, but Polk, after asserting that there 
was no connection between the two questions, insisted upon an 
immediate reply to Pakenham 's note. To his remark that the 
United States would do its duty towards both nations and leave 
the rest to God and the Country, Buchanan retorted that "God 
would not have much to do in justifying us in a war for the 
country North of 49°." Secretary "Walker concurred in the 
President 's views, and the other members expressed no opinions. 
Undeterred by the opposition of his Secretary of State, Polk 
called a special cabinet meeting for the following day and directed 
Buchanan to have a draft of his answer to Pakenham ready for 
consideration. The draft presented by Buchanan at the special 



OBEGON 573 

meeting was considered satisfactory — even admirable — so far as 
the historical array of facts relating to the title was concerned, 
but the President ordered changes to be made in the part relating 
to the withdrawal of the compromise offer. Although the Secre- 
tary of State argued that the answer ought to be postponed, 
Polk ordered him to deliver it as soon as it could be copied. At 
the close of the discussion the other members of the cabinet gave 
their hearty support to the policy adopted by the President. 
Having thus declined to make further overtures to John Bull, 
Polk, on the following day, directed that orders be sent to General 
Taylor that in case Mexico should declare war or begin hostilities 
he was to drive her army across the Rio Grande and invade 
Mexico.^*^ 

The note to Pakenham, in its completed form, was an able 
document. The historical part, prepared by Buchanan, presented 
the claims of the United States to the whole territory with pre- 
cision and clearness. The Nootka Sound convention, he asserted, 
had not procured for Great Britain any territorial rights, and 
all privileges acquired by that agreement had been cancelled by 
a subsequent war with Spain. To Pakenham 's contention that 
the admission of Spain's title to Oregon before 1819 would in- 
validate all claims based by the United States on discovery, 
Buchanan retorted that "this is a most ingenious method of 
making two distinct and independent titles held by the same 
nation worse than one — of arraying them against each other, 
and thus destroying the validity of both." The United States, 
said he, now possessed both its own and the Spanish titles ; either 
was better than that of England, and certainly the two, com- 
bined, could not be weaker than one. 

The compromise otfer was officially withdrawn, but Polk's 
original intention of making no allusion to further negotiations 
was not carried out. Presumably in deference to the wishes of 
Buchanan, it was stated that "the President still cherishes the 



36 Polk, Diary, I, 1-9. 



574 JAMES K. POLK 

hope that this long-pending controversy may yet be finally ad- 
justed in such manner as not to disturb the peace or interrupt the 
harmony now so happily subsisting between the two nations."^' 
In taking such a firm stand the President may have been 
influenced, to some extent at least, by the knowledge that Paken- 
ham's prompt rejection of the compromise offer had not been 
authorized by his government. On August 19, Polk had received 
a private letter from McLane which stated that 

The result of all I have learned is that this Government is earnestly desirous 
of adjusting the Oregon question, & willing to do so upon liberal terms. 
Their chief difficulty arises from the opposition 4- iiifiuence of the Hudson 's 
Bail Company. 

His information, he said, had not come directly from Lord Aber- 
deen, but he felt certain that England would agree to the forty- 
ninth parallel to the Straits of Fuca, leaving A^'ancouver 's Island 
to Great Britain. ^'^ At the same time Robert Armstrong, the 
American consul at Liverpool and an intimate friend of the 
President, wrote that it was generally understood that England 
held a mortgage on California. Great Britain, he urged, must 
never possess California ; Oregon should be made the bone of 
contention to prevent it.^^ 

Several weeks passed during which neither party attempted 
to break the diplomatic deadlock. At a cabinet meeting held on 
October 21, however, a dispatch sent by McLane on the third was 
read and discussed. In an interview with ^McLane, Lord Aber- 
deen had expressed regret because Pakenham had rejected the 
American offer. After condemning Pakenham 's act, he intimated 



37 Buchanan to Pakenham, Aug. 30, 1845 (Buchanan, Works, VI. 231- 
254). On the same day that Buchanan delivered his official note, Calhoun 
wrote from his home in South Carolina deploring the possibility of a 
rupture with England. "It is beyond the power of man, ' ' said he, ' ' to 
trace the consequences of a war between us and England on the subject 
of Oregon. All that is certain is, that she can take it & hold it against 
us, as long as she has the supremacy on the ocean & retains her Eastern 
dominions. The rest is rapt in mvstery" (Calhoun to Buchanan, Aug. 30, 
1845, ihid., 230). 

38 Copy of McLane to Polk, Aug. 4, 1845, Buchanan Papers. 

39 Armstrong to Polk, Aug. 4, 1845, PoJk Papers. 



OEEGON 575 

a willingness to agree upon a modified proposition, and asked 
whether President Polk would negotiate further on the subject. 
Anticipating that Pakenham had received new instructions by 
the same mail and would make new overtures, Buchanan asked 
the President what answer he should make. Polk promptly 
replied that 

all that could be said to him was, that if he had any further proposition 
to make on his part, it would be received and considered No intima- 
tion should be given to him of what the views or intentions of the adminis- 
tration were, & [but] leave him to take his own course. 

He declared, also, that should Pakenham propose to agree upon 
the adjustment recently offered by the United States he would 
not accept the proposal. Should the minister make some other 
offer, this would either be rejected or submitted to the Senate 
for its advice. To Buchanan's question whether he might inform 
the British diplomat that a proposition made by him would be 
submitted to the Senate, the President answered that such a 
course "would be improper; the British Minister had no right 
to know our councils or intentions." Although the Secretary 
of State prophesied war, Polk was obdurate and refused to 
modify his views. He told the cabinet that in his first message 
to Congress he "would maintain all our rights, would reaffirm 
Mr. Monroe's ground against permitting any European power 
to plant or establish any new colony on the North American 
Continent. ' '*° 

The conjecture that Pakenham had received new instructions 
from Lord Aberdeen seems to have been well founded, for two 
days after the cabinet meeting he called at the State Department 
and expressed regret because the American offer had been with- 
drawn. He suggested that negotiations might be reopened by 
the signing of a protocol, but as he was not prepared to make a 
definite offer of terms, Buchanan w^as not at liberty to accept the 
proposal. When the conversation was rej^orted to the President, 



40 Polk, Bianj, I, 62-65. 



576 JAMES E. POLE 

he insisted that "the British Government must move tirst," and 
he doubted that any oifer would be made which the United States 
could accept. ^^ 

Up to this time there had been an estrangement between the 
President and Senator Benton, as a result of the latter 's violent 
criticism of the course pursued by the Baltimore convention. 
Due, however, to a common interest in Oregon and, also, to the 
influence of Buchanan, a reconciliation was effected. With 
Polk's consent, Buchanan showed Benton the correspondence 
that had passed between himself and the British minister ; he 
intimated, also, that the Senator would be kindly received if he 
should feel inclined to call upon the President. Benton approved 
the action that had been taken and expressed a desire to con- 
verse with the President, therefore a meeting was arranged for 
the twenty-fourth of October. Polk was already preparing his 
message to Congress, and it is evident that he was anxious to 
win Benton 's support for the policy which he was about to recom- 
mend. The Missourian's judgment was not always sound, but he 
wielded an influence which could not be disregarded. 

During the interview the two men agreed upon the following 
points: that the twelve months' notice for abrogating the con- 
vention of 1827 should be given ; that the laws of the United 
States should be extended over Oregon in the same degree that 
British laws had been extended in 1821 ; that forts should be 
built on the route to Oregon ; and that the Indian policy of the 
United States should be extended to the whole region. On some 
phases, however, Benton was not jirepared to go so far as the 
President ; he thought that Great Britain possessed a good title 
to the Frazer River valley, and he was willing to accept the forty- 
ninth parallel as a sastisfactory boundary. To Polk's suggestion 
of reasserting the Monroe Doctrine against all colonization on the 
North American continent, he replied that while foreign nations 
should be excluded from California and the Columbia River 

41 Ibid., 66-67. 



OREGON 577 

valley, the Frazer River valley was already occupied by the 
British/- From the date of this interview until the court-martial 
of Fremont the Senator gave his support to the administration. 
And his support was of no small importance, although his arro- 
gance and dictatorial manner often taxed the patience of the 
President. 

Three days after his conversation with Benton {i.e., October 
27), the President received a call from T. W. Ward, Boston 
agent for the Baring Brothers. After speaking of the absurdity 
of a war between the two nations and of the unsettled business 
conditions which had resulted from war rumors. Ward intimated 
a desire to know whether Polk would persist in claiming title to 
the whole of Oregon. His visit did not elicit the desired informa- 
tion, for the President told him that "no one but myself & my 
Cabinet could know what had occurred or what was likely to 
occur.'' Two hours later Buchanan sent to the President a 
diplomatic note which he had just received from the British 
minister, and as it bore the date of October 25, Polk concluded 
that it had been held back until Pakenham had learned the result 
of Ward's interview with the President.*^ 

When presenting the note to Buchanan, Pakenham remarked 
that he would regard it as official or unofficial as he might deem 
best after he had ascertained the answer which it w^ould receive. 
A reply was prepared by Buchanan and carefully edited by the 
President after its contents had been discussed at two cabinet 
meetings. Against the wishes of the Secretary of State, who 
desired to leave the way open for further negotiation, Polk 
directed him not to submit his answer or to reveal its contents 
unless Pakenham would decide, in advance, to regard his note 
as official. He was unwilling, he said, to do anything "which 
would have the appearance of inviting Great Brittain to make 
another proposition." When told that no answer would be made 
except to an official communication, Pakenham, after some 



i2 Ibid., 55, 70-71. is Ibid., 73-75. 



578 JAMES E. POLK 

anxious hesitation, withdrew the note. During the conversation 
he denied that he had rejected the American offer, but had merely 
refused to accept it — a distinction which he hekl to be of great 
importance. Copies of the note and the reply which had been 
prepared were sent to McLane so that he might know precisely 
what had transpired." The President, at this same time, was 
holding conversations with Lieutenant Gillespie, preparing him 
for his mission to California with secret instructions for Larkin, 
the consul at Monterey, and two weeks later Slidell was sent to 
negotiate with Mexico. 

During the latter half of November Polk was busily engaged 
in drafting his first annual message to Congress. He discussed 
the proposed recommendations with Ritchie and with several 
members of Congress, and all parts of his original draft were 
read and considered at cabinet meetings. In general all mem- 
bers of the cabinet, except Buchanan, concurred in the Presi- 
dent 's views ; the Secretary of State dissented from his Oregon 
policy and seriously considered leaving the cabinet to accept the 
position of Justice of the Supreme Court. He made various 
suggestions which were intended to soften the tone of the message, 
and when they were not adopted the President noted that "]\Ir. 
Buchanan seemed to be depressed in spirits, and, as I thought, 
greatly concerned lest the controversy about Oregon might lead 
to War."'^' When his own protests had failed he tried to in- 
fluence the President by saying that many members of Congress 
were in favor of accepting parallel forty-nine as the boundary, 
but Polk replied that he, too, had conversed with congressmen, 
nine-tenths of whom were in favor of "going the whole length." 
•The diary states further that: 

Mr. B. expressed the opinion Avith some earnestness that the country 
would not' justify a war for the country North of 49°, and that my greatest 
danger would be that I would be attacked for holding a warlike tone. I 

44 lUd 75-82. Buchanan to McLane, Oct. 28 and Nov. 5, 1845 (Bu- 
chanan, Worl-s, VI, 28.5-286, 289). 
4s Polk, Diary, I, 102. 



OBEGON 579 

told him that my greatest danger was that I would be attacked for having 
yielded to what had been done by my predecessors and in deference alone, 
as he knew, to their acts and commitments, [and for having] agreed to offer 
the compromise of 49°. I told him that if that proposition had been ac- 
cepted by the Brittish Minister my course would have met with great opposi- 
tion, and in my opinion would have gone far to overthrow the administra- 
tion ; that, had it been accepted, as we came in on Texas the probability 
was ^Ye would have gone out on Oregon. I told him we had done our duty 
by offering 49°, and that I did not regret that it had been rejected by the 
Brittish Minister The truth is Mr. Buchanan has from tlihe begin- 
ning been, as I think, too timid and too fearful of War on the Oregon 
question, and has been most anxious to settle the question by yielding and 
making greater concessions than I am willing to make.^o 

The twenty-ninth Congress convened on the first of December, 
and on the following day Polk submitted his first annual message.' 
While he congratulated Congress on "the continued prosperity" 
of the country, he nevertheless felt called upon to make many im- 
portant recommendations. Foreign relations were given first 
attention, and on the topics of Texas and Oregon the views ex- 
pressed by the President were uncompromising, if not menacing, 
in tone. 

After giving a brief history of the attempts made by his pre- 
decessors to settle the Oregon boundary question, the President 
informed Congress of the offer which he had made and which 
Great Britain had rejected. He had become convinced that 
England would not agree to any adjustment which the United 
States ought to accept, consequently "the proposition of com- 
promise which had been made and rejected was by my direction 
subsequently withdrawn and our title to the whole of Oregon 
Territory asserted, and, as is believed, maintained by irrefragable 
facts and arguments." Since England by her rejection of the 
compromise offer had relieved the President from being further 
influenced by the acts of his predecessors and had left him free 
to assert the full rights of the United States, two things were 
recommended : first, notice should be given that the convention 
46 IMcl, 107-108. 



580 JAMES K. POLK 

of "joint occupancy" made in 1827 will be terminated at the 
end of twelve months; and second, "it will become proper for 
Congress to determine what legislation they can in the meantime 
adopt without violating this convention." 

While thus fully admitting the right of Congress to determine 
the degree of protection which might be given to American 
citizens in Oregon before the termination of joint occupancy, 
Polk nevertheless freely suggested the laws which he considered 
to be proper and necessary. "Beyond all question," said he, 
"the protection of our laws and our jurisdiction, civil and crim- 
inal, ought to be immediately extended over our citizens in 
Oregon." They should be extended to the same extent that 
England had extended her laws in 1821. Forts should be built 
along the route to Oregon to facilitate emigration to that region. 
He doubted that land grants could be made until the convention 
had expired, but emigrants might rest assured that they would 
be given land as soon as "joint occupancy" had ended. 

So far as Great Britain was concerned, the most objectionable 
part of the message was that which outlined the policy to be 
followed by the United States after the convention of 1827 had 
expired. "At the end of a year's notice," said the President, 
should Congress think it proper to make provision for giving that notice, 
we shall have reached a period when the national rights in Oregon must 
either be abandoned or firmly maintained. That they can not be abandoned 
without a sacrifice of both national honor and interest is too clear to admit 
of doubt. 

The claim of Great Britain to the Columbia as a boundary "can 
never for a moment be entertained by the United States without 
an abandonment of their just and clear territorial rights, their 
own self-respect, and the national honor." Evidently with Cali- 
fornia as well as Oregon in mind, he reasserted the Monroe 
Doctrine against European colonization on the North American 
continent.'*'^ 



47 Eichardson, Messages, IV, 392-399. 



OREGON 581 

According to the account recorded in Polk's diary, Demo- 
crats generally — even many of Calhoun's friends — expressed en- 
thusiastic approval of his message. ^'^ Archer, a Whig member 
from Virginia, was especially pleased with the part relating to 
Oregon, and remarked that "he believed he was half a Polk- 
man." "Well!" said Benton, "you have sent us the message," 
and "I think we can all go it as we understand it," to which 
Polk replied (alluding to Jackson's famous remark) that the 
Senator had very high authority for saying "as we understand 
it." The real meaning of Benton's remark, as further conversa- 
tion developed, was that England's title to the region drained by 
Frazer's River was quite as good as that of the United States 
to the valley of the Columbia.^'' 

The President was not moved to modify his uncompromising 
policy by the opinions expressed by so influential a person 
as Senator Benton ; neither did the continued opposition of 
Buchanan disturb his equanimity. At a cabinet meeting held on 
December 9, the Secretary of State, after stating that he antici- 
pated a call from Pakenham, asked the President what reply he 
ought to make if the British minister should interrogate him on 
the Oregon question. "Suppose," said he, "Mr. Pakenham in- 
quires whether any further proposition which the British Gov- 
ernment might make would be received, what shall I say to him?" 
Polk replied that Pakenham had no right to ask such a question. 
The minister, he said, knew the contents of the annual message 
and of the diplomatic correspondence he had received ; let him 
take his own course without any intimation as to how any future 
offer would be received. "Mr. B. repeated his anxiety to settle 
the question at 49° & avoid war. I told him that I did not desire 
war, but that at all hazards we must maintain our just rights." 
Pakenham called two days later, and, after expressing an earnest 
desire for peace, desired to know what the United States proposed 



48 Among those mentioned were Cass, McDuffie, Holmes, Seddon, Hunter, 
and Wilmot. 

49 Polk, Bianj, I, 116-117. 



582 JAMES E. POLK 

to do at the end of the year's notice, but Buchanan was, of course, 
unable to give him a satisfactory reply.^" In spite of his "high 
tone," Polk seems to have been rather uneasy because England 
was reported to be engaged in "warlike preparations," and 
McLane w'as instructed to ascertain whether they had been 
induced by possible hostilities over Oregon.^^ 

On December 23 "a grave discussion" took place in the 
cabinet regarding the probabilities of a war with Great Britain. 
Buchanan expressed himself as decidedly in favor of vigorous 
preparations for defense, and in such a policy the President 
heartily concurred. The Secretaries of War and Navy were 
directed to communicate the views of the administration to the 
military and naval committees of Congress and to aid them in 
drafting suitable bills. Still in fear of war, Buchanan inquired 
whether, in case Pakenham should offer to compromise on the 
forty-ninth parallel, leaving Vancouver's Island to England, 
Polk would submit the offer to the Senate for its advice. "I told 
him," wrote the President, 

if an equivalent, by granting to the U. S. free ports North of 49° on the 
sea & the Straits of Fuca sliould also be offered, I Avould consult confiden- 
tially three or four Senators from different parts of the Union, and might 
submit it to the Senate for their previous advice. 

As this was the first intimation, since the withdrawal of the 
American offer, that Polk might modify his claims, in deference 
to the Senate, Buchanan regarded the commitment so important 
that he reduced to writing what the President had said.^- 

Pakenham called at the State Department on December 27, 
and, after an unsuccessful attempt to induce Buchanan to recall 
his withdrawal of the American offer, proposed to refer "the 
Avhole question of an equitable division of that territory [Oregon] 
to the arbitration of some friendly sovereign or State." In 



50 Ibid., 119-121. 

f'! Buchanan to McLane, Dee. 13, 1845 (Buchanan, Works, VI, 341-342). 

52 He appended the memorandum: "I took down the foregoing from 
the lips of the President in the presence of the Cabinet" (Polk, Diary, I. 
133-136). 



OREGON 583 

anticipation of such an offer Polk and his cabinet had, on that very 
same day, decided to reject it, if it should be made. Buchanan 
could not, of course, reject the offer without referring it to the 
President, but he frankly told the British diplomat that he did 
not believe it would be accepted. Pakenham regretted that there 
seemed to be no way of reopening negotiations and intimated 
that the American government did not desire an amicable settle- 
ment. He said, on the other hand, that "the British government 
would be glad to get clear of the question on almost any terms ; 
that they did not care if the arbitrator should award the whole 
territory to us."^^ This frank remark indicated that England 
cared little about Oregon — except that she did not wish to be 
coerced — and the prospects of an amicable adjustment seemed 
very much brighter.^* 

In his answer to Pakenham, which had been carefully edited 
by the President, Buchanan explained why the offer of arbitra- 
tion could not be accepted. The offer to refer to an arbitrator 
the "equitable division" of Oregon, said he, "assumes the fact 
that the title of Great Britain to a portion of the territory is 
valid, and thus takes for granted the very question in dispute"; 
the President could not admit such an implication, for he believed 
that England had no claim to any part of the land. Pakenham 
now asked if the United States would agree to submit to arbitra- 
tion the question as to whether either nation possessed a valid 
title to the whole territory, and his query was answered in the 
negative, because the President did not "believe the territorial 
rights of this nation to be a proper subject for arbitration. ' '"^ 



53 Pakenham to Buchanan, Dec. 27, 1845; memorandum of the interview 
in Buchanan, Works, VI, 349-353. 

s^ Pakenham 's report of his government's attitude agrees with a 
statement made by Ashbell Smith: "In the conversation Lord Aberdeen 
remarked that the British government did not care a pin, comparatively, 
about Oregon and the Puget sound country; but that the universal con- 
viction in England was that the country to the Columbia river belonged of 
right to Great Britain and that the United States was attempting to bully 
England out of it" (Smith, Reminiscences of the Texas Republic, 41). 

"'5 Buchanan to Pakenham, Jan. 3 and Feb. 4; Pakenham to Buchanan, 
Jan. 16, 1846 (Buchanan, Works, VI, 355, 357, 370). 



584 JAMES K. POLK 

Polk's unyielding attitude did not necessarily mean that he 
either expected or desired a rupture with England. Apparently, 
he believed that he would yet be offered a proposition to which 
he could agree. When, on January 4, Black, of South Carolina, 
asked him to use his influence with Congress to induce that body 
to postpone the date for abrogating the convention of 1827, he 
declined with the remark that "the only way to treat John Bull 
was to look him straight in the eye ; that he [I] considered a bold 
& firm course on our part the pacific one.""" Despite, therefore, 
the blunt answers to Pakenham, McLane was authorized to let 
Lord Aberdeen know, "cautiously and informally," that, while 
the President himself would accept nothing less than the whole 
of Oregon, he would, should Great Britain offer the for-ty-ninth 
parallel as a boundary, refer the proposition to the Senate for 
its advice. Anything less advantageous to the United States 
would l)e rejected by the President without such a reference; 
"it is manifest, therefore, that the British Government should 
at once present their ultimatum."" A few days before these 
instructions had been sent Polk liad suggested to his cabinet that 
a settlement might possibly be made on the basis of a mutual 
reduction of tariffs and the payment to England of a sum of 
money for the surrender of her Oregon claims. TJiis sum was 
to enable her to indemnify the Hudson's Bay Company. The 
subject was postponed for further discussion and seems never to 
have been seriously considered. ^^ 

Before he had received the above-mentioned instructions Mc- 
Lane, in a private letter to Buchanan, said that although the 
Oregon question was becoming more critical every day, yet he 
believed that the President had it in his power to adjust the 
matter "upon a basis of a reasonable compromise," should he 
feel inclined to do so. He believed, also, "that it may he made 
to appear in the end that his [Polk's] mode of conducting the 

50 Polk, Diary, I, 155. 

5T Buchanan to MeLane, Jan. 29, 1846 (Buchanan, Worls, VI, 366-368). 

58 Polk, Diary, T, 191. 



OREGON 585 

negotiation had enabled liini to do what his predecessors had been 
unable to accomplish. "^'^ The latter suggestion was entirely su- 
perfluous, for the President was already endeavoring to create 
such an impression by his method of conducting the negotiations. 
His judgment proved to be sounder than that of his critics. His 
uncompromising attitude did not result in the war which they 
so confidently predicted, but, eventually, in another and better 
offer from the British government. 

In the meantime Congress was engaged in a spirited debate 
upon the President's message and the validity of the American 
title to Oregon. In the Senate, on December 8, Benton presented 
a memorial from the people of Oregon which stated that they 
had set up a temporary government and asked its approval by 
Congress. They requested Congress to create for them a terri- 
torial government, or at least to give them civil and military 
protection. "^^ Next day Cass introduced resolutions which in- 
structed the military and naval committees to inquire into the 
defensive needs of the country. 

When first presented, Cass's resolutions elicited no comments, 
but when, on December 15, he came to urge their adoption the 
character of his speech caused no little consternation. Negoti- 
ations, he said, had failed to settle the dispute, and Great Britain 
was assuming a menacing attitude; adequate military prepar- 
ation was the best means of avoiding war. The President, in his 
opinion, could never recede from the position he had taken, and 
it was better "to fight for the first inch of national territory than 
for the last." Allen, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, agreed that the best method of averting war was to pre- 
pare for it, "but the only, or rather the most effectual, preparation 
which could be made in the United States for this state of things, 
was the preparation of the hearts of the people." Webster, 
Crittenden, and Niles deplored warlike talk, and thought that 



59 McLane to Buchanan, Feb. 3, 1846, Buchanan Papers. 

60 Unless otherwise stated, the opinions and remarks of congressmen 
have been derived from the Congressional Globe under dates given. 



586 JAMES K. POLK 

Cass's remarks were most unfortunate. Webster did not believe 
that Polk expected war, and, in his opinion, the message had been 
intended as an ultimatum to induce England to make a better 
offer. Sevier, on the other hand, would not accept this interpre- 
tation. There would certainly be war, he said, for the United 
States could not recede, and Great Britain would not ; the only 
recourse for the United States was to drive the British out of 
the territory. There was little opposition to the resolutions them- 
selves — the criticism was aimed at the remarks which they called 
forth — and they passed near the close of the day (December 16) 
by a unanimous vote. 

The Senate having taken the first step in "preparing the 
hearts of the people" for war, Allen, on the eighteenth, presented 
a joint resolution which advised the President "to give, forth- 
with," the necessary notice for terminating the convention of 
1827 with Great Britain. On the same day Atchison, of Missouri, 
moved to instruct the Committee on Territories to inquire into 
the expediency of organizing a government for Oregon. During 
the next two weeks Texas rather than Oregon claimed the at- 
tention of the Senate, but on December 29 Hannegan, of Indiana, 
offered a resolution which declared all of Oregon to be " part and 
parcel" of the United States, and that "there exists no power 
in this Government to transfer its soil, and the allegiance of its 
citizens, to the dominion, authority, control, and subjugation of 
any foreign prince, state, or sovereignty." 

The Oregon question was introduced in the House on the 
second day of the session when Ingersoll read a petition from the 
citizens of that region asking for a territorial government. It 
was read and laid on the table, but on December 15 Douglas 
succeeded in having it referred to the Committee on Territories, 
of which he was chairman. On the nineteenth, Douglas reported 
from his committee a bill which provided for the protection of 
the rights of American citizens until the termination of joint 
occupation. It was read twice and referred to the Committee of 



OREGON 587 

the Whole, there to be made a special order for the first Tuesday 
in January, and to continue such from day to day until it had 
been adopted or rejected. Scarcely had the reference been made 
when Winthrop, of Massachusetts, offered resolutions to the effect 
that the differences with England were still open to negotiation 
or arbitration, and that war would be highly discreditable to 
both nations. Douglas responded immediately with resolutions 
which asserted that the title to any part of the territory south of 
54° 40' was not open to compromise or arbitration. From the 
Committee on Military Affairs, Brinkerhoft', on December 31, re- 
ported a bill for constructing forts along the route to Oregon ; 
this, also, was referred to the Committee of the Whole. 

While the House had been discussing the proposed govern- 
ment for Oregon, its Committee on Foreign Affairs had been 
trying to agree upon a joint resolution for giving notice to Eng- 
land that the convention of 1827 would be terminated. As the 
members were unable to agree, Ingersoll, the chairman, on Jan- 
uary 5, reported a resolution for the majority of his committee. 
It directed that the President "forthwith cause notice to be 
given" that the convention would be abrogated twelve months 
after the notice had been served. Garrett Davis, of Kentucky, 
then reported that the minority of the committee — himself and 
two colleagues — believed that the convention could be abrogated 
by the treaty-making power only. The House, he said, had noth- 
ing to do with it ; Congress neither made the convention nor could 
unmake it, except by a declaration of war. The contention of 
the minority was well founded, even though the objectors were 
governed more by partisan feelings than by constitutional scru- 
ples. Although the convention of 1827 did not specify by whom 
the notice should be given, the natural inference was that it meant 
the treaty-making power. 

As soon as the reports had been read, the House proceeded 
at once to consider the resolution. Giddings, who opened the 
debate, stated that heretofore he had opposed expansion, but 



588 JAMES K. POLK 

since the South had succeeded in annexing Texas he now wanted 
all of Oregon. The South, he said, was not interested in Oregon, 
and he believed that Polk would surrender all north of the forty- 
ninth parallel. Rhett repelled the charge that southern men who 
opposed giving notice to England were governed by sectional 
motives. His own reason for opposing the notice was that John 
Quincy Adams favored it; he would be "blackballed" in South 
Carolina if he should vote on the same side as the member fi-om 
Massachusetts. Cobb, of Georgia (January 9), regretted that 
southern men should question the title to all of Oregon ; if Con- 
gress should fail to back up Polk's message, Great Britain would 
be still less inclined to settle the question. In his opinion, it 
would be very unfair for Congress to shirk the responsibility by 
leaving the discretion to the President. The Washington Union 
in urging abrogation of the convention pointed out that so long 
as joint occupation continued England had no interest in the 
settlement of the question, for "s/;c lias now all that she asks 
for."''' 

As the debate proceeded, many arguments — some of them 
most unique — were offered in support of the notice and for the 
claim to the whole territory. Levin, of Pennsylvania (January- 
9 ) , based the claim to all of Oregon upon the ' ' genius of Ameri- 
can institutions" and the "laws of God"; Kennedy, of Indiana, 
upon the "American multiplication table," the operation of which 
made it necessary for the people to have more room.*'- Brinker- 
hoff, of Ohio, was captivated by the convincing logic of Bu- 
chanan's defense of the American title as was "the Queen of 
Sheba, when gazing on the architectural wonders of Jerusalem." 



f'l Union, Jan. 12, 1846. "If we are to govern Oregon peaceably," said 
the Union on January 16, "we must first get rid of 'joint occupation.' 
If we are to govern aiiy part of Oregon peaceaV^ly, we must first get rid 
of 'joint occupation' in that part." 

'■'-"Our people are spreading out with the aid of the American multi- 
plication table. Go to the West and see a young man with his mate of 
eighteen; after the lapse of thirty years, visit him again and instead of 
two, you will find twenty-two. That is what I call the American multi- 
plication table" (Cong. Glnhc. Jan. 10, 1846). 



OEEGON 589 

Sawtelle, of Maine, praised Polk for his firm stand, for he wanted 
no compromise like the Ashburton treaty; "we want no more 
half-English half-American secretaries to barter away any other 
portion of our territory." Douglas would not be satisfied so 
long as Great Britain held an inch of territory on the northwest 
coast, and he commended the President for reasserting the Mon- 
roe Doctrine. He seems clearly to have believed that Polk would 
not conclude a treaty of any kind with Great Britain. Had he 
believed otherwise he would hardly have uttered the remark about 
to be quoted, for his language would brand the President as 
unworthy of confidence as soon as the treaty had been signed. 
After citing the passage in Polk's message which stated that in 
future no European colony might be planted in North America 
with the consent of the United States, he asserted that the con- 
clusion of any treaty with England — whether the line esablished 
were 49° or 54° 40' — would be giving such consent. "But the 
President," said he, 

Has aunoiineed distinctly to the world, as our settled policy, that that 
consent cannot be given. Sir, he who knows the character of the man — 
he who knows the stern integrity of his political character — he who knows 
the consistency of his whole political life — he who knows his fidelity to 
his principles, must know that, during his four years, this "settled policy" 
will not be unsettled by him. Sir, he is not the man to put the distinct 
declaration forth to the world in the name of his Government of a settled 
policy, and then to sneak back from it, to violate it, to disgrace himself 
and his nation during that very presidential term in which he gave the 
notice. Then, I say, that during these four years, it is a settled, irrevoc- 
ably settled question, that no treaty fixing a boundary for the northern 
part of Oregon can be made. Sir, the making of any treaty fixing a 
boundary, would be a palpable violation of the very principle the President 
has put forth in his niessage.63 

Great difference of opinion existed as to who possessed the 
power and whose duty it was to notify England that the conven- 
tion would be abrogated. Could the President alone do so, or 
must he have the advice and consent of the Senate ; could 



03 Jan. 27, 1846 (Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 259-260). 



590 JAMES E. POLE 

Congress alone, or witli the approval of the President, serve the 
notice ; if Congress alone lacked power to give the notice, could 
it direct, or simply advise, the President, to do so? The Whigs, 
generally, favored leaving the question of serving the notice to 
the discretion of the President so that he might bear the respon- 
sibility, although many of them professed to be certain that notice 
would be followed by war. On January 7, Hilliard, of Alabama, 
moved an amendment which empowered the President to give 
or to withhold notice ; Democrats opposed the amendment and 
declared it to be both partisan and cowardly. ' ' But a few months 
ago," said Thurman, of Ohio, 

Many of them [the Whigs] professed to be unacquainted as to who Mr. 
Polk was. But so rapid had been their progress, that they had not only 
found out who he was, but they had ascertained that he was entitled to 
such confidence that they proposed to confer upon him what they argued 
was the war-making power. 6i 

Andrew Johnson condemned southern men wiio had accepted the 
Baltimore platform and supported the candidate and who now 
refused to sustain the President ; Strong, of New York, quoted 
the London Examiner as proof that England hoped to profit by 
a division in the Democratic party. 

Had John Randolph been living at this time he would have 
beheld another alliance quite as strange as that between ' ' puritan 
and blackleg,"''^ for the "puritan," Adams, now sided with the 
Oregon Democrats. He did not, he said, expect to add much to 
the argument, for in no debate had the subject been "more thor- 
oughly and completely exhausted." He wished to have the con- 
vention of 1827 abrogated so that the United States might get 
actual possession, for "that is the only thing we now want, to 
have a perfect, clear, indisputable, and undoubted right to the 



c'When Polk was nominated, said Cathcart, of Indiana, the Whigs 
cried, "Who is James K. Polk?"; "and yet these immaculate apostles of 
consistency are willing to vote this tremendous power [the war power] 
into the hands of this very same James K. Polk! " 

«5 On the alliance of Adams and Clav in 1824, see Schouler, Hist, of 
the U. S., Ill, 367. 



OREGON 591 

territory of Oregon." The government should therefore give 
notice to England, and occupy the territory. In his Memoirs, 
Adams makes the interesting statement that neither Monroe nor 
he, when President, really intended to divide the territory with 
Great Britain : 

This offer was formerly made under the imi^ressiou that it would uot 
be accepted, but that its effect would be to preserve the peace between the 
two countries, and postpone the issue of the controversy until the time 
should come when we should be able to maintain our claims by an appeal, 
if necessar}^ to arms.66 

His independence and his want of sympathy with the attitude 
of his political associates is manifested in his remarks concerning 
a conversation held with Representative Moseley, of New York : 

He is a member of the Whig party, the policy of which among the 
people appears to be concentrating itself upon a system of opposition to 
the present Administration on the ground of its propensity to war with 
Great Britain. Dangers of war, and a very contemptuous estimate of the 
object for which they suppose the President is provoking it, are the only 
theme upon which they dwell, without sufficiently considering that their 
terrors and prognostics may furnish to Mr. Polk motives and pretexts for 
yielding to the pretensions of our adversary, and sacrificing our own just 
claims to the territory in dispute, of which I think there is much greater 
danger than of a war for the maintenance of them.«^ 

The President's adversaries were unable to agree concerning 
the most effective, method of opposing his Oregon policy. In- 
surgent Democrats, as a rule, argued against abrogating the 
British convention because, as they said, war would result. Some 
of the Whigs offered similar arguments ; others, as we have seen, 
were willing to invest Polk with power to abrogate the conven- 
tion, and to make him responsible for the consequences. Tooms, 
of Georgia, Campbell, of New York, Ewing, of Tennessee, as well 
as others, did not regard the American title to be ''unquestion- 
able" except to the Columbia River valley; they were ready, 



60 Adams, Memoirs, XII, 221. 
e-! Ibid., 226. 



592 JAMES K. POLE 

therefore, to agree upon the forty-ninth parallel. King, of 
Georgia, wished to settle the question by arbitration, while Davis, 
of Mississippi, like Calhoun, advocated "masterly inactivity." 
He thought that Polk was in need of being saved from his friends ; 
if the title to Oregon was as "perfect" as the President claimed, 
it was dishonorable for him and his predecessors to have offered 
to compromise with Great Britain. 

On February 9, 1846, the Committee of the Whole ceased 
debating and prepared to vote on the bill as reported from the 
Committee of Foreign Affairs. Numerous amendments were 
offered,-- but few modifications were permitted. After much 
wrangling the House resolved by a vote of one hundred sixty- 
three to fifty-four that the President ' ' cause notice to be given ' ' 
to Great Britain that the convention of 1827 would be abrogated 
at the end of twelve months. A second paragraph explained that 
such action was not intended to preclude further "negotiations 
for an amicable settlement." In this form the resolution was 
sent to the Senate for its approval. 

The House resolution reached the Senate on the tenth but 
instead of giving it immediate consideration, that body continued 
to debate various joint resolutions which had been proposed by 
its own members. Among these was one that had been offered 
by Crittenden, on January 26, and this, with slight modifications, 
was the one finally adopted as an amendment to the House reso- 
lution. Before its adoption, however, the Senate indulged in a 
prolonged and acrimonious debate. 

The question of abrogating the convention of 1827 was dis- 
cussed from every possible angle, and yet very little new light 
was contributed by either the friends or the opponents of the 
administration. Although not a political supporter of the Presi- 
dent, Clayton, of Delaware, was willing to trust Polk's judgment 



68 For example, as to whether Polk should be requested, required, or 
left to his discretion, with respect to giving notice to England. Some 
wanted a long preamble, others, provision for further negotiation (Cong. 
Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 345-350). 



OREGON 593 

in the matter of giving notice. He expressed the belief that war 
would not result from abrogation of the convention, and quoted 
the Manchester Guardian to show that the British were in favor 
of such action.*"* Relying with the utmost confidence on Polk's 
"honesty, integrity, and firmness," Colquitt, of Georgia, was 
ready to follow the recommendations made in the President's 
message, for 

It has been very properly said that no message that ever emanated 
from a President of the United States has met with more general appro- 
bation on the part of the people than the one to which I now allude. It 
is able, dignified, and peaceful. All that he has said and all that he has 
done, and all that he has offered to do, has met a favorable response from 
the public. 

Colquitt did not believe, however, that the American title was 
so clear as to preclude further negotiation, and he was confident 
that Polk would not reject a reasonable offer to settle the dispute. 
In the course of his remarks Colquitt twitted Hannegan, of 
Indiana, with having been indifferent to the acquisition of Texas. 
"Both Texas and Oregon," replied Hannegan, "were united in 
the Baltimore convention. But I dreaded — if Texas went first — - 
I dreaded Punic faith. Yes, Punic faith."'*' Others besides 
Hannegan accused southern members with having declined, for 
sectional reasons, to support the President's Oregon policy, but 
for the most part these accusations seem to have been groundless. 
One of the most exhaustive speeches in support of Polk's 
policy was delivered by John A. Dix, of New York. He did not 



6s " "With respect to the notice for terminating the joint occupation of 
Oregon, ' ' said the Guardian, ' ' we are not sure that President Polk may 
not receive it from the English Government hefore he can possibly be in a 
condition to give it himself. But whether given by the one side or the other, 
we do not conceive that it will add materially, if at all, to the chance of a 
hostile collision. ' ' 

70 ''Texas and Oregon," said Hannegan on December 30, 1845, "were 
born the same instant, nursed and cradled in the same cradle — the Balti- 
more convention — and they were at the same instant adopted by the 
democracy throughout the land. There was not a moment's hesitation, 
until Texas was admitted; but the moment she was admitted, the peculiar 
friends of Texas turned, and were doing what they could to strangle 
Oregon ! ' ' 



594 JAMES K. POLK 

agree with Allen's assertion that the time for discussing the title 
"had gone by," nor with Clayton's contention that "it had not 
yet arrived." His argument in support of the American claim 
was so thorough and conclusive that Benton, who followed him, 
declared that "He [Dix] has left notliing for me to say on the 
point of title, familiar as I have been with that subject for thirty 
years. "'^ The exhaustive character of Dix's speech may have 
been sufficient reason for Benton's eschewing the subject of title 
himself, but a better reason, perhaps, was his own real belief, 
as he had already informed the President, that England held a 
valid title to Frazer's River valley. Dix had relieved him from 
the necessity of dwelling on this subject, and had left him free 
to employ more general terms in his defense of the administra- 
tion. Whatever his mental reservations may have been, he sup- 
ported Polk 's Oregon policy with enthusiasm, the first fruit of the 
recent reconciliation. "I concur with the President," said he, 
"in what he has done — both in what he has offered — in what he 
has rejected — and in what he has recommended to Congress to 
do." In his opinion, the policy pursued had produced a good 
effect both at home and abroad, had removed misapprehensions, 
and created a feeling favorable to friendly negotiation. He had 
no fear of war, for both governments were in good humor and 
desirous of peace. 

To Webster, Polk's Oregon policy was a riddle which baffled 
solution. He desired to know what the President intended to do, 
for he did not act like a man who expected a war : 

There is nothing in his reeonimendations to the other House, nor to this, 
indicative of such an expectation. There is nothing of preparation for 
defense, indicating that the President expects war. Well, then, he can 



'i"He has placed the American title to the Columbia," Benton con- 
tinued, "and to the coast north of it, on ground from which it can never 
be removed, and which must put an end to the argument wherever that 
speech is read. A speech more perfect in its proofs — better sustained by 
history — more crowded with material pertinent to the issue — more satis- 
factory to all lovers of truth and justice — more judiciously conceived and 
victoriously executed, I have never heard delivered. ' ' 



OREGON 595 

expect nothing but a continuance of this dispute, or its settlement by nego- 
tiation. I am bound to suppose that he expects its settlement by negotia- 
tion. What terms of negotiation? What basis of negotiation? What 
grounds of negotiation? Everything that we hear from the Executive de- 
partment is "the whole or none"; and yet negotiate! Sir, it is vain to 
conceal from ourselves, from the country, or from the world, the gross incon- 
sistency of this course of conduct. It is the spirit of that correspondence 
[Buchanan 's] to which my honorable friend has alluded, that the whole of 
Oregon is ours, and that nothing can be done which admits the existence of 
a doubt as to our right to the Avhole, or the possibility of a right existing 
in another; and yet we are to negotiate! Pray, what is negotiation? Does 
the Administration expect that, by negotiation, it can persuade the British 
Government to surrender the whole territory to us? Is that its expecta- 
tion? It may do that. I cannot say it will not. If that is the expectation 
of our Government, why then, of course, it will try its hand at it. I wish 
it success! That is to say, I wish the country could be rid of the dispute. 
Take the whole of Oregon, if you can get it; but, at all events, settle the 
question between the two countries fairly and reasonably. But I say I 
do not understand the position in which the Executive government has 
placed itself; in favor of negotiation all the time; but all the time refus- 
ing to take anything less than the whole! What consideration — what com- 
promise — what basis — what grounds, therefore, for negotiation? If the 
Government of the United States has made up its mind — I speak of the 
Executive government — that, so far as it is concerned, it will not treat for 
anything less than the Avhole of Oregon, then it should say so, and throw 
itself on the two houses of Congress and on the country. It should say so. 

He promised to support the administration in maintaining 
the rights of the United States, but insisted upon knowing 
whether the President intended to negotiate or to make war. In 
his own opinion, the latter course would be very unwise — the 
question should be adjusted by a compromise.'^" 



72 ' ' The speech of Mr. Webster, Mr. Calhoun, and others in the Senate 
advocating peace and the Brittish title to a large portion of the country," 
wrote the President some weeks later, "have made the Brittish Govern- 
ment & people more arrogant in their tone and more grasping in their 
demands. If war should be the result, these peace gentlemen & advocates 
of Brittish pretensions over those of their own country will have done 
more to produce it than any others" (Polk, Diary, I, 345). Webster had 
denounced the war spirit as early as November 7, 1845, in a speech in 
Faneuil Hall: "The man Avho shall incautiously, or led on by false am- 
bition or party pride, kindle those fires of war over the globe on this' 
[Oregon] question, must look out for it — must expect himself to be con- 
sumed in a burning conflagration of general reproach" (Curtis, Life of 
Webster, II, 258). 



596 JAMES K. POLK 

Polk told Benton that he had endeavored to write his message 
"in plain English, & thought no part of it could be misunder- 
stood."" Nevertheless, members of Congress seemed to find it 
ambiguous, and Webster's remarks caused another attempt to 
fathom its meaning. Colquitt was certain tliat the President did 
not mean to insist absolutely on procuring the whole of Oregon. 
Allen was equally certain that Polk would accept nothing less, 
since Great Britain had rejected the offer he had made. When 
asked by Reverdy Johnson, however, whether his assertions had 
been authorized by the President, Allen had to admit that he 
possessed no information except that contained in the official 
message. When making his declaration, Allen knowingly mis- 
represented the President. In fact Allen himself had, on Decem- 
ber 24, 1845, advised Polk, in case England should offer to com- 
promise on the forty-ninth parallel, to submit the offer confiden- 
tially to the Senate before acting upon it. Polk "agreed in the 
propriety of the course he advised, ' ' but did not authorize Allen 
to speak for him.'* Haywood, a Democrat from North Carolina, 
although willing to accept 49°, wished to intrust the w^hole ques- 
tion to Polk, for he would not 

do the President so much Avrong as to suppose that, if we passed the notice, 
and thus put into his hand a great moral weapon, that he could be guilty 
of so miserable a trick as to use it to the dishonor of his country on the 
one hand, or the reckless provocation of war on the other."3 

Reverdy Johnson thought that the President was bound to accept 
the forty-ninth parallel, if offered by England. " 'Who is James 
K. Polk?' was a question once asked. We all know now who he 
is, though there are some who do not know what he is." He is 
President of the United States, said Johnson, and if he had felt 
bound by the offers made by his predecessors, certainly he could 
not reject an offer once made by himself. Atchison, of Missouri, 



73 Polk, Diary, I, 117. 
-* Ibid., 139. 

'•"' Like Allen, Haywood had not been authorized to speak for the 
President (ihid., 262)." 



OBEGON 597 

was unable to see how his colleagues could discern compromise 
in the President 's declarations. Polk had accepted the Baltimore 
platform, and both his inauguaral and liis message had claimed 
all of the territory : ' ' The very moment he gave up any por- 
tion of Oregon, every honest man would condemn it."'^ 

The debate in the Senate on the question of giving notice to 
England continued until the middle of April. Many of the Whigs 
and a few of the Democrats opposed the joint resolution,"' but 
Democrats, generally, rallied to its support. The advocates of 
the resolution still differed in opinion as to the result of abro- 
gating the convention ; some argued that such action would lead 



■i"" W. C. Rives, of Virginia, believed that Polk and his supporters in 
Congress were simply playing polities: "Surely, such a spectacle was 
never exhibite<l before in any country as is now presented in ours. Every 
conciliatory advance of the British government unceremoniously repelled — 
the most extreme claims urged on our side — a tone of menace & disdain 
freely indulged by the chosen champions of the administration in both 
Houses — everything done which could apparently ])rovoke a war — and yet 
I learn a settled purpose to accept any compromise that can be obtained! 
The minds of the whole nation kept in constant & painful anxiety & all 
its business operations deranged, to enable a knot of small politicians to 
play brag for the retention of public office, & to acquire credit, with a 
people whom they hope thus to delude, for superior patriotism, spirit & 
valour! It is impossible to speak with patience, of such low & despicable 
manoevering, even if it can be carried on without committing the peace 
of the country. But the game is a most hazardous one, & Mr. Polk may 
yet find he has not the skill to play it out" (Rives to McLean, Feb. 18, 
1846, McLean Papers). Tooms, of Georgia, likewise charged the President 
with insincerity: "I do not think a war in the least probable. Mr. Polk 
never dreamed of any other war than a war upon the Whigs. He is 
playing a low grog-shop politician 's trick, nothing more. He would be 
as much surprised aiid astonished and frightened at getting into war with 
England as if the Devil were to rise up before him at his bidding. . . . 
His party were already committed to him to 54° 40', they would stand by 
him, and he expected finally to be forced by the British Whigs and 
Southern Calhoun men to compromise; but he greatly hoped that he would 
not be forced even to this alternative until he had 'all Oregon' on evejy 
Democratic banner in the Union for his 'second heat.' T have not the 
least doubt but that he fully calculated that the 'notice' would be rejected 
by a combination between the Whigs and Calhoun men of this Congress, 
and then he could have kept it open for a new presidential campaign" 
(Tooms to G. W. Crawford, Feb. 6, 1846, in Eep. Am. Hist. Assn., 19] 1, II, 
73-74). 

T7 ' ' Most of the Whigs in the Senate incline to remain rather quiet, 
and to follow the lead of Mr. Calhoun. He is at the head of a party of 
six or seven, and as he professes still to be an administration man, it is 
best to leave the work in his hands, at least for the present" (Webster 
to Sears, Jan. 17, 1846, in Webster, Private Corr., II, 215). 



598 JAMES K. POLE 

to compromise and settlement, others, that the sequel would be 
occupation of the entire territory. No agreement could be reached 
as to what the President would do if the resolution should pass, 
and nothing came from the ' ' Executive Mansion ' ' to aid in solv- 
ing the mystery. ' ' Was there ever such a case known, ' ' exclaimed 
Mangum, of North Carolina, "as an Executive without an organ 
of his views and opinions in either House of Congress?" — the 
Union had definitely stated that no one could speak for him ; 
"that no man, beyond his Cabinet, knew his views." It had not 
been so in Jackson's time, said Mangum, and it would not be so 
now if Clay, Benton, or Calhoun were at the head of the govern- 
ment. "The present Administration," he continued, was "re- 
markable chiefly for one thing in the management of this ques- 
tion, and that was, its secretiveness. ""'^ In answer to Mangum, 
Cass so far lifted the veil as to disclose that both Polk and 
Buchanan had given their approval, in advance, to his [Cass's] 
resolutions which called upon the army and navy departments for 
information regarding the defensive strength of the country. 
As to Polk's intentions for. the future, however, Cass had nothing 
to impart. In the opinion of the President himself the debate 
had 

taken a strange direction; that instead of examining and discussing my 
views as communicated in these documents [message and correspondence], 
Senators had been guessing and conjecturing what I might do hereafter, 
and were approving or condemning what they supposed I might or 
miglit not do. "9 



T8 A few days before, March 30, Barrow, of Louisiana, said: "Tliere 
never before had been a period when some one in the Senate was not 
authorized to speak for the Executive, acquainted with his views, and 
ready to put those right who misconstrued his language or his views." 

79 Polk, Diary. I, 285-286. In a letter written a little later Crittenden 
said: "Bitter <lissensions are already manifested among our ojiponents; 
they are about equally divided in the Senate. They cjuarrel about what 
the President's sentiments and purposes are in relation to Oregon, — each 
interprets the 'oracle' to suit himself, and each pretends to speak for him, 
while all are suspicious and jealous of him and of each other. They know- 
that one side or the other is cheated and to be cheated, but they can 't yet 
exactly tell which. In the mean time they curse Polk hypothetically. If 
he don 't settle and make peace at forty-nine or some other parallel of 
compromise, the one side curses him; and if he yields an in(di or stops a 



OREGON 599 

After the Senate had discussed its own resolution for more 
than two months, Allen who had originally reported it from his 
committee moved, on April 16, that it be sent to the table and 
that the Senate proceed to consider the resolution which had been 
passed by the House on the ninth of February. The motion was 
carried, and Reverdy Johnson at once offered an amendment to 
the House resolution. It w^as almost an exact replica of the Crit- 
•tenden proposal which, along with other amendments to the Allen 
resolution, had just been laid on the table. After some discus- 
sion, and attempts to alter it, the Johnson amendment was passed 
by a vote of 30 to 24. The resolution as passed by the House 
had directed the President to notify England that the conven- 
tion would be abrogated ; as amended by the Senate, Polk was 
"authorized, at his discretion" to give such notice. After the 
amendment had been passed, but before the whole resolution, as 
amended, had reached a vote, Allen bitterly assailed the modifica- 
tion made by the Senate and announced his intention to vote 
against the measure. The preamble, he said, advised negotiation, 
while the main clause left the question of notice to the discretion 
of the President: "they throw the whole subject back to the 
President, to be managed in future according to his discretion, 
after having condemned him for a want of discretion in his past 
management." The measure was passed by a vote of 40 to 14. 
The effect of attaching this amendment to the House resolution 
may not, as Allen asserted, have been to array each house against 
the other, and both against the President ; but the affirmative 
vote on the preamble must have made it clear to Polk that the 
Senate would ratify a compromise treaty and that, in all prob- 
ability, it would not cooperate with him in an aggressive Oregon 
policy. Undoubtedly this action of the Senate had some influence 
in modifying his diplomatic program. 



hair's breadth short of fifty-four degrees forty minutes, the other side 
danms him without redemption. Was ever a gentleman in such a fix? 
He might almost say like Satan, that ' hell was around him ' ' ' (Crittenden 
to Letcher, March 9, 1846, in Coleman, Life of John J. Crittenden, 235). 



600 JAMES E. POLK 

On April 18 the House proceeded to consider the joint resolu- 
tion as amended by the Senate. After adopting an amendment 
offered by Owen, of Indiana, by which the President was "author- 
ized and requested" to serve notice upon Great Britain, the 
measure was passed by a vote of 144 to 40. Two days later the 
House received notice that the Senate had rejected the Owen 
amendment and had adhered to its own. A conference was then 
arranged. Slight modifications were made in the Senate pre-- 
amble, but the main part of the resolution was left unchanged. 
In the final form the President was "authorized, at his discre- 
tion" to give the notice, and, by a vote of 142 to 46, the resolu- 
tion was passed by the House on the twenty-third of April. ^*^ 
The President regretted that action had been so long delayed 
and that the preamble had been prefixed by the Senate ; but 
' ' after all, ' ' he added philosophically, ' ' Congress by authorizing 
the notice, have sustained the first great measure of my adminis- 
tration, though not in a form that is altogether satisfactory or 
one that was preferred."'*^ He decided at once to transmit the 
notice directly to the British government instead of giving it to 
Pakenham. 



80 The Van Buren Democrats supported the administration by their 
votes, although some of them did so reluctantly. Undoubtedly C. C. 
Oambreleng voiced the sentiments of many of them when he wrote: 
"Heaven forgive me for having had any .hand in laying the foundation of 
this blundering administration. Tyler was bad enough but he had this 
advantage — there was no mock-mystery nor genuine duplicity in his eon- 
duet — if he betrayed his friends he was an honest knave, without any 
hypocritical cant about the sabbath &c &c. But apart from that T am 
utterly astonished at the little judgment and less integrity which has dis- 
tinguished the course of this administration. First as it regards England — 
when some three or four months ago she was making war-like prepar- 
ations — McLane was instructed to inquire of Aberdeen whether these 
preparations were intended for us — and now it appears that before that 
enquiry was made, Bancroft was 'confidentially' recommending ten war 
steamers — the Bureaus forty w^ar steamers and Marcy fifty thousand vol- 
unteers with the knowledge and approbation of the President! . . . IIow 
uncandid and dishonorable must the conduct of the President and his 
prime minister appear in the eyes of all honest men" (Cambreleng to 
Van Buren, May 16, 1846, Vati Buren Papers). 

81 Polk, Diary, I, 348. 



OEEGON GOl 

While the resolution for giving notice to England was under 
discussion attempts were made by both friends and opponents 
of the measure to induce the President to alter or to supplement 
the views expressed in his annual message. Opponents of the 
resolution wished him to commit himself to compromise ; its 
friends, on the contrary, desired additional pledges that he would 
insist upon the whole of Oregon. 

The first to approach him was James A. Black, a South Caro- 
lina member of the House and a personal friend of Calhoun. 
Calhoun was much opposed to the resolution, and his friends had 
endeavored to effect a compromise with certain western Senators 
who were its chief advocates. Black visited Polk on January 4, 
1846, and told him that he had just held a conversation with 
Senators Semple, of Illinois, and Atchison, of Missouri. He 
thought they would agree not to press the notice resolution if the 
South would unite with the West in supporting the other meas- 
ures recommended in Polk 's message, including that for granting 
lands to Oregon settlers. He therefore asked the President to 
induce his western friends to postpone action on the resolution. 
Polk declined to follow Black's suggestion, for, as he said, his 
mind had not changed since he had recommended that notice 
should be given. ' ' I remarked to him, ' ' he noted in his diary, 

that the only way to treat John Bull was to look him straight in the eye; 
that I considered a bold & firm course on our part the pacific one; that 
if Congress faultered or hesitated in their course, John Bull would imme- 
diately become arrogant and more grasping in his demands.S2 

The advocates of notice and 54° 40' were quite as unsuccessful 
in their efforts to commit the President to a definite future policy. 
As representatives of a caucus of Senate Democrats, Hannegan 
and Atchison interviewed Polk on the seventh of March and put 
the direct question whether he would insist upon 54° 40', or, if 
necessary, compromise on 49°. "I answered him [Hannegan]," 
Polk recorded, 

82 Ibid., 1.54-155. 



602 JAMES K. POLK 

that I would answer no man what I would do in the future; that for what 
I might do I would be responsible to God and my country and if I should 
hereafter do anything which should be disapproved by himself or others, 

it would be time enough to condemn me I said, 1 am charged 

with the Foreign relations of the country, and it was unheard of that 
the President should declare in advance to any one out of his Cabinet 
his intentions in reference to thenLs^s 

Although the President declined, at all times, to commit him- 
self as to his future course, he was careful, on the other hand, to 
leave the way open for possible concessions. On several occasions 
he informed both extremists and compromisers that if England 
should offer the forty-ninth parallel as a boundary he might, 
before acting, submit the question to the Senate. He was careful, 
also, to let both factions know that no member of Congress had 
been authorized to speak for him, and that the policy outlined 
in his annual message would remain unchanged unless modified 
by a future official communication.^* 

The want of harmony among Democrats in the Senate was 
highly displeasing to the President, and the more so because he 
attributed it to personal ambition rather than to honest difference 
of opinion. "The truth is," he wrote, on April 22, 1846, 

that in all this Oregon discussion in the Senate, too many Democratic 
Senators have been more concerned about the Presidential election in '48 
than they have been about settling Oregon either at 49° or 54° 40'. 
"Forty-eight" has been with them the Great question, and hence the 
division in the Democratic party. I cannot but observe the fact, and for 
the sake of the country I deplore it. I will however do my duty what- 
ever may happen. I will rise above the interested factions in Congress, 
and appeal confidently to the people for support.ss 



8* Ihid., 262-263 and passim. 

»3lbid., 273. 

»*r>Polk, Diary, I, 345. On March 9 he had observed: "This whole 
excitement in the Senate has grown out of the as])irations of Senators and 
their friends for the Presidency. Mr. Allen has such aspirations himself. 
Mr. Haywood probably prefers Gov. Wright of N. York. Gen '1 Cass has 
aspirations but is more prudent than some others. Mr. Calhoun has aspi- 
rations. My fear is that these factions looking to the election of my 
successor in" 1848, will so divide and weaken the Democratic party by their 
feuds as to defeat my measures and render my administration unsuccessful 
and useless. Each "one of the factions doubtless desire [s] to use the 



OREGON 603 

Although the joint resolution in its final form was not, as we 
have seen, entirely satisfactory to the President, he accepted it 
as preferable to no action at all.®*' He had tw^o reasons for desir- 
ing some action on the part of Congress, even though details 
might be unsatisfactory'. He suspected that a majority in the 
Senate would gladly see notice in any form defeated and would 
therefore effect their purpose if the House would decline to yield. 
He believed, also, that Great Britain would not make another 
offer until Congress had taken final action, and evidently he was 
confident that the serving of notice would induce such an offer. 
Consequently when the fate of the joint resolution was hanging 
in the balance, he and members of the cabinet sought interviews 
with their friends in the House, and apparently it was due to 
their influence that that body consented to accept the Senate 
amendment.®^ 

While the question was still undecided, no one perused the 
published correspondence with more care nor followed the debates 
with more interest than the veteran diplomat, Albert Gallatin. 
Having negotiated the conventions of "joint occupation," he 
naturally took an interest in their abrogation, and he now pre- 
pared a series of articles in which he considered both the validity 
of the respective titles and the expediency of abrogating the con- 
ventions. He was not in favor of giving immediate notice to 
Great Britain, for, "in the present state of excitement, an imme- 
diate amicable arrangement is almost hopeless." In his opinion. 



administration for their own advancement, and out of this circumstance has 
grown the excitement & unfortunate collision in the Senate. They will 
all be disappointed. I am not a candidate for re-election myself and will 
lend myself to none of them. I will not be identified with any of them. 
I will do my duty to the country & if my measures fail the responsibility 
shall rest where it belongs." He also attributed Buchanan's recent war- 
like attitude to a desire to supplant Cass in the good graces of the ex- 
tremists {ihid., 280, 297). 

ss While the Senate amendment was before the House, he told Cullom, 
of Tennessee, that: "I would have preferred a naked notice; that next 
to that I preferred the House Eesolutions; but it being now ascertained 
by repeated votes in the Senate that neither could be had, I decidedly 
preferred the Senate form of notice to no notice at all" {Diary, I, 341). 

87 Polk, Biary, I, 334-337. 



604 JAMES K. POLK 

the first and indispensable step towards an amicable arrangement consists 
in the investigation, not so much of the superiority of one claim over the 
other, as of the question whether there be sufficient grounds to sustain the 
exclusive pretensions of either Governmnet. 

This was substantially the policy advocated by Lord Aberdeen. 

Unlike J. Q. Adams, Gallatin did not believe that either nation 
possessed an exclusive title to the Oregon territory; therefore, 
both might recede from their extreme pretensions "without im- 
pairing national honor and dignity. ' ' Clear title for the "United 
States must, in his opinion, be based on the claims derived from 
Spain, and he did not regard the Spanish title as unquestionably 
complete. He did not, however, accept Pakenham's contention 
that the claim which the United States based on the Spanish title 
and that based on settlements made by American citizens were 
mutually exclusive. Believing that the President, in view of the 
policy outlined in his message, would be bound to assert title to 
the whole of Oregon, should the convention be abrogated, he was 
in favor of withholding the notice and of dividing the territory 
by negotiation.-^ 

On April 13, when it seemed probable that the resolution for 
giving notice to England would pass, the House, in Committee 
of the Whole, gave its attention to the bill, which Douglas had 
reported in December, for extending judicial and military pro- 
tection to American citizens in Oregon. Among other things this 
measure proposed to extend to Oregon the jurisdiction of the 
Iowa supreme court, to build forts, to make grants of land to 
settlers, and to establish a mail route between Saint Joseph, 
Missouri, and the mouth of the Columbia River. The debate was 
not prolonged, and the alignment of advocates and opponents 
was much the same as it had been when the resolution concerning 
notice was under discussion. Tliere was difference of opinion 
among those who favored the bill as to whether jurisdiction 
should be extended to the whole territory or to the southern 



88 Gallatin, The Oregon Question, 1-33, j^assim. 



OEEGON 605 

part only. Adams once more championed the American title 
to the whole of Oregon and, in defense of his consistency, called 
attention to the fact that he, in the Florida^ treaty, had procured 
the Spanish claims to that region. When asked if the relinquish- 
ment of Texas by the United States had not been "a considera- 
tion" in procuring these Spanish claims, he replied emphatically 
that "it was no consideration at all" — that the two territories 
had in no way been associated in the Florida negotiations. 
Douglas, the chief spokesman for the bill, advocated extending 
jurisdiction without designating boundary limits as the better 
way of procuring the desired effect with the least annoyance to 
Great Britain. He desired to have it understood, however, that 
he was not in favor of yielding an inch of territory south of 
54° 40', for any administration, present or future, which would 
consent to relinquish any portion of Oregon would be guilty of 
"perfidy." As already noted, such comments from Douglas 
and other ardent supporters of the administration seem to indi- 
cate that Polk's most intimate friends did not believe that he 
would consent to a compromise. Surely they could not have 
intended to brand him in advance as a man about to commit an 
act of ' ' perfidy ' ' and ' ' treachery. ' ' 

After certain amendments had been added, one of which ex- 
tended the jurisdiction of the Iowa courts to "all that portion 
of the territory of the United States which lies west of the Rocky 
Mountains," without defining limits, the House, on April 18, 
passed the bill and sent it to the Senate for its concurrence. 

The Senate Committee on Territories disapproved the House 
bill. On May 21 its chairman reported that, since a majority 
deemed immediate legislation on the subject to be inexpedient 
the committee desired to be discharged from further consideration 
of the bill. 

During the debate which followed the presentation of this 
report Benton expressed his real views on the American title to 
Oregon, a subject which he had avoided when discussing the 



()0() .lAMKS K. rOLK 

]•( solution I'of ^■iviii'^- notice to (Ji-cat Ui'itaiii. Orc^'oii, lie said, 
included three main divisions: the islands, Frazer's River valley, 
and the Cohnubia River valley. To the last only did the United 
States possess a clear title. He therefore moved to reconnnit the 
House bill to the eoininittee and thai it should be insti'ucted to 
ofTer the following atneiuhnents : (1) to extend the laws of the 
United States ovei- tlie territory to the same extent tliat Enji^land 
had extended hers; {"!) the ])ill to Ix'come etfective at the tei'inina- 
lion of the convention; (8) certain provisions for the administra- 
tion of justice and for fortifications; (4) the boundaries to be 
settled by treaty, but until this had been done the line of 49° 
sliould !)(' re<>'arded as the noi'thei-n limit of Amei'ican teri'itory. 
Cass assailed Benton's arguments and his })roposed instructions, 
and, on ( h-ittenden's suggestion, the latter were withdrawn. 
Within two weeks furtlier action by Congress was made unneces- 
sai'v by the conclusion of the Oi"ego!i treaty which divided tlu^ 
territory between the two nations. 

As the President liad anticipated, the passage of the joint 
i-esolution for aVu'ogating the convention of 1827 was soon fol- 
lowed by a new overture tVom the I>i'itish government. A dis- 
patch from McLane ai-rived on June 3, J 84(5, and gave the sub- 
stance of a ])i'0])osition which Lord Aberdeen had said would 
soon be made to the Hnited States by Pakeriham. The proposi- 
tion, as outlined by McLane, was so unsatisfactory that Polk 
was "certain" that it nnist be rejected.^" Howevei-, when the 
subject was bi'ought before the cabinet on the following ihxy, all 
meiid)ers present wei'c inclined to think that the i)roject ought 
to be submitted to the Senate for advice. The most objectionable 
featui-e of the British proposal was a stii)ulation wliich guar- 
anteed f !•(■(■ navigation of the Columbia River to tlie Hudson's 
Bay (^ompan\-. liuchanan suggested that this pi-ivilege might 



80 "If I reject it absolutely ami maUc iki other piopositioii tlic jMobable 
7-esiilt will be war. If J submit it to tlie Senate and tliev sliouiil advise 
its a('cei)taiu'e 1 should be bound bv tli(>ir advice vet 1 should do so re- 
luctantly" {Diary, I, 444-445). 



OREGON 607 

be limited to the duration of the company's existing charter, 
which would expire in 1859.^° 

When the cabinet met again, on June 6, Buchanan laid before 
it the formal proposition of the British government, which had 
arrived in the meantime and been delivered to him by Pakenham. 
It proposed to divide Oregon by the forty-ninth parallel from 
the Rocky Mountains to the Straits of Fuca, thence through the 
main channel to the sea. Two reservations were stipulated: 
first, the Hudson's Bay Company and actual British occupants 
were to retain title to their lands lying south of 49°, but subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States ; second, free use of the 
Columbia was retained for the Hudson's Bay Company and for 
British subjects when trading with that company. The question 
was raised as to Avhether, according to the proposal submitted, 
the privilege of navigation to be accorded to the Hudson's Bay 
Company would cease at the expiration of its existing charter in 
1859. Without waiting to decide this question, the President 
asked the cabinet whether he should submit the offer, as received, 
to the Senate with a request for its advice. Walker, Marcy, Ban- 
croft, and Johnson advised him to submit the offer to the Senate. 
Buchanan, who had recently assumed a belligerent attitude, said 
that his opinion would depend upon the character of the message 
which would accompany the document. "He said the 54° 40' 
men were the true friends of the administration and he wished 
no backing out on the subject." Although nettled by this 
poniard-thrust about "backing out" the President suppressed his 
feelings and even prevented Walker from openly resenting the 
insinuation. He told the cabinet that in case he should decide 
to submit the British offer to the Senate, he would reiterate the 
views already expressed in his annual message. Should the 
Senate advise its acceptance, with or without modifications, he 
would follow the advice; "but if they declined to express an 
opinion, or by the constitutional majority to give their advice, I 

90 Polk, Diary. I, 447-448. 



608 JAMES K. POLK 

should reject the proposition." After hearing this, Buchanan 
advised that the proposal be submitted to the Senate, but he 
declined to prepare a message embodying the President's views.^^ 
The ill feeling caused by Buchanan's attitude continued for 
several days. Other members of the cabinet freely criticized his 
conduct and recalled that he had repeatedly advocated the 
renewal of the compromise offer. After a conversation on the 
subject with Marcy and Bancroft, the President wrote : 

My impression is that Mr. Buchanan intends now to shun all responsi- 
bility for the submission of the Brittish proposition to the Senate, but 
still he may wish it to be done without his agency, so that if the 54° 40' 
men complain, he may be able to say that my message submitting it did 
not receive his sanction. I shall be disappointed if any message which 
can be drawn will receive his assent. He will choose to dissent and if 
it is condemned he will escape all responsibility. In his despatches to 
Mr. McLane I have more than once, & in the presence of the Cabinet, 
caused paragraphs to be struck out yielding as I thought too much to 
Great Brittain, and now it is most strange that he should take suddenly, 
and without the assignment of any reason, the opposite extreme, and talk 
as he did yesterday of "backing out from 54° 40'." His course is one 
which I cannot approve. Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bancroft both condemned 
it in decided terms.o-' 

Buchanan called on the following day and expressed doubts 
concerning the wisdom of submitting to the Senate the correspond- 
ence which passed between McLane and himself on the Oregon 
question. Although he surmised that these doubts had been 
prompted by the Secretary's fear that his inconsistency might 
be exposed, Polk permitted him "to select what portions of the 
correspondence, if any, should be sent." His indulgence was 
rewarded by renewed insolence, for Buchanan not only refused 
once more to draft a message for the President, but he had the 



91 /buZ., 451-454. Polk attributed Buchanan's change of front to a 
desire to curry favor with the extremists. "It was not until within a 
short time since that he gave indications of a change of position. The 
first indication I had of it was a remark which fell from him incidentally 
when speaking of the subject, to the purport that Gen '1 Cass had made 
character by his course in the Senate on the subject. Gen '1 C. was a 
54° 40' man' ' ' 

92 Ibid., 456. 



OREGON 609 

audacity to remark that "when you have done your message I 
will then prepare such a one as I think ought to be sent in. ' ' At 
last thoroughly aroused by the insolence of his Secretary, the 
President indignantly asked : 

For what purpose will you prepare a message? You have twice refused, 
though it is a subject relating to your Department, to give me any aid in 
preparing my message; do you wish, after I have done, to draw up a paper 
of your own in order to make an issue with me? 

Buchanan at once resumed his normal state of timidity and 
explained that his remark had been entirely misunderstood. 
Nevertheless, when Polk submitted his message to the cabinet 
for discussion, the Secretary of State raised so many objections 
that some of the passages were eliminated.^^ 

On June 10 the President transmitted the British proposal 
to the Senate and, in an accompanying message, requested advice 
as to whether it should be accepted. He made it clear that his 
own opinions, as expressed in his annual message, remained un- 
changed, and that he would reject the offer unless the Senate by 
a "constitutional majority" should recommend its acceptance. 
After two days of deliberation the Senate, by a vote of 38 to 12, 
advised him to accept the proposal, and on the fifteenth Buchanan 
and Pakenham signed the treaty which terminated the long- 
debated Oregon question.''* As shown by the vote, not many of 
the extremists were ready to risk a war by rejecting the British 
overture. Most uncompromising of all was Allen, chairman of 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs. On the day that the treaty 
was signed, after a free expression of his feelings, he resigned 
from the committee. 



^^Ihid,, 459-462. 

9^ Kichardson, Messages, IV, 449-450. Polk, Diary, I, 467, 470. The 
treaty may be found in Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, 1, 656. It fixed 
the boundary at 49°, from the Eocky Mountains to the Straits of Fuca, 
leaving all of Vancouver's Island to England; the Hudson's Bay Company 
retained the use of the Columbia Eiver on the same footing as citizens of 
the United States; that company and British occupants retained title to 
land already possessed south of 49°. 



610 JAMES E. POLK 

The adjustment of the Oregon question by an extension of the 
existing boundary between the United States and Canada was 
eminently fair to both nations. Indeed it was the only sensible 
solution of the long-standing dispute. The more one examines the 
respective claims the more apparent it becomes that neither party 
possessed a "clear and unquestionable" title to the entire terri- 
tory. Was, therefore, President Polk justified in asserting claim 
to "all of Oregon," and if so, must be he condemned for accept- 
ing less? Neither query can be answered by an unqualified yes 
or no. Whether wise or unwise, whether designed or controlled 
by circumstances, Polk's Oregon policy Avas not so inconsistent 
as his opponents represented it to be. He offered to divide the 
territory, and when this offer was declined he steadfastly refused 
to make another offer of any kind. While he continued to assert 
that the American title to the whole territory was "clear and 
unquestionable," at no time did he say that he would decline a- 
compromise, if offered by England. On the contrary, he told 
both supporters and opponents in Congress that if England 
should offer 49°, or anything approaching it, he would seek the 
advice of the Senate before rejecting the proposal. As Webster 
said in the Senate, Polk did not at any time act like a man who 
expected war, and the President told Black that he "considered 
a bold & firm course on our part the pacific one." He stated 
repeatedly that he did not look for an offer from England until 
Congress had passed the resolution terminating joint occupation, 
and, although he did not specifically say so, he inferred that its 
passage would undoubtedly be followed by an overture from that 
government. This opinion was well founded — the "bold and 
firm course" of abrogating the convention proved, indeed, to be 
the pacific one, for Great Britain very soon afterward made the 
offer to compromise."" Without loss of time, Polk did Avhat he 



95 Commenting on the success of Polk's policy, Eichard Eush wrote: 
"For one, 1 am unshaken in the belief, that It was the President's open- 
ing message to the first congress he met on the second of December last, 
that produced the settlement of the Oregon difficulty. It was like a great 



OREGON 611 

had long promised to do; he submitted the proposal to the Senate, 
but with a warning that unless that body should advise its accept- 
ance he would reject the offer and adhere to the party platform. 
It would have been unfair to expect the President to stand alone 
in demanding the full measure asked by that platform after the 
debates in Congress and the press had made it plain that neither 
Congress nor the people would approve his rejection of a reason- 
able offer. It was not cowardly to ascertain the wishes of the 
Senate on so important a question, and it would have been crim- 
inal to provoke a war for the sake of maintaining a campaign 
cry, when it was evident that neither Congress nor the people 
desired it to be maintained. 



bomb-shell thrown into the British cabinet. It took them by surprise, 
and first roused them to the unavoidable necessity of a settlement. I 
thought when it appeared, that it would lead to war — so bold was it, 
though every word was just; whereas it led to peace" (Rush to Trist, 
Sept. 21, 1846, Trisl Papers). 



CHAPTER XXII 

SLAVERY AND TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENTS 

Although a lawyer by profession, Polk owned slaves and 
employed them in cultivating his plantation in Mississippi. As 
a southern man he despised abolitionists, yet at no time during 
his career does he seem to have taken a deep interest in the slavery 
question — especially in the extension of the slaveholding area. 
Like Jackson, he desired to extend the boundaries of the United 
States and to increase its power and prestige, but neither man 
was interested in promoting the spread of slavery. In support- 
ing the annexation of Texas and in planning the acquisition of 
other Mexican territory Polk acted as an expansionist, and not 
as a slaveholder. 

As early as 1826, while a proposed amendment to the Consti- 
tiition was being debated, remarks made in the House by mem- 
bers from New England led Polk to express his views on the 
slavery question : 

I have regretted exceedingly, sir, that scarcely any subject of general 
concern can be agitated here, without having this unfortunate subject 
of slavery, either collaterally, or incidentally, brought into vievv^, and 

made to mingle in our deliberations When this country became 

free and independent, this species of population was found amongst us; 
It had been entailed upon us by our ancestors, and was viewed as a com- 
mon evil; not confined to the locality where it was, but affecting the 
whole nation. Some of the States which then possessed it have since 
gotten clear of it: they were a species of property that differed from all 
other: they were rational; they were human beings.i 

Fully admitting that the institution was an evil, he did not believe 
that this fact should affect the solution of great national questions. 



1 Ahridg. of Dch., IX, 16-17. 



SLAVEBY AND TEBEITOEIAL GOVEENMENTS 613 

As Speaker of the House, Polk was called upon to decide many 
points in which the slavery question Avas involved. His task was 
simplified by the operation of the so-called gag rule under which 
nearly all petitions and memorials relating to the subject were 
referred automatically to the "committee of oblivion." As a 
party man, he rigorously enforced this rule, but in cases which 
did not clearly fall within its scope he did not seem disposed to 
support the extreme southern view. For example, when an 
attempt was made, on February 6, 1837, to prevent John Quincy 
Adams from presenting abolition petitions submitted by other 
states than Massachusetts, Speaker Polk decided that "every 
member had a right to present a petition, come from what quarter 
it might. "- This decision ran counter to the well-known southern 
claim that while, under the Constitution, all citizens possessed 
the right to petition for a redress of their own grievances, they 
had no right to concern themselves about the grievances of others. 

The Speaker 's decision in favor of Adams was not induced by 
admiration for the ex-President or by approval of his conduct. 
In a manuscript to be found among his papers^ Polk complained 
that Adams, by his petitions, "has consumed so much of the 
present session of Congress, to the delay of the public business, 
to the annoyance of the whole House, and the degredation of his 
own character." After asserting that it was necessary to have 
a general rule, since the House could not take time to consider 
each petition, he continued: 

Mv. Adams was unwilling to submit to the decision of the majority. 
On every petition day, he made constant attempts to wreck that decision, 
to violate the rules, and defy the authority of the House. Upon the 
plainest propositions he would take appeals from the Speaker's decisions, 
and consume time in' debating the appeal 

Mr. Adams knew .... that it was the duty of the Speaker to observe 
and execute the rules and orders adopted by the House for its govern- 
ment 



2 Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 164. 

3 "Notes on Mr. Adams' letter to the Quincy Patriot," undated, Poll: 
Papers. 



614 JAMES E. POLK 

The Speaker carries out and enforces the decisions of the majority & 
therefore he represents in his letter that the "Speaker and the majority 
of the House" have, undertaken to exercise "arbitrary authority." If 
Mr. Adams is unwilling to submit to the decisions of the majority of the 
House, he is unfit to be a member of that body. He seems to have an 
utter aversion to decisions made by majorities. This principle lies at 
the foundation of all our institutions. Majorities must govern, and it 
cannot be helped if a few such refractory spirits as Mr. Adams are 
unwilling to submit to that Government. 

The manuscript is of considerable value, for, as Polk was the 
presiding officer, his opinions on this important subject cannot 
be found in official records. 

On one occasion during his term as governor of Tennessee, 
Polk was called upon to repel outside interference with the 
"peculiar institution." In the summer of 1840 a "World's Con- 
vention" met in London to consider ways and means of abolishing 
slavery and the slave trade. Letters were addressed to officials 
in the United States, and, among others, to Governor Polk. In 
his last message to the legislature, October 7, 1841, the governor 
stated that he had received two such letters. 

Viewing these communications [said he], as an impertinent and mis- 
chievous attempt on the part of foreigners to interfere with one of the 
domestic institutions of this State, and having received the countenance 
of a member of the Congress of the United States, under whose official 
frank one of the packages containing them came to me, I declined enter- 
ing into a correspondence with a foreign convention, but addressed to the 
member of Congress alluded to the letter, a copy of which is herewith 
transmitted to you, accompanied by the communication.* 

His answer asserted the right of a state to control its own affairs, 
but it was a vindication of state rights rather than a defense of 
slavery. In the words of a local editor, he 

came boldly and manfully out before the country with a letter containing 
the sound doctrine of the Constitution of our Union, and rebuked the 
foreign interference with our State affairs in a spirit as becoming to the 
patriot and the man as it was honorable to the State over which he 
presided as Chief Magistrate^ 



4 Tenn. Sen. Jour., 1841-42, 22-42. 

5 Nashville Union, April 15, 1841. 



SLAVEBY AND TEBEITORIAL GOVERNMENTS 615 

Agitation in favor of annexing Texas to the United States 
began as soon as that province had declared its independence in 
1836. Although its principal supporters were southern men there 
is little evidence that they were moved by a desire to extend the 
institution of slavery.'' When, however, Tyler turned his atten- 
tion to the annexation of Texas, the question took on a more dis- 
tinctly southern aspect ; and Calhoun, in his correspondence as 
Secretary of State, brought slavery into prominence by distinctly 
asserting that the United States desired to annex Texas in order 
to protect that institution. When commenting on this correspond- 
ence, early in 1845, the Democratic Review declared that Calhoun, 
the apostle of state rights, had, in fact, nationalized the slaveiy 
question : 

What has become of this position [that the uational governnieut cau not 
interfere Avith slavery in the District of Columbia] after a Southern Presi- 
dent and a Southern Secretary of State — and that Secretary, John C. Cal- 
houn, of all men living! — have so nationalized, so federalized, the question, 
as we have lately seen done? When that has been not only acted upon, but 
avowed, argued, vehemently urged — that, and that almost exclusivhy — as 
the ground for a large and momentous measure of national policy !7 

In general, Calhoun's intimate friends were interested in Texas 
because they were interested in slavery. For example, Dixon 
H. Lewis deemed annexation to be "the greatest question of 
the Age" on account of the political power which it would bring 
to the South. "It will," he wrote, "unite the hitherto divided 
South, while it will make Abolition & Treason synonymous & 
thus destroy it in the North."'* This feeling, however, was not 
shared by the Jackson Democrats. 

When his views as a candidate for the Vice-Presidency were 
solicited, Polk declared himself to be unequivocally in favor of 
annexing Texas." Neither his public utterances nor his private 

For a discussion of this whole subject, see Justin H. Smith, Annex- 
ation of Texas. 

~ Bern. Eev., January, 1845, article on Abolitionists. The whole article 
is worth reading. 

8 Lewis to Cralle, March 19, 1844, Cralle Papers. 

9 Answer to S. P. Chase et al., April 23, 1844, Folic Facers. Printed, 
also, in various newspapers. 



616 JAMES E. POLK 

letters indicate any interest in extending slavery ; on the contrary, 
the correspondence with his most intimate friends shows a desire 
to avoid an affiliation with the southern wing of the party. It 
has been noted elsewhere that Polk's bosom friend, Cave Johnson, 
tried to induce Van Buren to declare himself in favor of annex- 
ation, and that Polk was anxious to cooperate with that wing 
of the party which was indifferent or hostile to slavery. After 
Polk's nomination, Johnson warned him repeatedly that the 
southern faction would try to claim and to control him. When 
issuing invitations to the Nashville ratification meeting, great 
care was taken to preclude any attempt to identify the candidate 
with the South Carolina radicals. ^*^ 

Throughout tlie campaign of 1844 neither Polk nor his asso- 
ciates urged additional protection for the South, much less for 
slavery ; nevertheless, both of these subjects, to a certain degree, 
became party issues. Some excitement was created by the ap- 
pearance of a pamphlet entitled "The South in Danger." It was 
prepared by Robert J. Walker, chairman of the Democratic na- 
tional committee, and its object was to show that Whigs and 
Abolitionists had united in the North and tliat all in the South 
should join in defeating them. It was published without Polk's 
knowledge and was deplored by his intimate friends." Despite 
the fact that the candidate and his chief supporters were inter- 
ested in territorial expansion rather than in slavery, his opponents 
undoubtedly believed with John Quincy Adams who, on hearing 
the result of the election, wrote : " It is the victory of the slavery 
element in the constitution of the United States. "^- 

Having received notice that the Mexican government had 
agreed to renew diplomatic relations, President Polk, in August, 
1846, asked Congress for an appropriation of two million dollars 



10 Johnson to Polk, June 21 and June 28, 1844, PoW Papers. 

11 W. E. Cramer to Polk, Oct. 4, 1844; Armstrong to Polk, Nov. 5, 1844, 
iMd. The Walker pamphlet was published by the "Democratic Associ- 
ation of Washington, D. C. " and bore the date Sept. 25, 1844. 

12 Adams, Memoirs, XII, 103. 



OUgllt r 

'islied — I 
1 pay I 



SLAFEEY AND TEh'EITOEIAL GOVERNMENTS 617 

to be used in conducting negotiations. In making this request the 
President unwittingly precipitated an "irrepressible conflict" 
which ceased only with the end of the Civil "War. 

When he asked for this appropriation Polk had no thought 
of slavery. He desired to buy Mexican territory and he w 
to be able to assure the Mexican government that he could 
an installment of the purchase price as soon as a treaty had been 
concluded. But when the subject came before the House the 
slavery question emerged, for Wilmot introduced his well-known 
"proviso" by which slavery would be excluded from all territory 
to be acquired by the use of the appropriation. After adopting 
what the President called Wilmot 's "mischievous & foolish 
amendment," the House passed the bill by a vote of 87 to 64. 
The amended bill came before the Senate on the last day of the 
session, and, as Davis, of Massachusetts, obtained the floor and 
refused to yield it, no vote could be taken. Polk was astonished 
and chagrined by the unexpected turn of events. He blamed 
Wilmot for having introduced an irrelevant topic, but he blamed 
Davis still more for preventing the Senate from acting on the 
measure. "What connection slavery had with making peace with 
Mexico," is the remark in his diary, "it is difficult to conceive. "^'^ 
While this comment undoubtedly expressed the real attitude of 
the President, it has nevertheless been charged that his request 
for the money was "caused by the burning desire to acquire 
additional slave territory."^* 

On August 5, 1846, the day after the request for the two 
millions had been sent to the Senate, General Armstrong arrived 
from London bearing the ratified Oregon treaty. On the same 
day the President asked Congress to frame a territorial govern- 
ment and to adopt regulations for making land grants to settlers 
in that region. But the session was nearing its close, and Congress 
adjourned without having taken action on the subject. 



3 3 Polk, Diary, II, 75. He believed that, if permitted, the Senate would 
have eliminated the proviso and that the House would have acquiesced. 
1* Jay, Eeview of the Mexican War, 184. 



618 JAMES E. POLK 

When Congress reassembled in December, Polk renewed his 
request for a two million dollar appropriation. He renewed, 
also, his recommendation that Oregon should be provided with a 
territorial government.^^ 

On December 23, in response to the latter recommendation, 
Douglas reported from the Committee on Territories a bill to 
establish a government in Oregon; it was read twice and referred 
to the Committee of the Whole. The twelfth section of this bill 
extended to Oregon both the privileges and the restrictions of the 
Ordinance of 1787, the most important restriction, of course, 
being the prohibition of slavery. 

On the evening of the same day Wilmot called by appointment 
on the President, and the proviso which he had attached to the 
appropriation bill at the last session was the topic of conversation. 
Wilmot told the President that he would not again offer his pro- 
viso, but that he would have to vote for slavery restriction if it 
should be proposed by another member. In his record of this 
interview Polk thus stated his opinions on the slavery question : 

I told liim I did not desire to extend slavery, tliat I Avould be satisfied 
to acquire by treaty from Mexico the Provinces of New Mexico & the Cali- 
fornias, and that in these Provinces slavery could probably never exist, and 
the great probability was that the question would never arise in the futui-e 
organization of territorial or State Governments in these territories. I 
told him that slavery was purely a domestic question, and to restrict the 
appropriation which had been asked for, so as to require the President to 
insert it in a Treaty with a Foreign Power, was not only inappropriate 
and out of place, but if such a Treaty were made it must be opposed by 
every Senator from a slave-holding State, and as one third of the Senators 
could reject a Treaty, it could not be ratified, though it might be satisfactory 
in all other respects. 

This argument, of course, overstated the effect of the Wilmot 
proviso, for no one had asked that it should be incorporated into 
the treaty. Wilmot answered that in any case he would be satis- 
fied with a simple legislative declaration, and that he would not 
again take the initiative in asking for this.'" 

15 Eichardson, Messages, IV, 495, 504. 

16 Polk, Diary, II, 288-290. 



SLAVERY AND TEEEITOEIAL GOVERNMENTS 619 

In spite of Polk's effort to bury the slavery discussion by an 
agreement with Wilmot, the question of excluding the institution 
from territories was soon brought before the House. On January 
4, 1847, Preston King, of New York, offered a bill to appropriate 
two million dollars for diplomatic purposes the second section 
of which was virtually a restatement of the Wilraot proviso. 
King was not permitted to introduce this bill, and on February 1, 
when another bill for granting the President three million dollars 
came up for discussion in the House Wilmot, in spite of the 
promise made to Polk, moved to amend the bill by adding his 
anti-slavery proviso.^' When informed of King's bill Polk noted 
in his diary : 

The sla\'\'ery question is assuming a fearful & most important aspect. 
The movement of Mr. King to-day, if persevered in, will be attended with 
terrible consequences to the country, and cannot fail to destroy the Demo- 
cratic party, if it does not ultimately threaten the Union itself. [At the 
close of a cabinet meeting held on the following day, he again reverted to 
the subject.] Slavery has no possible connection with the Mexican War, 
and with making peace with that country. Should any territory be acquired 
by a Treaty with Mexico, Congress will have the full power to raise the 
question of slavery in it upon the organization of a territorial Government 
in it, or upon its admission as a state of the Union. Its introduction in con- 
nection with the Mexican War is not only mischievous but wicked. It is, 
moreover, practically an abstract question. There is no probability that any 
territory will ever be acquired from Mexico in which slavery could ever 
exist. 

Buchanan expressed himself as willing to extend the Missouri 
Compromise line to the Pacific, and in this view all other mem- 
bers of the cabinet agreed. Polk declined to commit himself on 
this method of dealing with the subject, although urged to do so 
by both Buchanan and Walker. ' ' Though willing myself, ' ' said 
he, "to assent to the proposition, I was not ready, until I saw 
further developments, to recommend it to Congress as the policy 
of the administration." On the same evening he presented the 



3 7 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 105, 303. 



620 JAMES K. POLK 

proposition to Benton in order to see if it would meet with his 
approval, but the Senator declined to give an immediate answer. ^'^ 

While the President was not interested in the extension of 
slavery, he was, on the other hand, unable to appreciate the fact 
tliat there might be such a thing as honest opposition to the spread 
of that institution. Except as it affected party interests he seemed 
quite as indifferent toward the subject as Douglas was at a later 
date when he declared that he did not care whether slavery was 
"voted down or voted up." Polk attributed all agitation of the 
subject to the same cause that he attributed everything which 
thwarted his plans — a desire to promote the interests of candi- 
dates for the Presidency. Politicians of both parties and both 
sections were criticized for their unpatriotic conduct. Comment- 
ing on the delay in enacting war measures, he wrote in his diary : 

Even the question of slavery is tlirown into Congress and agitated in 
the midst of a Foreign War for political purposes. It is brought forward at 
the North hy a few ultra Nortliern members to advance the prospects of 
their favourite. No sooner is it introduced than a few ultra Southern 
members are manifestly well satisfied that it has been brought forward, 
because by seizing upon it they hope to array a Southern party in favour 
of their favourite candidate for the Presidency. There is no patriotism 
on either side, it is a most wicked agitation that can end in no good and 
nuist produce infinite mischief. i^ 

On the day after this was written he told Crittenden that 

I deprecated the agitation of the slavery question in Congress, and 
though a Southwestern man & from a slave-holding State as well as him- 
self, I did not desire to acquire more Southern Territory than that which 
I had indicated [California and New Mexico], because I did not desire by 
doing so to give occasion for the agitation of a question Avliich miglit sever 
and endanger the Union. 20 

King's appropriation bill, with the section prohibiting slavery 
in all territory to be acquired, not only raised the issue with 
respect to anticipated cessions from Mexico, but it affected also 



18 Polk, Diary, II, 304-309. At a meeting held on January 16 the 
cabinet again unanimously advised the extension of the 36° 30' line to the 
Pacific. 

19 Polk, Diary, II, 348. 20 ihid., 350. 



SLAVERY AND TEEBITOEIAL GOVERNMENTS 621 

the Oregon bill. It will be remembered that the twelfth section 
of the measure proposed by Douglas extended to Oregon the 
Ordinance of 1787. When the bill came up for discussion on 
January 14, 1847, Burt, of South Carolina, moved to amend this 
section by adding an explanatory statement to the effect that 
the restrictions of the Ordinance were extended to Oregon ' ' inas- 
much as the whole of the said territory lies north of 36° 30' north 
latitude."-^ While willing, apparently, to let slavery be excluded 
from Oregon, Burt nevertheless denied categorically the power 
of Congress to prohibit slavery in any state or territory. He 
argued at some length to prove that neither the Ordinance of 
1787 nor the Missouri Compromise was a constitutional law. 
This denial of the federal government's power to exclude slavery 
from any territory was soon echoed by other southern members; 
consequently, an attempt was made to eliminate the prohibition 
from the Douglas bill or else to defeat it altogether. 

The President was embarrassed, and his opponents assisted, 
by the hearty support given to his policy of territorial acqui- 
sition by southern enthusiasts, both in Congress and in the press. 
For example, the Charleston Patriot trusted "that our southern 
Representatives will remember that this is a southern war, ' ' and 
the Charleston Courier asserted that the war would widen the 
field of southern enterprise and pow^er.^- 

In the House, Seddon, of Virginia, declared King's bill to be 
grossly unconstitutional. ' ' It more than violates a single specific 
clause of that instrument. It outrages its whole scope and spirit, 
and subverts the very basis of its being. ' ' Bedinger, of the same 



21 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 178. 

22 The former is quoted in Jay, Eeview of the Mexican War, ^ 82. See also 
other excei-pts from southern papers there given. The latter is thus quoted 
by Eathbun of New York: "Every battle fought in Mexico, and every 
dollar spent there, but insures the acquisition of territory which must 
widen the field of southern enterprise and power in the future. And the 
first result will be to readjust the whole balance of power in the Confed- 
eracy so as to give us control over the operations of the Government in all 
time to come. If the South be but true to themselves, the day of our de- 
pression and suffering is gone, and gone forever" (Cong. Globe, as cited 
above, 364). 



622 JAMES K. POLK 

state, still loved the Union; but he would cease to love his wife 
(if he had one), "if, like the farfamed Mrs. Caudle, she were 
forever taunting nie witli what she chose to regard as a great 
deformity and annoyance."-' Should the North persist in its 
purpose to restrict slavery, he saw no remedy short of a disso- 
lution of the Union. During the debate on the Oregon bill Rhett, 
also, denied absolutely the power of Congress to exclude slavery 
from territories, for they belonged to the states and not to the 

United States. 

For that [Oregon] territory [said he], we care but little, since it is 
not probable that a single planter would ever desire to set his foot within 
its limits. But the right is important, because it applies to future acqui- 
sitions of territory; and by refusing to acknowledge the obligations of 
the Missouri compromise, you force open the whole question of power.2J^ 

The question of the control of Congress over slavery in ter- 
ritories came before the Senate by a more indirect route. On 
January 19, 1847, Sevier reported, from the Committee on For- 
eign Relations, a bill for granting the President three million 
dollars with which to conduct negotiations with Mexico. "When 
it came up for discussion on February 1, Berrien, of Georgia, 
a southern Whig, gave notice of his intention to offer an amend- 
ment. His amendment, among other things, declared that "the 
war with Mexico ought not to be prosecuted by this Government 
with any view to the dismemberment of that republic, or the 
acquisition by conquest of any portion of her territory. ' ' A few 
days later Cass offered a substitute which authorized the Presi- 
dent to demand indemnity from Mexico. To those who desired 
an extension of slavery Berrien's amendment was quite as of- 
fensive, except in principle, as the Wilmot proviso itself; for 
no acquisition of territory meant no extension of political power. 
During the debate, Berrien warned southerners that slavery 
'These northern Mrs. Caudles," he continued, "will not let us rest 



by night or bv dav. We get no sleep for them! Their eternal din will 

drive us to distraction. They interfere with our domestic matters; they 

ter our very kitchens, and intrude upon our most sacred household 

fairs'" {Cong. Globe. 29 Cong., 2 sess., App., 86). For Seddon 's remarks. 



drive us to distraction, 
en 
aflfa 

see ibid., 76. 
2i Ibid., 346. 



SLAVEEY AND TEBEITOSIAL GOVERNMENTS 623 

would surely be excluded from all land acquired ; therefore both 
the interest and the safety of the South ' ' demands that we should 
oppose ourselves to any and every acquisition of territory." 

Berrien was not the only southern man who was averse to 
territorial acquisition. Whigs would naturally oppose any policy 
advocated by the administration, but there was a still more potent 
reason why certain Democrats, as well as Whigs, did not favor 
expansion. This reason was a conviction that slavery would be 
excluded ; and that while their section could not hope to gain 
any advantage, further agitation of the subject might result in 
a dissolution of the Union. Why, asked Morehead, of Kentucky, 
should a policy (of expansion) be followed which would pre- 
cipitate discord over slavery and probably destroy the institu- 
tion ? In the House, Alexander H. Stephens vigorously opposed 
the acquisition of territory and gave as one of his reasons his fear 
of the results of slavery agitation. He had faith in the strength 
of the Union, but he had "no disposition to test its strengh by 
running against that rock upon which Mr. Jefferson predicted 
we should be finally wrecked." 

Calhoun joined the Whigs just mentioned in combating the 
President's expansion policy. He saw even more clearly than 
they did the approaching "irrepressible conflict." In a lugu- 
brious speech made in the Senate on February 24 he declared that 

Every Senator knows that I was opposed to the war; but none knows 
but myself the depth of that opposition. With my conception of its 
character and consequences, it was impossible for me to vote for it. . . . 
On the passage of the act recognizing the war, I said to many of my 
friends that a deed had been done from which the country would not be 
able to recover for a long time, if ever; and added, it has dropped a 
curtain between the present and the future, which to me is impenetrable; 
and for the first time since I have been in public life, I am unable to see 
the future. I also added, that it has closed the first volume of our political 
history under the Constitution, and opened the second, and that no mortal 
could tell what would be written in it. . . . Since then less than a year 
has elapsed; but in that short period enough has already been developed 
to make what was then said look like prophecy. 25 



25 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 500. Also, Calhoun, Worls, IV, 371. 



624 JAMES K. POLK 

The thing which had developed, of course, was the inclination 
of the North to resist the spread of slavery, and Calhoun fully 
realized that that section possessed the power if the people should 
decide to make use of it. His first remedy for the impending 
disaster was to prevent, if possible, the acquisition of more ter- 
ritory. Later, when he became convinced that this could not be 
done, he felt constrained to deny that Congress possessed the 
power to restrict the institution. 

Already, indeed, Calhoun had been offered an opportunity 
for asserting the latter doctrine. On February 15 Douglas had 
attempted in the House to extend the Missouri Compromise line 
through the territory to be acquired, as an alternative to ex- 
cluding slavery from all of it. His amendment for this purpose 
was rejected by a considerable nuijority. Four days after this 
action had been taken, Calhoun announced in the Senate that he 
was "against any compromise line." He had always, he said, 
considered the Missouri Compromise to have been a great error, 
although he had acquiesced in respecting it in order to preserve 
peace. But since its rejection as a solution of the new territorial 
question, he was now ready to insist upon the full rights of the 
South in all territories. An enumeration of these rights he em- 
bodied in a series of resolutions which Benton was unkind enough 
to call a "string of abstractions." In substance the resolutions 
declared territories to be the property of the several states, con- 
sequently Congress did not possess the constitutional power to 
prevent a citizen of a state from migrating with his slaves to any 
of the territories.-" 

The real reason why Calhoun and his supporters felt obliged 
to abandon the historic method of compromise and to deny the 
power of Congress over slavery in territories is obvious ; they 
were confronted by a condition of affairs which had never before 
existed. In all land previously acquired slavery was already 
established, therefore the institution might continue unless 



20 Co7ig. Globe, loc. cit., 453-455. Calhoun, Works, IV, 339-349. 



SLAVERY AND TEESITOEIAL GOVERNMENTS 625 

specificall}' prohibited by Congress. In the proposed acquisition 
slavery had been abolished by Mexican law, and, according to 
international custom, this law would continue in force until sup- 
planted by positive legislation on the subject by the United States. 
Now Congress had never specifically authorized slavery anywhere, 
and there could be no hope that it would do so in the present 
instance. Consequently a new doctrine must be promulgated; 
it must deny the power of Congress to exclude slave property 
from land which belonged to the several states. For the sake of 
consistency the doctrine must apply to Oregon as well as to the 
proposed Mexican cession.-' The issue was now squarely joined. 
The advocates of the Wilmot proviso claimed full power to ex- 
elude slavery from all territories, while Calhoun and his ad- 
herents denied in toto the existence of such a power. After 
Congress had adjourned, Benton told his constituents that at last 
extremes had met — Calhoun and the abolitionists had joined 
hands in subverting the Union.^^ 

^ Congress adjourned on March 3, 1847, without having pro- 
Aided a government for Oregon. A bill for this purpose had 
passed the House on January 16, but on the last day of the session 
it was laid on the table by the Senate. Under Polk's direction. 



2T The Baltimore American, Feb. 17, 1847, pointed out very clearly why 
southern members, after applauding the plan suggested by Cass, Buchanan, 
and Dickinson for letting the people of the territories decide the question, 
turned suddenly to oppose it. ' ' To leave to the territories themselves the 
absolute decision of the existence of slavery upon their soil, might do very 
well if slavery had been previously established there, as was the case when 
Louisiana was purchased, when Florida was acquired, and when Texas was 
annexed. But in the present case it would not do. The old formula must 
be changed. The long and fondly cherished doctrine of state sovereignty, 
so conveniently inchoate in a territory as the germ of a state — even this 
must be abandoned." Quoted in Niles' Beg., Feb. 19, 1848, LXXIII, 392. 

28 The Calhoun resolutions, said he, ' ' go the precise length of the 
northern abolitionists, and with the same practical consequence, only in 
a reversed form. The abolition creed is, that the admission of slavery in 
any part of the Union is a violation of the constitution, and a dissolution 
of the Union; the new resolutions declare that the prohibition of slavery 
in any ten-itory of the Union is a violation of the constitution and the 
rights of the states, and a subversion of the Union! So true it is, that 
extremes meet, and that all fanaticism, for or against any dogma, termi- 
nates at the same point of intolerance and defiance" (speech at St. Louis 
(no date given), quoted in Niles' Beg., June 5, 1847, 223). 



626 JAMES E. POLK 

Buchanan expressed to the people of Oregon the President's re- 
gret because they had been left by Congress without a govern- 
ment. Ignoring the real difficulty, Buchanan stated that the 
failure of Congress to act had not resulted from indifference to 
the interests of the territory, but to a pressure of business which 
did not allow time to perfect the details of the bill!-'' Just be- 
fore adjourning, however, Congress passed the "three million 
bill" which enabled the President to use this sum in conducting 
negotiations with Mexico. As we have seen, efforts were made 
to attach to this bill either the Wilmot proviso or an extension 
of the Missouri compromise line, but all such restrictions were 
rejected. 

During the session which had just closed Calhoun felt that 
he had attained a commanding position. ' ' My friends, ' ' he wrote, 
"think I never stood higher, or stronger than I now do"; and 
he was "now certain that there will be no more Baltimore nomi- 
nations, or if there should be, the nominee will be assuredly de- 
feated." Through Benton, he said, the administration was trying 
to build up the old Van Buren party, but their efforts would end 
in failure.'^" After Congress had adjourned, he went home to 
begin an active compaign for uniting the South in defense of 
slavery. He desired, first of all, to prevent the reelection of 
Polk, or the election of any of his adherents; if Calhoun himself 
could not be elected, he was ready to support General Taylor.^^ 
It is interesting to note that while northern Whigs and "proviso" 
Democrats were denouncing the President as a slavery extension- 
ist, Calhoun and his supporters were identifying him with Van 
Buren and other enemies of ' ' southern institutions. ' ' 



29 Buchanan, WorJcs, VII, 2.58. 

30 Calhoun to Thos. G. Clemson, Jan. 80, 1847, in lit p. Am. Hist. Assn., 
1899, II, 717. 

31 "The days of hunkerism is numbered. IVIr. Polk is the last of the 
dynasty. It never can rise again to power. . . . As much as I am op- 
posed to military chieftains for })resident3, I shall, thus thinking, be 
content to see him [Taylor] elected against Mr. Polk, or any one, who 
contributed to make the war; and, let me add, against the nominee of a 
convention, either democrat, or Whig" (Calhoun to Clemson, Mav 6, 1847, 
ibid.. 728). 



SLAVEEY AND TEBBITOBIAL GOFEENMENTS 627 

Early in April the President was informed by his Secretary 
of the Navy that Calhoun was soliciting signatures for an address 
to the people on the subject of slavery. "I remarked to Mr. 
Mason," says the Diary, 

that Mr. Calhoun had become perfectly desperate in his aspirations to 
the Presidency, and had seized upon this sectional question as the only 
means of sustaining himself in his present fallen condition, and that such 
an agitation of the slavery question was not only unpatriotic and mis- 
chievous, but wicked. 

He was as little pleased with a story told by Benton to the effect 
that the supporters of Silas Wright "would be rejoiced at the 
opportunity to take issue with Mr. Calhoun on such a question. ' ' 

The truth is, [he continued], there is no patriotism in either faction 
of the party. Both desire to mount slavery as a hobby, and hope to secure 
the election of their favourite upon it. They will both fail and ought to. 
The people of the U. States, I hope, will cast off all such intrigues, and 
make their own selection for the Presidency, and this if they are wise 
they will do. I now entertain a worse opinion of Mr. Calhoun than I 
have ever done before. He is wholly selfish, I am satisfied has no patriot- 
ism. A few years ago he was the author of Nullification & threatened 
to dissolve the Union on account of the tariff. During my administration 
the reduction of duties which he desired has been obtained, and he can 
no longer complain. No sooner is this done than he selects slavery upon 
which to agitate the country, and blindly mounts that topic as a hobby. 
Gov. Wright 's friends in Congress as unpatriotically have shown by their 
course that they desire to mount the same hobby in the North and hope 
to be successful by their opposition to slavery. They both forget that the 
Constitution settles [those] questions which were the subjects of mutual 
concession between the North and South. I am utterly disgusted at such 
intriguing men in high place, & hope they will be rebuked by the people. 32 



32 Polk, Diary, II, 457-459. Although Polk was wrong in attributing 
the sectional discord wholly to President-making, it was true that the 
slavery question was being used on both sides of Mason and Dixon's line 
to break down party lines and to solidify public opinion either for or 
against the "peculiar institution." A few months later Holmes, of S. C, 
wrote: "I wish the Southern Representatives would consent to act to- 
gether without regard to Whig or Democrat. The Wilmot Proviso is 
paramount to all Party. We are in great danger. The North is resolved 
to crush Slavery — are we equally in the South resolved at all hazards to 
defend it?" (Holmes to Cobb, Aug. 21, 1847, in Bep. of Am. Hist. Assn. 
1911, II, 88). ■ 



628 JAMES K. POLK 

What the President desired most of all was to eliminate the 
slavery question entirely and to have Congress confine its atten- 
tion to the policies of his administration. However, since the 
slavery question had emerged, he could not maintain simply a 
negative attitude with respect to it. He was compelled, against 
his will, to adopt some positive program for dealing with slavery 
in the territories. As early as January 5, 1847, the cabinet sug- 
gested an extension of the Missouri Compromise line, but at that 
time Polk declined to commit himself .^^ 

About a week after the cabinet had made this suggestion 
Atocha appeared in Washington and the prospect of an early 
acquisition of Mexican territory seemed brighter. Since Congress 
persisted in discussing slavery, some positive plan on the part 
of the administration seemed desirable. In his diary for January 
16 Polk lamented that the session was nearly half over and that 
Congress, instead of enacting necessary military measures, was 
engaged in "a worse than useless discussion about slavery." He 
and the cabinet deprecated this discussion, but "all feared it 
would be impossible now to arrest it. ' ' Although every member 
of the cabinet advised an extension of the 36° 30' line through 
the territory to be acquired, Polk was not ready to commit him- 
self to this solution-^** In fact, the President does not seem to 
have decided upon any definite policy during the session, although 
he intimated to Crittenden that the Missouri Compromise line 
would be extended ;='^ and as Congress voted the three million 
dollars without attaching the Wilmot restriction, slavery for the 
time being ceased to be a vital question. 

In June, the President decided to made a tour of the north- 
eastern states. Although we have no direct evidence that polit- 
ical considerations induced him to make this decision, it is quite 



33 See above, p. 619. 

34 Polk, Diary, II, 335. 

sr. He told Crittenden that the slavery question in California and New 
Mexico would not be a practical one "because there would be but a 
narrow ribbon of territory South of the Missouri compromise line ' ' (Dtary, 
Jan. 23, II, 350). 



SLAVEBY AND TEEBITOEIAL GOVEBNMENTS 629 

probable that he hoped, by making the journey, to retain the 
support of northern Democrats and to prevent further defections 
on account of slavery agitation. Among those who accompanied 
him was Edmund Burke, commissioner of patents and his close 
personal friend. No doubt Burke voiced the President's views 
when, on the eve of the journey, he told Franklin Pierce that 
the signs of the times portended a coalition of the South and 
West against the North. He attributed this state of affairs to 
the ' ' foolish course ' ' pursued by the ' ' proviso ' ' Democrats ; " it is 
clear that the Northern and Southern Democracy are now divided, 
a consummation which the federalists of the Nortli have sought 
for fifty years to accomplish. "^^ Polk did not, during the sum- 
mer, decide upon any definite policy with respect to slavery in 
the territories, though his approval (somewhat reluctant, to be 
sure) of Buchanan's open espousal of an extension of the 36° 30' 
line indicated that he would not oppose this plan as a solution of 
the question.^' 

When Congress convened in December, 1847, the President, 
in his third annual message, informed that body of the failure 
of Trist's mission. He recommended that California and New 
Mexico should be retained permanently by the United States and 
that Congress should at once provide each of these territories with 
a civil government. In this connection he made no allusion to 
slavery, but he concluded his message by quoting Washington's 
admonition regarding the value of union and the calamity of 
sectional controversies. 

How unimportant [said Polk] are all our differences of opinion upon 
minor questions of public jjolicy compared with its preservation, and how 
scrupulously should we avoid all agitating topics which may tend to dis- 
tract and divide us into contending parties, separated by geographical 
lines, whereby it may be weakened or endangered. 

On December 8, two days after Congress had convened, the 
Vice-President laid before the Senate a memorial from the Oregon 



36 Burke to Pierce, June 21, 1847, Pierce Papers. 

37 Polk, Diary, III, 142. Buchanan to Berks County Democrats (Bu- 
chanan, Works, VII, 385). 



630 JAMES E. POLK 

"Legislative Assembly" praying for the confirmation of their 
land titles and for the adoption of measures to promote education. 
This assembly had been created by the people of Oregon, without 
authority from the United States government. The movement 
to establish a temporary government began as early as 1843, and 
one section of the "Organic Laws" prohibited slavery.'''* 

On December 14, before any consideration had been given to 
this memorial, Dickinson, of New York, submitted resolutions 
which attempted to define the policy of the government for both 
acquiring and governing territories. They asserted that "true 
policy" required the United States to strengthen its political and 
commercial relations on the continent by the acquisition of con- 
tiguous territory, and that in all such territories the people should 
be'left free to settle "all questions concerning the domestic policy 
therein, ' ' without any restrictions imposed by the federal govern- 
ment. In other words, Dickinson advocated the "popular sover- 
eignty" program which Douglas later mounted as a hobby in 
1854. In his well-known "Nicholson letter" Cass made a bid 
for the Presidential nomination by casting doubt on the power 
of Congress over slavery in territories and by espousing the doc- 
trine of "popular sovereignty."'"' 

The Dickinson resolutions were followed by others in which 
individual Senators endeavored to commit the government to what 
each deemed to be the "true policy" respecting territories. One 
offered by Calhoun opposed holding Mexico as a province, or 
incorporating it into the Union. As a s^^bstitute for the Dickin- 
son plan, Yulee, of Florida, offered a resolution which declared 
that territory owned or to be acquired by the United States "is 
the common property of the Union," and that neither the federal 
nor the territorial government can prevent any citizen from enjoy- 
ing full rights therein. Hale, of New Hampshire, offered another 
substitute which purposed to exclude slavery entirely from lands 



3H Gray, History of Oregon, eliaps. xiii-xiv. 

3!) Cass to A. O. P. Nicholson, Dec. 24, 1847. Priuted in Niles' Reg., 
Jan. 8, 1848, LXXIII, 293. 



SLAVEEY AND TEEEITOEIAL GOVERNMENTS 631 

that might be acquired. All of these proposals were defeated, 
yet they afforded an opportunity for airing divergent views and 
for illustrating the impossibility of arriving at any practical 
settlement of the slavery question. 

On January 10, 1848, Senator Douglas presented a bill for 
establishing a territorial government in Oregon, and on February 
9 Caleb Smith, of Indiana, reported from the House Committee 
on Territories a bill for the same purpose. Both measures were 
referred to committees, and for some time war legislation pre- 
cluded their consideration. 

The Douglas bill did not come before the Senate until May 
31, and then Hale moved to amend by adding section twelve of 
the Senate bill of the last session — the section which extended to 
Oregon the Ordinance of 1787. Calhoun opposed the inclusion 
of a slavery restriction, while others like Hannegan and Benton 
thought such restriction to be unnecessary, since slaves would 
never be taken to Oregon. Benton was unwilling to have neces- 
sary legislation delayed by the introduction of this "pestiferous 
question." He was especially anxious that military protection 
should be extended immediately to the people of Oregon. But 
Hale was obdurate, and insisted upon a positive prohibition of 
slavery. "If this Union," said he, "with all its advantages, has 
no other cement than the blood of human slavery, let it perish ! ' ' 
When the discussion was resumed on June 5, Foote moved to 
amend by inserting in section twelve the words: "provided the 
same [the slavery restriction] be compatible with the laws and 
Constitution of the United States. ' ' In this way he undoubtedly 
hoped to obtain a ' ' Dred Scott decision ' ' at that early date. After 
Underwood, of Kentucky, had denied the authority of Congress 
to interfere with local institutions and Baldwin, of Connecticut, 
had declared that slaves were held solely by state laws and that 
when a slave left the confines of a slave state — even if accompa- 
nied by his master on a temporary sojourn — "his shackles fell 
off," Badger, of North Carolina, offered, as a substitute for 



632 JAMES K. POLE 

Foote's proposal, a proviso which would exempt the people of 
Oregon from the operation of the sixth article (the one prohibit- 
ing slavery) of the Ordinance of 1787. Foote accepted the modi- 
fication. After considerable discussion this amendment was with- 
drawn by the mover on June 23, and Davis, of Mississippi, pre- 
sented another which asserted that nothing in the bill should l)e 
so construed as to 2^rohibit slavery in Oregon while it remained a 
territory. 

After a long delay the House, on March 28, proceeded to 
consider Caleb Smith's Oregon bill. In a most ingenious speech 
Gayle, of Alabama, asserted that all laws by which Congress had 
excluded slavery from territories had been based on precedent 
merely and had not been authorized by the Constitution. He 
held that territories were legally states before entering the 
Union f^ on the other hand, he denied that their government 
thereby possessed the power to exclude slavery. In reply, Smart, 
of Maine, declared that Congress not only had the power but was 
bound by the will of the majority to prevent slavery from entering 
all territories. 

The President, as we have seen, was reluctant to announce a 
definite policy regarding slavery in territories, even though the 
Van Burenites believed this to be the issue nearest his heart.*^ 
Both he and his cabinet opposed the Wilmot proviso,*- and, since 
a negative policy could not be pursued indefinitely, Polk at 
last decided to advocate an extension of the Missouri Compromise 
line. 



40 "Now, sir, how can a 'new State be admitted into the Union' unless 
it was a State before admission?" 

41 ' ' The slavery question, ' ' wrote John M. Niles, ' ' is evidently first 
& foremost with the administration; it overrides the Mexican war & any 
other question. The slave power rules as tyrannically here as it can in 
Louisiana; that, is made the test & tie of fealty to the administration" 
(Niles to Van Buren, Dec. 16, 1847, Van Buren Papers). 

42 After Clifford had been sent to Mexico the President announced his 
intention to select some northern man to fill his place. All members ex- 
pressed an unwillingness to be associated with a Wilmot p)roviso man 
(Polk, liiary, III, 431). 



SLAVERY AND TEEBITOEIAL GOVEENMENTS 633 

As already noted, the President desired most of all to elimi- 
nate the subject of slavery, but forces beyond his control made 
it apparent that this could not be done. Indeed, since the Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo had been ratified by Mexico, the question 
of governments for California and New Mexico had become more 
urgent than ever. Congress persisted in discussing slavery and 
there seemed to be no prospect of an agreemnt on the subject. 
On May 26 a messenger arrived from Oregon and laid before 
the President a memorial from the legislative assembly of that 
territory, stating that the Indians were making war on the inhab- 
itants. Polk transmitted the memorial to Congress along with 
a message recommending the immediate creation of a government 
for Oregon. He said nothing about slavery.*^ But on June 24, 
in a conversation with Senator Hannegan concerning "the dis- 
tracting subject of slavery, which is embarrassing the Bill to 
establish a Territorial Government in Oregon," he advised the 
Senator to "bring forward & press the adoption of the Missouri 
compromise line & extend it to the Pacific." Hannegan, as well 
as the entire cabinet, agreed with Polk that "the adoption of the 
Missouri compromise w^as the only means of allaying the excite- 
ment & settling the question." The President sent for other 
members of Congress and urged them to support this policy in 
order to checkmate the action of the Barnburners : 

The necessity for settling the question is the greater since the con- 
vention of Barnburners, held at Utiea, New York, on the 22nd Instant, 
have bolted from the regular Democratic nominations made at the Balti- 
more convention in May last, and have nominated Martin Van Buren for 
President and Henry Dodge of Wisconsin for Vice President distinctly 
upon the ground of the Wilmot Proviso. This is a most dangerous attempt 
to organize Geographical parties upon the slavery question. It is more 
threatening to the Union than anything which has occurred since the 
meeting of the Hartford convention in 1814. Mr. Van Buren 's course is 
selfish, unpatriotic, and wholly inexcusable. The effect of this movement of 
the seceding and discontented Democrats of New York will be effectually 



43 Polk, Diary, III, 463. Message dated May 29, 1849 (Eichardson, 
Messages, TV, 584). 



634 JAMES E. POLE 

co[u]nteraete(l if the slave question can be settled by adopting the Missouri 
compromise line as applied to Oregon, New Mexico, & Upper California at 
the Present Session of Congress. If the question can be thus settled harmony 
Avill be restored to the Union and the danger of forming geographical parties 
be avoided. For these reasons I am using my influence with members of 
Congress to have it adopted.** 

He was quite indifferent regarding the extension of slavery, 
but he was vitally concerned over preserving the Union and in- 
suring the success of his party. He did not believe that sound 
principles, or what he considered to be such, should be jeopar- 
dized by a sudden change in the popular viewpoint. After the 
Baltimore convention, Cass showed to Polk the first draft of his 
letter of acceptance, one sentence of which declared that the 
government should keep pace with public opinion. "I suggested 
to him, ' ' is the comment in the Diary, that the assertion 

might be misconstrued to mean that constitutional principles might be 
changed, in order to accommodate themselves to what might seem from 
time to time to be public opinion, which T thought was an untenable & 
dangerous doctrine. *5 

A few days after his conversation with Hannegan the Presi- 
dent discussed the Oregon bill with Senators Bright, of Indiana, 
and Foote, of Mississippi. He dictated an amendment which 
would extend the 36° 30' line to the Pacific. When Bright intro- 
duced the amendment in the Senate, Calhoun again asserted that 
Congress could not, without violating the Constitution, prevent 
a slaveholder from carrying his property to any territory.*" 

During the first two weeks in July, Polk conversed with va- 
rious southern members of both houses, nearly all of whom were 
ready to accept an extension of the 36° 30' line. Judge Catron 
wrote from Nashville that the position taken by those who denied 
the power of Congress over slavery in acquired territory could 
not be maintained. He was in favor of excluding the institution 



** Polk, Diary, III, 501-503. 

*5 Ibid; 471-472. 

*6 Ibid., 504-505. Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 875-876. 



SLAVERY AND TEREITOBIAL GOVERNMENTS 635 

from Oregon and believed that it would be wise, politically, to 
do so.*' The pleasure which Polk derived from the support of 
so many southern men was offset by the acerbity of Alexander H. 
Stephens. By a resolution introduced on July 10 Stephens called 
upon the President for information concerning the governments 
which had been set up in California and New Mexico. In a 
violent speech he scathingly denounced the President and General 
Pillow, and characterized the former as "Polk the mendacious."*^ 

In the Senate, on July 12, after Jefferson Davis had upheld 
the right of a slaveowner to locate with his "property" in any 
territory, Clayton, of Delaware, moved that the question of slav- 
ery in territories be referred to a committee of eight to be selected 
by ballot — four from the North and four from the South. Dur- 
ing the discussion of this proposal Westcott, of Florida, asserted 
that should the Wilmot proviso be attached to the bill, ' ' we have 
a Chief Magistrate at the other end of the avenue who would 
put his veto on it. ' ' However true this statement may have been, 
it must have been based upon pure conjecture, for Polk would 
hardly have given advance information to a man whom he de- 
tested as he did Westcott. The Senate passed the resolution and 
Clayton was made chairman of the select committee. *° 

Calhoun w'as made a member of the Clayton committee and, 
on July 14, Polk expressed to the Senator's friend, Elmore, a 
hope that he might recede from his extreme position and accept 
the 36° 30' line as a compromise. He could not with propriety. 



47 '< Were I in Congress, not a moment's hestiation would be felt in 
voting for the exclusion of slavery from [in?] the Oregon bill; and if 
this is done, with the sanction of the Democratic party — as it must be in 
the Senate, the Barnburners may hang their harp on the willows, so far 
as capital is sought from this slavery question; not that I think so much 
will come of it as has been supposed, for Mr. V. Buren will have to carry 
his abolition brethern, who will be very apt to absorb his party, & to 
incorporate his good self, & Son John." Catron "w'd feel much gratified 
to see this slavery question adjusted by a compromise on 36° 30' — the true 
division as I think" (Catron to Polk, July 12, 1848, Folk Papers). 

48 Polk, Diary, IV, 14. Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 912. 

49 Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 927-928, 932. 



636 JAMES K. POLK 

he said, ask Calhoun to call and discuss the subject,^" so Elmore, 
two days later, brought the Senator to call upon him. After 
Polk had expressed a "decided opinion" in favor of adjusting 
the slavery question by an extension of the compromise line, 
Calhoun said that the Clayton committee had as yet been unable 
to agree upon a solution. He stated that a suggestion had been 
made in committee which he was willing to accept : that the ex- 
isting Oregon laws which prohibited slavery be allowed to operate 
until changed by the territorial legislature ; and that the govern- 
ments of California and New Mexico be prevented by Congress 
from legislating on the subject of slavery, leaving the question, 
should it arise, to be decided by the local judiciary. Polk was 
willing to accept this adjustment, although he preferred an ex- 
tension of the compromise line. Calhoun now produced the 
loaded dice by which he hoped to win the game so far as the 
Mexican cessions were concerned : 

He said that much would depend on me, in appointments to be made 
of Governor, Secretary, & Judges; that they might be Northern men in 
Oregon, but that they ought to be Southern men in California & New 
Mexico, who would maintain the southern views on the subject of slavery. 
The tone of his conversation on this point seemed to be designed to elicit 
a pledge from me to this effect. I at once felt the delicacy of my situa- 
tion & promptly replied that that was a subject upon which I could not 
speak, that if the laws passed in tlie form suggested I would do my duty, 
and jocosely added that my friends, as Gen'l Harrison's Cincinnati Com- 
mittee in 1844 [1840?] said for him, must have a "generous confidence" 
that I would do so.^i 

Calhoun returned on the following day and reported that the 
committee had agreed upon the general terms above mentioned, 
but that the northern members insisted upon a provision which 
would allow appeals from the territorial courts to the Supreme 
Court of the United States. He and two other members would 



50 "I told him I could not invite Mr. Calhoun to call, 1st, because he 
was an older man than myself, had been longer in public life, and 2nd, 
because he might suppose that I desired to exercise some ofiicial influence 
over him. ' ' 

51 Polk, Diary, IV, 19-21. 



SLAFEEY AND TEERITOEIAL GOVERNMENTS 637 

not admit this provision, and he now suggested that the whole 
subject might be postponed until the next session of Congress. 
Since Polk urged immediate action, the Senator, after another 
vain attempt to carry his point in committee, finally yielded on 
the subject of appeal. "There is now some prospect," wrote the 
President, "that the question may be settled at the present session 
of Congress, and I sincerely hope it may be." On July 18, Clay- 
ton reported a bill v;hich left undisturbed the prohibition in 
Oregon. The status of slavery was left for the Supreme Court 
to determine, and until this had been done, the territorial govern- 
ments were not to legislate on the subject.^" 

When the bill came up for discussion, on July 22, Niles, of 
Connecticut, asked Clayton whether his bill answered the im- 
portant question Avhether Congress had or had not the power to 
interfere with slavery in territories. He replied that it "neither 
affirms nor denies the power, and herein consists the compro- 
mise." Northern members were unable to discern a compromise 
in a measure which left slave-owners free to enter California and 
New Mexico without hindrance, except an improbable decision of 
a pro-slavery court. The northern press was equally suspicious. 
Said the New York Evening Post: 

Talk as we may of the impartiality of our courts, a judge from the 
Southern States, allied to the aristocracy of those States, would share 
their prejudices and decide according to their views. This compromise is, 
therefore, an ingenious method of giving Mr. Calhoun his own way in the 
controversy. 

And the New York Tribune: 

We protest against this juggle. We say it [slavery] has acquired no 
right to a single foot of the new territory; the South avers the contrary. 
We press Congress for a decision, and it is refused us. Instead of de- 
ciding Congress undertakes to run the matter through so many different 
crucibles, that slavery will finally be established and that inveterate old 
rascal, Nobody, be alone responsible for it. . . . 

A governor and three Judges are to be the law makers and the law 
expounders in each Territory — said governor and judges being appointed 



52 Ibid., 21-24. Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 950. 



(338 JAMES K. POLK 

by Polk, and of course ehoseu from among the most determined, wily and 
unscrupulous champions of slavery extension. Nobody can pretend to 
doubt how they will construe the constitution. f^a 

/I^he discussion in the Senate continued until the morning of July 
^ 27, when, after an all-night session during which numerous 
amendments were rejected, the measure as submitted by the select 
committee was passed. On the following day, after a brief debate, 
the House laid the Senate bill on the table and proceeded to con- 
sider its own Oregon government bill. 

The President was sorely disappointed by this action on the 
part of the House. He was especially mortified because the 
defeat of the bill had been accomplished by the votes of New 
York Barnburners and Democrats "who are timid & afriad to 
risk their popularity at home." The result of leaving the slavery 
question unsettled, to be agitated by "ambitious aspirants & 
gamblers," would be to produce an organization of parties on 
geographical lines and to endanger the Union. He did not doubt 
that the bill would have passed if there had been no Presidential 
election pending. The Whigs were desirous of preventing any 
adjustment during the present session, 

doubtless in the expectation that in the chapter of accidents growing out 
of the excitement & agitation which must follow, that they may stand 
some chance to elect a Whig President. I deplore as a national calamity 
the want of patriotism which seems to actuate the conduct of the leaders 
of the Whig party in Congress; and I exceedingly regret that any portion 
of the Northern Democrats from timidity or other causes have been in- 
<luced to act with them.-"'-! 

By the eighth of August he had become convinced that Con- 
gress would not, at the present session, create governments for 
New Mexico and California, yet he believed that the Oregon bill, 
with its clause excluding slavery, might be passed. He asked 
the cabinet whether, in case this bill should pass, he ought to 
sign it. Each member responded that, since the whole territory 

s 3 Both tjuoted in Niles' Reg., LXXIV, 55-56. 
r.4 Polk, Diary, IV, 33-35. 



SLAVEBY AND TEBBITOEIAL GOFEHNMENTS 639 

lay north of 36° 30', he ought to do so. He then asked whether 
he ought to accompany his approval with a message stating that 
he had signed the bill because the territory lay north of the 
Missouri Compromise line. Buchanan feared that such a state- 
ment might injure the campaign of General Cass; the others 
believed that it should be made, either in a message or in the 
Washington TJnionJ'^ 

The House passed its own bill on August 2 and sent it to the 
Senate for approval. The Senate attached certain amendments 
which the House promptly rejected, and it looked for a time as 
if no agreement could be reached. Polk was ready to approve 
slavery restriction for Oregon, but he told the cabinet that he 
did not wish it to be inferred that he would sanction a restriction 
south of 36° 30'.='^ 

In taking his stand against the application of the Wilmot 
proviso to all territory it is evident that the President was ani- 
mated not by a wish to extend slavery but by a desire to preserve 
the Union. He believed that the Union could be saved by an 
extension of the compromise line — and, perhaps, in no other way. 
He had set his heart on having the whole territorial question 
settled by the adoption of such a policy. The elimination of 
Oregon would make the adjustment more difficult, consequently 
he preferred to have the matter setled by a measure that would 
apply to all three territories. He believed that the South was 
entitled to the privilege of occupying with its "property" the 
southern part of the Mexican session ; but, personally, he was 
most interested in allaying sectional discord. He was equally 
insistent — in defiance of southern pressure — upon prohibiting 
slavery north of 36° 30', although he samewhat doubted the 



55 Ibid., 61-62. 

56 "I expressed the opinion that if I approved and signed the Bill in 
the usual form without assigning my reasons, my opinion in regar<l to 
California & New Mexico would not be understood, and that it might be 
inferred that I had .yielded the question in regard to the Territory South 
as well as North of the Missouri compromise line, which would not be 
true" (ibid., 67-68). 



640 JAMES E. POLK 

constitutional power of Congress to apply such a restriction. In 
this, too, he was moved not by any feeling against the institution, 
but by the opinion that nothing else would satisfy the North and 
prevent further agitation. In a word, his attitude toward slavery 
was one of indifference. 

When, on the morning of August 13, Polk learned that the 
.'Senate, at the close of all-night session, had passed the House 
Oregon bill, with its prohibition of slavery, he realized that he 
must decide the question of affijcing or withholding his signature. 
Although disappointed because the compromise line had not, at 
the same time, been extended through the Mexican cession, he 
nevertheless decided to approve the Oregon bill and, in a mes- 
sage, to state his reasons for so doing. Buchanan did not wish 
Polk to state in the message that he would veto any bill which 
purposed to exclude slavery south of 36° 30' ; Mason, Marcy, 
and Ritchie advised such an announcement. While the President 
was drafting his message to the House, Senator Turney, of Ten- 
nessee, called and urged him to veto the bill; and Hannegan, 
although he had voted for the bill, offered to sustain a veto. 
Calhoun and Burt, of South Carolina, importuned him to veto 
the measure, but he informed them that he would sign it, "al- 
though I would do so reluctantly ' ' ; 

I told him [Calhoun] that if the question of imposing the restrit-tion 
was an original one arising for the first time, I would have serious doubts 
of its constitutionality. I remarked that there might be questions arise 
effecting [affecting] the very existence of the Union, upon which we ought 
to yield individual opinions, in deference to what our predecessors had 
done, and I considered this one of them. 

He reminded Calhoun that the Clayton committee of which the 
Senator was a member had been willing to exclude slavery from 
Oregon, and that many southern Senators had voted for the 
Clayton bill. He reminded him also that Burt, who was present, 
had proposed the amendment in the House for prohibiting slavery 
in Oregon, on the ground that the territory lay north of the 
compromise line. Calhoun pleaded for a veto, but 



SLAVERY AND TEEEITOBIAL GOVERNMENTS 641 

I repeated that I would sign it, and told him that if I were to veto it 
after all that had occurred, and in the present excited state of Congress 
& of the public mind, I should do more to inflame that excitement & to 
array the country into geographical parties and to rend the Union, than 
any act which had ever been done by any President or any man in the 
country. He left me fully understanding my opinions & what I would do."'" 

Congress had agreed to adjourn on August 14, the day after 
Polk had held the above-mentioned conversation with Calhoun. 
The President rose early and carefully revised his message to 
the House before the cabinet had assembled for the purpose of 
accompanying him to the capital. To Buchanan's caustic remark 
concerning Ritchie 's assistance in the preparation of the message 
Polk retorted indignantly that none of the editor's suggestions 
had been followed. The Secretary then reiterated his opposition 
to sending the message. 

Shortly after Polk had reached the Vice-President's room at 
the capitol he was informed that both houses were engaged in 
a debate against suspending the joint rule under which bills 
could not be submitted to the President for his signature on the 
last day of the session. Unless it were suspended not only the 
Oregon bill but the army appropriation bill would fail. The 
President communicated to several members his determination to 
call an extra session on the following day if this session should 
terminate without passing the appropriation bill. The joint rule 
was suspended and both bills presented for his approval. As 
he was about to affix his signature, Calhoun asked him not to 
assign his reasons in a message, but the request was denied. Nomi- 
nations to fill the offices created by the Oregon bill were made and 
confirmed. When the hour for ending the sessoin had arrived 
the House was so pressed for time that it adjourned in confusion 
without having read the President's message. ^^ — ■ 

In his message Polk told the House that he had signed the 
territorial bill, even though New Mexico and California had been 



5T Polk, Diary, IV, 70-74. 
58 /bid., 74-77. 



642 JAMES E. POLK 

left without governments, because Oregon urgently needed legal 
organization and protection. Turning to the cause of sectional 
discord, he thus stated the position of the slaveholder : 

In the progress of all governments (jiiestions of such transcendent 
importance occasionally arise as to cast in the shade those of a mere party 
character. But one such question can now be agitated in this country, 
and this may endanger our glorious Union, the source of our greatness 
and all our political blessings. This question is slavery. With the slave- 
holding States this does not embrace merely the rights of property, how- 
ever valuable, but it ascends far higher, and involves the domestic peace 
and security of every family. 

After commending the "mutual concession" shown by the fram- 
ers of the Constitution in dealing with the subject of slavery, 
as well as the compromise adjustments of the Missouri and Texas 
questions, he stated that he had not felt at liberty to withhold 
his approval of the Oregon bill, because all of the territory lay 
north of 36° 30'. "Had it embraced territories south of that 
compromise," he continued, "the question presented for my con- 
sideration would have been of a far different character, and my 
action upon it must have corresponded with my convictions." 
Since the extension of the Missouri Compromise line w^ould leave 
but a small area in which the people might hold slaves, if they 
saw fit, "is this a question to be pushed to such extremities by 
excited partisans on the one side or the other, in regard to our 
newly acquired distant possessions on the Pacific, as to endanger 
the Union of thirty glorious States, which constitute our Con- 
federacy ? ' '■'" 

Nowhere in his political career did Polk speak so emphati- 
cally as a southern man as he did in this message, and yet, as 
we have just noted, Calhoun tried to dissuade him from sending 
it to the House. It is unlikely, even at this time, that Polk was 
desirous of spreading slavery, but he feared that unless some con- 
cession were made to the South a dissolution of the Union would 



59 Richardson, Messages, IV, 606-6(19. 



SLAVERY AND TEBRITOBIAL GOVERNMENTS 643 

result. His desire for some immediate and permanent settlement 
of the slavery controversy was intensified by the defection of the 
Barnburners and the consequent weakening of the Democratic 
party. If the vexed question could not be settled during his 
administration there was, in his opinion, grave danger that no 
adjustment could be made which the South would accept. 

Chagrined because the Van Buren Democrats had cooperated 
with the Whigs in defeating the California and New Mexico ter- 
ritorial bills, he resolved, as soon as Congress had adjourned, to 
punish leading Barnburners for inciting insurrection in Demo- 
cratic ranks. His punitive measures must of necessity be con- 
fined to persons actually holding offices, and of these the most 
objectionable was Benjamin F. Butler, whom he had made United 
States Attorney for the southern district of New York. At the 
Barnburner convention, which had recently met at Buffalo to 
nominate Van Buren, Butler had made a speech in which he had 
denounced the administration and had practically defied the 
President to remove him. Polk accepted the challenge and sum- 
marily removed Butler from office. He would not have removed 
the attorney "for his mere opinions upon abstract questions, nor 
for his free expression of them," but Butler's action in throwing 
obstacles in the way of successful administration of the govern- 
ment had forfeited his right to an office of honor and profit. In 
Polk's opinion, Butler was now "one of the worst enemies of the 
Democratic party and its principles in the Union, ' ' and his news- 
paper organs in New York were more hostile to the administration 
than any of the Whig papers : 

Indeed the whole party of Barn-burners in New York, of whioh Mr. 
Butler is a leading & controlling member, are not only abusive of me & 
my administration, but they seem to challenge and defy me to remove 
Mr. Butler, in the hope, no doubt, that they may enlist the public sym- 
pathy over him as a martyr for opinion 's sake. By his removal to-day I 
have gratified [them], & they may make the most of it.oo 



60 Polk, Diary, Sept. 1, 1848, IV, 114-115. 



644 JAMES K. POLK 

The harrowing question of slavery in the territories could not 
be disposed of so easily as could obnoxious office holders. As 
soon as Congress had adjourned, the redoubtable Missouri Sen- 
ator gave the President new cause of annoyance by writing an 
officious letter to the people of California. Benton informed the 
Californians that since Congress had failed to legislate for them 
they were without a lawful government.''^ Therefore he exhorted 
them to meet in convention and frame a government under which 
they could take care of themselves until Congress should act. 
He sketched the type of government which would suit their pur- 
poses and suggested that a governor would be necessary to ad- 
minister it. The Senate, he said, had voted seven million dollars 
to pay the people of California for miltiary services, but the bill 
for this purpose had been killed in the House committee by lies 
against Colonel Fremont. 

Polk was much perturbed by this letter and sought advice 
from his cabinet as to the best means of counteracting its influ- 
ence. Without admitting that the governments established in 
the new territories had "been void from the beginning" he was 
aware that the military governments had "ceased to exist" and 
that "the Executive had no authority to organize a civil Govern- 
ment over them." Benton's "extraordinary letter," he told the 
cabinet, had been sent to California 

by Col. Fremont, the son-in-law of the writer, and the inference is ]>lain 
enough that he means they shall make Col. Fremont the Governor of the 
Independent Government they shall form. Indeed I think it pretty clear 
that this was the main object. 

He believed that the Secretary of State should inform the Cali- 
fornians, by letter, that the President would urge Congress to 



''i"The edicts promulgated by your temporary Governors (Kearny 
and Mason, each an ignoramous) so far as these edicts went to change the 
laws of the land, are null and void, and were so from the beginning. . . . 

"Having no lawful government, nor lawful officers, you can have none 
that can have authority over you except by your own consent. Its sanc- 
tion must be in the will of the majority" (Benton to the People of Cali- 
fornia, Aug. 27, 1848. Printed in Niles' Beg., LXXIV, 244. Also in AJta 
California, Jan. 11, 1849). 



SLAVERY AND TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENTS 645 

frame a government for them, and that they "need not be de- 
ceived by the semi-official and officious proclamation of Senator 
Benton. ' '"- A few days later the matter was again brought before 
the cabinet, and the more the subject was discussed the greater 
number of legal difficulties did it present. Polk thought it 
probable that the military government in California was still 
"a Government de facto," yet he was not certain that the Presi- 
dent could enforce obedience to it. Toucy, the Attorney General, 
thought that "the sovereignty of the territory rested in the 
people, and that they could, in the absence of the action of 
Congress, govern themselves as they chose." Mason and Walker 
believed that the sovereignty rested with the people of the United 
States and that Toucy 's view would permit even the establish- 
ment of a monarchy. "I stated," wrote Polk, 

that it was a subject which from its novelty was surrounded with many 
difficulties, but I thought instructions could be prepared which would avoid 
the decision of any abstract, doubtful question. 

He instructed Buchanan to tell the people that they had no 
right, under the Constitution, to abrogate their de facto govern- 
ment and form one of their own. These views were embodied 
in a letter written by the Secretary of State and intrusted to 
William V. Voorhies, who was about to set out for California in 
the capacity of postal agent for that territory.''^ 

The election of a Whig President made Polk more anxious 
than ever for an adjustment of the territorial question during 
his own term of office. His fourth annual message contained 
an urgent plea for the immediate establishment of civil govern- 
ments in New Mexico and California. The reasons for the failure 
to do this at the last session, he said, ' ' are well known and deeply 
to be regretted, ' ' and it would be irrational further to agitate a 
domestic question which is coeval with the existence of the 
government itself. 

«2 Polk, Diary, IV, 135-138. 

fi3 Ibid., 140-1-13. Buchanan to Voorhies (Buchanan, Worlcs, VIII, 211- 
215). 



646 JAMES K. POLK 

111 the eyes of the world and of posterity how trivial and insigiiifieaiit 
will be all our internal divisions and struggles compared with the preserva- 
tion of this Union of the States in all its vigor and with all its countless 
blessings! No patriot would foment and excite geographical and sec- 
tional divisions. No lover of his country would deliberately calculate 
the value of the Union. 

Although a staunch Union man, the President's conception of 
the rights of a slaveholder in the territories was quite as south- 
ern as that of Calhoun himself. The people of every state, he 
told Congress, had helped to conduct the war, consequently "it 
would not he just for any one section to exclude another from 
all participation in the acquired territory." Whether slavery 
would enter these territories, even if left to the slaveholding 
states, was believed, he said, to be rather abstract than practical ; 
but however that might me, "the quesion, involving, as it does 
a principle of equality of rights of the separate and several 
States as equal copartners in the Confederacy, should not be 
disregarded." 

His views on the constitutional aspects of the question were 
quite as southern as those on the political side. The Constitu- 
tion, he pointed out, had imposed upon Congress no duty to 
legislate on the subject of slavery in the territories, "while their 
power to do so is not only seriously questioned, but denied by 
many of the soundest expounders of that instrument." 

Considering the several States and the citizens of the several States 
as equals and entitled to equal rights under the Constitution, if this were 
an original question it might well be insisted on that the principle of 
non-interference is the true doctrine and that Congress could not, in the 
absence of any express grant of power, interfere with their relative rights. 

Since Congress, however, had, when dealing with previously ac- 
quired territory, divided the area between slavery and freedom, 
he was in favor of adjusting the present dispute in a similar 
manner, but if 

Congress shall now reverse the decision by which the Missouri coniproinise 
was effected, and shall propose to extend the restriction over the whole 
territory, south as well as north of the parallel 36° 30', it will cease to be 
a compromise, and must be regardetl as an original question. 



SL AVERT AND TEEEITORIAL GOFEENMENTS 647 

After this implied threat to veto any bill for prohibiting slavery 
south of 36° 30', he expresesd a willingness to accept an exten- 
sion of the compromise line, the policy of letting the people decide 
for themselves, or the submission of the whole subject to the 
decision of the courts.^* 

If the President had entertained hopes that his message would 
arouse Congress to take action, they seem to have vanished soon 
after his recommendations had been submitted. In less than a 
week he expressed to the cabinet a fear that Congress would do 
nothing and that California would establish an independent 
government and be lost to the Union. The rapid influx of popu- 
lation would make the demand for civil government imperative, 
and he believed that "the leading Federalists (alias Whigs) 
would be glad to avail themselves of the opportunity to give up 
the country for the purpose of relieving Gen'l Taylor of his 
embarrassments upon the Wilmot Proviso. ' ' This party, he 
said, had always opposed expansion, and had combated the pur- 
chase of Louisiana with as much vigor as they had opposed the 
present acquisition. Although the prospect seemed discouraging, 
he urged the members of the cabinet to use their influence with 
their friends in Congress. "It is, " said he, "a question of rising 
above ordinary considerations. We have a country to serve as 
well as a party to obey. "*^^ 

Even though the President was ready to go nearly as far as 
Calhoun in defending "southern rights," apparently his atti- 
tude was not prompted by an interest in slavery per se. He was 
willing — even anxious — to admit California immediately as a 
state, although there was every probability that slavery would 
be prohibited by its constitution.'"^ On December 11, Douglas 



6i Eichardson, Messages, IV, 640-642. 

65 Polk, Dianj, IV, 231-233. 

6« Indeed, if newspapers may be taken as an index of public opinion, 
it was certain that slavery would be excluded, for the only two journals 
in California were emphatic on this point. The California Star of March 
25, 1848, asserted that ninety-nine hundredths of the population opposed 
the imposition of "this blight" u]3on the territory, and the "simple recog- 
nition of slavery here ' ' would be a greater misfortune than to remain in 



648 JAMES K. POLE 

had introduced in the Senate a bill for admitting both territories 
as one state, but Polk believed the area to be too large and the 
settlements too scattered for a single government. He summoned 
Douglas and advised the admission of California as a state, and 
the creation of a government for New Mexico by a separate bill. 
Douglas approved this policy, but Calhoun, when consulted, re- 
fused to commit himself. On that very day, however, the House 
by a considerable majority voted its approval of the Wilmot 
proviso, some of the Democrats reversing the votes which they 
had cast during the preceding session. Polk now saw no hope 
of an adjustment except, possibly, the admission of the whole 
territory as a state under the bill offered by Douglas.**' 

Not content with approving the Wilmot proviso the House, on 
December 21, instructed its committee to bring in a bill for 
abolishing the slave trade in the District of Columbia. South- 
ern members were much excited and took immediate steps to 
arrange for a caucus. When informed of this fact, Polk declared 
slavery agitation to be "a mere political question on which 
demagogues & ambitious politicians hope to promote their own 
prospect for political promotion. ' ' About seventy members, both 
Democrats and Whigs, attended the caucus, and, after appoint- 
ing a committee to prepare an address to be sent to southern 
states if the anti-slave-trade bill should be pressed, it adjourned 
to meet at a later date.*"'^ 

In another effort to procure some positive action, the President 
sent for Senator Butler, of South Carolina, chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee to which the Douglas bill had been referred. 
He told Butler that no territorial bill which did not include the 
Wilmot proviso could pass the House, and that if such a bill 



the present state of disaster. The CuUfornian of October 11 was certain 
that the people preferred to remain as they were rather than have "this 
blighting curse" put ui)on them. On December 13 Benton presented in 
the Senate a petition from a New Mexico convention which asked Congress 
to protect the people there from the introduction of slavery {Cong. Globe, 
.'}0 Cong., 2 sess., 3H). 

67 Polk, Diary, IV, 232-235. ^'^ Ihid., 248-253. 



SLAFEEY AND TEBEITOBIAL GOVERNMENTS 649 

should pass both houses he would be compelled to veto it. The 
only way to save California was to admit her as a state ; he 
therefore asked Butler's aid in bringing this about. Like Cal- 
houn, Butler left the President in doubt as to what he would do. 
Polk then sent for Douglas who, after considerable persuasion, 
agreed to alter his bill so that California might be admitted 
and a territorial government be provided for New Mexico.''" 

The adjourned meeting of the southern caucus was scheduled 
for January 15, 1849, and on the fourtheenth Polk held a con- 
sultation with several of the southern leaders. They told him 
that the address to southern states, which Calhoun had prepared, 
was of such a nature that neither they nor their friends could 
sign it. The President approved their decision, for he thought 
that such an address would be mischievous. When nearly all 
of the Whigs and many of the Democrats who attended the caucus 
declined to sign Calhoun's address, it was returned to the com- 
mittee for report at a future meeting. On the following day 
Calhoun called on the President and said that the South could 
no longer delay in resisting the aggressions of the North upon 
its rights. Polk advised the admission of California and spoke 
with approval of a plan suggested by Douglas for joining to 
Texas all of the remaining territory south of 36° 30'. When 
Calhoun opposed every suggestion and declined to offer a solu- 
tion of his own Polk became convinced that the Senator did not 
desire an amicable adjustment. "I was firm and decided," said 
he, "in my conversation with him, intending to let him under- 
stand distinctly that I gave no countenance to any movement 
which tended to violence or the disunion of the States. ' ' ' '^ 

The President had come to distrust Calhoun thoroughly and 
to believe that he compassed a dissolution of the Union. This 
opinion of the Senator is made very clear in the report of a 
conversation held with Representative Stanton, of Tennessee, 
who approved the address to southern states. After urging the 

«9 7&id.. 253-2.55, 257. 7o/&,vZ., 28-i-288. 



650 JAMES K. POLK 

admission of California, Polk told Stanton that meetings and 
addresses would weaken the South and add to the strength of 
the northern abolitionists. A gathering of members from any 
section quietly to discuss a political question was proper, but 

I told him that I could not avoid the suspicion that there were two 
or three individuals, perhaps not more than one (but I named no one 
[Calhounf]) who desired to have no set[t]lement of the question, but who 
preferred a sectional excitement iu the South & a dissolution. I set my 
face against being involved in any such movement. I urged the necessity 
and importance of going to work in earnest in Congress, and not in caucus, 
to settle the question. I told him it was time enough to think of extreme 
measures when they became inevitable, and that that period had not 
come. I told him that the people everywhere were devoted to the Union, 
and that it would be a heavy responsibility if Southern members of 
Congress should prevent an adjustment of the slavery question by meet- 
ing in caucus & publishing addresses, instead of meeting in Congress, where 
their constituents had deputed them to act. He seemed surprised at 
these views. I told him I was a Southern man, and as much attached 
to Southern rights as any man in Congress, but I was in favor of vindi- 
cating and maintaining these rights by constitutional means; and that 
no such extreme case had arisen as would justify a resort to any other 
means; that when such a case should arise (if ever) it would be time 
enough to consider what should be done.'i 

Hopes and fears alternated in the President's mind as daily 
reports came to him of the debates in Congress on the admission 
of California. At a cabinet meeting held on January 20 letters 
received from Commodore Jones, Consul Larkin, and Paymaster 
Rich were read and discussed. Each reported that, on account 
of the gold rush, veritable anarchy prevailed and some form of 
government should be established at once. Polk directed that 
these letters be published in the Union in the hope that they 
might influence Congress to pass the California bill. He feared, 
however, that no bill could pass which did not include the Wilmot 
proviso; and he felt bound to veto any measure which prohibited 

Ti Ibid., 289-291. Polk was not alone in believing that Calhoun wished 
to disrupt the Union. "It is thought here," wrote Horace Mann, "by 
nianv of the most intelligent men, that Mr. Calhoun is resolved on a dis- 
solution of the Union" (Mann, Life of Horace Mann, 273). 



SLAVEEY AND TEERITOEIAL GOVEENMENTS 651 

slavery south of 36° 30'. He desired the immediate admission of 
California and thought that no southern man ought to object to 
its admission, but he feared that southern extremists led by 
Calhoun and northern extremists led by Hale and Giddings 
would prevent an amicable settlement of the question. "I stated" 
to the cabinet, was his comment, ' ' that I put my face alike against 
southern agitators and Northern fanatics, & should do every- 
thing in my power to allay excitement by adjusting the question 
of slavery & preserving the Union." Once more he exhorted 
his cabinet advisors to use their influence with members of Con- 
gress. His efforts failed to prevent the caucus from adopting 
Calhoun's address to the southern states, and he apprehended 
further excitement as a result of this proceeding.'- 

The southern Whigs were not ready for extreme measures. 
This fact was shown by their support of an address presented 
by Berrien at the southern caucus as a substitute for the one 
drawn by Calhoun. On January 22 Tooms told Crittend .n that 
California could never be a " slave country ' ' and that it ought to 
be admitted as a state. "We have," he wrote, "only the point of 
honor to serve, and this will serve it and rescue that country 
from all danger of agitation. "''' Even some of the extreme ad- 
vocates of the "peculiar institution" had little hope of install- 
ing it in the new domain. For example, the Mobile Tribune said 
that nothing could save the territories from becoming free states. 
If necessary, it was prepared to defend by extreme measures 
"our abstract right to a participation in them," yet it believed 
that ' ' the victory would be barren. ' '" ^ 

In order to facilitate matters and to avoid certain technical 
difficulties, the Senate referred the California question to a 
select committee of which Douglas was made chairman. On 
January 29 he reported a bill by which California was to be 



• 2 Polk, Diary, IV, 296-299, 306. 

-■s Coleman, Life of John J. Crittenden, I, 335. 

'i Quoted in Niles' Eeg., LXXV, 75. 



652 JAMES K. POLK 

admitted as a state and New Mexico given a territorial govern- 
ment. In the evening he called to tell the President that he had 
strong hopes of its passage. During the next few days Polk 
conversed with various southern members and advised them to 
support the bill, for, as he told them, this was the only way to 
allay "geographical excitement" on the subject of slavery.'^ 
However, northern members attacked certain paragraphs in the 
bill which purposed to extend laws of the United States to the 
proposed state and territory. They charged that the committee 
was attempting to introduce slavery into these communities by 
a jugglery of words. 

The end of the session was approaching and those wlio did 
not approve the Douglas bill endeavored to prevent debate upon 
it by urging the necessity of considering the general appropria- 
tion bill. In this they were outgeneraled by Walker, a ' ' dough 
face" from Wisconsin, who, after consultation with Foote, of 
Mississippi, offered an amendment which joined the territorial 
government bill, as a rider, to the appropriation bill. By this 
amendment the Constitution of the United States and certain 
specified laws were extended to the territories, and the President 
was given wide discretion in selecting the laws and regulations 
to be enforced.''' The introduction of the Walker amendment 
gave rise to an animated debate on constitutional points, and 
Webster and Calhoun took leading parts. It is unnecessary here 
to follow this debate, yet it may be said that northern members 
considered the amendment to be an instrument for smuggling 
slavery into the territories through executive action and judicial 
interpretation. Their charges to this effect had more real founda- 
tion than those of similar purport already brought against the 
Douglas bill. There was a momentary excitement among Demo- 
crats due to a rumor that Free Soilers and Whigs had planned 
to attach the Wilmot proviso to the Walker amendment and 

-■' Cong. Globe, .30 C'oug., 2 sess., 381. Polk, Diarii, IV, 312-313, 316. 
i^Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 2 sess., 561. 



SLAVERY AND TEEBITOBIAL GOVERNMENTS 653 

thereby to force the President either to accept the proviso or to 
veto the entire appropriation bill. When informed of this rumor 
by Venable, of North Carolina, Polk announced that he would 
veto an application of the proviso to territory south of 36° 30', 
no matter in what form it might be presented to him. In a 
slightly altered form, the "Walker amendment was passed by a 
bare majority of the Senate on February 26 ; on the following 
day, by a vote of 126 to 87, the House passed its own bill by 
which slavery was excluded from the territories. 

Only a few more days of the session remained and nothing 
short of a miracle seemed likely to break the deadlock of the 
two houses ; and unless some adjustment could be made the gov- 
ernment would be left without funds. On March 2 the House 
rejected the Walker amendment, and on the next day — the last 
of the session — a conference committee of the two houses reported 
its inability to agree upon any plan of settlement. The appro- 
priation bill would now be lost unless the Senate should consent 
to eliminate the Walker amendment. Officially, the session ex- 
pired at twelve o'clock on March 3, but the Senate indulged in 
a heated debate — even fist-fights" — until daybreak on March 4 
without coming to an agreement. Hunter, of Virginia, was ready 
to let the government go without funds rather than sacrifice 
southern rights, while Douglas believed a government for Cali- 
fornia to be more important than either. 

Polk had come to the capitol armed with a message with 
which he intended to veto the Wilmot proviso if it should be 
attached to the Walker amendment. Late at night he was told 
that the House had voted to amend the Walker amendment by 
a provision which declared the laws of Mexico to be in force 
until altered by Congress. The effect of this provision, as Polk 
at once saw, would be to sanction the law by which Mexico had 
abolished slavery. Buchanan, Walker, Marcy, and Toucy 
advised him to sign the bill if it should be presented in this 



7T Mann, Life of Horace Mann, 277. 



654 JAMES K. FOLK 

form. "Tli(\y drew a distinction, whicli I did not perceive," 
wrote the President, "between the amendment in this form and 
tlu' Wihiiot Proviso." Mason, on the contrary, advised him to 
veto the bill, while Jolmson thought that he had no right to 
take any action, since his term of office had expired. Members 
of Congress came to the President in excitement and asked him 
to veto any bill containing the House pi-ovision. After telling 
them that he had already decided to do so he began to alter his 
veto message so as to meet the new situation. ' ' It was a moment 
of high responsibility," says the Diary, "i)erhaps the highest of 
my official term. I felt the weight most sensibly, but resolved to 
pursue the dictates of my own best judgement and to do my 
duty." About four o'clock in the morning he retired to his hotel, 
and two hours later he was aroused by a committee from the 
two houses of Congress. Having reported that both the Walker 
amendment and the House provision had l)een eliminated, the 
committee presented for his signature a simple appropriation 
bill and another for extending federal revenue laws over Cali- 
fornia. He signed these, although he had some doubt that he 
was still President of the United States; the appropriations 
were saved, but Califoi-nia and New Mexico were still witliout 
governments.'^^ 

As a believer in territorial expansion, if for no other reason, 
Polk was sorely disappointed because Congress had not given 
goverinnents to these territories, for appai'ently he fully ])elieved 
that the Whigs would acquiesce in their separation from the 
United States. He had some reason for this belief, although it 
is evident that he attached too uuu'h importance to statenu'nts 
made by certain membei-s of tliis party. For example, when he 
asked Senator Clarke, of Rhode Island, to save California to the 
ITnion by sujiporting the bill foi- admitting her as a state, the 
Senator replied with indiff'erence : "Let her go." In the House, 
Alexander H. Stephens tried to block tlie payments to Mexico for 



7s Polk, Diarji, IV, 3()l' :U;9. Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 2 sess., 682-698. 



SLAVEEY AND TEERITOBIAL GOVERNMENTS 655 

the territories, and when Buchanan remonstrated with him he 
answered that he was opposed to retaining those lands.'^ Polk 
was disposed to accept these utterances as indicative of the Whig 
policy because, as he said, the "Federalists" had always been 
averse to expansion. As if to cap the climax, Taylor, as the 
two men rode together in the inaugural procession, stated his 
belief that Oregon and Califonia were too far distant to become 
members of the Union and that it would be better for them to 
form an independent government of their own. Doubtless Polk 
was not surprised to hear these remarks from the Whig leader, 
nevertheless he tliought that they were "alarming opinions to 
be entertained by the President of the U. S." and he hoped that 
they had not been well considered. 

Gen '1 Taylor is, I have no doubt, a well meaning old man. He is, however, 
exceedingly ignorant of public affairs, and, I should judge, of very ordinary 
capacity. He will be in the hands of others, and must rely wholly upon 
his Cabinet to administer the Government. s^' 

Such was his oj^inion of a successor whom he had never met until 
a few days before this. He did not foresee that Taylor would 
develop very decided views on the territorial question and that 
he would, in effect, adopt Polk's own latest policy of having both 
California and New Mexico admitted as states. 



T» Polk, Diary, IV, 294, 300. 

so 7b)d., 37.5-376. Taylor's attitude toward California was not new. 
He had opposed the acquisition of this country while he was fighting in 
Mexico (Taylor to Wood, Aug. 23, 1846, Taylor Letters, 49). 



CHAPTER XXIII 

TARIFF, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, AND THE 
INDEPENDENT TREASURY 

Throughout his political career Polk had been a consistent 
opponent of protective tariff, and of internal improvements 
undertaken by the federal government. He believed the so-called 
"American System" to be decidedly un-American — a breeder 
of extravagance and a menace to the constitutional rights of the 
states. Entering Congress at the same time that John Quincy 
Adams became President, he took a vigorous stand against that 
administration, particularly against its advocacy of internal im- 
provements. His views on this subject, as well as on others, 
accorded with those of General Jackson with whom he main- 
tained an intimate correspondence.^ 

In his first annual message, Jackson stated his opinions con- 
cerning both tariff and internal improvements. He regretted 
that nations did not, by common consent, see fit to abolish all 
trade restrictions ; as they did not, he was in favor of adjusting 
the tariff in a "manner best calculated to avoid serious injury 
and to harmonize the conflicting interests of our agriculture, our 
commerce, and our manufactures." He urged that the public 
debt be extinguished at the earliest possible date and that all 
revenue not otherwise needed be applied to this purpose. As 
there seemed likely to be a permanent surplus revenue after the 
national debt had been paid he was in favor of distributing tliis 
among the states, since internal improvements undertaken by 



1 In a letter to Polk, Jackson, after expressing friendship for and 
approval of Polk, stated that "I am sure the general government has no 
right to make internal improvements within a state, without its consent 
first had & obtained" (Jackson to Polk, Dec. 4, 1826, Polk Papers). 



TARIFF AND INTERNAL IMPEOVEMENTS 657 

the federal government were considered to be both inexpedient 
and unconstitutional. All loyal adherents of the President ac- 
cepted this announcement as the party program. 

Polk's utterances in Congress at this time were in full accord 
with Jackson's message. On December 30, when the House was 
discussing the expediency of distributing among the states the 
proceeds from the sale of public lands, he opposed such a dis- 
tribution as premature, since the public debt had not yet been 
paid. After it had been paid, he favored distributing the sur- 
plus among the states rather than have Congress spend it on 
public improvements.- When discussing the Maysville road bill, 
which Jackson vetoed later, Polk expressed himself as ' ' opposed 
altogether to this system of appropriations for sectional pur- 
poses." He "conceived these applications to be most pernicious 
in their tendencies, and unconstitutional in principle." The 
country, he said, "looked to the present Executive for the 
adoption of a system of economy and retrenchment," a system 
entirely out of harmony with the purposes of this bill. During 
the same session a proposal to allow a drawback on rum made 
from imported molasses gave him a chance to assert that he was 
"upon principle opposed to the w^hole system of the protecting 
policy called tariff . "" 

Always an advocate of strict economy, Polk, while a member 
of congress, did not hesitate to apply this rule to small as well 
as to large expenditures. At the risk of being considered "un- 
gracious" he opposed, in 1831, a resolution for giving thirty 
cords of wood to the suffering poor of Georgetown. The fact 
that Congress was the legislature of the District of Columbia did 
not, in his opinion, entitle it to give the national revenue to the 
inhabitants. Should it adopt such a practice "the poor of the 
other sections of the country had nothing to do but to come and 
sit down here, in this District, and apply to Congress for relief. ' ' 
The resolution was passed, but a year later he succeeded in 

^ Ahridg. of Deb., X, 594. 3 Ibid., 677-678, XI, 67. 



658 JAMES E. POLK 

defeating a semi-philanthropic project to pay forty thousand 
dollars to certain persons for giving instruction in silk culture. 
It was absurd, said he, to appropriate public money for such 
purposes.* 

In 1832 Polk was made chairman of the Committee of Ways 
and Means. In this position his most difficult task was the man- 
agement of Jackson 's war on the bank, but he had also to super- 
vise all questions of finance. His attempts to enforce economy 
very naturally led his opponents to charge him with arbitrary 
conduct. In 1834 Adams accused him of attempting to force 
the general appropriation bill through without adequate discus- 
sion, while Lincoln, of Massachusetts, charged him with trying 
to starve the opposition into submission.-'^ Criticism did not 
deter him; he persisted in his opposition to unnecessary appro- 
priations and in many cases was able to carry his point. For 
example, he advocated, and successfully carried, a reduction in 
the appropriation for the Cumberland road from $652,00 to 
$300,000." This was a triumph for economy, and a damper on 
internal improvements as well. 

As early as 1832 Clay became interested in a scheme to dis- 
tribute among the states the proceeds from the sale of public 
lands. Successive bills to effect his purpose met with disaster — 
one by the President's veto — and during the session of 1835- 
1836 another distribution bill was introduced. It passed the 
Senate and was brought up in the House on June 7, 1836. A 
motion made to refer it to the Committee of the Whole for dis- 
cussion received a vote of 97 to 96. Polk, who was then Speaker 
of the House, added his vote to the minority and prevented a 



4 Ibid., XI, 306-307, 691-693. 

5 "The chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means," said Lincoln 
on April 25, 1834, "came into this House when we had got only to the 
45th line of this bill, with the declaration that he was determined to press 
this bill through before the House adjourned. We were in consequence 
kept here eight or nine hours without refreshment, and exhausted by the 
fruitless efforts of the honorable chairman to accomplish his purpose." 

Co7ig. Globe, 23 Cong., 1 sess., 340, 347, 461. 



TAEIFF AND INTERNAL IMPBOVEMENTS 659 

reference to the committee/ This particular measure was laid 
on the table. Another bill was introduced in the House which, 
instead of giving the surplus to the states, proposed to * ' deposit ' ' 
it with them subject to recall. It passed both houses in this 
form, and while everybody knew that in all probability the money 
would never be recalled, the modification satisfied Jackson's 
scruples sufficiently to enable him to affix his signature. The 
money was to be deposited in four installments, beginning on 
January 1, 1837. 

The panic of 1837 which paralyzed all business activities 
soon after Van Buren's inauguration transformed the surplus 
into a deficit and created a demand for legislation to replenish 
and to safeguard the national treasury. The Whigs very natu- 
rally advocated a restoration of the Bank of the United States, 
but the Democrats, quite as naturally, could not think of re- 
habilitating the "monster" which they had so recently and so 
thoroughly crushed. Neither could the latter party rely any 
longer on "pet banks," for these too had gone down in the 
general crash. 

On May 15 Van Buren issued his proclamation, summoning 
Congress to meet in extra session on the first Monday in Septem- 
ber. It convened on the appointed day and, on the first ballot, 
Polk was reelected Speaker over his "Whig rival, John Bell. In 
the message which was submitted on September 5 the President, 
after calling attention to the financial distress of the nation, 
recommended legislation designed to separate government finances 
from all banks and to make the government the custodian of its 
own funds. The plan which he proposed was known officially 
as the "independent treasury," but it was more frequently 
called the "sub-treasury." Despite the vociferation against the 
continuance of the policy inaugurated by Jackson's "specie cir- 
cular," the President boldly insisted that government finances 



" This was a power of which a Speaker ' ' rarely, if ever, avails him- 
self, " said the National Intelligencer, June 9, 1836, in criticizing his act. 



660 JAMES E. POLE 

should be conducted on a hard money basis. Nearly a month 
before this message was submitted to Congress, General Jackson 
learned of the recommendations which Van Buren intended to 
make, and his approval is thus expresesd in a letter written to 
Polk: 

I have ree M lately some very pleasant information from the city — all 
is harmony and the object of the Executive is, or will be, to separate the 
Government from all Banks — collect & disburse the revenues by its own 
agents, — receipts of all public dues in gold & silver coin, leaving the 
Banks & the commercial community to manage their transactions in their 
own way.'^ 

Polk, like Jackson, approved the sub-treasury plan ; on the 
other hand, it met with opposition even among Democrats in 
Tennessee.** Judge Catron believed that the government should 
be the custodian of its own money, for, ' ' I care not what private 
Banks you put it into, it will convert the keepers into Federalists 
in principle & practice in a few years" i^" but his solution of the 
financial depression was a large emission of paper money. In 
the letter just quoted, he stated that a "Treasury circulation 
must be adopted," and, after reading Van Buren 's message, he 
pronounced the President's recommendations "sound in prin- 
ciple, but hardly possible in practice." The people, said he, 
are governed by habit and want paper money. They would not 
be able to understand Van Buren 's plan, and the "party will go 
down with it." A few weeks later he urged Polk to 



8 Jackson to Polk, Aug. 6, 1837, Poll Papers. 

!> In a letter, August 7, informing Polk of his overwhelming defeat in 
his race for Congress, W. C. Dunlap stated that every candidate for the 
state legislature favored some kind of a federal bank. James Walker in 
a letter to Polk, August 27, stated that should the administration adopt 
the sub-treasury plan it would find itself in a minority in Tennessee (both 
letters in Polk Papers). 

10 "The treasury,'' he continued, "dare not pass from the majority, 
without power passing with it — the Treasury is the arm of power, as much 
in this Gov't as in any on Earth; the placing it in private hands, is to 
raise up a rival power in the place of the popular will — of numbers, which 
will govern in fact, in Congress, & out of it, by sops. ' ' 



TARIFF AND INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS 661 

Strike boldly — it is your habit, & the means of your elevation; it is 
expected of you. Go for 30 or 40 millions, to be circulated fast as may 
be by the Govt — go for 20ties & over in gradations of tens. Strike out 
the interest feature— boldly declare that the farmers will hoard the notes 
bearing 5 per eent.n 

Polk did not adopt Catron 's advice to strike out boldly for paper 
money. He agreed with Jackson and Van Buren in supporting 
a hard money policy, although his position as Speaker prevented 
him from taking an active part in the House debates. At its 
session of 1837-38 the Tennessee legislature instructed her 
United States Senators to vote against the sub-treasury bill ; and 
Cave Johnson reported that although he was heartily in favor 
of the measure, the people did not understand the new financial 
plan and consequently were opposed to it.^- 

At the extra session of Congress a bill to create an inde- 
pendent treasury was introduced by Silas Wright, a close friend 
of the President ; it passed that body by a small majority, despite *fy^ 
the vigorous opposition of both Webster and Clay. In the House 
it was laid on the table by the combined votes of Whigs and con- 
servatives. Nothing was done to relieve the financial situation 
except to postpone payment of the fourth installment under the 
distribution act and to authorize the emission of $10,000,000 in 
treasury notes to meet the present emergency. Van Buren 
renewed his recommendation, and at both regular sessions of 
the twenty-fifth Congress an independent treasury bill was intro- 
duced, but each time the plan was rejected. Not even a letter 
from "Old Hickory" in which he admitted the iniquity of the 
pet banks ' ' that he had selected as repositories and commended 
Van Buren 's plan, had weight enough to influence the vote.^^ 

With this Congress Polk closed his career as a legislator. He 
was fully in sympathy with the financial policy of the adminis- 
tration although, as he said in his farewell address, "a sense of 

11 Catron to Polk, Sept. 2, Sept. 10, Sept. 27, 1837, Folic Papers. 

12 James Walker to Polk, Jan. 25, 1838; Cave Johnson to Polk, March 
25, 1838, Folic Papers. 

13 Jackson to Moses Dawson, Dec. 17, 1837 (Niles' Reg., LIII, 314-315). 



662 JAMES K. POLE 

propriety'' had precluded him from taking part in the debates. 
The fact that he had once supported Jackson's state bank policy 
and now favored a divorce from all banks subjected him to 
severe criticism from opposition members of the House. Williams, 
of Tennessee, quoted a speech made by Polk during the session 
of 1834—35 as the best argument that could be made in favor of 
employing state banks and against such a fiscal agent as the 

^dependent treasury.^^ After Polk had left Congress to become 
governor of Tennessee the independent treasury bill ( but not 
under that name) passed both houses of the twenty-sixth Con- 
gress, only to be repealed by the victorious Whigs at the first 
session of the Harrison-Tyler administration. 

We have noted elsewhere that Polk's "Address to the People" 
by which he opened his canvass for the governorship of Tennessee 
dealt principally with national issues. It was an able state 

, paper^^ and, among other things, expressed his views on the 
"American System" and the independent treasury. One result 
of protective tariff, he said, 

Avas to take the property of one man and give it to another, Avithout right 
or consideration. It was to depreciate the value of the productive industry 
of one section of the Union and transfer it to another — it was to make the 
rich richer and the poor poorer. 

Another result of protection was the accumulation of unneces- 
sary funds in the national treasury, and means had to be devised 
to get rid of the money without lowering the tariff. ' ' This plan 
was soon found in an unconstitutional and gigantic system of 
internal improvements," and these were parceled out among 
communities where the tariff politicians hoped to get votes. 



14 "But all must now be abandoned," saitl Williams, "for the sub- 
Treasury scheme, even at the expense of a political somerset. What, Mr. 
Chairman, is this much-talked-of Sub-Treasury bill? It is sinijily to sub- 
stitute individuals in the place of banks as the fiscal agents of the Gov- 
ernment. I propose to adopt as my own Mr. Polk's speech, delivered at 
the session of 1834-5, against this change. It is an excellent argument; 
I cannot better it; let it speak for itself" (Cong. Globe (Feb. 22, 1839), 
25 Cong., 3 sess., App., 372). 

1^ See page 143 and note. 



TARIFF AND INTERNAL IMPEOVEMENTS 663 

The assumptiou and exercise of the power, by Federal authority, to 
construct works of internal improvement within the States, constituted 
an essential branch of the system of which Mr. Clay was the reputed 
father and head, and to which the popular but false name of the "Amer- 
ican System ' ' was given. It was an essential branch of the falsely called 
"American System," because it was the great absorbent, the sponge 
which was to suck in and consume the excessive, unequal, unjust and 
oppressive exactions upon the people, and especially upon the people of 
the planting States, levied by a high protective tariff. High, unnecessary 
and oppressive taxes, levied by a high protective tariff — lavish and 
wasteful expenditures of the surplus money, by a gigantic system of 
internal improvement, and high prices of public lands, that emigration 
to the west might be checked — the laboring poor retained in the manu- 
facturing districts, in a state of dependence on their richer neighbors 
in whose employment they were, constituted Mr. Clay's far famed and 
miscalled "American System." 

The United States Bank, said he, was closely allied to the 
American System. By use of it "Federalism" saw the means, 
under another party name, to accomplish the "dangerous pur- 
poses" of Alexander Hamilton — "extending the power and 
patronage of the General Government, [and] corrupting the 
sources of Legislation." Banks, both federal and state, had 
"proved to be faithless fiscal agents," and therefore he now 
advocated the adoption by law of the independent treasury 
plan.^'^" 

With the bank controversy of the Tyler administration which 
followed the repeal of the independent treasury act, Polk had 
nothing to do. His friend Catron still retained his belief in the 
virtue of paper money and thought that the Democratic party 
could regain control if it would take a stand in favor of some 
sort of a bank — something like the one proposed by Tyler, which 
would issue paper currency. The party, said he, could not hope 
to win by simply ' ' offering nothing, ' ' and the sub-treasury had 
always been "an absurd shadow"; in addition, "the hard money 
plan is a theory — & deemed a feeble & exploded theory, by the 
people. "^^ Uninfluenced by Catron's arguments, Polk held 

16 Copy in pamphlet form in Polk Papers. 

17 Catron to Polk, Jan. 2, 1842, Folic Papers. 



664 JAMES K. POLK 

fast to his orthodox opinions. This fact is evidenced by his reply 
to a series of questions propounded by a group of persons in 
Memphis during his campaign for governor in 1843. He was in 
favor, he told them, of a sub-treasury and of metal money, 
although he did not object to a limited amount of paper cur- 
rency if issued by state banks. He was in favor, also, of a 
"moderate tariff," but for revenue purposes only.^'^ 

The Democratic platform of 1844 said nothing about tariff, 
except to reaffirm the very general plank in the platform of 
1840; nevertheless this subject formed one of the issues of the 
campaign. The compromise tariff arranged by Clay and Cal- 
houn in 1833 as a settlement of the nullification trouble pro- 
vided for biennial reductions until 1842, after which it was to 
remain at a uniform rate of 20 per cent. In 1842, however, just 
as this rate was about to go into operation, a new act was passed 
which abandoned the Democratic revenue basis and fixed the 
rates in accordance with the Whig policy of protection. In addi- 
tion to protective tariff, the Whigs desired to enact Clay's pet 
measure of distributing among the states the money derived 
from the sale of public lands, but Tyler blocked this by insisting 
upon retaining the so-called safety-valve proviso which had been 
incorporated into the distribution law passed during the extra 
session of 1841.^*^ It was well known that a revival of the policy 
of distribution and internal improvements would follow Whig 
success in 1844, consequently the Democrats, in the Baltimore 
platform, declared distribution to be both inexpedient and uncon- 
stitutional and reaffirmed the declaration of 1840 against internal 
improvements. 

Absence of any new tariff plank in the Democratic platform 
made it desirable for the candidate, Polk, to declare his views 
on the subject, and such a declaration was made in the "Kane 
letter" of June 19, 1844. As noted elsewhere, he expressed his 



18 Eeply dated May 15, 184.3. Printed in Nashville Union, June 2, 1843. 

19 This safety-valve provided that distribution should cease whenever 
the rate should be raised above 20 per cent. 



TABIFF AND INTEENAL IMPROVEMENTS 665 

belief in revenue tariff, sufficient "to defray the expenses of 
the Government economically administered." In adjusting it, 
he believed in shaping the revenue laws so as to afford just pro- 
tection to the interests of the whole Union, "embracing agri- 
culture, manufactures, the mechanic arts, commerce and navi- 
gation." In other words, he adhered to the historic doctrines 
of his party — tariff for revenue, with incidental protection. To 
be sure, Cameron and others may have tortured this letter into a 
promise of protective tariff in order to delude Pennsylvanians 
and other tariff Democrats, but nothing in the Kane letter itself 
warranted such a construction. 

In his inaugural address President Polk reiterated his well- 
know^n views on the tariff. After quoting from his ' ' Kane letter ' ' 
he stated that, when levying duties, revenue should be the object 
and protection the incident : 

To reverse this principle and make protection the object and revenue 
the incident would be to inflict manifest injustice upon all other than 
protected interests. In levying duties for revenue it is doubtless proper to 
make such discriminations within the revenue principle as will afford 
incidental protection to our home interests. Within the revenue limit 
there is a discretion to discriminate; beyond that limit the rightful exercise 
of the power is not conceded. 

Soon after he had taken the oath of office, he announced to 
George Bancroft "the four great measures" of his administra- 
tion: first on the list came the reduction of the tariff; and 
second, the reestablishment of the independent treasury.-'- Since 
Congress does not convene until December, his attention was 
first of all directed to foreign affairs ; he did not, however, lose 
interest in these party measures, even in the midst of foreign 
complications. 

As early as October the President began to draft the part 
of his annual message relating to the tariff and the ' ' Constitu- 
tional Treasury" as he preferred to designate what others called 
the independent or sub-treasury. His draft when submitted to 



20 See Sehouler, History of the United States, IV, 498. 



666 JAMES K. FOLK 

the cabinet was approved by all except Buchanan. The Secre- 
tary of State approved the recommendation to abolish the 
"minimum principle" and, in general, that of substituting ad 
valorem for specific duties, but thought that specific duties should 
be retained on certain articles such as iron, coal, and sugar. -^ 
Polk agreed to consider Buchanan's suggestions, but eventually 
he decided not to follow them. 

As submitted to Congress on December 2, 1845, the message 
invited the attention of that body to "the importance of making 
suitable modifications and reductions" in the existing tariff 
rates. All duties, he said, should be kept within a "revenue 
standard," consequently it was necessary to understand dis- 
tinctly what was meant by that term. By specific illustrations 
he showed that revenue diminished or ceased after a certain rate 
had been reached, and the point at which it began to diminish 
was the maximum limit of the revenue standard. No rate should 
go beyond this point, and all duties within the revenue standard 
should be no higher than the expenses of the government should 
make necessary. Rates need not be uniform, for discrimination 
within the revenue standard was permissible, but such discrimin- 
ation must be for the general welfare and not in favor of a 
particular industry or section. 

The tariff of 1842, he told Congress, violated the cardinal 
principles which he had laid down, because its object had been 
"protection merely" and not revenue. Its use of "minimums, 
or assumed and false values" and the imposition of specific 
duties had benefitted the rich and worked injustice to the poor. 
Such abuses should be remedied, and 

I recommend to Congress the abolition of the minimum principle, or 
assumed, arbitrary, and false values, and of specific duties, and the 
substitution in their place of ad valorem duties as the fairest and most 
equitable indirect tax which can be imposed. By the ad valorem principle 
all articles are taxed according to their cost or value, and those which 
are of inferior quality or of small cost bear only the just proportion of the 



n Polk, Diary, I, 85. 



TARIFF AND IN-TEBNAL IMPBOVEMENTS 667 

tax with those which are of superior quality or greater cost. The articles 
consumed by all are taxed at the same rate. A system of ad valorem 
revenue duties, with proper discriminations and proper guards against 
frauds in collecting them, it is not doubted will afford ample incidental 
advantages to the manufacturers and enable them to derive as great 
profits as can be derived from any other regular business. It is believed 
that such a system strictly within 'the revenue standard will place the 
manufacturing interests on a stable footing and inure to their permanent 
advantage, while it will as nearly as may be practicable extend to all 
the great interests of the country the incidental protection which can 
be afforded by our revenue laws. Such a system, when once firmly 
established, would be permanent, and not be subject to the constant com- 
plaints, agitations, and changes which must ever occur when duties are 
not laid for revenue, but for the "protection merely" of a favored 
interest. 

Attention was next directed to safe-guarding the government 
funds after they had been collected. Banks, both national and 
state, had, in his opinion, proved to be unworthy custodians; 
besides the framers of the Constitution never intended that the 
funds of the nation should be turned over to private corporations 
to be used by them for profit and speculation. Believing that 
government moneys should be completely separated from bank- 
ing institutions, he recommended that "provision be made by 
law for such separation, and that a constitutional treasury be 
created for the safe-keeping of the public money. ' ' The money 
of the people should be kept in the treasury of the people in the 
custody of agents directly responsible to the government : 

To say that the people or their Government are incompetent or not 
to be trusted with the custody of their own money in their own Treasury, 
provided by themselves, but must rely on the presidents, cashiers, and 
stockholders of banking corporations, not appointed by them nor responsi- 
ble to them, would be to concede that they are incapable of self-government. 22 

These two recommendations — for a revenue tariff and for a 
constitutional treasury — formed the keynote of Polk's domestic 
policy. He may have been less brilliant than his illustrious 
opponent, but few will now deny that he held sounder views on 



-~ Eichardson, Messages, IV, 406-408. 



668 JAMES K. POLK 

the industrial and the financial needs of the country. His policy 
was simple and economically sound ; and because, under it, the 
business of the country was, so far as possible, to be left free to 
seek its natural channels, little positive legislation was required. 
Clay, on the other hand, like Hamilton, reveled in thaumaturgy 
and legerdemain. His system of a government bank, protective 
duties, and the collection of revenue to be distributed among 
the states, was highly artificial ; and even if they were not uncon- 
stitutional, surely Polk was right in saying that they had never 
been contemplated by the framers of that document. 

So far as his own party was concerned the message was well 
received. Cass told the President that in the part relating to 
tariff "You have struck out the true doctrine, you have cut the 
Gordian Knot." His tariff policy was, of course, highly ac- 
ceptable to southern Democrats, and many of them called to 
express their approbation. ''We Pennsylvanians, " Cameron 
told him, ''may scratch a little about the tariff but we will not 
quarrel about it"; Wilmot, on the other hand, remarked that 
"the doctrines on the tariff were the true doctrines & he would 
support them."^^ It was rumored that Secretary Walker had 
written the paragraphs relating to the tariff, but Polk asserted 
indignantly that "the tariff part of the message and every other 
part of it is my own. "-^ 

Without waiting to see whether the Van Buren independent 
treasury would prove to be a success or a failure the triumphant 
Whigs abolished it in 1841, but, much to their discomfiture, 
Tyler blocked the reestablishment of the United States bank. 
After the election of 1814 the Democrats carried through the 
House a bill to revive the independent treasury, but as it failed 
in the Senate the whole financial question went over to the Polk 
administration^ The new President, as we have seen, made it 
one of his leading measures and recommended the establishment 



23 Polk, Diary, I, 109-110. Cameron, despite liis remark, opposed the 
tariff bill when it came before the Senate. 

24 Ibid., 124. 



TARIFF AND INTEBNAL IMPEOVEMENTS 669 

of a ''constitutional treasury" which was simply another name 
for the independent treasury. In following his advice it can 
not be said that Congress actually created anything ; all that was 
asked and all that was done was to authorize the executive to 
collect the government revenues in gold and silver, and to deposit 
them in the treasury vaults until disbursed in the course of ordi- 
nary business transactions. Congress simply made the govern- 
ment the custodian of its own funds instead of having them 
deposited in banks.-^ When, therefore, on March 30, 1846, 
Dromgoole, of Virginia, presented the bill which had been pre- 
pared by the Committee of Ways and Means, the title merely 
authorized the building of fireproof vaults for the safekeeping 
of public money, which vaults were formally declared to be the 
' ' Treasury of the United States. ' '^^ The requirement that metal 
money alone should be received by the government was added 
later in the form of an amendment. 

Caleb Smith, of Indiana, at once opened the attack upon the 
bill and offered an amendment, the gist of which was to author- 
ize the Secretary of the Treasury to deposit government funds 
in "any bank or banks M'hich he may deem expedient, and also 
to receive the Government dues, in the paper of specie-paying 
banks. ' ' As this amendment would nullify the main purpose of 
the proposed law there was, of course, no prospect that it would 
be adopted. It served, however, to make the issue definite, to 
align on the one side those who believed in a government treasury 
and hard money, and on the other, the friends of banks and 
bank currency. 



25 The same may be said of the Van Buren independent treasury. 

26" Be it enacted (^c., That the rooms prepared and provided in the new 
treasury building at the seat of Government for the use of the Treasurer 
of the United States . . . and also the fireproof vaults and safes erected 
in said rooms for the keeping of the public moneys in the possession, and 
under the immediate control of said Treasurer of the United States; and 
the said Treasurer of the United States shall keep the public moneys which 
shall come into his hands in the Treasury of the United States as hereby 
constituted, until the same shall be drawn therefrom according to law" 
(Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 574). 



670 JAMES K. POLK 

Smith's arguments in opposition to the independent treasury 
were not very convincing. He stated, erroneously, that the Demo- 
crats had not made the subject an issue in the recent election ; 
that Polk and other Democrats had once favored state banks ; 
and that the Van Buren measure was a "miserable humbug" 
which had never really been carried into effect. On the other 
hand, Grider, of Kentucky, asserted that the sole purpose of 
introducing the bill was to redeem party pledges, for he was 
certain that many Democrats did not approve of ''reckless 
financial experiments." J. R. Ingersoll, of Pennsylvania, saw 
nothing in the measure "to commend it to respect"; besides, 
everything contained in the bill was already covered by the law 
of 1789 which had created the Treasury Department. In gen- 
eral the arguments against the bill were so lacking in force — 
and frequently in pertinence — that Daniel, of North Carolina, 
had good reason for concluding that the Whigs themselves had 
"the internal conviction" that much good would result from its 
passage. 

The Democrats had small need for arguments, as they were 
certain that they could command the requisite number of votes. 
They maintained with justice that a fiscal agent was superfluous, 
and that the government was most competent to protect and dis- 
burse its own funds. They ridiculed the assertion that the meas- 
ure was a device to draw all metal money into the coffers of the 
government, leaving the people with nothing but "rag money." 
Dromgoole, who made the principal argument for the bill, denied 
the charge of discriminating against banks, for, as he said, they 
had no legitimate claim to the use of public money. On April 2, 
after Dromgoole had added an amendment which required pay- 
ments to the government to be made in gold and silver, the bill 
passed the House by an overwhelming majority.-^ 

On the following day the bill was received by the Senate and 
referred to the Committee on Finance. Nothing more was 



122 to 66 {Cong. Glohe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 595). 



TARIFF AND INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS 671 

heard of it until the twenty-second of April. On that date Web- 
ster asked the chairman, Dixon H. Lewis, when it was likely to 
be reported to the Senate and whether the committee had settled 
upon any amendments. In response to this inquiry Lewis stated 
that it was the intention of the committee to give precedence to 
bills relating to warehousing and mints. This apparent indiffer- 
ence to immediate action on one of the "leading" administra- 
tion measures did not escape the watchful eye of the President. 
He sent for Lewis and urged him to give precedence to this and 
the tariff bill, as postponement might endanger their passage. 

I then told him [said he] that I had great anxiety for the passage 
of the Constitutional Treasury Bill and the reduction of the Tariff, which 
I had recommended in my annual message. I told him that I considered 
them as administration measures and that I intended to urge them upon 
Congress as such, and that I considered the public good, as well as my own 
power and the glory of my administration, depended in a great degree upon 
my success in carrying them through Congress. 

Lewis was an ardent supporter of Calhoun, and the President 
embraced the opportunity to read him a lecture on the way 
southern men were jeopardizing important measures by petty 
opposition to the confirmation of northern appointments. North- 
ern Senators, he said, had ratified appointments of southern 
men, and there was no good reason why southern Senators should 
not reciprocate. To Lewis's complaint that Colhoun and his 
friends had been turned out of office, Polk replied that he had 
made his appointments without reference to any aspirant for 
the Presidency. Being "the first President who had taken bold 
ground and fully satisfied the South on the tariff," he thought 
men from that section ought "to cease their opposition upon these 
small matters in which no principle was involved, for the sake 
of enabling me to carry out the great measure which involved 
principle. ' '-^ 

2s Polk, Diary, I, 367-371. Polk believed that northern men attached 
more importance to appointments than southern men did. "I reminded 
him that Mr. Jefferson 's plan was to conciliate the North by the dispen- 
sation of his patronage, and to rely on the South to suj)port his principles 
for the sake of these principles. ' ' 



672 JAMES E. POLK 

Despite the President's anxiety the bill was held by the com- 
mittee until the eighth of June. Lewis then reported it to the 
Senate with sundry amendments, the most important of which 
postponed for six months the operation of the specie clause. 
After another period of slumber the measure was brought up for 
consideration, and, after three days of debate, it was passed by 
a small majority on August 1, the day after the President had 
signed the tariff bill. The House concurred in the Senate amend- 
ments, and the constitutional treasury bill became the law of 
the land. 

As early as January 9, 1846, the erratic MeConnell, of Ala- 
bama, asked leave to introduce a "bill to repeal the tariff of 
1842, with all its iniquities," but not until April 14 did McKay, 
of North Carolina, chairman of the Committee of Ways and 
Means, report a revenue bill based on recommendations made by 
the President and the Secretary of the Treasury. Under it, all 
duties were to be ad valorem. Commodities were grouped in 
schedules; those in the first group w^ere to pay 100 per cent, 
others 75, 30, 25, etc., until the free list was reached. It was by 
no means a free-trade measure, yet it was attacked as such by 
the advocates of protection. They seemed to regard the tariff 
of 1842 as something sacred, something which could not be altered 
without prostrating industry and ruining the country. "We are 
in one breath told," exclaimed Biggs, of North Carolina, "that 
if you do not protect the manufacturers they must be prostrated ; 
and in the next you are informed that by your protection you 
diminish their profits.-'' 

Opponents of the measure denounced the ad valorem prin- 
ciple and charged that it was an invitation to conunit fraud in 
valuation. They ridiculed the claim of the administration that 
a lower tariff would produce more revenue. "We are called on 
now," said Senator Evans, of Maine, 

29 Co?(ry. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 1022. He quoted from Clay (1833) 
to the effect that "In general it may be taken as a rule, that the duty 
upon an article forms a portion of its price. ' ' 



TAEIFF AND INT SEN AL IMPEOFEMENTS 673 

to reduce the rates of duty, not because too much revenue is raised, but 
because there is too little, and because more can be obtained by a reduction 
of the rates. Well, sir, I commend the prudence of those who take this 
view of the subject. Whether they may be able to demonstrate it in a 
satisfactory manner, is another matter.so 

Personal abuse of the President was not wanting. Gentry, from 
his own state, denounced, in the House, what he termed "the 
great, damnable, and infamous conspiracy" (Kane letter) by 
which the people of Pennsylvania had been defrauded out of 
their votes, and by which the men who had perpetrated it had 
reached the positions they now occupy : these men were ' ' James 
K. Polk and James Buchanan. ' '^^ 

Seaborn Jones, of Georgia, was selected as chief spokesman 
for the House Committee of Ways and Means, and indirectly, 
for the administration. All sections of the Union, he contended, 
would be benefited by a revenue tariff; for it was based on 
justice and would insure stability for all lines of industry. ' ' Pro- 
tection," on the other hand, "operates as a hotbed in bringing 
forth exotics which the soil and climate would not naturally 
produce ' ' ; and the fostering of special industries was not a 
legitimate function of government.^" Of northern Democrats, 
Wilmot, of Pennsylvania, was one of the most enthusiastic sup- 
porters of Polk's tariff policy. He branded the tariff of 1842 
as the ' ' ' bill of abominations, ' in violation of the genius of our 
institutions, of the provisions of our Constitution, and fatally 
subversive of the rights and liberties of the people. ' ' He favored 
a "constitutional tariff" such as the one under consideration, 
one "which would grant equal protection to all, exclusive 
privileges to none."^^ 

On July 3, after divers amendments had been rejected^* and 
an attempt to lay the whole question on the table had been 



30 Ibid., 1090. 31 ih id., 104:7. 32 iMd., 990-991. 33 ibid., 104:5. 

3i While nearly all of the amendments related to adjustments in rates, 
a few were grotesque. For example, Schenck, of Ohio, wished to insert 
Polk's Kane letter in the bill, and Stewart, of Pennsylvania, moved to 
make the title read: "A bill to reduce the duties on the luxuries of the 



674 JAMES K. FOLK 

defeated, the House passed the tariff bill and submitted it to the 

Senate for approval. On learning the good ne-ws, Polk recorded 

in his diary : 

I -was much gratifietl to hear the result, as this was one of the leading 
and vital measures of my administration. It was in truth vastly the most 
important domestic measure of my administration, and the vote of the 
popular branch of Congress, which had fully endorsed my opinions and 
recommendations on the subject of the tariff, could not be otherwise than 
highly gratifying.35 

The House bill was taken up by the Senate on July 6, and 
after two readings by title, Sevier, of Arkansas, moved that it be 
made a special order. Evans, of Maine, endeavored to have it 
referred for consideration to the Committee on Finance, but 
many Democrats contended that such reference would cause 
unnecessary delay. During the debate Clayton, of Delaware, in 
an attempt to outmanoeuver the administration forces, moved 
certain amendments and instructions which would, if followed, 
compel the committee to consider the whole bill. He was not 
successful, however, for Dixon H. Lewis, of Alabama, whose 
''twenty score of flesh "^'^^ was a host in itself, promptly re])orted 
the measure back from the committee with a request to be excused 
from its consideration. 

As chairman of the Committee on Finance, it devolved upon 
Lewis to lead the debate in favor of the bill. The belief so widely 
held, said he, that ad valorem duties would fail to produce suffi- 
cient revenue was "one of those axiomatic errors which, upon 
examination, will be found to be wholly fallacious"; even under 
the tariff of 1842 such duties had produced more than half of 
the revenue. Hannegan, Bagby, and many other Senators sup- 
ported the measure ; the main arguments urged in its favor were 
the abolition of the minimum and specific duties, and the read- 
justment of rates upon a revenue basis. 

rich, and increase them on the necessarian of the poor; to bankrupt the 
treasury; strike down American farmers, mechanics, and workingmeu; to 
make way for the products of foreign agriculture and foreign labor . . . 
etc." ' 35 Polk, Diflri/, II, 11. 

30 Adams, Memoirs, XII, 25. Lewis weighed 430 pounds. 



TAEIFF AND INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS 675 

Opponents of the tariff bill consumed more time than did its 
friends. In replying to Lewis, Webster attacked the policy of 
relying upon ad valorem duties, and he hoped 

to show to the Senate and to the country that this bill, so novel, so danger- 
ous, so vicious in its general principles; so ill considered, so rash, and I 
must say so intemperate in many of its provisions, cannot but produce in 
the country the most serious and permanent mischief if it should become 
a law.3" 

''As a friend of the Administration," Niles, of Connecticut, pro- 
foundly regretted the introduction of the bill, and "as a friend 
of the Administration he would vote against it. ' '^* Of the Demo- 
crats, Cameron, of Pennsylvania, was the most aggressive in com- 
bating the measure; but his charge that Pennsylvanians had 
been deceived by the Kane letter came with bad grace from his 
lips, for if deception had been employed, Cameron himself had 
been the chief offender. Benton did not approve all features of 
the bill, yet he declared himself ready to vote for any measure 
which would rid the country of the tariff of 1842. 

The attitude of two members merits special notice, for the 
Senate was so evenly divided that the fate of the tariff bill 
rested in their hands. Like other Democrats, Haywood, of North 
Carolina, wished the tariff to be reduced, but he maintained that 
the House bill would effect too radical a change. After several 
attempts to amend the bill had failed, he broke with his party 
and resigned his seat in the Senatc^^* Although his act was 
severely condemned by the party press, the President believed 
him to be sincere and conscientious.**' 



37 Cong. Glohe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 1089. 3s lUd., 1117. 

39 The reasons which he assigned for his resignation are given in his 
"Address to the People of North Carolina" (Conq. Globe, 29 Cono- 1 
sess., App., 1178 ff.). "'"' 

« Polk, Diarij, II, 48. He thought that the Senator might be piqued 
because he had not been given a part in framing the bill, yet "I believe 
him to be an honest and pure man, but a man of great vanity and possess- 
ing a good deal of self esteem. ... I give not the slightest heed to the 
painful insinuations which I learn this evening are made by illiberal 
persons as to the motives & causes which have induced his course." 



676 JAMES K. POLK 

After Haywood's resignation attention centered on Senator 
Jarnagin, of Tennessee, for with him rested the power to pass 
or to defeat the ''great domestic measure." Jarnagin was not 
only a Whig and a believer in protective tariif, but in his home 
state he had been a bitter personal and political opponent of the 
Pi-esident. On the other hand, the legislature of Tennessee had 
instructed him to vote for the administration tariff bill, and it 
remained to be seen whether he would follow his instructions. 
On July 25 the President was much perturbed by a report that 
Jarnagin had threatened to resign; for "should he do so, and 
Mr. Haywood's successor reach here in time, the tariff bill will 
be lost by one vote. ' ' Polk sent for Senator Turney, who prom- 
ised to ascertain the intentions of his colleague. Jarnagin agreed 
to remain in the Senate and to obey his instructions; but Polk 
was not wholly relieved from anxiety, for Turney informed him 
that manufacturing interests were attempting to win votes by 
the use of bribe money and that even he (Turney) had been 
offered a bribe. *^ 

Jarnagin 's position was a most unenviable one. Although 
he thoroughly disapproved the administration bill, his instruc- 
tions required him to support it. On July 27 he denounced the 
measure but declared his intention to vote for it; he did not, 
however, believe that his instructions precluded him from voting 
for amendments which did not affect its main purpose — the abol- 
ishment of the minimum and specific duties. When, therefore, 
Clayton moved a reference to the Committee on Finance, with 
instructions to amend, Jarnagin voted with his party. Polk took 
this to mean that he would break both his pledges and his in- 
structions. "Jarnegan," he observed in his diary, "holds the 
fate of the Bill in his hands and there [is] no reliance to be 
placed upon him," and he regretted the folly of Haywood in 
resigning at such a critical moment.'- P>ut the President was 
mistaken, for Jarnagin yielded the "pound of flesh" even though 

41 Ibid., 49-50. ^^ md., 51. 



TARIFF AND INTEBNAL IMFBOVEMENTS 677 

he succeeded in making the operation annoying to his opponents. 
On July 28 he again announced his intention to vote for the 
administration tariff, but 

I shall, when the question comes on the engrossment of the bill, transfer 
the whole responsibility, as far as I am concerned, to the keeping of the 
representative of the whole people, and then we will know whether it be 
a Democratic measure or not. 

He meant of course that on incidental questions he would refrain 
from voting and compel the Vice-President to save the measure 
by his casting vote ; this done, he would obey his instructions and 
help to pass the bill. He kept his promise,*^ and the bill was 
passed by a vote of twenty-eight to twenty-seven after an amend- 
ment proposed by Webster for guarding against under-valuation 
had been adopted. Before the final vote was taken Webster pre- 
dicted that the measure would be repealed at the next session, 
for ''it is as impossible that the sun should go backward and set 
m the east, as that the people should suffer the principle con- 
tained in this bill to prevail." 

Even after the Senate had passed the tariff bill the President 
was pessimistic. He doubted that the House would concur in 
the Senate amendment. A report that certain Democrats from 
New York and Pennsylvania would join the Whigs in opposing 
the amendment gave him "great uneasiness." They did vote 
with the Whigs on incidental questions, but, due to fear so the 
President thought, they joined with their own party on the final 
vote. Polk 's gratification found expression in his diary : 

This great measure of reform has been thus successful. It has given 
rise to an immense struggle between the two great political parties of the 
country. The capitalists & monopolists have not surrendered the immense 
advantages which they possessed, and the enormous profits which they 
derived under the tariff of 1842, until after a fierce and mighty struggle. 

43 Writing from his post at Naples to his brother, W. H. Polk said that 

-fl^'f ^ ??. f "^ ? ^VT'^ "'^* *''" ^^*^ °^ t^^^ t^"fie bill depended on 

the doubtful honesty of Spencer Jarnagin. " He had up to this time 

believed that Jarnagm would sell out even if the price were labeled in 

P^"yig^it= J"s "l-'^'x.'inT^ ^° *^"' •^^'^' i' *o me wholly inexplicable! " 
(W. H. Polk to J. K. Polk, Nov. 6, 1846, Polk Papers) 



G78 JAMES K. POLK 

This City has swarmed with them for weeks. They have spared no effort 
within their power to sway and control Congress, but all has proved to be 
unavailing and they have been at length vanquished. Their effort will 
probably now be to raise a panic (such as they have already attempted) 
by means of their combined wealth, so as to induce a repeal of the act.'t^ 

The President had reason to be gratified with the passage of 
this important party measure. It not only dealt a severe blow 
to Clay's "American System," but it put in operation a tariff 
policy which Polk had advocated ever since he had been in public 
life. Much to the disappointment of his critics no industrial 
calamities resulted from it, and the act was not repealed as 
Webster had so confidently predicted. Despite the scoffing of 
Evans, reduction of the tariff rates was followed by an increase 
in the amount of revenue ; it became redundant in 1857 and was 
still further reduced. While it would be absurd to attribute the 
prosperity of this decade to the operation of the "tariff of '46," 
no longer could it be said that an ad valorem revenue tariff* would 
block the wheels of industry. 

The reestablishment of the independent treasury gave addi- 
tional reason for gratification, and, like the tariff bill, it caused 
none of the disasters which its opponents had prophesied. With 
few modifications, the "constitutional treasury" has continued to 
the present day, and it has done much to extricate national reve- 
nue from the field of party politics. With the enactment of 
these two measures and the settlement of the Oregon question 
Polk had effected three of the four items of his administrative 
program. There was no longer need of anxiety for the "glory" 
of his administration, even though Davis had talked the diplo- 
matic appropriation bill to death. 

Having faithfully complied with the recommendations con- 
tained in the President's message, Congress believed, apparently, 
that the law of compensation entitled it to a free hand in ' ' pork 
barrel" legislation. Despite the heavy drain on the treasury for 
military purposes, items were recklessly added to the river and 

44 Polk, Diary, II, 54-55. 



TARIFF AND INTERNAL IMPEOVEMENTS 679 

harbor bill until it called for appropriations amounting to nearly 
a million and a half dollars. Clay himself could scarcely have 
asked for a more cordial endorsement of his internal improvement 
policy, and especially from a Congress controlled by Democrats. 
Polk promptly vetoed this bill, and his message to the House 
is an able statement of the Jeffersonian doctrine of strict con- 
struction. In his opinion, the measure under consideration was 
both unconstitutional and inexpedient, and parts of it "a disrep- 
utable scramble for the public money. " ' ' It is not questioned, ' ' 
said he, 

that the Federal Government is one of limited powers. Its powers are 
such, and such only, as are expressly granted in the Constitution or are 
properly incidental to the expressly granted powers and necessary to their 
execution. 

After quoting Madison's rule for determining the scope of im- 
plied power, Polk maintained that : 

It is not enough that it may be regarded by Congress as convenient or 
that its exercise would advance the public weal. It must be necessary and 
irroper to the execution of the principal expressed power to which it is an 
incident, and without which such principal power can not be carried into 
effect. The whole frame of the Federal Constitution proves that the 
Government which it creates was intended to be one of limited and speci- 
fied powers. A construction of the Constitution so broad as that by which 
the power in question is defended tends imperceptibly to a consolidation 
of power in a Government intended by the framers to be thus limited in 
its authority. 

National appropriations, in his opinion, should be confined to 
national purposes, and Congress ought to refrain from exercising 
doubtful powers. He censured in particular the present attempt 
to include purely local items by a jugglery of words. "To call 
the mouth of a creek or a shallow inlet on our coast a harbor can 
not confer the authority to expend the public money in its im- 
provement. "*^ Although he did not consult the cabinet on the 
advisability of vetoing this bill, he believed that Buchanan, 
Marcy, Bancroft, and perhaps Walker, would, if consulted, have 



45 Eichardson, Messages, IV, 460 ff. 



680 JAMES E. POLK 

advised him to sign it.^" He declined, also, to sign a bill for 
making improvements in the territory of Wisconsin, but his veto 
message was not submitted until the following December/" 

In the interest of economy and as a check upon political job- 
bery the President put his veto on a bill to grant five million 
dollars in land scrip to persons who claimed damages for French 
spoliations prior to 1800. In his message he pointed out that 
this question had often been discussed, yet no former Congress 
had seen fit to pay these claims, even when there had been a 
surplus in the treasury. Since the United States had never re- 
ceived anything from France for the injuries done he saw no 
reason for the assumption that our government had become re- 
sponsible to the claimants for aggressions committed by a foreign 
power. *^ 

As frequently happens at the halfway point of an adminis- 
tration, the autumn elections showed a decrease in Democratic 
strength. Doubtless the main cause of defection was the unpop- 
ularity of the Mexican War ; but the Whigs attributed much of 
it to abhorrence of the "free trade" tariff, although that law 
had not yet become operative. Among others. Governor Wright, 
of New York, failed in his canvass for reelection, and adminis- 
tration candidates were defeated in Pennsylvania. With his 
usual delight in causing the President discomfort, Buchanan at- 
tributed these defeats to the reduction of the tariff. Probably 
he hoped to get some concessions for his friends in Pennsylvania, 
but instead, Polk told him that he would, in his next message, 
recommend that no change whatever be made in the law until 
it had been given a fair trial. Wright's defeat had, in Polk's 
opinion, been caused by the treachery of the "Old Hunkers" 
who no longer deserved to be called Democrats; "this faction 
shall hereafter receive no favours at my hands if I know it. ' '*^ 



46 Polk, Diary, II, 58. -J" Richardson, Messages, IV, 610 ff. 

•<« Ibid., 466 flf. 

■*••' Polk, Diary, II. 217-218. In a letter to Henry D. Foster, of Penn- 
sylvania, Nov. 19, 1846, Buchanan said that he had always disapproved 



TARIFF AND INTEENAL IMPBOVEMENTS 681 

When, early in November, the President began the prepar- 
ation of his second annual message, the war estimates of Marcy 
were so large that doubts were expressed in the cabinet as to the 
ability of the government to meet its financial obligations. In 
accordance with Democratic tradition, financial ills were readily 
traced to "the money power," and the difficulty in floating a loan 
was attributed to the machinations of bankers in Boston and 
New York who were endeavoring to force a repeal of the inde- 
pendent treasury law. The gloomy Secretary of State doubted 
that the war could be conducted on a hard money basis; and 
although he had advocated the independent treasury, he was now 
satisfied that the government could not finance the war under its 
operation. °° 

In his message the President dealt with financial questions in 
very general terms. It was too early, he said, to estimate the 
revenue to be derived from the new tariff law ; but by the simul- 
taneous abandonment of the protective policy by England and 
the United States, commerce had received a "new impulse," while 
labor and trade ' ' have been released from the artificial trammels 
which have so long fettered them." The present tariff law had 
been framed in accordance with sound principles and conse- 
quently ought not to be disturbed. In order to meet the extraor- 
dinary expenses of the war a revenue duty might well be placed 
on certain articles now on the free list, but it should be repealed 
as soon as the needs of the treasury would permit. Walker, in 
his report, recommended, for the war period, a special duty of 
twenty-five per cent on tea and coffee, but like the President, he 
was averse to making changes in the existing tariff law.^^ 



the tariff of 1846, aud he hoped that a modification "will be effected be- 
fore the Manufacturers & Coal Dealers can be seriously injured" (Bu- 
chanan, Worls, VII, 117). 

50 Polk, Diary, II, 221. 

51 Eichardson, Messages, IV, 498-502. Walker 's Eeport (H. Ex. Doc. 7, 
29 Cong., 2 sess.). "All experience," said Walker, "is against the pro- 
tective policy. ... It is as unwise and unjust as it is repugnant to equal 
rights and republican principles, to force, by legislation, any class of the 
community to buy from or sell to another. ' ' 



682 JAMES K. POLK 

The tariff of 1846 remained the source of revenue for the 
remainder of the administration, for this Congress and its suc- 
cessor steadfastly refused to vote additional war duties. Never- 
theless, Walker was able to say in his annual report of December, 
1847, even while renewing his request for duties on tea and coffee, 
that 

It is now proved that a tariff for revenue not only yields a larger 
income than the protective system, but also advances more rapidly, in a 
series of years, the prosperity of the manufacturers, by the aug:mentation 
of their foreign and domestic market. 

In like manner he could truthfully assert that, instead of 
paralyzing industry as had been predicted, the independent treas- 
ury and hard money had benefited those who had so vigorously 
opposed them : 

Domestic manufactures require for their permanent and successful oper- 
ation the basis of specie, checking vibrations and inflations of the paper 
system. ... If our manufacturers desire great advantages from the home 
market, it must be abundantly and permanently supplied with a large 
specie circulation, which alone can sustain that market for a number of 
years, and prevent those calamities which follow an inflated paper cur- 
rency. A home market for our manufacturers, when based upon specie 
and low duties, is solid, permanent, and augmenting; but when founded 
upon paper credits, it is inflated one year, only to be depressed the next, 
or some succeeding year — thus depriving the manufacturer of any well- 
assured and permanent domestic market. ^J^ 

The Whig Congress was not disposed to aid the administration 
by voting additional war revenue. On the contrary, the Presi- 
dent was certain that attempts were being made to create a panic 

and paralyze public credit. 

The truth is [he observed] that the Whig party and leading presses, 
having failed to defeat the Government in the prosecution of the war by 
the "aid & comfort," they have given to Mexico by their unpatriotic 
sentiments, are now insidiously attempting to produce a panic in the 
money market and thereby, if possible, to break down the Treasury, and 
thus compel the inglorious withdrawal of our army from Mexieo.53 

52 H. Ex. Doc. 6, 30 Cong., 1 sess. When he saw the original draft of 
this report Polk wrote that "though in the main sound in its doctrines, 
I thought some parts of it speculative, and perhaps too highly wrought" 
{Biary, III, 229). 

53 Polk, Diary, III, 322. 



TARIFF AND INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS 683 

While this may have been an exaggerated portrayal of Whig 
machinations, the intemperate abuse of the President for having 
"deliberately plotted the war" naturally led him to believe that 
his opponents would resort to any means of crippling his admin- 
istration. 

If Congress could embarrass the President by declining to 
follow his recommendations, he was equally determined to thwart 
its attempt to force his hand on the question of internal improve- 
ments. Late in July, 1848, the House passed a civil and diplo- 
matic bill which contained, in the form of a rider, an item for 
money to improve the Savannah River. Polk well knew that 
the object was to compel him to abandon the principles of his 
last veto message, or to incur the odium of defeating the entire 
appropriation. The Senate later eliminated the obnoxious item, 
but before this had been done Polk outlined in his diary the course 
which he intended to pursue : 

My mind is made up. I will veto the Bill, if it comes to me with this 
item in it, whatever may be the consequences. I will do so, if it comes 
on the last night of the session, and if I am over-ruled by two 'thirds, & 
Congress should adjourn without passing the Civil Diplomatic [Bill], I 
will issue my Proclamation conv[en]ing an extra session of Congress for 
the next day. 

He was much depressed by the "want of patriotism" displayed 
by Whigs and bolting Democrats, both in the matter of appro- 
priations and in their refusal to create governments for the ter- 
ritories. "Whilst I deplore this state of things, all I can do 
during the remainder of my term is to adhere undeviatingly to 
my principles & to perform my whole duty. This I will do at any 
hazard." The present Congress, in his opinion, was as reckless 
and extravagant as any he had ever known ; the success of its 
improvement schemes would bankrupt the treasury.^* 

The adjournment of Congress did not relieve the President 
from the schemes of improvement promoters, for the Secretary 
of State now presented a project for external improvement. He 



54 Polk, Dianj, IV, 35-36, 66. 



684 JAMES K. POLK 

called Polk's attention to the provision in the treaty recently 
negotiated with New Granada whereby American citizens had 
been given the right of passage across the Isthrans of Panama. 
It was of great importance, he said, that a railroad or canal 
should be constructed there, and he recommended that engineers 
should be ordered to make a survey. Without consulting other 
members of the cabinet the President promptly put a quietus 
on Buchanan's project. If the government could make the sur- 
vey, said he, it could also construct the works, and he believed 
that it did not have the constitutional authority to do either.^^ 

Polk's aversion to internal improvements had become almost 
an obsession, and during the month of October he spent his spare 
moments in formulating a more thorough expose of the whole 
"American System." Originally it was his intention to incor- 
porate his expose in a veto message, for he fully expected that 
Congress would pass another internal improvement bill. 

Should another veto become necessary I desire to make it a strong 
paper, so that if I should be over-ruled, as I may be, by a united Whig 
vote and a part of the Democratic members, making a vote of two thirds, 
I may leave my full views on record to be judged of by my countrymen 
& by posterity. I can add to the strength of my veto message on the 
same subject of the 15th of December last. If I should not have occasion 
to use it, it will be left among my papers at my death. I am thoroughly 
convinced that I am right upon this subject, and therefore I have de- 
stowed much labour in preparing a paper which may contribute to con- 
vince others that I am so. 

His jnirpose, as he recorded in another place, was to show that 
the "American System" consisted of several closely allied 
branches: a federal bank, protective tariff, distribution of the 
land fund, and internal improvements ; that the system liad been 
overthrown in all branches except the last ; and if this should be 



55 "I told him furthermore that if any improvement Bill shouhl during 
my time be presented to me, I should certainly veto it, and that if I were 
to yield my sanction to his proposition it would be argued by my op- 
ponents in 'Congress that while I denied the i)ower to make internal im- 
provements, I was exercising the power, and that too without an act of 
Congress, to make foreign surveys with a view to make foreign improve- 
ments" (ibid., 139-140). How different from the attitude of a later 
President, who could boast that ' ' I took the canal ! ' ' 



TABIFF AND INTERNAL IMPEOVEMENTS 685 

permitted to survive, all the others would soon be revived. ^° One 
may, or may not, agree with his views, yet there can be no doubt 
of the President's own belief that, in demolishing this network 
of special privilege which had been woven by Hamilton and Clay, 
he was performing a most patriotic service. Those who have 
charged him — and justly charged him — with being a strong party 
man have failed to appreciate his conscientious belief in the 
principles of his party. No former President — not even Jeffer- 
son himself — had succeeded so well in putting Jeffersonian the- 
ories into actual operation. He w^as grieved by the thought of 
retiring without having crushed the last remnant of the system 
so elaborately constructed by Hamilton and Clay. He could no 
longer hope for reward or distinction from his party, yet he was 
quite as willing as he had been in 1834 to ply the oar of the 
' ' galley-slave ' '^^ in promoting the principles of his party, because 
he regarded them as most beneficial to his country. Even if 
laborious effort to indite a document so convincing that posterity 
must heed it is but an exhibition of personal conceit, still there 
can be no doubt that he was impelled by patriotic motives and by 
a desire to save his country from what he considered to be a real 
and serious menace. 

On the advice of his cabinet, Polk decided not to leave the 
promulgation of so important a document to the chance passage 
of an internal revenue bill. Yielding to their judgment, he made 
it a part of his last annual message. The message is well written 
and shows a firm grasp of the entire subject. It deserves careful 
reading, for it is distinctly the most able indictment of the 
"American System" to be found among our public documents. 
Although the historical, and perhaps the best, part of the mes- 
sage relating to this subject is too long to be quoted, a few 
paragraphs will serve to indicate the conclusions which he had 
reached : 



56 Polk, Diary, IV, 144, 157-158, 167-168. 

57 ' ' Polk worked like a galley-slave to cram down his report ' ' (Adams, 
Memoirs, IX, 83). 



686 JAMES K. POLK 

The spveral braiifhes of this system were so intimately blended to- 
gether that in their operation each sustained and strengthened the others. 
Their joint operation was to add new burthens of taxation and to encour- 
age a largely increased and wasteful expenditure of public money. It 
was the interest of the bank that the revenue collected and the disburse- 
ments made by the Government should be large, because, being the de- 
pository of the public money, the larger the amount the greater would be 
the bank profits by its use. It was the interest of the favored classes, 
who were enriched by the protective tariff, to have the rates of that pro- 
tection as high as possible, for the higher those rates the greater would be 
their advantage. It was the interest of the people of all those sections and 
localities who expected to be benefited by expenditures for internal im- 
provements that the amount collected should be as large as possible, to the 
end that the sum disbursed might also be the larger. The States, being 
the beneficiaries in the distribution of the land money, had an interest in 
having the rates of tax imposed by the protective tariff large enough to 
yield a sufficient revenue from that source to meet the wants of the Gov- 
ernment without disturbing or taking from them the land fund; so that 
each of the branches constituting the system had a common interest in 
maintaining the public debt unpaid and increasing its amount, because 
this would produce an annual increased drain upon the Treasury to the 
amount of the interest and render augmented taxes necessary. The oper- 
ation and necessary effect of the whole system were to encourage large 
and extravagant expenditures, and thereby to increase the public patron- 
age, and maintain a rich and splendid government at the expense of a 
taxed and impoverished people. 

Under the pernicious workings of this combined system of measures 
the country witnessed alternate seasons of temporary apparent prosperity, 
of sudden and disastrous commercial revulsions, of unprecendented fluc- 
tuations of prices and depression of the great interests of agriculture, 
navigation, and commerce, of general pecuniary suffering, and of final 
bankruptcy of thousands. After a severe struggle of more than a quarter 
of a century, the system was overthrown. 

The bank has been succeeded by a practical system of finance, con- 
ductoil and controlled by the Government. The constitutional currency 
has been restored, the public credit maintained unimpaired even in a 
period of a foreign war, and the whole country has become satisfied that 
banks, national or State, are not necessary as fiscal agents of the Govern- 
ment. Eevenue duties have taken the place of the protective tariff. The 
distribution of the money derived from the sale of the public lands has 
been abandoned and the corruj)ting system of internal improvements, it is 
hoped, has been effectively checked. 



TABIFF AND INTEBNAL IMPROVEMENTS 687 

It is not doubted that if this whole train of measures, designed to take 
wealth from the many and bestow it upon the few, were to prevail the 
effect would be to change the entire character of the Government. One 
only danger remains. It is the seductions of that branch of the system 
which consists in internal improvements, holding out, as it does, induce- 
ments to the people of particular sections and localities to embark the 
Government in them without stopping to calculate the inevitable conse- 
quences. This branch of the system is so intimately combined and linked 
with the others that as surely as an effect is produced by an adequate 
cause, if it be resuscitated and revived and firmly established it requires 
no sagacity to foresee that it will necessarily and speedily draw after it 
the reestablishment of a national bank, the revival of a protective tariff, 
the distribution of the land money, and not only the postponement to the 
distant future of the pajTuent of the present national debt, but its annujil 
increase. 

I entertain the solemn conviction that if the internal-improvement 
branch of the "American System" be not firmly resisted at this time 
the whole series of measures composing it will be speedily reestablished 
and the country be thrown back from its present high state of prosperity, 
which the existing policy has produced, and be destined to witness all the 
evils, commercial revulsions, depression of prices, and pecuniary embar- 
rassments through which we have passed during the last twenty-five years.^s 

An early payment of the national debt was regarded by Polk to 
be of such transcending importance that he was loth to relinquish 
the helm without having made a beginning. With a view to in- 
fluencing his successor, he told his Secretary of the Treasury that 
he desired, if possible, to purchase government stock, "however 
small the sum might be"; and as soon as the department esti- 
mates had been submitted, he directed Walker to purchase half 
a million dollars' worth. ^^ 

Like the President's message, Walker's report was an ably 
written document and a strong vindication of the financial policy 
of the Polk administration. The predicted disasters had not 
followed in the wake of the tariff of 1846 ; instead, Walker had 



58 Eichardson, Messages, IV, 6,57, 661. 

59"! informed him [Walker] that I desired to do this supposing it 
might exert some influence over the policy of my successor. I deem the 
speedy payment of the public debt of great national importance. If I 
commence its payment my successor may dislike to take the responsibility 
of reversing my policy in this respect" (Polk, Diary, IV, 162, 195). 



688 JAMES E. POLE 

the satisfaction of informing Congress that even the manufac- 
turers did not "desire the restoration of the tariff of 1842." He 
came out boldly as an advocate of free trade, and although his 
views were too radical for practical purposes, it would be difficult 
to find a better statement of the free trade theory. After an 
elaborate argument to show that nations as a whole, as well as 
all classes within them, were best served by unhampered trade, 
he arrived at the following conclusions: 

Wliene\'er the laws of nature are beyond the reach of man, there is 
perfect order under the direction of Almighty power; but whenever man 
can disturb these laws, discord and injury are sure to ensue. . . . The 
laws of political economy are fixed and certain. Let them alone is all that 
is required of man; let all international exchanges of products move as 
freely in their orbits as the heavenly bodies in their spheres, and their 
order and harmony will be as perfect, and their results as beneficial, as 
is every movement under the laws of nature, when undisturbed by the 
errors and interference of man. go 

Even though the President declared Walker's report to be 
"one of his ablest papers," his own remark concerning the Secre- 
tary's rejDort of 1847 was applicable to this, also — that it was 
"in the main sound in its doctrines" but "some parts of it specu- 
lative, and perhaps too highly wrought."*'^ Tlie two men were 
in substantial agreement on the fundamentals of economic and 
financial policy. Polk, however, always directed his attention to 
the attainable, for he was too conservative by nature to indulge 
in theoretical discussions. 

The specter of improvements — both external and internal — 
haunted the President to the closing hours of his official term. 
In January, 1849, he expressed to his cabinet a determination to 
veto a bill pending in Congress which proposed to pay Aspinwall 
and others $250,000 annually for twenty years, to enable them 
to construct a road across the Isthnnis of Panama. He opposed 
the measure first of all on constitutional grounds ; in addition. 



«o Walker, Annual Beport., Dec, 1848 (ff. Lx. Doc. 7, ;30 Cong., 2 sess. 
'n Polk, Diary, III, 299, IV, 224. 



TABIFF AND INT ESN AL IMPBOVEMENTS 689 

he regarded it as ' ' little better than a proposition to plunder the 
Treasury." On the very last night of his administration he 
went to the capitol armed with a veto which was to be applied to 
any internal improvement bill. No bill of the kind was presented 
for his signature, but he regarded the unused veto message as 
"one of the ablest papers I have ever prepared. ' "'- 

Among the bills signed on the last night of his official term 
was the one which established the Department of the Interior. 
"I had serious objections," says the Diary, "but they were not 
of a constitutional character and I signed it with reluctance." 
He feared that such a department, in its practical operations, 
would draw power from the states and extend, unduly, the juris- 
diction of the national government. Had he been a member of 
Congress, he would have voted against the measure.*^^ Walker, 
therefore, and not Polk, deserves the credit for this important 
achievement. It was the child of his fertile brain,''* and the 
passage of the bill was due in no small degree to his personal 
influence. 

Those who have been most bitter in their condemnation of 
Polk's foreign policy have found little to criticize in his internal 
administration. "When he withdrew to private life all industries 
were in a flourishing condition, and not even the victorious Whigs 
cared to repeal the ' ' great measures ' ' of his administration. None 
except Clay was fatuous enough to dream of reviving the obsolete 
' ' American System. ' "'^ 



62 Polk, Diary, IV, 314, 364. 
G3lUd., 371-372. 

64 Walker had, in his report, urged the creation of such a department, 
and it was his hand that drafted the bill. See Vinton 's statement in 
Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 2 sess., 514. 

65 See comments on his Ullmann letter in Schurz, Henry Clay, II, 299. 



CHAPTER XXIV 

THE ''POLK DOCTRINE" AND MINOR DIPLOMATIC 
QUESTIONS 

In a commencement address delivered before the Yale law 
school in 1903, Whitelaw Reid attached the name of "Polk Doc- 
trine" to President Polk's declarations concerning European in- 
terference in American affairs. Although Reid himself con- 
demned the doctrine, yet the very name given to it acknowledges 
Polk's important contribution to the great American policy of 
resisting European intermeddling with the affairs of the western 
hemisphere. Moreover, despite Reid's criticisms and his state- 
ment that it originated "in an intrigue of the slave power, "^ the 
Polk Doctrine has been approved and continued by the American 
people; and Presidents chosen by the party which overthrew 
slavery, and of which Reid himself was a leading member, have 
increased rather than diminished the scope of its application. 

Polk's first public declaration on the subject appeared in his 
first annual message of December 2, 1845, and referred to Ore- 
gon ; but nearly three months before this he had applied the 
doctrine to the Hawaiian Islands, and certainly not in the interest 
of slavery. In September, 1845, Anthony Ten Eyck was sent as 
agent to the islands, and his instructions prepared under the 
President's order contained the following significant paragraph: 

Your mission, under existing circumstances, is one of great importance. 
The United States have a deep stake in the continued independence of 
the Hawaiian Islands. They present one of those commanding commercial 
positions which Great Britain, judging from her past history, would be 
anxious to annex to her dominions. To promote the prosperity and secure 
the independence of these Islands, is therefore the clear policy as well as 



1 Reid, The Monroe Boetrine, the PoJlc Doetrine and the Doetrine of 
Anarchism, 7. 



THE "POLK DOCTBINE" AND MINOR QUESTIONS 691 

the duty of the Government of the United States. We could not view with 
indifference their transfer to or their dependence upon any European 
Power. 2 

This is a noteworthy addition the doctrine of Monroe : acquisition 
of the islands by Great Britain could hardly be regarded as col- 
onization, and the question of suppressing representative govern- 
ment was, of course, not involved. The reason why the transfer 
could not be viewed with indifference was that it would affect, 
detrimentally, the commerce of the United States. 

It was, however, the Oregon question, and his desire to obtain 
California, that gave the President the best opportunity to de- 
velop his policy of resistance to foreign influence in American 
affairs. Pakenham's rejection of his offer to fix the Oregon 
boundary at the forty-ninth parallel made it necessary for him to 
make recommendations to Congress, and, on October 24, he dis- 
cussed the subject with Senator Benton. He told Benton that 
he was strongly inclined to reaffirm Monroe 's declaration against 
permitting foreign colonization, "at least so far as this Conti- 
nent is concerned." "I remarked," said he, 

that Great Britain had her eye on that country [California] and intended 
to possess it if she could, but that the people of the U. S. would not will- 
ingly permit California to pass into the possession of any foreign mon- 
archy, and that in reasserting Mr. Monroe's doctrine, I had California «&; 
the fine bay of San Francisco as much in view as Oregon. 

The conversation then turned to Cuba and the two men agreed 

that 

as long as Cuba remained in possession of the present Government we 
would not object, but if a powerful foreign power was about to possess it, 
we would not permit it. On the same footing we would place California.s 

There was of course nothing new in Polk's stand on the 
Cuban question. From the beginning of our national existence 
Cuba had been regarded as essential to our commercial prosperity, 
and consequently within the sphere of American influence. His 



2 Buchanan to Ten Eyck, Sept. 10, 1845 (Buchanan, Worls, VI, 255 ff.). 

3 Polk, Diary, I, 71. 



692 JAMES K. POLK 

attitude was the same as Jefferson's,* that its possession by Spain 
might be tolerated, but that it must not pass to a strong maritime 
power. Although he later attempted to purchase Cuba, Polk was 
not desirous of acquiring insular possessions, except as a safe- 
guard to American interests. This fact is shown by his refusal, 
a short time before his conversation with Benton, to purchase 
from Sweden the island of Saint Bartholomew. In reply to the 
offer made by the king of Sweden, the President directed 
Buchanan to state that "the acquisition of distant insular posses- 
sions, for Colonial dependencies, has never been deemed desirable 
or expedient by the United States. "^ In a word, Polk was not an 
imperialist, albeit he was a most ardent expansionist. 

Rumors of British and French designs on California induced 
Polk to take early steps to prevent their success. Six weeks be- 
fore Congress had assem^bled he instructed Buchanan to notify 
Thomas 0. Larkin, American consul at Monterey, that the Presi- 
dent could not view with indifference the transfer of California to 
Great Britain or any other European nation, for "the system of 
colonization by foreign monarchies on the North American con- 
tinent must and will be resisted by the United States." The 
government, he said, did not intend to interfere between Mexico 
and California, but "it would vigorously interfere to prevent the 
latter from becoming a British or French Colony.'"^ In a com- 
munication written during the following month Slidell, also, was 
given a statement concerning the policy of his government. After 
speaking of the beneficial results of the Monroe Doctrine, 
Buchanan said that 

The nations on the continent of America have interests peculiar to 
themselves. Their free forms of Government are altogether different from 
the monarchical institutions of Europe. The interests and independence 
of these sister nations require that they should establish and maintain an 
American system of policy for their own protection and security, entirely 



4 See Henry Adams, Historii of the United States, IV, 342-343. 

5 Buchanan to Ellsworth, July 28, 1845 (Buchanan, Worls, VI, 212). 

G Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845 (Buchanan, Worls, VI, 275-276). 
The original is in the Larkin Papers, Bancroft Library. 



THE "POLK DOCTRINE" AND MINOR QUESTIONS 693 

distinct from that which has so long prevailed in Europe. To tolerate 
any interference on the part of European sovereigns Avith controversies 
in America; to permit them to apply the worn-out dogma of the balance 
of power to the free States of this continent; and above all, to suffer them 
to establish new Colonies of their own, intermingled wdth our free Ke- 
publics, would be to make, to some extent, a voluntary sacrifice of our 
independence. These truths ought everywhere, throughout the continent 

of America, to be impressed on the public mind Liberty here must 

be allowed to work out its natural results; and these will, ere long, 
astonish the world.'^ 

So far, the expression of the President '^ sentiments had been 
confined to secret instructions, but his message of December 2, 
1845, announced to Congress and to the world the policy which 
he meant to pursue. He told Congress that certain European 
nations, in order to check the territorial expansion of the United 
States, were attempting to extend to America the "balance of 
power" doctrine which had long been maintained in Europe. 
But the United States, he said, 

can not in silence permit any European interference on the North 
American continent, and should any such interference be attempted will 
be ready to resist it at any and all hazards. 

.... Existing rights of every European nation should be respected, but 
it is due alike to our safety and our interests that the efiieient protection 
of our law« should be extended over our whole territorial limits, and that 
it should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy that 
no future European colony or dominion shall with our consent be planted 
or established on any part of the North American continent.^ 

In this pronouncement Polk professed to be reiterating the 
Monroe Doctrine, but it differed in two particulars from the; 
declaration of Monroe. In the first place, Polk forbade anu 
European interference; and in the second, he spoke only of North\ 
America. His statement that "we must maintain the principle/ 
that the people of this continent alone have the right to decide 
their own destiny" evidently applied only in cases where a peo- 
ple desired to join the United States, for his views with respect 
to Cuba and Hawaii would seem to preclude a transfer of 



■ Buchanan to Slidell, Nov. 10, 1845 (Buchanan, Works, VI, 295). 
8 Eichardson, Messages, IV, 398-399. 



694 JAMES K. POLK 

possessions, even with the consent of the inhabitants. In each 
case it was the commerce of the United States which he sought 
to protect, and not the civil rights of the people of those islands, 
f Polk's declaration was, also, much more definite than that of 
his predecessor; in fact it was a contingent declaration of war. 
Some of the London papers were severe in their criticism of 
the President's message. They perverted it into a declaration 
of intention to absorb all of North America. ''The President 
advises Congress," said the Spectator, 

to ann and organize the militia that they may be prepared to receive all com- 
munities already settled on the North American continent into the bosom of 
the Union, and prevent the colonization of any part of the continent by 
European nations. 

Only a part of this statement was true. The Times professed to 
see in the message not merely a bar to future colonization, but 
"we must infer from the language of the President that exist- 
ing rights and settlements are held by a questionable tenure.'"^ 
There was, of course, no occasion for this inference, for Polk had 
stated explicitly that existing rights should be respected. 

On January 14, 1846, Senator Allen, chairman of the Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations, asked leave to introduce a joint 
resolution relating to the subject of foreign interference in 
American affairs. It followed closely the language of the Presi- 
dent's declaration, and its object was to reenforce that declaration 
by giving it the formal approval of Congress. Calhoun objected 
even to the introduction of the resolution on the ground that a 
discussion of the subject would stir up enmities and would lead 
to no possible good. He resented, he said, such outrageous inter- 
ference as that undertaken by France and England in the affairs 
of Buenos Ayres, but 

the great question presented by this resolution was, whether we should take 
under our guardianship the whole family of American States, and pledge 
ourselves to extend to them our protection against all foreign aggression.io 

9 Quoted by Cass in Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 240. 

10 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 197. 



THE "FOLK DOCTBINE" AND MINOR QUESTIONS 695 

Allen's motion for leave to present his resolution was sent 
to the table, but on January 24 the vote was reversed. The main 
supporters of the resolution were Cass and Allen, the former 
asserting that the President's declaration would be barren of 
results "unless adopted by the national legislature." We could 
not, he said, permit the United States to be "belted round by the 
fleets, armies, and territories" of England; "Oregon and Cali- 
fornia, if gained, and Mexico influenced, if not ruled, would 
complete the circle" of British domination. In opposing the 
resolution, Calhoun characterized it as "vaporing bravado." He 
deplored the attempt to lay down general rules, and held that 
each question should be settled on its merits. For example, the 
machinations of Great Britain and France in Texas should, if 
necessary, be resisted by war, for they "would have as much right 
to induce a member to go out of the Union as to prevent one 
coming in."[!] The resolution was referred to the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, from which it never emerged ; Polk's decla- 
ration, like that of his predecessor, remained a mere dictum of 
the executive. 

Throughout the year 1846 there were persistent rumors of 

European designs to establish a monarchy in Mexico. As early 

as January 17 McLane wrote from London that 

a favorite scheme of the leading po-\vers of Europe is to compose the Mexican 
troubles by giving her a settled monarchical form of Government, and sup- 
plying the monarch from one of their o^vn families. 

There were many protests, he added, against Polk's allusions to 
the Monroe Doctrine.^ ^ However groundless such rumors may 
have been, their recurrence could hardly fail to cause apprehen- 
sion on the part of the administration. 

In March, Buchanan informed Slidell that ' ' we have received 
information from different quarters, in corroberation of your 
statement^- that there may be a design on the part of several 



11 McLane to Polk, Jan. 17, 1846, PoJJc Papers. 

12 Slidell had written on February 6 that "for some time past, rumora 
have been rife of the establishment of a monarchy in the person of a 
foreign prince" {E. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 58). 



696 JAMES E. POLK 

European Powers to establish a monarchy in Mexico." It is 
supposed, said he, that the ck^-rgy would welcome such a change, 
and that continued revolution may induce the people to accept 
it as a means of security and protection. "Indeed, rumor has 
already indicated the King, in the person of the Spanish Prince 
Henry, the son of Francisco de Paula, and the rejected suitor of 
Queen Isabella." While Buchanan believed these rumors to be 
idle speculations, nevertheless Slidell was instructed to use the 
utmost vigilance in ascertaining whether such a plot really 
existed. 

Should Great Britain and France attempt to place a Spanish or any 
other European Prince upon the throne of Mexico, this would be resisted 
by all the power of the United States. In opposition to such an attempt, 
party distinctions in this country would vanish and the people would be 
nearly unanimous. i^ 

Apparently, the President did not believe that foreign nations 
would actually attempt to set up a monarchy in ]\Iexico, for his 
diary is silent on this subject. Still, he was ever on the alert, 
and determined, if necessary, to resist such an attempt. In 
December, he denied Donelson's request for a leave of absence 
from Berlin, because "a project has been suggested, of establish- 
ing a monarchy in Mexico and placing a foreign Prince upon the 
throne." Although Prussia, said he, had no special interest in 
the matter, she probably would be committed, therefore Donel- 
son should be in Berlin to meet the issue. Whatever the facts 
might be. 

Should such a project be attempted, it must be resisted by this Govern- 
ment, at any hazard. This was shadowed forth in a mild manner in my 
late message to Congress. i* 

Rumors of the Mexican monarchy proved to be, as Mark 
Twain said of the report of his own death, "greatly exaggerated" ; 
but in asserting that he would resist such a project, Polk can not 



13 Buchanan to Slidell, March 12, 1846 (Buchanan, Works, VI, 404-405;. 
i*Polk to Donelson, Dec. 29, 1846, "Polk-Donelson Letters," Tenn. 
Hitit. Mag., Ill, No. 1, 72. 



THE ''POLK DOCTEINE" AND MINOS QUESTIONS 697 

be charged with inventing a new doctrine, for this case at least 
fell clearly within the declaration of Monroe against the activities 
of the Holy Alliance. It is well known, of course, that at a later 
date France was compelled by the United States to withdraw her 
support from the Emperor Maximilian. 

None of President Polk 's utterances against foreign influence 
in America has met with so much criticism as his message relat- 
ing to Yucatan. During the Mexican war this department main- 
tained, as far as possible, a neutral position which necessarily 
deprived it of the protection of Mexico. In March, 1848, Justo 
Sierra, Yucatanese commissioner in Washington, applied to 
Buchanan for military assistance, stating in his application that 
the white inhabitants were threatened with extermination by the 
Indians. Buchanan and Walker were in favor of sending them 
arms and ammunition, and after some hesitation the President 
consented to authorize Commodore Perry to supply the white 
inhabitants with ammunition, if he could be assured that it 
would not find its way to other parts of Mexico." 

After several rather unsatisfactory conversations with both 
Buchanan and Polk, Sierra, on April 25, presented a formal 
communication from the governor of Yucatan. The governor 
requested aid against the Indians and stated that the people of 
the department "were ready to surrender their country & the 
sovereignty over it to any Government which would protect & 
save them from extermination." He stated, also, that a similar 
offer had been made to Great Britain and Spain. Prospect of 
foreign domination called for prompt action, and Polk informed 
his cabinet that 

Ave could never agree to see Yucatan pass into the hands of a foreign 
monarchy to be possessed and colonized by them, and that sooner than this 
should take place the U. S. should afford the aid & protection asked, but 
that tills could only be done by the authority of Congress.i6 

Without delay, the President began the preparation of a 
message on the subject of Yucatan. The preliminary draft was 



15 Polk, Diary, III, 374. " Jhid., 433-434. 



698 JAMES K. FOLK 

shown to the cabinet and to various members of Congress, all 
of whom approved the sentiments which he had expressed. As 
submitted to Congress on April 29, 1848, the message, after call- 
ing attention to the deplorable conditions in Yucatan, stated 
that the department had offered to transfer the "dominion and 
sovereigny of the peninsula" to the United States, and that 
similar offers had been made to both England and Spain. 

Whilst it is not my purpose, [said he], to recommend the adoption of any 
measure with a view to the acquisition of the ' ' dominion and sovereignty ' ' 
over Yucatan, yet according to our established policy, we could not consent 
to a transfer of this "dominion and sovereignty" either to Spain, Great 
Britain, or any other European power.i" 

1 

/While the president alleged that he was restating the "established 

policy" announced by Monroe, which "applies with great force 
to the peninsula of Yucatan," it is obvious that the question 
under consideration was not covered by either declaration of the 
Monroe Doctrine. Monroe had spoken of colonization, and of 
forcible interference with established governments ; Polk asserted 
that we could not consent to a transfer of ' ' dominion and 
sovereignty," even at the solicitation of the inhabitants. But to 
show that the Yucatan question did not fall within the purview 
of the Monroe Doctrine does not prove that Polk should not have 
announced his own much-criticized doctrine. Monroe dealt with 
the threatened dangers of his own time ; was it presumptuous in 
Polk to declare, in similar manner, his policy for dealing with 
new phases of foreign domination ? Indirectly, there was a close 
connection between the Polk Doctrine and that of Monroe. The 
purpose of the anti-colonization declaration of Monroe was to 
shut out, for the future, undesirable neighbors; this, also, was 
the purpose of forbidding the transfer of Yucatan to any Euro- 
pean nation. In neither case was any thought given to tlie wishes 
of the actual or the prospective inhabitants ; the sole considera- 
tion was the welfare of the United States. Moreover, Polk's 



17 Eichardson, Messages, IV, 581-582. 



THE ''POLK DOCTSINE" AND MINOR QUESTIONS 699 

announcement regarding Yucatan was quite in line with that of 
his predecessors with respect to Cuba, and the degree of im- 
portance does not affect the principle involved. For example, 
when Secretary Clay, by order of President Adams, notified 
France and other powers that we could not consent to the occu- 
pation of Cuba and Porto Rico "by au}^ other European power 
than Spain under any contingency whatever, "^^ he was thinking 
of the transfer per se and of the effect upon the United States, 
and not of the wishes of the Cubans. 

In his message, President Polk made no specific recommenda- 
tions, but left it "to the wisdom of Congress to adopt such 
measures as in their judgment may be expedient to prevent Yuca- 
tan from becoming a colony of any European power. ' ' There was 
no intimation that he desired to take permanent possession of 
the territory or that he had any other object in view than to 
prevent it from falling into the hands of a foreign nation ; still, 
we know from his diary that he was ready to annex the depart- 
ment rather than see it become a possession of Great Britain.^" 

As soon as the message was read in the Senate, Calhoun 
asserted that the ' ' broad and dangerous principle ' ' announced in 
it could not possibly be deduced from the Monroe Doctrine. It 
was, however, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
from which, on May 4, Hannegan reported an act to enable the 
President to "take temporary military occupation of Yucatan." 
The debate which followed elicited widely divergent opinions, 
both as to the President 's meaning and the expediency of occupy- 
ing the territory. It is unnecessary to dwell on this discussion, 
for before it had proceeded far dispatches arrived bearing the 
news that a treaty had been concluded between Yucatan and the 
Indians. Calhoun's remarks, however, are worthy of note, on 



18 Clay to Brown, Oct. 25, 1825 (Am. State Pap., For. Bel., V, 856). 

19 '<Mr. Walker was in favour of its ultimate annexation to the United 
States, & Mr. Buchanan opposed it. T concurred with Mr. Walker rather 
than see it fall into the hands of England" (Diary (May 6, 1848), III, 
444-445). 



700 JAMES K. POLK 

account of his peculiar interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. 
It consisted, he said, of friendly declarations, with "not a word 
in any one of them in reference to resistance." But Polk, he 
continued, "seems to hold these declarations as imposing a 
solemn duty on him as Chief Magistrate to resist on all occasions ; 
and not only to resist, but to judge of the measure of that re- 
sistance."-- As construed by Calhoun, the sole survivor of 
Monroe's cabinet, the famous "doctrine" became a harmless 
declamation — a simple statement of our desires, and not a warn- 
ing to the European alliance. Hannegan, the chief supporter of 
the bill, disclaimed any desire to annex Yucatan, although, like 
the President, he was ready to do so if this should prove to be 
the only means of saving it from British domination. That 
country, in his opinion, would never neglect an opportunity to 
strengthen her hold on the Gulf of Mexico : ' ' Cuba was said to 
be the key, and with Yucatan she would have both lock and key, 
and control the whole outlet of the vast Mississippi." It w^as 
control of the Gulf region, and not the desire to possess additional 
southern territory, that led the President and his supporters to 
resist a possible extension of British domination over the depart- 
ment of Yucatan. British activities in Texas had, justly or un- 
justly, convinced Polk that England w^as ever ready to deal a 
blow at the commercial prosperity of the United States. 

Discussion of the Yucatan question, and of the alleged attempt 
of Great Britain to make the Gulf of Mexico a "marc clausum," 
naturally revived interest in the destinies of Cuba. That island 
had always been regarded as the key to the Gulf, and adminis- 
trations of all parties had agreed that its control must never pass 
to a strong maritime power. As noted above. Clay, under Adams ' 
instructions, had, in 1825, asserted that "we could not consent 
to the occupation of those islands by any other European power 
than Spain under any contingency whatever." In similar 



20 Printed in full in Calhoun, Works, IV, 454 ff. 



THE "POLK BOCT BINE" AND MINOR QUESTIONS 701 

language Webster, in 1843, informed the United States consul at 
Havana that his government "'never would permit the occupation 
of that island by British agents or forces upon any pretext what- 
ever, " and that the entire naval and military resources of the 
United States would be employed to prevent it.-^ 

At the first session of Congress under the Polk administration 
resolutions were offered in both houses for the purpose of author- 
izing the President to purchase Cuba, provided the consent of the 
inhabitants could be obtained. Nothing resulted from these reso- 
lutions, for more pressing questions soon absorbed the attention 
of both Congress and the executive. But when, in 1847, certain 
British statesmen urged their government to seize Cuba as 
security for the interest on Spanish bonds held in England, the 
American press began to discuss the advisability of purchasing 
the island. For example, the New York Sun came out strongly 
in favor of annexation. It stated in an editorial that Spain 
would sell Cuba for $100,000,000, and that the Cubans were so 
eager to join the United States that they would raise the neces- 
sary money if given a week's notice ( !)" There is no evidence, 
however, that the President gave serious thought to the subject 
until the summer of the following year when the importance of 
acquiring the island was urged upon him by John L. 'Sullivan, 
editor of the Democratic Review and of the New York News. 

In his diary for May 10, 1848, Polk mentioned a visit from 
'Sullivan and Senator Douglas. They had come, apparently at 
the instance of the former, for the purpose of exhorting the 
President to take immediate steps to buy the island from Spain. 
As usual, he declined to give them his own views, on the subject, 
although his decision had already been made. "Though I ex- 
pressed no opinion to them," is the conunent in his diary, "I 
am decidedly in favour of purchasing Cuba & making it one of 



21 Webster to Campbell, Jan. 14, 1843 (Wharton, Int. Law Digest, I, 
372), 

22 Quoted in Niles' Beg., LXXII, 338 (July 31, 1847). 



702 JAMES K. POLK 

the States of [the] Union." A few weeks later he wrote that 
it was 'Sullivan "who first suggested to me the idea of pur- 
chasing Cuba."-^ 

Late in the month, when consulting his cabinet on the ad- 
visability of making an offer to Spain, Polk emphasized the 
danger of the island's falling into the hands of Great Britain. 
Walker and Mason were in favor of making an offer, and were 
willing to go as high as $100,000,000. Johnson objected to in- 
corporating the territory into the Union, while Buchanan feared 
that any agitation of the subject might injure the party in the 
Presidential election.-* Two days later Buchanan received an 
"important despatch" from the American consul at Havana 
which said that on account of impending revolution the Creoles 
were in favor of annexation. 'Sullivan told the President that 
an agent of wealthy Cuban planters had informed him of a 
scheme of his employers to overthrow Spanish authority for the 
purpose of hastening annexation. 'Sullivan said, also, that a 
distinguished American general, -■'' now in ]\Iexico, had agreed to 
resign his commission at the close of the war and to embark for 
Cuba with discharged American troops. But Polk was too cir- 
cumspect to indulge in filibustering schemes : 

1 at once said to Mr. O 'Sullivan that if Cuba was ever obtained by 
the U. S., it must be by amicable purchase, and that as President of the 
U. S. I could give no countenance to such a step, and could not wink at 
such a movement.-'' 

When consulted on the subject, Cass expressed himself as 
heartily in favor of purchasing Cuba, but Buchanan still main- 
tained that the proposed acquisition was the "gravest & most 
important ' ' question that had ever been submitted to the cabinet. 
At the next meeting he predicted that war with England and 



23 Polk, Diary, III, 446, 493. The fact that O 'Sullivan was a "Barn- 
burner ' ' and an enthusiastic supporter of Van Buren is evidence that the 
project was not prompted by a desire to extend the slaveholding area. 

24 7b?d., 468-469. 

25 Probably Quitman. 20 Polk, Diari/, III, 475-477. 



TEE "POLK DOCTRINE" AND MINOR QUESTIONS 703 

France would follow an attempt to acquire the island ; but Polk 
nevertheless decided that R. M. Saunders, our minister at Madrid, 
should be instructed to buy it if he could. Buchanan petulantly 
demanded specitic instructions as to contents of the dispatch to 
Saunders. Evidently he was preparing to disclaim responsibility 
in case the project should turn out to be politically unwise. 

In order to forestall filibustering schemes. General Butler 
was instructed to prevent our troops from taking part in a 
Cuban expedition, and the American consul at Havana was told 
that the United States would "preserve national faith with 
Spain." On Walker's suggestion, it was decided that copies of 
these instructions should be forwarded to Saunders at Madrid, 
with directions to communicate them to the Spanish government. 
Indeed, Saunders was to make it appear that the presentation of 
this evidence of good will on the part of his government was the 
main object of his interview with the Spanish minister; he was 
then to say that the United States would make an offer to pur- 
chase the island, if such an offer would be agreeable to Spain. 
Walker's happy thought caused Buchanan to withdraw his ob- 
jections, and he announced to that he ' ' would cheerfully prepare 
the necessary instructions to Mr. Saunders."-^ 

The dispatch to Saunders, in which Buchanan had incor- 
porated the President 's views, was formally approved at a cabinet 
meeting held on June 17, 1848. He stated that the United States 
had no reason to complain so long as Cuba should continue to 
be a colony of Spain, 

But we can never consent that this Island shall become a Colony of any 
other European power. In the possession of Great Britain or any strong 
naval power, it might prove ruinous both to our domestic and foreign com- 
merce, and endanger the Union of the States. The highest and first duty 
of every independent nation is to provide for its own safety; and acting 
upon this principle we should be compelled to resist the acquisition of Cuba 
by any maritime State with all the means which Providence has placed at 
our command. 

27 Ibid., 487. 



704 JAMES K. POLE 

Having thus definitely stated tlie policy of his government 
and the determination to enforce it, the Secretary of State pro- 
ceeded to show the necessity for such a policy and to give reasons 
for believing that American interests were already menaced by 
the designs of Great Britain. Incidentally, these reasons had an 
important bearing on the President's recent message relating to 
Yucatan. Cuba, said Buchanan, is situated between Florida and 
Yucatan, and its possession would give England command of 
both inlets to the Gulf. In time of war she could effectively 
blockade the mouth of the Mississippi and sever the connection 
between the Gulf states and those on the Atlantic. 

As reasons for believing that England had ambitious designs, 

Buchanan cited first 

her uniform policy throughout her past history to seize upon every A-alu- 
able commercial point throughout the world whenever circumstances have 
placed this in her power. 

Under the mask of protector of the Mosquito Indians, "she is 
endeavoring to acquire permanent possession of the entire coast 
of the Carribean Sea from Cape Honduras to Escuda de Ver- 
agua" — and this, too, in violation of her treaty of 1786 with 
Spain. By a similar violation, a simple permission to cut log- 
wood and mahogany had led to the establishment of the British 
colony at Belise. She had taken forcible possession of the har- 
bor of San Juan de Nicaragua with the evident purpose of obtain- 
ing control over all communication between the Atlantic and 
Pacific oceans. Inability of Spain to pay the interest on securi- 
ties held in England had given her a much more plausible pre- 
text for seizing Cuba than she had for assuming the protectorate 
of the Mosquito Indians, and the threatening utterances of Lords 
Bentinck and Palmerston indicated a disposition to make use of 
this pretext. Indeed, the recent dismissal of the British minister 
at Madrid had made a rupture between the two nations almost 
inevitable; should it come, "no doubt can be entertained that 
Great Britain would immediately seize Cuba." 



THE "FOLK DOCTRINE" AND MINOR QUESTIONS 705 

Saunders was then told that, in the opinion of the President, 
a crisis had arrived which made it desirable for the United 
States to purchase the island. He was, therefore, to conclude a 
treaty, if possible, paying as a maximum the sum of $100,000,000. 
He was instructed to make the offer orally, and not until he had 
made it plain to the Spanish government that the United States 
had been moved wholly by a desire to prevent Cuba from passing 
to another power.-^ 

The hope-** of the President to crown his work of expansion 
by annexing Cuba to the United States was doomed to disap- 
pointment, for the traditional reluctance of Spain to part with 
her West Indian possessions could not be overcome. After an 
exasperating delay the Spanish foreign minister replied that it 
was 

more than any minister dare to entertain any such proposition; that he 
believed such to be the feeling of the country, that sooner than see the 
island transferred to any power, they would prefer seeing it sunk in the 
ocean. 

After all, this statement amounted to a pledge that Spain woidd 
retain Cuba; and so long as the pledge could be maintained, it 
effected the main purpose which Polk had in view. Fear of 
British control of the Gulf had prompted his offer, and such 
control could not be obtained so long as Spain retained possession 
of the island. 

A letter dealing with Central American affairs, similar to 
the one sent to Saunders, had already been transmitted to Elijah 
Hise, who had recently been made charge d' affaires at Guate- 
mala. The dissolution of the Central American confederacy, 
said Buchanan, had encouraged British encroachments on the 
Mosquito coast, therefore Hise was to promote a revival of the 



28 Buchanan to Saunders, June 17, 1848 (Buchanan, Worls, VIII, 90- 
102). Polk, Diary, III, 493. 

29 A person who represented himself to be a financial agent of the 
Spanish queen told Dallas that he had been instructed to ascertain whether 
the United States would be willing to buy the island. Apparently his 
story was pure fabrication. See Polk, Diary, TV, 4-5. 



706 JAMES E. POLK 

confederacy. The Secretary was not yet prepared to say what 
course the United States would pursue with respect to the British 
protectorate over the Mosquito Indians, but 

To suffer any interference on the part of the European Governments 
with the domestic concerns of the American Republics and to permit them 
to establish new colonies upon this continent, would be to jeopard their 
independence and to ruin their interests. These truths ought everywhere 
throughout this continent to be impressed on the public mind.so 

Hise concluded a general commercial treaty on the last day of 
Polk's term of office, l3ut nothing was accomplished in the way 
of reuniting the Central American states. The Taylor adminis- 
tration adopted a more conciliatory attitiTde toward England the 
result of which was the conclusion of the well-known Clayton- 
Bulwer treaty of 1850. 

Early in the Polk administration an event, unimportant in 
itself, very nearly caused a break in our diplonuitic relations 
with Brazil. On October 31, 1846, Lieutenant Alonzo B. Davis, 
of the United States ship Saratoga, went on shore at Rio Janeiro 
to apprehend deserters from his vessel. As Davis was about to 
take them to his ship, the Brazilian police interfered and im- 
prisoned both Davis and the sailors. Henry A. Wise was then 
minister to Brazil, and, to use his own expression, he played 
"old Hickory on them" by demanding the immediate release of 
the prisoners. He wanted, he said, "to make these Spanish & 
Portugese Mongrells in S. America understand that the U. 
States MUST be respected.' '^^ All except one of the prisoners 
were set free, and the affair might have been dropped had not 
Wise and Commodore Rousseau of the American squadron not 
wounded the pride of the Brazilian court by further Jacksonian 
contempt for diplomatic punctilio. 

A fortnight after the prisoners had been released. Wise 
ignored an invitation to the baptismal ceremonies of the Imperial 
Infanta, and Commodore Rousseau neglected to fire the customary 

30 Buchanan to Hise, June 3, 1848 (Buchanan, Worls, VIII, 78-84). 

31 Wise to J. Y. Mason, Nov. 6, 1846, Polk Papers. 



THE "POLK DOCTRINE" AND MINOB QUESTIONS 707 

salute. A little later, when the Emperor's birthday was being 
celebrated, Rousseau neither fired a salute nor hoisted the flag 
on his ship, while Wise (not invited this time) made a speech 
on shipboard which was anything but complimentary to the 
Brazilians. Brazil now requested the recall of both men and 
asked for an apology from the United States. The apology was 
claimed on the ground of discourtesy to the Emperor and the 
more serious charge that Davis had denied the sovereignty of the 
empire by resisting the police-conduct which had been approved 
and supported by Wise. 

When the complaints were presented in Washington by 
Lisboa, the Brazilian minister, Polk instructed Buchanan to say 
that he would neither apologize nor recall Wise and Rousseau- 
recall of the minister would imply dissatisfaction with his con- 
duct, whereas it M^as highly approved by the President. Buchanan 
added, however, that since Wise had, before the trouble had 
arisen, asked to be relieved, the President would grant his re- 
quest ; Rousseau, also, Avould soon be sent to another port. With 
this understanding, Buchanan and Lisboa agreed to let the matter 
drop; but the Brazilian government recalled Lisboa, demanded 
an apology, and declared that a successor to Wise would not be 
received until this had been made. 

The new demand for an apology was presented bv the charg^. 
de affaires, Leal, in the summer of 1847. The only question of 
importance was Lieutenant Davis's alleged resistance of the au- 
thority of the police in Rio Janeiro, and everything hinged on 
whether Davis or the police first had the sailors in custody. The 
evidence seemed to show that Davis had apprehended them before 
the police arrived on the scene. While it was admitted that the 
jurisdiction of any nation is absolute within its own borders, cus- 
tom permitted naval officers to go on shore to arrest their' own 
sailors. As this was all that Davis had done, he had, in Polk's 
opinion, committed no "infractions of police regulations," conse- 
quently Wise was justified in demanding his release from prison. 



708 JAMES K. POLK 

The threat to reject a new minister was resented as ''dictating 

terms" to which Brazil ''could not have expected submission"; 

but, said Buchanan, "the President will take no decisive steps" 

until he shall have learned that Brazil has actually refused to 

receive him."- This firm but reasonable declaration had the 

desired effect, and the new minister, David Tod, was received 

courteously by the Emperor. Wise returned to the United States 

filled with gratitude for the man whom he had once called a 

"petty tyrant" and whom he had tried to goad into fighting a 

duel. "I learn," wrote the President, after Wise had called to 

pay his respects, 

that he returns to the U. S. my friend, & his expressions of gratitude to 
me to-day were as strong & decided as human language could make them, 
so that I have lived to conquer the hostility of at least one of my political 
opponents & persecutors. This I have done by performing my duty in a 
magnanimous and liberal manner. 33 

Zeal of naval officers to protect American rights nearly 
involved the government in difficulties with another South 
American state. In January, 1845, Buenos Ayres attempted to 
invest Montevideo with an absolute blockade; and because this 
was forcibly violated by French vessels, a United States naval 
officer, G. J. Pendergrast, demanded exemption for his own ves- 
sels. The authorities at Washington, however, held that an 
offense committed by one nation did not entitle anotlier to dis- 
regard belligerent rights, and the officers were instructed to 
respect the blockade. 

Before this question had been adjusted, British and French 
naval officers announced a blaekade of the whole coast of Buenos 
Ayres and allowed other neutrals only forty-eight hours to with- 
draw their vessels from the harbors. Pendergrast entered a 
vigorous protest on the ground that neutrals^' have no riglit to 

32 The most important letter (written to Leal on Aug. 30, 1847) is 
printed in Buchanan, Worls, VII, 888-404. Nearly all of the correspond- 
ence relating to this affair may be found in Sen. Ex. Docs. 29, 35, 30 Cong., 
1 sess. 33 Polk, Diary, III, 192. 

34 England and France had not declared war on Buenos Ayres. 



TEE "POLK DOCTRINE" AND MINOR QUESTIONS 709 

establish a blockade, and that even a belligerent has no right to 
declare an entire coast to be blockaded. United States vessels 
were given time to discharge their cargoes and withdraw from 
the ports, and, since no seizures were made, nothing more serious 
resulted than caloric speeches in Congress.^^ 

On December 12, 1846, Benjamin A. Bidlack, acting without 
instructions,^" concluded a commercial treaty with New Granada 
one article of which provided for transit across and guaranteed 
the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama. Doubtless Bidlack 
was moved to take this unauthorized step by Buchanan's letter 
of June 23, 1845, which instructed him to use his influence to 
prevent New Granada from granting transit concessions to 
European powers, and which stated that "the United States 
have strong motives for viewing with interest any project which 
may be designed to facilitate the intercourse between the Atlantic 
and the Pacific oceans."- Nevertheless, the arrival of the treaty 
in Washington took the President completely by surprise. At 
first, Polk doubted that he could approve this "entangling 
alliance. "3s ^ ^ 

In general this document followed the usual form of com- 
mercial treaties, and only the thirty-fifth article merits special 
comment. Among other things, it stipulated that 

TT -r? ^^^^^^-^^t of New Granada guarantees to the Government of tlie 
United States that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of 
Panama upon any modes of communication that now exist, or may be liere'- 
after constnxcted, shall be open and free to the Government and citizens 

35 See correspondence, H. Ex. Doc. 212, 29 Cong 1 sess 
Janua7y"2' IM? ''::SoZll S^/*\T^ *^ Washington,' Buchanan, on 
See Bufhaian kS,'viI,'l8S '" "'^'*"'^ " commercial treaty. 

3" Buchanan, Works, VI, 180-181 



710 JAMES K. POLK 

of the United States, [and that] .... the United States guarantee, posi- 
tively and efficaciously to New Granada, by the present stipulation the 
neutrality of the before-mentioned isthmus, with the view that the free 
transit from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed 
in. any future time while this treaty exists; and, in consequence, the United 
States also guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty and 
property Avhich New Granada has and possesses over the territoiy. 

The treaty was to remain in force for twenty years, and then 
indefinitely, unless terminated by twelve months' notice from 
either party. ^'^ 

A few days of deliberation overcame Polk's scruples regard- 
ing the entangling alliance and convinced him that the transit 
agreement was too important to be rejected. On February 10 
he submitted the treaty to the Senate with a message which stated 
that "the importance of this concession to the commercial and 
political interests of the United States can not easily be over- 
rated." He advised ratification because 

The treaty does not propose to guarantee a territory to a foreign nation 
in which the United States will have no common interest with that nation. 
On the contrary, we are more deeply and directly interested in the subject 
of this guaranty that New Granada herself or any other country. 

Besides, the purpose was commercial, not political, and it was 
expected that England and France would join in the guaranty. 
The guaranty of sovereignty w^as, in his opinoin, indispensable 
to neutrality and to the protection of property rights ; and as- 
surance of New Granada's permanent sovereignty would remove 
cause for jealousy on the part of maritime powers.*" jMisgivings 
respecting the thirty-fifth article and pressure of other business 
caused a postponement of action until the next session of Con- 
gress, but in June, 1848, the Senate finally gave its approval. 
Although the extent of our obligation to insure the ' ' neutrality ' ' 
and the "sovereignty" of New Granada has been subject to dif- 
ferent interpretations, the subsequent history of this treaty is 



30 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I, 302 ff. 
40 Richardson, Messages, 1\ , 511-513. 



THE "POLK DOCTRINE" AND MINOR QUESTIONS 711 

not within the purview of the present volume. ^^ However, it may 
be said in passing that a forced construction of the thirty-fifth 
article was utilized by President Roosevelt to prevent Colombia 
from suppressing the Panaman insurrection and to facilitate the 
process of "taking" the canal zone. 

In the last year of his administration President Polk ap- 
pointed the first diplomatic agent ever sent from the United 
States to reside at the capital of Ecuador and diplomatic rela- 
tions w^ere opened wtili the republic of Bolivia.''- In both cases 
assurences were given that foreign interference would be re- 
sisted, and emphasis was laid on the identity of interests of the 
American republics. 

One of the last diplomatic events of Polk's official term was 
the ratification of a postal convention with Great Britain. Suc- 
cess in its negotiation was due to the untiring efforts of George 
Bancroft, and its importance consisted in removing vexatious 
discriminations against United States mails. Of it the President 
said in his diary : 

It places our own steamers and packets upon an ec^ual footing with the 
Brittish and relieves our merchants, naturalized citizens, and others from 
a heavy discriminating charge of postage on letters and other mailable 
matter conveyed in American vessels. This change has been effected by 
the policy of the administration. Had it occurred under other circum- 
stances & when so many other great events had not been crowded into a 
single Presidential term, it would have attracted more public attention and 
been regarded as an important achievement.-is 

It was, in deed, an important achievement, for it established 
reciprocal privileges and deprived the Cunard steamers of a 
virtual monopoly in carrying the mails.** 



*i See Latane, Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish 
America, 182-188. 

42 Buchanan to Livingston, May 13, 1848; same to Appleton, June 1, 
1848 (Buchanan, Worlds, VIII, 64, 74). 

43 Polk, Diary, IV, 271-272. 

44 See Buchanan to Bancroft, July 27, 1847, in which he speaks of the 
"conduct of the British Post Office, in charging the same postage on 
letters carried on our steamer, the Washington, to Southampton, at the 



712 JAMES K. POLK 

Polk's remark concerning the postal convention applies 
equally well to_ a number of minor diplomatic achievements 
which were overshadowed by the Mexican and Oregon questions ; 
in a peaceful period they would have attracted more attention 
and redounded more to the credit of the man who directed our 
foreign policy. His vigilance in safeguarding American inter- 
ests prevented foreign nations from gaining additonal influence 
on this continent. While the original Monroe Doctrine has long 
ceased to have any practical application, the "Polk Doctrine" 
has been an active force in our history down to the present day. 
It has not, indeed, been an unmixed blessing, for it has brought 
us burdens as well as prestige. But whether we approve or con- 
demn the doctrine, it was Polk who first declared that the United 
States would not permit any interference, solicited or otherwise, 
in American affairs, by European monarchies. In general, his 
doctrine has been indorsed by the people of the United States. 



expense of the United States, as though they had been carried there by a 
British steamer, at the expense of the British Government" (Buchanan, 
Works, YII, 375). 



CHAPTER XXV 

CLOSE OF CAREER 

Despite the oue-term pledge included in his letter accepting 
the Presidential nomination, there were many who believed that 
Polk would stand for a second term. Some of the Democratic 
leaders feared that he might do so,' while certain of his friends 
Jioped that he might be induced to accept another nomination. 
Both fears and hopes were wholly unwarranted, for the Presi- 
dent never swerved from his determination to retire at the end 
of four years. Notwithstanding Claiborne 's disparaging remark 
that "no one but himself dreamed of his re-election,"^ nothing 
in contemporary documents indicates that Polk indulged in such 
dreams ; on the contrary, there is abundant evidence to show that 
he longed to retire from public life. 

As early as December, 8145, Senator Benton expressed tlie 
belief that certain Tennessee politicians were planning to run 
Polk for another term. When told of this the President noted in 
his diary that there was not the slightest foundation for such a 
belief: "My mind has been made up from the time I accepted the 
Baltimore nomination, and is still so, to serve but one term and 
not be a candidate for re-election." In January, 1847, he re- 
joiced "that with my own voluntary free will & consent I am 
not to be again a candidate. This determination is irrevocable. ' '' 

During the course of his administration political leaders fre- 
quently suggested to the President that he ought to (sometimes 
must) run again. On all occasions his answer was the same — 
that under no circumstances would he again be a candidate. 

1 Claiborne, Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman, I, 235. 

2 Polk, Diary, I, 142, II, 328. 



714 JAMEH K. FOLK 

In 1848, when commenting? on liuclianan's scheming for the nomi- 
nation, th(> President wrolc in his diary: 

• 

Tlu^ truth is, 1 have no doubt, tliouj^h 1 caiiiiot provo it, tliat Mr. 
I'.ucliaiiiui has become apjjrehensivo tliat in the contest for the nomination 
between Gen'l Cass, Mr. Woodbury, and himself the Democratic party 
may ultimately be forced to look to me for re-election. He knows that I 
hiive no such views & that I have constantly declared to all who have 
introduced the subject to me that I would retire at the end of a single 
Iriiii, I, lit, notwithstanding this ho fears that a state of things might arise 
ill whit ii the party might reciuire me against my will to be placed before 
the country for re-election.^ 

On May lo, 184S, the seeond anniversary of the (h'claration 
of war against Mexico, the President i-ead to Cave Johnson a 
letter in which he formally declared that lu; wonld not stand for 
reelection. It was addressed to Dr. J. M. G. Ramsey, a Tennessee 
delegalc to IIh' Dfinocral i(^ national convention, and was "to be 
by him pi-esented to the eonv(!ntion if, as has been often sng- 
gested to mc it might he, my name sliould be bronght before the 
convention for nomination." Inasmnch as lie was determined 
to i-etirc, lie deemed it "proper to relieve the Convention of any 
embaiTassment which the presentation of his [myj name might 
l)rodnce." Snbsecpiejitly the letter was shown to several of the 
delegates wlio liad sto])i)ed in Washington on tlieir way to P>alti- 
more, and to personal friends. All regretted his determination to 
retire. Uliett, of Honth Carolina, and Venable, of North Caro- 
lina, went so far as to say that Polk conld carry their- respective 
states, bnt that ('ass woidd be nnable to do so. AVhile he conld 
not fail to he gratilied with such expressions of ap()roval, the 
President adhered to his original purpose, and his letter to 
Ramsey was read to the convention before tiie balloting had 
begun.* 

Not only did th(> President decline another nomination, but 
from first to last he had refused to lend his influence to any 



3 Ibid., Ill, 354-355. 

4 Polk, Diary, IV, 448-463, passim. The letter itself is jirintetl in Jen- 
kins, Life of James Knox PoUc, 307. 



CLOSE OF CAEEEB 715 

aspirant of his party. Not even in his diary does he express a 
distinct preference, although there are indications that he prob- 
ably preferred Cass. He made his appointments and shaped his 
policies with a view to the success of his own administration. 
To aspirants and to the public he made it clear that he would 
affiliate with no faction of the party ; he would support the can- 
didate chosen by the representatives of the people, whoever that 
candidate might be. He even tolerated the Barnburners until 
they had openly seceded from the party. 

The Democratic national convention assembled at Baltimore 
on May 22, 1848, and its greatest difficulty proved to be the 
solution of a knotty problem presented by the delegates from 
New York. Two sets of delegates from this state appeared, and 
each claimed the right to s^ats in the convention. On the first 
day the credentials committee decided tentatively to admit neither 
faction unless it would agree to abide by the nomination. Tliis 
decision was regarded as a victory for the Hunkers and as advan- 
tageous to Cass, and the Barnburners refused to submit to inter- 
rogations. When reporting this to Polk, J. Knox Walker Avrote 
that ' ' Your true position before the Convention will be presented 
immediately before any balloting." Two days later he reported 
much bitterness and confusion, and that the convention probably 
would admit both delegations.^ This course was adopted event- 
ually, as the convention did not care to assume the responsibility 
of deciding between the two factions. 

The Barnburners, who favored the Wilmot proviso, were dis- 
satisfied and retired from the convention. They met at Utica in 
June and nominated Van Buren for President. In August, at 
.a convention held in Buffalo, they joined with Whigs and Aboli- 
tionists in nominating Van Buren and Charles Francis Adams on 
a "Free-soil" ticket. 

The secession of the New York delegation from the Baltimore 
convention and their subsequent affiliation with old-time enemies 



5 Walker to Polk, May 22, 24, 1848, Polk Papers. 



716 JAMES K. POLK 

were regarded by the President as little short of party treason. 
He lost no time in removing from office B. F. Butler and other 
active Barnburners. When news of the nominations made at 
Buffalo reached Washington, he remarked that ' ' Mr. Van Buren 
is the most fallen man I have ever known. ' '" 

Party schism and ill health overcame temporarily the iron 
will of the President, and he yielded to despondency — almost to 
despair. Schism mean the probable success of the Whigs and 
the reversal of his cherished policies. Ill health portended an 
early termination of his earthly career. On November 2, hi? 
fifty-third birthday, he confided to his diary : 

It will be 21 years on to-morrow since my father died. My mother is 
still living. Upon each recurrence of my birthday I am solemnly im- 
pressed with the vanity & emptiness of worldly honors and worldly enjoy- 
ments and of [the wisdom of] preparing for a future estate. In four 
months I shall retire from public life forever. I have lived three fourths 
of the period ordinarily allotted to man on earth. I have been highly 
honoured by my fellow-men and have filled the highest station on earth, 
but I will soon go the way of all the earth. I pray God to prepare me to 
meet the great event. 

The news, a week later, that Taylor had probably been elected 
President called forth another melancholy comment : 

Should this be so, it is deeply to be regretted. Without experience in 
civil life, he is wholly unqualified for the station, and being elected by 
the Federal party and the various factions of dissatisfied persons who 
have from time to time broken off from the Democratic party, he must be 
in their hands and under their absolute control. Having no opinions or 
judgment of his own upon any one public subject, foreign or domestic, he 
will be compelled to rely upon the designing men of the Federal party who 
vdll cluster around him, and will be made to reverse, so far as the Execu- 
tive can reverse, the whole policy of my administration, and substitute 
the Federal policy in its stead. The country will be the loose [loser] by 
his election, and on this account it is an event which I should deeply 
regret." 

The defection of the Barnburners, which augured Democratic 
defeat in November, made the President all the more determined 

G Polk, Diary, IV, 36-37, 67. t iMd., 177, 184-185. 



CLOSE OF CABEEE 717 

to achieve new victories while his own party remained in power. 
During the summer of 1848 he busied himself with what proved 
to be a hopeless attempt to acquire Cuba, and with extending 
the influence of the United States in South and Central America. 

When Congress convened in December, Taylor had been 
elected and there remained but one short session of Democratic 
rule. Polk's four great policies* had been carried through suc- 
cessfully, but the problem of slavery in the Mexican cession still 
remained to be solved. Defeat of his party at the polls did not 
deter the President from urging once more his own solution — 
the extension of the Missouri Compromise line. His persistency 
led Collamer, of Vermont, to compare him with the lawyer who, 
being reprimanded for contending against the opinion of the 
judge, replied that he "was not rearguing the case, hut damning 
the decision."^ 

Judged by standards of the period which was just closing, 
the solution offered by the President's message seemed both nat- 
ural and reasonable. Even so shrewd a politician as Polk did 
not seem to realize that the days of King Compromise were 
numbered and that conscience and abstract principles had be- 
come the dominating factors in the slavery question. Influential 
leaders of both North and South were now more interested in 
constitutional rights than in rquare miles of territory, and the 
rank and file were rapidly falling into line. To be sure another 
compromise law was recorded in the statute books in 1850, but 
Clay's famous omnibus turned out to be Pandora's box in dis- 
guise. During the debate on this bill, Calhoun gave warning that 
disunion would surely result from further agitation against 
slavery on the part of the North. In reply, Seward announced his 
"higher law" doctrine which served as a battle-cry in renewed 
onslaughts upon the ' ' peculiar institution. ' ' 



8 California, Oregon, Tariff, and the Independent Treasury. 

9 Coleman, Life of John J. Crittenden, 328. 



718 JAMES K. POLK 

' Naturally, Polk was chagrined because the slavery question 
remained unsolved at the close of his administration, and, as we 
have seen in a preceding chapter, he left Washington harboring 
the fear that California would become an independent state.^*^ 
Still, he had little cause for discouragement on account of failure 
in this particular. The most ambitious executive might well be 
satisfied with the achievements of his administration. 

During the course of his official term Polk renewed amicable 
relations with nearly all of his political antagonists. Bailie Pey- 
ton was the first to seek a reconciliation, and in September, 1845, 
in response to an inquiry, the President said that he "would 
receive him courteously & respectfully. "^^ Peyton was subse- 
quently given a miltiary appointment during the war with Mex- 
ico. Wise, as we have seen, was completly won over by the loyal 
support which the President gave him while he was minister to 
Brazil. John Bell was the last to seek a renewal of friendly 
relations, but in January, 1848, he, too, offered the pipe of peace. 
As the two men had not spoken since the Speakership contest 
in 1835, the first interview was somewhat embarrassing, especi- 
ally so on the part of Bell. The President's "manner and con- 
versation," however, "soon put him at his ease'."^" With Clay, 
the President always maintained cordial personal relations. Clay 
was a dinner guest at tbe executive mansion on several occasions, 
and, according to Foote, he tendered his services to the Presi- 
dent in overcoming Whig opposition to the treaty with Mexico.^^ 
Polk left office liarboring greater resentment for individual 
Democrats than for members of the opposition party. Blair and 
Benton had proved themselves to be "unprincipled," and the 

10 See above, page 655. n Polk, Diary, I, 32. 

12 "I said to him that I was glad to see him, and that so far as I was 
concerned I was willing to let bye-gones be bye-gones, to let the past be 
forgotten, and to renew with him our personal intercourse. He said that 
was' his desire, that we were to live neighbors when we retired from public 
life, and that he desired to be on terms of friendship. I expressed similar 
desires on my part" (Polk, Diary, III, 284-285). 

13 Polk, Diary, passim. H. S. Foote, Casket of Eeminisccnces, 22. 



CLOSE OF CABEEE 719 

"baseness" of Wilmot could not "be adequately described.'* 
For the opposition party as a whole, his feelings had undergone 
no change. As late as February 20, 1849, he recorded that 

The Whigs & abolitionists in Congress pursue me with a malignity and a 
bitterness which can only be accounted for because of their chagrin at 
the success of Democratic measures during my administration. i-^ 

Determined to uphold Democratic principles so long as the power 
rested in his hands, he went to the capitol on the last evening of 
his official term prepared to veto the Wilmot proviso and any 
internal improvement bill that might be presented. As we have 
seen in the preceding pages, he was not called upon to use the 
veto power, although Congress would in all probability have 
passed the obnoxious bills if the President's determination to veto 
them had not become known. 

The delight caused by the thought of retirement is recorded 
by the President on February 13, 1849, the fourth anniversary 
of his arrival in Washington : 

I am heartily rejoiced that my term is so near its close. I will soon 
cease to be a servant and become a sovereign. As a private citizen I will 
have no one but myself to serve, and will exercise a part of the sovereign 
power of the country. I am sure I Avill be happier in this condition than 
in the exalted station I now hold.is 

General Taylor arrived in Washington on February 23, and 
immediately an annoying question of etiquette presented itself. 
Buclianan and other members of the cabinet were planning to 
call upon the President-elect, and one of them consulted Polk 
concerning the propriety of their doing so. Polk and Taylor had 
never met ; but since their relations during the Mexican war had 
been mutually distrustful, the President was not at all certain 
that Taylor would call upon him to pay his respects. He told 
the members, therefore, that "if my Cabinet called on Gen'l 
Taylor before he called on me, I should feel that I had been 



14 Polk, Diary, IV, 227, 343-344. 
^5 Ibid., 331-332. 



720 JAMES K. POLK 

deserted by my own political family. ' ' All except the Secretary 
of State agreed with the President ; Buchanan threatened to dis- 
regard Polk's wishes, but did not carry out his threat. Taylor 
removed the cause for embarrassment by calling at the White 
House on February 26, after which Polk gave a dinner in his 
honor and treated him with the utmost cordiality.^" As they 
rode to the capitol on inauguration day, Polk found his successor 
to be well meaning, but ' ' exceedinglly ignorant of public affairs ' ' ; 
he added to the general's difficulties by absconding with the Ex- 
ecutive Journal so that poor Taylor did not know what officers 
he was expected to appoint !^^ When reporting to Polk this joke 
of the season. Cave Johnson said that the new President knew 
less about public affairs than even his opponents had believed. 

On the evening of March 5^^ Polk boarded the steamboat and 
began his journey homeward. In response to invitations from 
southern cities, he traveled via Richmond, Charleston, and New 
Orleans, thence up the Mississippi river. During his whole Presi- 
dential term he had suffered much from chronic diarrhoea, and 
the fatigue of tlie journey caused its recurrence in an acute form. 
Medical attention gave temporary relief, and the ex-President 
reached Nashville much weakened yet apparently on the road to 
recovery. After a brief rest he was able to visit his mother at 
Columbia and Mrs. Polk's mother at Murfreesborough. 

About a year before he left Washington he disposed of his 
home in Columbia and purchased the Nashville residence of the 
late Senator Grundy. It was renamed Polk Place, and under 
the personal supervision of Mrs. Polk the house was enlarged 
and refurnished, and the grounds beautified. Tlie President 



i6/&id, 349-359. 

17 "The old Geiil liimself says that by some acciilent or mistake you 
had taken off the Executive Journal & therefore he had been dilitory in 
presenting his nominations — he could not know what offices he had to fill 
on that acct!" (Johnson to Polk, Washington, March 17, 1849, PoUc 
Papers). Johnson remained in the Post Office Department for a few days 
after Taylor's inauguration. 

18 As the 4th fell on Sunday, Taylor was not inaugurated until the 5th. 



CLOSE OF CABEEB 721 

longed for the day to arrive when he might put aside the cares 
of state and enjoy the quiet of a private citizen, although many 
of his utterances indicate that he believed the end to be near. 

For a time, after his arrival in Nashville, he was more cheer- 
ful. The enthusiastic welcome accorded by his neighbors and 
the interest which he took in supervising the improvements being 
made at Polk Place restored temporarily his old-time vigor. 
Whenever he undertook the performance of a task it was his 
habit to expend his energies freely ; and in his present state of 
health, his storehouse of energy was rapidly exhausted. The 
labor of arranging the books in his library caused a recurrence 
of the malady from which he had suffered on his homeward 
journey, and it was soon apparent that he could not recover. 

The Polk family as well as Mrs. Polk were Presbyterians, but 
the ex-President was not a member of any church. He went 
regularly with his wife to the church of her choice, although his 
preference was for the Methodist denomination.^'* A few days 
before his death his aged mother came from Columbia bringing 
her own pastor in the hope that her son might accept baptism 
and unite with the Presbyterian church. But the son recalled a 
promise once given to Reverend McFerren, of the Methodist 
church, that, when he was ready to join the church, McFerren 
should baptize him.'*^ Having thus formally embraced Chris- 
tianity, he felt prepared "to meet the great event. "-^ He died 
on June 15, 1849, in the fifty-fourth year of his age. He was 
buried in the garden at Polk Place. In 1893 his body, with that 
of Mrs. Polk, was removed to the grounds of the state capitol. 
On his tomb is the following epitaph, prepared by A. 0. P. 
Nicholson : 



10 "Mrs. Polk being a member of the Presbj'terian Church I generally 
attend that Church with her, though my opinions and predilections are in 
favor of the Methodist Church" (Polk, Diary, I, 86). 

20 Chase, History of the Poll: Administration, 474-475. 

21 See above, page 716. 



722 JAMES E. POLK 

By his public policy he defined, established, and extended the boun- 
daries of his country. He planted the laws of the American union on the 
shores of the Pacific. His influence and his counsels tended to organize 
the national treasury on the principles of the Constitution, and to apply 
the rule of freedom to navigation, trade, and industry. 

This eulogium by no means exaggerates the national service 
rendered by President Polk. Indeed, Nicholson might have added 
that he had made the American continents "safe for democracy''" 
by repelling with vigor all interference by Enropean powers. 

Seldom in our history has such an ambitious and so varied a 
program been carried into effect in the brief space of four years. 
It was a program conceived, for the most part, by the President 
himself, and his dogged persistence was an important factor in 
procuring the legislation necessary for putting it in operation. 
And yet, as Schouler has truthfully said, when commenting on 
the ex-President 's death : 

After this brief-spaced decent tribute Polk's name was seldom pub- 
licly mentioned. Over the fruits, sweet and bitter, which his adminis- 
tration had cast so abundantly into the lap of the people, there sprang 
up very soon sectional quarrel and contention, but the gatherer of those 
fruits was very soon forgotten. 22 

And, in a great measure, he remained "forgotten" notwith- 
standing the fact that his tariff policy led to prosperity ; that 
his "constitutional treasury"' proved to be successful; that his 
"Polk Doctrine" has been approved and extended; and that his 
expansion policy added over five hundred thousand square miles 
of territory and gave the United States free access to the Pacific. 
The acquisition of Louisiana, witli its abundant resources and 
its value as a home for America's surplus population, has com- 
monly been accredited to the statesmanship and farsightedness 
of Thomas Jefferson. When the centennial of this event was 
celebrated at St. Louis in 1904, Jefferson's part in the trans- 
action was commemorated bv medals struck in liis honor. At a 



22 Schouler, History of the United States, Y, 127. 



CLOSE OF CABEER 723 

similar exposition held in San Francisco in 1915 to celebrate the 
opening of the Panama canal, one listened in vain for any men- 
tion of the name of the man who had acquired the ground on 
which the exposition was being held, although days were dedi- 
cated officially to many individuals who had contributed little 
or nothing to the acquisition of the canal or to the prosperity 
of the Pacific coast. Possibly, many who attended the exposition 
could not have answered the campaign cry of 1844, "Who is 
James K. Polk ? ' ' And yet, every one who is f amilair with our 
history knows that Louisiana was purchased without Jefferson's 
knowledge or consent, and that a vast empire (including Cali- 
fornia) on the Pacific coast came into the possession of the United 
States as the result of a policy conceived by President Polk and 
consummated despite vigorous opposition, both at home and 
abroad. 

Why, then, has this man's name been enveloped in compar- 
ative obscurity? Why has he not received full credit for his 
achievements ? Undoubtedly one reason is that he possessed little 
personal magnetism, while his uncompromising independence dis- 
satisfied all factions ; and, consequently, he had no personal fol- 
lowing to sound his praises and perpetuate his memory. The 
excerpt from Schouler, above quoted, suggests incidentally a more 
potent reason, although Schouler lays the chief emphasis on the 
fact that Polk was "soon forgotten." As he says, "there sprang 
up very soon sectional quarrel and contention, ' ' and unquestion- 
ably this sectional discord had much to do with attaching odium 
to the Polk administration and with consigning the President's 
memory to oblivion. 

The introduction of the Wilmot proviso precipitated a real 
crisis in our history. The debate which it elicited presented new 
phases of the slavery question and rendered the sectional conflict 
truly "irrepressible." The determination of the anti-slavery 
forces to exclude the institution from all territories called forth 
a counter-determination on the part of the South that the 



724 JAMES K. POLK 

"rights" of the slaveholding states must be guaranteed and pro- 
tected. Henceforth the slavery question overshadowed all others. 
Little thought was given to the "sweet fruits" which Polk had 
gathered. Debates on topics wholly unrelated to slavery inevit- 
ably drifted into a discussion of this fatal subject, and all at- 
tempts made to solve the problem increased rather than dimin- 
ished sectional bitterness. 

Since the conflict at first-^ concerned the territories acquired 
from Mexico, Polk's expansion policy Avas represented to be a 
conspiracy to extend slavery. But the President was not even 
given the credit usually accorded to a successful conspirator, for 
he wa^ alleged to be the mere tool of more capable intriguers. 
On the other hand, the protagonists of slavery had no gratitude 
for the man who was charged with being their agent in the plot 
to extend slavery. His unswerving independence, his refusal to 
approve the extreme southern program, and his advocacy of an 
extension of the Missouri Compromise line, made him, in their 
eyes, a traitor to southern interests. As we have noted elsewhere, 
Polk's policy of compromise was the policy of a period which 
had just closed. Total exclusion of slavery from the territories, 
had become the watchword of one of the parties to the all-ab- 
sorbing contest; unrestricted admission of "slave-property" was 
demanded by the other. As the advocate ' of the traditional 
method of adjusting the slavery qiiestion Polk satisfied neither 
side, and he was charged by each with being weak and tempor- 
izing. Tlie achievements of his administration and his valuable 
services as chief executive were obscured by the focusing of public 
attention on the slavery question in its new and more acute form. 
Leaders of more extreme views won the approval of their respec- 
tive sections. Conservatives like Polk were remembered only to 
be condemned. In the earlier histories of the Mexican War the 
writers have derived their information mainlv from Whig sources 



23 It was not until the intiodiictiou of the Nebraska bill in 1854 that 
territories in the Louisiana Purchase were included in the discussion. 



CLOSE OF CABEEE c 725 

and from distorted accounts written by dissatisfied Democrats like 
Senator Benton."* Very naturally, therefore, Polk has been cari- 
catured as the pliable instrument of the slave power, and little 
attention has been given to the constructive policies of his admin- 
istration. More recently, however, much valuable material has 
been made available, and investigators have approached the sub- 
ject with minds unprejudiced by the obsolete sectional contro- 
versy. They have found — and it is believed that the preceding 
pages have shown — that Polk was neither a conspirator nor a 
weakling, but that he was a constructive statesman, an unsually 
able executive, and a sound patriot. No other President took his 
task more seriously nor spent his energies more freely for his 
country ; and few, indeed, have done more to increase the power 
and prestige of the nation. 



21 Especially his Thirty Years' View. 



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1, 29 Congress, 1 sess. 

107, 29 Congress, 2 sess. 

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35, 30 Congress, 1 sess. 

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65, 30 Congress, 1 sess. 

Tennessee 

House Journal, 1839-40. 
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Senate Journal, 1839-40. 
Senate Journal, 1841-42. 



BIBLIOGEAPHY 727 

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Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements, be- 
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MANUSCEIPTS 

Buchanan, James. Papers: Library of Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 

Cralle, Eichard K. Papers: Library of Congi-ess. 

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Jackson, Andrew. Papers: Library of Congress. 

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Trist, Nicholas P. Papers: Library of Congress. 

Van Buren, Martin. Papers: Library of Congress. 

Welles, Gideon. Papers: Library of Congi-ess. 



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Adams, John Quincy. Memoirs of John Quiney Adams, comprising por- 
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Brown, Aaron V. Speeches, Congressional and Political, and Other Writ- 
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Buchanan, James. The Works of James Buclianan, comprising his 
speeches, state papers, and private correspondence ; collected and 
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1908-1911. 

Calhoun, John C. Correspondence, edited by J. Franklin Jameson. In 
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1900. 

Calhoun, John C. The Works of John C. Calhoun, edited by Eichard K. 
Cralle. G vols. New York, 18.)1-1870. 



728 JAMES E. POLK 

Heiss, John P. "Papers," Tennessee Historical Magazine, II, No. 2. 

Laughlin, Samuel H. "Diary," Tennessee Historical Magazine, II, No. 1. 

Lincoln, Abraham. Complete Works, compiled by John G. Nicolay and 
John Hay, edited by Francis D. Tandy. 12 vols. New York, 1905. 

Polk, James K. The Diary of James E. Folk, edited by Milo Milton Quaiie. 
4 vols. Chicago, 1910. 

V "Polk-Donelsou Letters," Tennessee Historical Magazine, III, No. 4. Let- 
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' * Polk-Johnson Letters, ' ' Tennessee Historical Magazine, I, No. 3. Letters 
of James K. Polk and Cave Johnson, edited by St. George L. Sioussat. 

"Polk-Pillow Letters," American Historical Eevieiv, XI, No. 4. Edited by 
Jesse SiddaU Eeeves. 

Taylor, Zachart. Letters of Zachary Taylor from the Battle-Ficlds of 
the Mexican War, edited by William K. Bixby. Rochester, N. Y., 
1908. 



NEWSPAPERS 
Baltimore 

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Sun. 

Nashville 

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Daily Bepuhlican Banner. Daily and triweekly. 

Union. Semiweekly and triweekly. 

Whig. 

San Francisco 

Alta California 

Washington 

Gazette. 

Glohe. 

Madisonian. 

National Intelligencer. 

Spectator. 



BIBLIOGEAPHY 729 



PEEIODICALS 



American Historical Magazine. 9 vols. Nashville, 1896-1904. Contains 
Mary Winder Garrett 's ' ' Pedigree of the Polk Family, ' ' also letters 
of Jackson and other statesmen. 

Democratic Bevicw. New York, 1838-18.j9. 



ARTICLES IN PERIODICALS 

Bourne, Edward G. "The United States and Mexico, 1847-1848," Amer- 
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SCHAFER, Joseph.. "British Attitude toward the Oregon Question, 1815- 
1846," American Historical Beview, XVI, No. 2. 

SiousSAT, St. George L. "Some Phases of Tennessee Politics in the Jack- 
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Adams, Ephraim Douglas. British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838- 
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Adams, Henry. History of the United States. New York, 1891-1898. 

Ambler, Charles Hei-try. Thomas Bitchie. Richmond, 1913. 

Banckoft, Hubert Howe. History of California, Vol. 5. San Francisco, 

1886. 

Benton, Thomas H. Thirty Years' View. New York, 1862. 

Birney, William. James G. Birney and His Times. New York, 1890. 

Chase, Lucien B. History of the Polk Administraiion. New York, 1850. 

Claiborne, J. F. H. Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman. 2 vols. 
New York, 1860. 

Coleman, Ann Mary Butler. The Life of John J. Crittenden, ivith selec- 
tions from his correspondence and speeches. 2 vols. Philadelphia, 
1873. 

Curtis, George Ticknor. Life of Daniel Wehster. 2 vols. New York, 
1870. 

Curtis, George Ticknor. Life of James Buchanan. 2 vols. New York, 
1883. 

FooTE, Henry S. Casket of Beminiscences. Washington, 1874. 

Fremont, John Charles. Memoirs of My Life. Chicago and New York, 

1887. 



730 JAMES K. POLK 

Gallatin, Albert. Tke Oregon Question. New York, 1846. 

Garrison, George Pierce. Westivard Extension. New York, 190(i. 

Grant, U. S. Personal Memoirs. 2 vols. New York, 1885-1886. 

Gray, W. H. A Hi.<iiorii of Oregon, 1792-1849. Portland, 1870. 

Hitchcock, Ethan Allen. Fiftn Years in Camp and Field, edited by 
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HoLST, Dr. H. VON. The Constitutional and Political History of the United 
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HoLST, Dr. H. VON. Verfassungsgescliiclite der Vereinigten Staaten vo7i 
Amerila. 4 vols. Berlin, 1878-1884. 

Howe, M. A. De Wolfe. The Life and Letters of George Bancroft. 2 
vols. New York, 1908. 

Jay, William. A Beview of the Causes and Consequences of the Mexican 
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Jenkins, John S. The Life of James Knox Polk: Auburn, 1850. 

Jones, Anson. Memoranda and official correspondence relating to the 
Republic of Texas, its history and annexation. Including a brief 
autobiography of the author. New York, 1859. 

Latane, John H. Diplomatic Eelations of the United States and Spanish 
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Learned, Henry Barrett. Some Aspects of tlie Cabinet Meeting. Wash- 
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Mann, Mary Tyler. Life of Horace Mann. Boston, 1865. 

Meade, George Gordon. Tlie Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade. 
2 vols. New York, 1913. 

Meigs, William Montgomery. The Life of Thomas Hart Benton. Phila- 
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Nelson, Anson and Fanny. Memorials of Sarali Childress Polk. New 

York, 1892. 
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Porter, V^\x,entine Mott. General Stephen W. Kearny and the Conquest 
of California. Los Angeles, 1911. 

Prentiss, George Lewis. Memoir of S. S. Prentiss. New York, 1855. 

Reeves, Jesse Siddall. American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk. Balti- 
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> 



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Reid, Whitelaw. The Monroe Doctrine, the Polk Doctrine and the Doc- 
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Rives, George Lockhart. The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848 
2 vols. New York, 1913. 

SCHOULER, JAME.S. mstorii of the United States. 6 vols. New York 1880- 
1899. ' 

SCHURZ, Carl. Life of Henry Clay. 2 vols. Boston and New York, 1887. 
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Tyler, Lyon G. Letters and Times of the Tylers. 3 vols. Riclunond, 
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Wh.uiton, Francis. A Digest of the International Law of the United 

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INDEX 



Aberdeen, Lord, 417; and Oregon, 
563, 574, 584. 

Abolition vote, 279-280. 

Adams, C. F., ' ' Free-soil ' ' nom- 
inee (1848), 715. 

Adams, J. Q., 46, 304; opposes 
Polk, 44, 97, 122; slavery peti- 
tions, 109, 126; opposes annex- 
ation of Texas, 117, 126; de- 
clines to attend Polk 's inaugura- 
tion, 319; supports Polk's diplo- 
matic appropriation, 443 ; agi'ees 
with Polk on "all Oregon," 443, 
590; death, 545; and Cuba, 699. 

"Alabama letters," 271.. 

Alexander, A. R., 208. 

Allen, E., 357, 371. 

Allen, William, 403, 561, 585; on 
Oregon, 599; resigns, 609; de- 
sires congressional ' ' Polk Doc- 
trine," 694. 

Almonte, J. N., 354, 445, 465. 

"American System," Polk's opin- 
ion of, 656 ff.; defeated, 678; 
Polk's able message on, 686; ob- 
solete, 689. 

Ampudia, Pedro de, 411. 

Anaya, P. M., President ad interim, 
521 ; appoints peace commission- 
ers, 522. 

Anderson, Alex., Senator, 169, 271. 

Archer, W. S., 313, 441, 581. 

Arista, Mariano, 412. 

Armstrong, Robert, 152, 273, 286, 
574; informs Polk of election, 

283. 

Ashburton, Lord, boundary mis- 
sion, 558. 



Ashmun, George, 467. 

Astor, John J., 556. 

Atchison, David R., 346, 586, 596. 

Atherton, C. G., 126. 

Atocha, A. J., advises Polk on 
Mexican policy, 396-399, 465; 
472, 487; suggests bribery, 534. 

Aristain, Miguel, peace commis- 
sioner, 522. 

Badger, G. E., 631. 

Bagby, A. P., 674. 

' ' Balance of power, ' ' opposed by 
Polk, 693. 

Baldwin, R. S., 631. 

Bancroft, George, works for Polk's 
nomination, 237 ff., 272; Secre- 
tary of Navy, 298; instructions 
to Taylor, 375; order relating to 
Santa Anna, 439; his postal 
treaty with Great Britain, 711. 

Bank of the United States, asks 
for recharter, 28 ; sale of stocks, 
30. 

"Bank war," importance of, 26; 
Polk's part in, 26-46. 

Bankliead, Charles, British minister 
in Mexico, 506, 514. 

Baranda, Manuel, desires peace 
with United States, 506. 

Barnburners, convention (1848), 
633 ; removed by Polk, 643. 

Bayly, T. H., 305. 

Beacli, Moses Y., would make treaty 
without authority, 538. 

"Bear flag" episode, 426. 



[733] 



INDEX 



"Bedford letter," 84. 

Bedinger, Henry, 621. 

Bell, John, 57, 174; chosen speaker, 
50; Murfreesborough speech, 53; 
his "Cassedy letter," 58, 68, 
84, 105; favors U. S. bank, 84- 
85; charges Polk -with partisan 
bias, 98; denounces Jacksonism, 
99, 130; northern tour, 123; 
never a real Jackson man, 130 ff. ; 
renews friendship Avith Polk, 
718; supporter of White, 63, 68. 

Benton, Thomas H., 28, 33, 164, 
230, 236, 255, 262; "insane," 
257, 264-265; anti-Texas, 266; 
opposes Tylerites, 288; on Texas 
bill, 314; advises Polk, 403, 436, 
441, 466; urges expedition to 
Mexico City, 453 ; declines mili- 
tary appointment, 471; breaks 
with Polk, 476; thirteen day de- 
nunciation of Kearny, 477; sug- 
gests ambulatory commissioner, 
486; on Oregon question, 560, 
576, 581, 594, 606, 631; Califor- 
nia letter, 644; on tariff, 675; 
"unprincipled," 718. 

Berrien, John M., on slavery, 622. 

Biddle, Nicholas, 29, 32. 

Bidlack, Beuj. A., his treaty Avith 
New Granada, 709-711. 

Biggs, Asa, 672. 

Birney, James G., nomination for 
President, 263; prefers Polk to 
Claj, 263; and free trade, 281. 

Black, James A., 584, 601. 

Black, John, 384. 

Blackwell, J. W., 138. 

Blair, F. P., hostile to Polk, 57, 
164; instructed by Jackson, 265, 
268, 315; sells Globe, 333; "un- 
principled," 718. 

Blair, John, 286. 

Bouck, W. C, 279. 



BoAvlin, J. B., 275. 

Bradford, J. O., 114. 

Brady, William, 56, 76. 

Briggs, G. N., 95. 

Bright, J. D., 634. 

Brinkerhoff, Jacob, 587, 588. 

BroAvn, Aaron V., 6, 64, 77, 174, 
209, 259, 320 ; part in Texas pro- 
gram, 220, 257; instructs Polk, 
253. 

Brown, Jacob, killed, 429. 

Brown, Milton, 205; Texas resolu- 
tion, 311, 314. 

Brown, Thomas, 195. 

Brownlow, "Parson" (W. G.), 
124. 

Buchanan, James, 164, 284; Secre- 
tary of State, 294, 400 ; on acqui- 
sition of territory, 416, 423, 437, 
527; drafts jiroject of treaty 
with Mexico, 491; rejects Mexi- 
can peace terms, 518; Avould re- 
ject Trist's treaty, 539; sus- 
pected of treachery, 549; fears 
war over Oregon, 572, 578, 581; 
no "backing out," 607; on Ore- 
gon bill, 640; on tariff, 666; 
fears war over Cuba, 702; presi- 
dential aspirations, 714. 

Buena Vista, battle of, 480. 

Burges, Tristam, 83. 

Burke, Edmund, 629. 

Burt, A., 621, 640. 

Butler, A. P., 469, 648. 

Butler, B. F., 234, 239; declines 
war portfolio, 295; removed by 
Polk, 643. 

Butler, W. O., 471, 703; succeeds 
Scott, 531. 

Bynum, J. A., 129. 

Cadwalader, George, 511. 



[734] 



INDEX 



Calhoun, John C, 7, 203, 231, 262, 
270, 308; on Jackson's part in 
abolition, 108; Secretary of 
State, 218, 562; Texas "con- 
spiracy," 220, 241; siigg-ested 
for Polk's cabinet, 289; "na- 
tionalizes ' ' slavery and aboli- 
tion, 311, 615; desires Califor- 
nia, 403; declines to vote on 
declaration of Avar, 415; opposes 
lieutenant-general, 463; "most 
mischievous man in the Senate, ' ' 
468; opposes war, 530, 623; 
urges ' ' masterly inactivity, ' ' 
560; declines British mission, 
567; "against any compromise 
line," 624; presidential hopes, 
626; seeks pledge from Polk on 
southern governors for terri- 
. tories, 636; urges veto of Oregon 
bill, .640; address on slavery, 
649 ; opposes congressional ' ' Polk 
/ Doctrine, " 694 ; interpretation 
f of Monroe Doctrine, 700; dis- 
f union warning, 717. 

,^ California, one of Polk's "great 
measures, ' ' 351 ; supposed de- 
; signs upon, 386; Mexican war 

"waged for," 391; Kearny sent 
to, 422; conquest of, 426; gov- 
ernment, 644 ff., 651, 654; inde- 
pendence of, 655. 

Cambreleng, C. C, 292; Polk 
"worse than Tyler," 416. 

Cameron, Simon, on tariff, 278, 
668, 675. 

Campbell, R. B., 439. 

CampbeU, W. W., 591. 

Cannon, Ne^vton, assails Jackson 
and Van Buren, 118; meets Polk 
in debate, 145 ff . ; charges against 
Jackson, 146; last message, 155. 

Carroll, William, 42, 87, 122. 

Carson, "Kit," 473. 

Cass, Lewis, 209, 216, 441, 585, 
598; Texas letter, 229; cam- 
paigns for Polk, 258, 275; his 
"Nicholson letter," 630; on 
tariff, 668 ; desires congressional 
"Polk Doctrine," 695. 



"Cassedy letter," 58, 68, 105; 
copy of, 84. 

Castro, Jose, 424, 427. 

Catholics, 279; as chaplains, 421. 

Catron, Jolin, 61, 252, 286, 302; 
favors paper money, 115, 660; 
on constitutionality of Texas 
i-esolution, 314; asserts power of 
Congress over slavery, 634. 

Cerro Gordo, battle of, 4S1. 

Ohapultepec, battle of, 485. 

Childress, John W., 53, 77. 

Cliilton, Thomas, 38. 

Churubusco, battle of, 483. 

Cilley, Jonathan, 121, 128. 

Claiborne, J. F. H., 119, 326. 

Clarke, John H., "Let her [Cali- 
fornia] go," 654. 

Clay, C. C, 47, 68, 275. 

Clay, C. M., 277, 280. 

Clay, Henry, 78, 144, 151, 169, 189, 
205; and U. S. Bank, 29; distri- 
bution bill, 102 ; certain of nom- 
ination (1844), 212; hopes to 
avert Texas issue, 223 ; anti- 
Texas letter, 226, 262; defamed, 
228, 273 ; nominated for Presi- 
dent, 229; claim to gi'eatness, 
249; embodiment of party, 251; 
vacillation, 263, 272, 277; not 
defeated by Texas issue, 281 ; 
God thanked for his defeat, 283 ; 
like Hamilton, 668 ; and Cuba, 
699. 

Clayton, A. S., 28. 

Clayton, John M., 67, 592; Clayton 
committee, 635; Clayton bill, 
637; and tariff, 674. 

Clifford, Nathan, 539; Mexican 
mission, 548, 550. 

Cobb, Howell, on Oregon, 588. 

Coe, Levin H., 166. 

Collamer, Jacob, on Polk's persis- 
tency, 717. 



[735] 



INDEX 



Colquitt, W. T., and Oregon, 593, 
596. 

Coutreras, battle of, 482. 

Cook, D. P., 13. 

Conner, David, 375; bombards 
Vera Cruz, 481. 

Corcoran, W. W., 547. 

Couto, Bernardo, peace commis- 
sioner, 522. 

Cramer, W. E., 280. 

Crary, I. E., opposes supreme 
court, 135. 

Crittenden, John J., 223, 488, 585; 
Oregon resolution, 592. 

Crockett, David, 24, 62, 81 ; opposes 
Tennessee land bill, 21 ff., 23 ; 
splits Jackson party, 22; and 
Polk, 22, 76. 

Cuba, and "Polk Doctrine," 691, 
700; key to Gulf, 700; proposed 
purchase of, 701-705. 

Cuevas, Gonzago, peace commis- 
sioner, 522. 

Cullom, A., 403. 

Gushing, Caleb, 127. 

Dallas, G. M., nominated for Vice- 
President, 239. 

Daniel, J. R. J., 670. 

Davis, Alonzo B., imprisoned in 
Brazil, 706. 

Davis, Garrett, on "President's 
war," 415; Polk a usurper, 459; 
on Oregon, 587. 

Davis, Jefferson, opposes army re- 
duction, 553 ; and Oi-egon, 592, 
632 ; on slavery, 635. 

Davis, John, talks Polk's appro- 
priation bill- to deatli, 443. 

Democratic convention (1844), con- 
venes, 236; attitude toward Van 
Buren, 236; two-thirds rule, 237; 
platform, 239, 562. 



Democratic convention (1848), 715. 

Democratic groups, 259, 337. 

Derrick, Wm. S., 493. 

Dickinson, D. S., 470, 530; for 
' ' popular sovereignty, ' ' 630. 

Dimond, F. M., 384, 435. 

"Disputed territory," 377, 381, 
408-413, 415, 458, 517. 

Dix, John A., 470; on Polk's Ore- 
gon policy, 593. 

Douelson, A. J., 35, 59, 88, 298, 
355, 360; exposes Bell, 122; 
favors Polk for Vice-President, 
Kil ; on Texas issue, 231; works 
for Polk's nomination, 240; 
charge in Texas, 308, 354; de- 
sired as party editor, 332; views 
on expansion, 465. 

Douglas, Stephen A., 275; movers 
to admit Texas as state, 371; de- 
feuds Polk, 460 ; and Oregon, 
586, 589, 631; and California, 
648, 651, 653; and Cuba, 701. 

Doyle, Percy W., urges Mexico to \ 
make treaty, 536. 

Dromgoole, G. C, 669-670. 

Duaue, Wm. J., 36. 

Eaton, John H., 67. 

Eaton, Mrs. John H., 25. 

Election frauds (1844), 281. 

Elliot, Capt. Charles, 359, 361. 

Elmore, F. H., 239, 567. 

Evans, George, on tariff, 672, 674. 

Everett, Edward, unconstitutional 
to amend Constitution, 16; on 
military chieftain, 17; in Lon- 
don, 561. 

Ewing, E. H., 591. 

Fairfield, John, 290. 

Fisk, Theophilus, 218, 229. 

Flagg, A. C, 291. 



[736] 



INDEX 



riores, J. M., 428; leads insurrec- 
tion in California, 473-474. 

Florida Purchase, 390, 402, 555, 

570. 
Floyd, John, report on Oregon, 

556. 
Foote, Henry S., and slavery, 631, 

652. 

Foster, E. H., 58, 153, 194, 199; re- 
signs from Senate, 168; elected 
Senator, 208. 

Foster, E. C, 176. 

"Frankland," state of, 197. 

Freanor, James D., bearer of 
treaty, 537. 

Frelinghuysen, Theodore, Wliig 
candidate, 229. 

Fremont, John C, 423-426; acts 
without authority, 425, 549; his 
court-martial, 476. 

''Gag rule," 95, 107, 121. 

Gaines, E. P., 430. 

Gales, Joseph, refuses to oppose 
peace treaty, 547. 

Gallatin, Albert, on Oregon title, 

603. 
"Garland forgery," 278. 
Gayle, John, on slavery, 632. 

Gentry, M. P., calls Polk "petty 
usurper," 462; denounces Polk 
and Buchanan, 673. 

Gerolt, Baron, 379. 

Giddings, J. R, on expansion, 587. 

Gillespie, A. H., 388, 424, 473. 

Gillet, R. H., 101. 

Gilmer, T. W., 217. 

Globe (Washing-ton), unfavorable 
to Polk, 57, 65. 

Gholson, S. J., 119. 

Graham, Daniel, 77. 



Granger, F., 182. 

Grant, U. S., 429. 

Graves, W. S., 121. 

Gray, Robert, explores Columbia 
River, 556. 

Greeley, Horace, 245. 

Green, B. E., 392. 

Green, Duff, 75, 222, 289. 

Greene, C. G., 123-124. 

Grier, Robert C, 339. 

Grider, Henry, 670. 

Grundy, Felix, Polk 's preceptor, 4 ; 
48, 59, 67, 75, 85, 113, 118, 166- 
169. 

Guadalupe Hidalgo, treaty of, first 
project, 491; negotiation of, 
536; signed, 537; ratification, 
538 ff., 551; cabinet divided on, 
539 ; proclaimed, 552. 

Guild, Major, 87. 
Gurley, H. H., 557. 
"Gwin letter," 86. 
Hale, John P., prefers disunion to 
slavery, 631. 

Hall, A. A., 55, 68, 124, 129, 141; 
charges Harris with abolition- 
ism, 149. 

Hamilton, Alexander, 130. 

Hamilton, James, 288. 

Hanmiet, W. H., seeks Van Buren's 
views on Texas, 224. 

Hanmiond, J. H., 94. 

Hannegan, E. A., 229, 438, 601,' 
633, 640, 674, 700; Oregon reso- 
lution, 586; on "Punic faith," 
593. 

Hardin, John J., 260. 

Hargous, Louis, 508. 



[737] 



INDEX 



Harris, J. George, editor of Nash- 
ville Union, 124, 274; his "buz- 
zard," 141, 150; "abolitionist," 
149; shot by Foster, 176; de- 
nounces Harrison, 179; retires 
from Vnion, 201; 267, 302, 339. 

Harrison, W. H., nominated, 173 ; 
' ' Federalist ' ' and ' ' abolition- 
ist," 174; carries Tennessee, 
174; his "hospitality," 178; 
"autocrat," 179. 

Hawaii, and "Polk Doctrine," 
690. 

Hayes, A. C, 49, 56. 

Haywood, W. H., 313, 596; re- 
signs from Senate, 675. 

Heart, John, 247. 

Heiss, John P., pre-nomination 
"guesses" (1844), 234-235; 
manager of "Polk organ," 333; 
excluded from Senate, 469. 

Herrera, J. J. de, overthrown, 395. 

Hickman, John, 237. 

Hilliard, H. W., 590. 

Hise, Elijah, in Guatemala, 705. 

Hitchcock, E. A., 510. 

Hoist, H. von, on Texas boundary, 
364-366. 

Hopping, E. D., 470. 

Horn, Henry, 261. 

Houston, Samuel, 271, 309, 355, 
404, 437, 553; opposes annexa- 
tion, 356. 

Howard, T. A., 308. 

Hubbard, Henry, 76, 161, 238. 

Hunt, Memucan, 355. 

Hunter, E. M. T., 138, 653. 

Ibarra, D., 506. 

"Immortal thirteen," 194, 200- 
201, 204, 207. . 

Independent treasury, 659 ff., 668. 

Ingersoll, C. J., 402, 587. 



Ingersoll, J. E., 670. 

Interior, Department of the, cre- 
ated, 689. 

Irvin, James, 260. 

Irving, Washington, 308. 

Jackson, Andrew, born leader, 7-8; 
vetoes bank bill, 29; 59, 74; 
opposes White, 65, 67, 79, 81, 88, 
106; breaks with Bell, 81; faith 
in Tennessee, 83, 88, 104, 119; 
' ' Gwin letter, " 86 ; dictates Ten- 
nessee politics, 86-87 ; mortified 
by loss of Tennessee, 106; per- 
sonal triumph, 111; specie cir- 
cular, 112; slandered, 113; re- 
joices because Polk has redeemed 
Tennessee, 152 ; at Polk 's in- 
auguration as governor, 156; on 
Oregon question, 565; urges in- 
structions for Senators, 177; 
praises Governor Polk, 188; 
favors Polk for Vice-President, 
207; Texas letter, 220; discon- 
certed by Van Buren's letter, 
229, 232; suggests Polk for 
President, 232, 243; drops Van 
Buren, 233, 244; on Polk's abil- 
ity, 246; on Benton's "in- 
sanity," 257, 264; aids Polk in 
campaign, 264-265; "let Tiler 
alone, ' ' 268 ; induces Tyler to 
withdraw, 270 ; instructs Hous- 
ton, 271; tries to save Blair, 
303; prayers for Polk, 321; last 
letter, 334 fP.; on tariff, 656; on 
internal improvements, 656; 
favors independent treasury, 660. 

" Jacksoniana, " state of, 198. 

Jacksonism, denounced, 130-134; 
criticism of, becomes popular, 
135; Polk's part in, 135. 

Jackson, Daniel, 129. 

Jackson, Wm., 94. 

Jarnagin, Spencer, 194, 208; his 
vote decides tariff of 1846, 676- 
677. 

Jefferson, Thomas, 7, 350, 402, 441, 
490, 553, 692. 



[738] 



INDEX 



Jesup, T. S., 434. 

Johnson, Andrew, 177, 186, 192 
194, 236, 342; moves to create 
' ' state of Frankland, " 197. 

Johnson, Cave, 36, 47, 51, 59, 76, 
lU, 138, 174,216,230, 235,259; 
opiioses political persecution, 
153 ; Avarns Van Bur en on Texas 
issue, 225; distrusts Globe, 254; 
fears disunion, 266, 275; in 
Polk's campaign, 274, 276; Post- 
master General, 298. 

Johnson Henry, 314. 

Johnson, Eeverdy, 437, 596, 599. 

Johnson, E. M., 85, 159, 213, 238. 

Jones, Anson, 355, 368. 

Jones, James C, selected to defeat 
Polk, 180; ridicules Polk, 182, 
184, 185; defeats Polk, 187; 
governor of Tennessee, 192. 

Jones, J. B., 267, 302. 

Jones, Seaborn, on tariff, 673. 

Jones, Wm. Carey, 336, 475. 

Kane, J. K., "Kane letter," 261 
664, 673. 

Kearny, S. W., sent to California, 
422; conquest of New Mexico, 
4eO; California expedition, 473- 
475. 

Kendall, Amos, "lying machine," 
127 note 33; 164, 230. 

Kendall, George W., 454. 

Kennedy, Andrew, on "American 
multiplication table," 588. 

Kennedy, John P., denounces Jaek- 
sonism, 132-133. 

King, Preston, three million bill, 
619. 

King, T. B., 592. 

King, Wm. E., 214, 301. 

Lane, Joseph, 485. 

Larkin, Thomas O., 386, 424, 549, 



692. 



Laughlin, S. H., 56, 58, 81, 91, 104 
155, 162, 170, 192, 200, 208, 228^ 
274, 339; works for Polk's nom- 
ination, 235 ff., 240. 

Lea, Luke, 75. 

Leal, F. J. P., Brazilian charge, 707. 

Legare, H. S., 219. 

Letcher, E. P., criticizes Polk, 246 
278 note 90, 286. ' 

Levin, L. C, 588! 

Lewis, Dixon H., 212, 222, 615 671 • 
and tariff, 674. ' ' 

Lewis, W. B., 48, 52, 129, 268; dis- 
missed, 333. 

Liberty Party, nominates Birney, 
263. ^' 

Lincoln, Abraham, 381; criticizes 
Polk, 530. 

Lincoln, Levi, 658. 

Linn, Lewis P., Oregon resolu- 
tion, 558; Oregon bill, 560. 

Lisboa, Caspar J., complains of 
Wise and Eousseau, 707. 

Lloyd, Thomas, 331. 

Louisiana Purchase, 403, 441, 555. 

McConnell, P. G., 672. 

McDuflSe, George E., amendment 
to Constitution, 13; bank bill 
27; 37, 39, 45, 441; Texas reso- 
lution, 262, 311; Oregon worth- 
less, 560. 

McKay, J. J., appropriation bill, 
442; tariff bill, 672. 

Mackenzie, Alex. S., mission to 
Cuba, 439-440. 

McKintry, John, 51. 

McLane, Louis, 28, 36, 405, 548; 
British mission, 567, 582, 584. 

McLane, Eobert M., 451. 

McLean, John, 63. 

Maclin, Saekfield, 151. 



[739] 



INDEX 



Maiiffiuii, W. P., "Whig- but a 
gentleman," 336, 548; on "ex- 
ecutive organ, ' ' 598. 

Manning, E. I., 95-96. 

Marcy, W. L., 296; Secretary of 
War, 298; instructions to Tay- 
lor, 379-380; disciplines Scott, 
420, 449, 470, 494, 518. 

Marshall, John, 112, 130. 

Marshall, Thomas F., 275. 

Mason, John Y., 218, 285; Attor- 
ney General, 298; and Cuba, 
. 702. 

Mason, E. B., sent to command 
troops in California, 453; gov- 
ernor of California, 475. 

May, W. L., 76. 

Meade, George G., dif3ficulties of 
warfare, 447. 

Medary, Samuel, 238. 

Mejia, F., 410. 

Melville, G., 275, 281. 

Mercer, C. F., 116. 

Merritt, Ezekiel, 426. 

Methodists, settle Willamette Val- 
ley, 558. 

Miller, J. L., 237. 

Miller, S. F., 271. 

Mississippi, contested election, 
119 ff. 

Missouri Compromise, on extend- 
ing, 619; "unconstitutional," 
621. 

Molino del Eey, battle of, 485. 

Monroe Doctrine, 394, 575, 580, 
691, 693, 699; as interpreted by 
Calhoun, 700. 

Monterey, battle of, 448. 

Montgomery, John B., 426. 

Morehead, J. T., 623. 



Mormons, as soldiers, 422. 

Moseley, W. A., 591. 

' ' Mustang, ' ' see Freauor. 

"Native Americans," 279-281. 

New Granada, treaty with, 709- 
711. 

Nicholson, A. O. P., 113, 122, 174, 
272, 283; appointed Senator by 
Polk, 176; loyalty doubted, 199, 
204. 

"Nicholson letter," 630. 

Niles, John M., 585, 675. 

O'Connell, Daniel, 126. 

Oregon, American title to, 555-556, 
568, 579; British title to, 555; 
joint occupation of, 556, ended, 
600; "54° 40' or fight," 563; 
England cares little for, 583 ; 
Douglas bill, 604; British offer, 
606 ; treaty signed, 609 ; and 
slavery, 625 ; government bills, 
625, 632, 641. 

O 'Sullivan, John L., suggests pur- 
chase of Cuba, 701-702. 

Owen, Eobert D., COO. 

Pacheco, J. E., peace negotiations, 
514, 516. 

Pakenham, Eichard, Oregon mis- 
sion, 562, 568, 570, 577, 581; 
signs Oregon treaty, 609. 

Palo Alto, battle .of, 429. 

Paredes, Mariano, President of 
Mexico, 395 ; proclaims ' ' defen- 
sive Avar,' ' 412. 

Parrott, W. S., 383, 389. 

Patterson, Eobert, Tampico expe- 
dition, 446; 449. 

Patton, J. M., 93, 116, 121. 

Peel, Sir Eobert, on Oregon ques- 
tion, 564. 

Peiia y Peiia, 395; President of 
Mexico, 486, 521, 536; advises 
ratification of treaty, 551. 



[740] 



; 



INDEX 



Pendergrast, G. J., trouble in 
Buenos Ayres, 708. 

Pew, T. J., 85. 

Peyton, Bailie, 72-73, 97, 111, 113, 
454, 718. 

Pickens, P. W., 239, 567. 

Pico, Andres, 473. 

Pico, Pio, 427. 

Pillow, Gideon, 233; works for 
Polk's nomination, 235 ff., 240; 
intrigixe, 243, 289; 340, 446, 511; 
criticizes Taylor, 455; at Cha- 
•pultepec, 485; denounced by 
Trist, 526; arrested by Scott, 
531; denounced by Stephens, 
635. 

Pinckney, H. L., 95. 

Polk, Ezekiel. his "Toryism," 2, 
273. 

Polk, Jane Knox, 1, 721. 

Polk, James K., ancestry and edu- 
cation, 1-4; lawyer, 5; mar- 
riage, 6; personal traits, 4, 7-9, 
25, 69, 139, 283; republicanism, 
10, 18; in state legislature, 5; 
enters Congress, 6, 10, 12; and 
majority rule, 14, 17; on state 
rights, 18; and Jackson, 19, 21, 
30, 39, 65, 81-82, 86-88, 91, 104, 
134; opponent of Adams, 19, 20; 
party man, 20; on Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, 20; and six 
militia men, 21; minority re- 
port on r. S. Bank, 31 ff.; chair- 
man of Comipittee on Ways and 
Means, 37, 38, 41-42; elected 
Speaker, 90, 93; "unscrupulous 
partisan," 91; selected to re- 
deem Tennessee, 123-125, 140; 
and party press, 123, 274; 
phrenological chart, 139; victim 
of discord as Speaker, 92 ff . ; 
"Jackson's creature," 92, 102; 
committee appointments, 93, lOl' 
116, 127, 136; and slavery peti- 
tions, 94, 107, 109, 121; de- 
cisions attacked, 96 ff., 110, 122; 



decisions praised, 103; 102, 115, 
118; decides Mississippi election,' 
119 ff. ; " glorious infamy, ' ' 120 ; 
last term as Speaker, 125 ff. ; 
scorns "affairs of honor," 129; 
vote of thanks opposed, 136; 
farewell to House, 137; "best 
Speaker," 138; and White, 68 
ff., 73, 76, 79, 88, 90; attitude 
toward Van Buren, 164, 210, 213 
217, 221, 232, 241, 292, 297, 338, 
633 ; and Bell, 50, 63 ff., 68, 70 
75, 8o, 91, 96, 123, 659; attitude 
toward slavery, 191, 464, 612, 
614, 618-620, 6^7 ff., 633, 640, 
646; begins gubernatorial cam- 
paign, 140; denounced by press, 
141 ff., 148; "address to the 
people" (1839), 142; denounces 
Hamiltonism and defends Jeffer- 
sonism, 143 ff.; political consis- 
tency, 145; elected governor, 
150; inaugural address as gov- 
ernor, 156; first message as gov- 
ernor, 157; and banks of Ten- 
nessee, 169 ; remedial legislation, 
171; denounces Harrison, 183; 
defeated by Jones, 187; doubts 
Nicholson's loyalty, 199; no 
compromise with Bell, 199; runs 
for governor (1843), 204; favors 
pledging candidates, 206; de- 
feated, 207; and Vice-Presidency 
161-164, 201, 207, 209, 213 ff., 
218, 233; opposed by old line 
Democrats, 214; nominated for 
Vice-President by Tennessee 
159, by Mississippi, 315; dis- 
trusts Blair, 214, 266, 300; de- 
clines place in Tyler's cabinet, 
217; Texas letter, 227; avail- 
ability as candidate, 231; sug- 
gested for President by Jackson, ' 
232; nominated at Baltimore, 
238-239; reasons for nomina- 
tion, 240, 245 ff., 251; comments 
on ability by Jackson, 246- 
' ' Wlio is James K. Polk ?, ' ' 248 • 
claim to greatness, 249-251 ; rep- 
resents younger Democrats, 252, 
257; party organ, 252, 266, 299, 
331; letter of acceptance, 258; 



[741] 



INDEX 



views on tariff, 260, 278, 662, 
665 ff., 677 ; " Kane letter, ' ' 261, 
664, 673; " no -pledges, " 268, 
284, 287, 300, 305; slauderea, 
237; electoral vote, 282; loses 
Tennessee, 282 ; informed of 
election, 283; deterniinatiou to 
be President in fact, 287, 321; 
liarmony difficult, 288 ff., 311; 
declines to retain Calhoun in 
cabinet, 290; frugality, 293; 
cabinet appointments, 298, 322 ; 
' ' deception ' ' on Texas resolu- 
tion, 315 ff. ; inaugui'ation, 319 
ff . ; letter to cabinet appointees, 
325; "political martinet," 326; 
executive ability, 323 ff. ; devo- 
tion to duty, 327 ff.; declines 
presents, 331 ; dismisses Major 
Lewis, 333 ; bench breeds Fed- 
eralists, 336; on patronage, 18. 
341-349 ; accepts House resolu- 
tion, 353 ; announces annexation 
of Texas, 371; does not antici- 
pate war, 376; object of Slidell's 
mission, 385 ; renews friendship 
Avith Benton, 385, 576 ; desires 
California. 351, 386, 390, 402, 
418, 421, 427, 441, 552; first an- 
nual message, 393 ; cites Monroe 
Doctrine, 394, 575, 580; appro- 
priation for Mexican territory, 
402; seeks Benton's advice, 403, 
404, 422, 441, 453, 466, 471; 
aggressive policy, 405; war mes- 
sage, 407, 414; on acquisition of 
territory, 417, 423, 437, 439, 517, 
528, 541, 552; opinion of Tavlor, 
430, 435, 448, 454, 463, 467; 
plans discord in Mexico, 436; 
permits Santa Anna to return to 
Mexico, 439; on Mackenzie mis- 
sion, 440; views on Wilmot Pro- 
viso, 443; aversion for Seott, 
455, 467, 471, 532; charges 
"Whigs with treason, 457; ample 
grounds for war, 458 ; asks Con- 
gress for lieutenant-general, 464 ; 
deserted by Democrats, 464; 
peace offer to Mexico, 466; de- 
nounces generals and politicians, 
468; criticizes Calhoun, 468, 
627; worst day of his life, 469; 



on hoolc warfare, 472; breaks 
Avith Benton, 475-476, 535; 
orders Scott to contimre war, 
484; decides to send commis- 
sioner to Mexico, 486 ff. ; sends 
Trist to Mexico, 488 ff. ; vieAvs 
on Scott and Trist, 501, 504, 527, 
532 ff.; army to liA^e on country, 
519; officially condemned by 
House, 530; recalls Scott and 
Trist, 531; urged to run again, 
535; on unauthorized diplomats, 
538; on submitting Trist 's 
treaty to Senate, 538 ff.; vieAvs 
on Buchanan, 541-542; Trist a 
"scoundrel," 543; fears Bee- 
ton, 547; on army reduction, 
553; on Oregon question, 557, 
563, 567, 571 ff., 600, 602; mes- 
sage on Oregon, 579; refuses to 
arbitrate Oregon question, 583; 
to "look John Bull in tlie eve," 
584, 601; "hell all around 
him," 598 note 79; distrusts 
Buchanan, 608; reason for Ore- 
gon policy, 610; on extension of 
Missouri Compromise line, 628, 
632, 634, 636, 639, 642; on Union, 
629, 640, 642, 646, 651; and 
"Barnburners," 633, 643; 
"Polk the mendacious," 635; 
no pledge on territorial gover- 
nors, 636; signs Oregon bill, 641; 
on California government, 645 ; 
Calhoun a disunionist, 650 ; fears 
independence of California, 655; 
on "American Svstem," 656, 
663, 678, 684, 686; and inde- 
pendent treasury, 660, 671; 
A^etoes "pork barrel" laws, 679; 
party ' ' galley-slave, ' ' 685 ; fears 
Interior Department, 689; de- 
clines to buy Saint Bartliolomew, 
692 ; not an imperialist, 692 ; 
Avould purchase Cuba, 701-705; 
no apology to Brazil, 707 ; on 
treaty Avith NeAv Granada, 710; 
on postal treaty Avith Great 
Britain, 711; on reelection, 712 
ff., 719; on vanity of life, 716; 
reneAA'ed friendships, 718; death, 
721 ; achievements unappreci- 
ated, 722-725. 



[742] 



INDEX 



"Polk Doctrine," named by Reid, 
690 ; applied to Hawaii, 690 ; ap- 
plied to Oregon, 691 ; applied to 
Cuba, 691, 703; applied to Cali- 
fornia, 692 ; differs from Monroe 
Doctrine, 693 ; denied congres- 
sional sanction, 695; and Mex- 
ico, 695-698; and Central Amer- 
ica, 706. 

Polk, Samuel, 2. 

Polk, Sarah Childress, personality, 
6; Presbyterian, 721. 

Polk, Col. William, 8. 

Polk, W. H., 195, 215, 340. 

Prentiss, S. S., defeated by Polk's 
casting vote, 119 ff.; calls Polk 
tool of party, 136 ; Nashville 
speech, 276; denounces Polk, 

277. 

Preston, W. C, 169. 

Princeton disaster, 217, 357. 

Quitman, John A., 511, 531. 

Ramsey, J. M. G., Polk's letter to, 
714. 

Randolph, T. J., opinion of Trist, 
490. 

Read, John M., 336. 

Reid, Whitelaw, on "Polk Doc- 
trine," 690. 

Rejon, M. C, 445, 465. 

Resaca de la Pabna, battle of, 429. 

Rhett, R. B., 121; favors weak 
government, 135 ; on Oregon, 
588, 622; on Polk's reelection, 
714. 

Rincon, Manuel, peace commis- 
sioner, 522. 

Ritchie, Thomas, 269, 302; edits 
Polk "organ," 333; excluded 
from Senate, 469. 

Ritchie, W. F., 237. 

Rives, W. C, 213, 597. 

Roane, W. H., 239. 



[743] 



Robertson, John, 101. 

"Roorback" canard, 273. 

Roosevelt, Theodore, "takes" 
canal zone, 711. 

Rosa, Luis de la, 521, 536. 

Rousseau, Commodore, trouble with 
Brazil, 706. 

Rueker, W. R., 54, 77. 

Rush, Richard, 290. 

Saint Bartholomew, Polk declines 
to purchase, 692. 

Salas, J. M., 445. 

San Juan de Uliia castle, cap- 
tured by Scott, 481. 

San Pascual, battle of, 473. 

Santa Anna, Antonio Lopez de, 
397, 439; says Nueces boundary 
of Texas, 440; dupes Polk, 444 
ff. ; indirect offer of peace, 465 ; 
declines to make peace, 472; 
assumes presidency, 481; re- 
signs presidency, 485; deprived 
of cojnmaud, 486; proposes 
armistice, 515. 

Saunders, R. M., instructed to buy 
Cuba, 703-705. 

Sawtelle, Cullen, 589. 

Sawyer, L., 122. 

Schenck, R. C, 460. 

Scott, Winfield, given command of 
army, 416; indiscretion, 419- 
420; sent to Mexico, 455; gives 
military plans to newspapers, 
467; captures Vera Cruz, 481; 
defeats Santa Anna at Cei-ro 
Gordo, 481; armistice, 483; inso- 
lence to Polk and Marcy, 495, 
513; quarrel Avith Trist, 495- 
500, 513; peace with Trist, 507 
ff. ; bribery, 510 ff. ; wishes Trist 
to make treaty, 523; arrests Pil- 
low and Worth, 531; declines 
dictatorship, 550. 

Seddon, James A., 621. 



INDEX 



Semple, James, 5(51, 601. 

Sevier, A. H., 1(53, 546; Mexican 
missiou, 548, 550; on Oregon 
question, 561, 586; and tariff, 
674. 

Seward, W. H., "higher law" doc- 
trine, 717. 
Shiehls, James, 446, 511, 531. 
Shubrick, W. B., 475. 

Sierra, Justo, seeks aid for Yuca- 
tan, 697. 

Slaeum, Wm. A., report on Ore- 
gon, 558. 

Slade, W., 120; power of patron- 
age, 133. 

Slavery, Polk's attitude toward, 
612-614, 618-620, 627, 633, 642; 
new southern doctrine, 625, 630, 
635. 

Slidell, John, Mexican mission, 
385; instructions, 390, 401; re- 
jected by Mexico, 404; opposed 
by Benton, 488. 

Sloat, John D., 388, 42(5. 

Smart, E. K., 632. 

Smith, Ashbel, 370. 

Smith, Caleb, 631, 669. 

Smith, Justin H., 282. 

Smith, J. M., 124. 

Smith, Persifer F., 506. 

Soule, Pierre, 504. 

Staudifer, James, 52. 

Stanton, F. P., 649. 

Stephens, Alex. H., opposes ex- 
pansion, 623; calls Polk "men- 
dacious," 635; on payments to 
Mexico, 654. 

Stevenson, Andrew, 47, 126. 

Stevenson, J. D., 446. 

Stockton, E. F., 389, 473; usurps 
command in California, 474. 



Story, Joseph, 6, 246. 

Storrs, H. E., 14. 

Supreme Court, "British," 135. 

SAvartwout, Samuel, 125, 127, 129. 

Taney, E. B., 37, 111. 

Tappan, Arthur, 174. 

Tappan, B., 315. 

TarifP, Polk's views on, 260, 278, 
662, 665 ff.; "Kane letter," 
261; E. J. Walker on, 260, 688; 
Polk's message on, 666; of 1846, 

672-677, 682. 

Taylor, Zachary, at Fort Jesup, 
364; march to Eio Grande, 408 
ff. ; defeats Mexicans, 429; pro- 
moted, 430; distrusts Polk, 430, 
450, 455 ; truce at Monterey, 
448 ; letter to Gaines, 467 ; de- 
cides to accept nomination, 479 ; 
quarrel with Scott, 479; wins at 
Bueua Vista, 480 ; reprimanded, 
480 ; views on Scott and Trist, 
532; would not mourn Polk's 
death, 532 ; indifferent to inde- 
jjendence of California, 655. 

Ten Eyck, Anthony, in Hawaii, 
(390. " 

Tennessee, land question, 11-12, 
21 ; election of Senators, 193 ff. 

Texas, independence recognized, 
112; annexed, 314; admitted as 
state, 372 ; boundary, 373 ff. 

Texas Question, origin of, 219; 
Jackson's letter on (1843), 220; 
Calhoun's "conspiracy," 220; 3^ 
Van Buren and Clay ojjpose an- 
nexation of, 224-226; Polk urges 
' ' immediate re-annexation ' ' of, 
227; Cass favors annexation of, 
229; "enigma," 263; issue in 
1844, 281. 

Thompson, Jacob, 467. 

Thompson, Waddy, claims credit 
for treaties Avith Mexico, 457 
note 9. 



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